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Sri Yamunacharya's

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The Collective name of

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Pendent treatises designed to establish respectively the visishtadvaitic conception of atman (jiva or soul), Isvara (God), and Samvit (consciousness; knowledge), after a critical consideration of rival views with a Sanskrit commentary

GOODHA PRAKASA

By

Sri. U. Ve. Abhinava Desika
UTTAMUR VIRARAGHAVACHARYA

and

Introduction in English

by

Professor R. RAMANUJACHARI

and

Translation in English

by

Prof. R. RAMANUJACHARI
& Mimamsakesari K. SRINIVASACHARYA

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श्रीः

श्रीभगवद्रामानुजपरमाचार्य

श्रीभगवद्यामुनमुनिविरचितं

सिद्धित्रयम्

अभिनवदेशिकवात्स्यवीराघवाचार्य-

विरचित गूढप्रकाशाख्यटिप्पणसहितम्

SRI YAMUNACHARYA'S

SIDDHI TRAYA

with a Sanskrit Commentary (Goodha Prakasa)

By

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Formerly Professor and Dean

Faculty of Philosophy and Education, Annamalai University

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SRI U. VE. ABHINAVA DESIKA

Uttamur T. VIRARAGHAVACHARYA

Editor and Chairman

UBHAYA VEDANTA GRANTHAMALA BOOK TRUST

[REGISTERED]

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MADRAS - 17

Ubhaya Vedanta Granthamala Book Trust

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

We have great pleasure in presenting to the public, as our maiden venture in publication, Sri Yamunacharya's "SIDDHITRAYA". This book was originally published in the year 1942, on the Shashtiabdapoorthi celebrations of **Sri Kozhiyalam Swami** with a concise Sanskrit commentary by Sri U. Ve. Abhinava Desika Uttamur Swami. At a later date an English translation was also published jointly by Sri R. Ramanujacharya, Professor of Philosophy and Dean of Annamalai University and Mimamsa Kesari Sri K. Srinivasacharya, Lecturer, Annamalai University.

It is our Vice-Chairman Sri V. T. Rangaswamy Iyengar, who suggested the re-printing of the above book as the original publication was out of print. He also suggested that we apply for financial aid from the Ministry of Education, Govt. of India and he himself came forward to bear the balance in cost of the publication. Mainly through his efforts, we get a sanction of less than half the cost of the book from the Govt. of India.

Sri U. Ve. Abhinava Desika Uttamur Swami agreed to provide a more elaborate Sanskrit Commentary and also agreed to undertake the Printing of the Sanskrit version in his own press Our reverential thanks are due to him.

Sri R. Ramanujachari and Sri K. Srinivasacharya also gave us permission to reprint the English commentary and Sri R. Ramanujachari readily agreed to re-edit the English version and our thanks are also due to him.

Our thanks are also due to Sri Raghavasimham Press and India Printing Works for undertaking the printing of the English version.

Our thanks are also due to Muthu & Co. for undertaking the binding work of this book.

The importance of the present publication, SIDDHITRAYA, will be seen from the introduction to the English version by Sri R. Ramanujachari. As earlier said, Sri V. T. Rangaswami Iyengar, our Vice-Chairman, during his intensive study of all the Granthas on Visishtadvaita Siddhanta, found that 'SIDDHITRAYA' of Sri Yamunacharya which gave the basis for Sri Bhagavad Ramanuja in writing the famous commentary, 'SRI BHASHYA' on Brahma Sutras, and which still occupies the undisputed and unassailable rock basement for all the SRI SUKTHIS of the later Acharyas including Sri Vedanta Desika, needs reprinting.

It is only fitting that this being the very first available book on Visishtadvaita such an important book should be our maiden venture in publication and any amount of thanks will not be sufficient to show our gratitude to Sri V. T. Rangaswamy Iyengar in not only suggesting the publication but also undertaking to finance the entire cost.

It is regrettable to note that Visishtadvaita Siddhanta lacks the publicity it deserves in foreign countries and we are sure that the efforts of Sri V. T. Rangaswamy Iyengar will fill a long felt need of publicity among the English knowing scholars of the world. We only pray to the Lord Almighty, Sriman Narayana, to give Sri V. T. Rangaswamy Iyengar, long life and continued interest and health to achieve the task he has undertaken to bring to print other books like Sri Baghavad Gita, etc. with English commentaries.

Finally our reverential thanks are also due to our Chairman, Sri U. Ve. Abhinava Desika Uttamur Swami, for not only guiding us in all our activities but also for publishing all the works of ancient Acharyas like Sri Vedanta Desika with versatile commentaries in Sanskrit and Tamil so that our task in translating to English will be easy. May our Lord Sriman Narayana give him long life and continued good health.

Madras
24—3—73

R. VENKATACHARI,
Secretary & Treasurer,
Ubhaya Vedanta Granthamala Book Trust (Regd.),
Madras-17

॥ श्रीः ॥

श्रीपद्मावतीसमेतश्रीनिवासपरब्रह्मणे नमः

श्रीभगवद्यामुनमुनये नमः

आत्मसिद्धिः

प्रकृतिपुरुषकालव्यक्तमुक्ताः यदिच्छामनुविदधति नित्यं नित्यसिद्धैरनेकैः ।
स्वपरिचरणभोगैः श्रीमति प्रीयमाणे भवतु मम परस्मिन् पूरुषे भक्तिभूमा ॥

श्रीः

श्रीमते रङ्गरामानुजमहादेशिकाय नमः

गूढप्रकाशः

श्रीवेङ्कटेशमसद्गुरूंश्च सर्वान् समाश्रये येषु ।
[1]यामुनशरणसमुच्छ्रित सुमनस्संदर्भसंस्तवो जयति ॥

भगवद्बादरायण-बोधायन-द्रमिडाचार्यादिप्राचीनाचार्यदर्शितः परमार्थः पश्चात्तनकतिपयपृथङ्मतिप्रवर्तितविविधविसंष्ठुलार्थविक्षिप्तचित्तानां हृदि न प्रतिष्ठास्यतीति, पारम्पर्येण प्रवर्त्यमानं समुपसन्नशिष्यजनोपदेशमात्रमपर्याप्तमाकलय्य प्रकृष्टयोगप्रत्यक्षितपरावरयाथात्म्यैः प्रपन्नजनसंतानप्रभवभूतैः उभयवेदान्तप्रवर्तकैः परमकारुणिकैर्भगवन्नाथमुनिभिः न्यायतत्त्वाभिधानं शास्त्रं योगरहस्यश्चेति ययोर्ग्रन्थरत्नयोर्निर्माणेन निबन्धमुखेन परमार्थतत्त्वहितविज्ञानप्रतिष्ठानं प्रथममादरेण विदधे, तयोः स्वपितामहपादानुगृहीतयोरेकतरस्मिन् सर्वार्थगर्भे गभीरे न्यायतत्त्वे शास्त्रे सर्वेषामपि प्राज्ञमणीनां सरसप्रवेशसंपिपादयिषया तथैव भक्तिविज्ञानवैराग्यैः प्रथितः सरसकविताविहारभूमिः सकलपरमतमर्मभेदिकर्कशतर्कशास्त्रप्रयोग-शास्त्रार्थवर्णनसमार्जितकथासङ्ग्रामजयलक्ष्मीसमेधितप्रभावो भगवद्यामुनमुनिः आत्म-परमात्म-तत्संबन्ध-तत्प्राप्ति-तत्साधनोपदेशकं प्रकरणग्रन्थं प्रारभमाणो निर्विघ्नपरिसमाप्तये विरचितं मङ्गलं वक्ष्यमाणार्थसंग्रहरूपतया ग्रन्थे निबध्नाति प्रकृतीति । पुरुषः बद्धजीवः। व्यक्तं प्रकृतिकार्यं महदादि । मुक्ताः विगलितबन्धा आत्मानः । अनुविदधति अनुवर्तन्ते स्वरूपस्थितिप्रवृत्तिषु । वक्ष्यति हि 'स्वाधीनत्रि-

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1 श्रीवेंकटेशः श्रीनिवासः । तदालये यामुनगृहमित्येकं स्थानम् । तत्र पुष्पाणि संभ्रियन्ते ; मालारूपेण च ग्रथित्वा श्रीनिवासाय समर्प्यन्ते । तेषां संस्तवः परिचयस्तत्र श्रीनिवासे इत्येकोऽर्थः । तदा शरणं गृहम् ; सुमनसः पुष्पाणि । येषु इत्यस्य श्रीवेंकटेशे गुरुषु चेत्यर्थः । तत्र यामुनाचार्यरूपशरणबलात् सिद्धित्रयादिना प्राप्तोच्छ्रायाः सुमनसः विद्वांसो भाष्यकारादयः । तेषां संदर्भाः ग्रन्थाः तत्परिचयश्च गुरुषु विवक्षितः । एवं यामुनरूपशरण विषयकः संस्तवः—स्तोत्रमिति च ।

विधचेतनाचेतनस्वरूपस्थितिप्रवृत्तिभेदम्' इति। **नित्यसिद्धैः** नित्यसूरिभिः। सहेति शेषः। प्रकृत्या. दयो नित्यसिद्धाश्चानुविदधतीत्यर्थः। **अनेकैरिति** सूरीणां संसारिजीवापेक्षया त्रैगुण्यमभिप्रेतम्। सूरीणां परमे व्योम्नि पादत्रयमितत्वञ्च श्रुतम्, 'पादोऽस्य विश्वा भूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि' इति। भोग्य-भोगस्थान-भोगोपकरणान्यपि नित्यविभूतौ नित्यसिद्धानि सन्ति। तान्यपि ग्राह्याणि। **श्रीमति** लक्ष्मीनित्ययुक्ते। अनेन यच्छब्दग्राह्यवस्तुनिष्कर्षणेन देवतान्तरे प्रकृत्यादिनियन्तृत्वभ्रमव्युदासः। **भक्तिभूमशब्दः** उपायभक्तिमिव साध्यभक्तिरूपां प्रपत्तिमपि वक्ति। अत्र आत्मनाम्, परमात्मनः, **नित्यमनुविदधती**ति तत्संबन्धस्यापृथक्सिद्ध्यादेः, **स्वपरिचरणभोगै**रिति मोक्षाख्यतत्प्राप्तिप्रकारस्य, **भक्तिभूमे**ति तत्साधनस्य च कीर्तनात् वक्ष्यमाणार्थसङ्ग्रहो भाव्यः।

इदमत्र बोद्धव्यम्—**न्यायसिद्धाञ्जने न्यायतत्त्वाख्यस्य** शास्त्रस्य तत्रतत्रोपविंशाधिकस्थलेषु निर्देशात्, तत्रत्यकतिपयवाक्यश्लोकोपादानात्, क्वचित्क्वचित् पादनामसंकीर्तनात्, 'सप्तमे', 'अष्टमे' इत्येवमधिकरणसंख्याकथनात्, उपात्तसूक्तिशैलीपरिशीलनया च तच्छास्त्रं सर्वार्थगर्भं गभीरविस्तृतं वाक्यश्लोकोभयात्मकं परमतपरिमर्दि चेति, तत्र **ज्ञानपादः, प्रमातृपादः, करणपादः, प्रमेयपाद** इति पादचतुष्कमस्तीति, एकैकोऽपि पादो विषयभेदेन बहुधिकरणात्मना विभक्त इति चावसीयते। आहुश्च, "यो वेत्ति युगपत् सर्वं प्रत्यक्षेण सदा स्वतः। तं प्रणम्य हरिं शास्त्रं न्यायतत्त्वं प्रचक्ष्महे" इति तत्राऽऽदौ श्लोक इति। **श्रीभाष्ये जिज्ञासाधिकरणे** अविद्यादूषणघट्टे 'ज्ञानरूपं परं ब्रह्म' इत्यादिना उपात्तास्त्रयः श्लोकाः नाथमुनिभिरुक्ता इति श्रुतप्रकाशिकायाम्। ते च नूनमत्रत्या एव स्युः। श्रीविष्णुचित्तीये तु श्रीयामुनार्यसूक्तयः ग्रहणमिव। एवमत्रात्मसिद्धावपि बहूनि **न्यायतत्त्वाधिकरणानि** नाम्ना निर्दिष्टानि। "प्रत्युक्तश्चायं प्रतिबिम्बवादः **प्रच्छन्नबाह्यमतप्रत्यादेशे**" इत्यात्मसिद्धिवचनमपि मन्ये अत्रत्यकिञ्चिद्भागपरं स्यात्। अहो बतेदृशं विशिष्टाद्वैतस्थापनेदम्परं कूटस्थकृतं भगवद्यामुनमुनिभगवद्रामानुजमुनिप्रभृतिमहनीयप्रवर्तकाचार्यमार्गदर्शि महच्छास्त्रम् अंशतोऽप्यर्वाचीनैर्न परिपालितमभूदिति। अथाप्यपरहयमुखावताराणाम् अशेषपरमतसमूलोन्मूलनेन अस्मत्सिद्धान्तप्रमाणप्रमेयनिष्कर्षणेन च निरवशेषमुपकृतवतां **श्रीमन्निगमान्तमहादेशिकाना**मिदं सामग्र्येण दृष्टिपथं प्राप्य स्थितमिति तावन्तं वा कालं सर्वं परिपालितमासीदिति कूटस्थाभीष्टसिद्ध्या कथंचिदाश्वसनीयम्।

तस्यैतस्यायं प्रकरणग्रन्थः नूनं विशिष्य तत्रत्यप्रमातृपादवैशद्यार्थः। अत्र च आदौ आत्मपरमात्मतत्संबन्धतत्प्राप्तितत्साधनविषयविप्रतिपत्तिप्रदर्शनपूर्वं तच्छोधनप्रतिज्ञानात् ग्रन्थेऽस्मिन् तावानप्यंशो निरूपित इति निश्चीयते। उपलभ्यमानात्मसिद्धिभागे तु जीवात्मनिरूपणमपि न समग्रम्; **देहेन्द्रिये**ति कारिकोत्तरार्धविवरणारम्भ एव शिष्टं सर्वं विनष्टम्।

अत्र कश्चिदाक्षेपः—यद्येवं प्रतिज्ञानुरोधेनात्रैव परमात्मापि न्यरूपीति विमृश्यते, किमिति ईश्वरसिद्धिर्व्यरचीति। तत्र—

निरीश्वरवादनिराकरणेन तार्किकादृत-आनुमानिकेश्वरसिद्धिप्रकारमात्रकथनाय स ग्रन्थ इति कश्चित् परिहारः। अन्यस्तु—भगवता भाष्यकृता ईश्वरसिद्धौ दृश्यमानं सर्वं तथैव शास्त्रयोनित्वाधिकरणे पूर्वपक्षेऽनूद्य उपरि आनुमानिकत्वनिरसनेन श्रौतत्वसिद्धान्तविधानात् भगवद्यामुनमुनिग्रन्थेऽपि सैव रीतिः स्थितेति युक्तम्। कथं हि जीवात्मविषय एवानुमानानि प्रदूष्य, "आनुमानिकीमप्यात्मसिद्धिमश्रद्धधानाः श्रौतीमेव तां श्रोत्रियाः संगिरन्ते" इति कथयन्नयं ईश्वरसिद्धिमानुमानिकीं मंस्यते; अतः प्रक्रमानुसारेण एकस्यैवाऽऽत्मसिद्धिग्रन्थस्य जीवात्मसिद्धिः ईश्वरसिद्धिश्चेति भागद्वयम्। तत्र चेश्वरसिद्धौ, विप्रतिपत्तिप्रदर्शनरीत्यनुसारेणानुमानेन निरीश्वरवादनिराकरणानन्तरं विविधाद्वैतमतपातञ्जलमतादि निरस्य श्रौतयथावस्थितेश्वरसिद्धिप्रकारः प्रतिपादितो भवेत्। अथवा 'आनुश्रविक एवेत्येके, आनुमानिकश्चेत्यन्ये, विशिष्टप्रत्यक्षसमधिगम्यश्चेत्यपरे' इति प्रमाणनिर्देशक्रमानुसारेणाद्वैतादिनिरासेन वैदिकेश्वरसिद्धिप्रकारमुपवर्ण्यानुमानतोऽपि एतत्सिद्धिम् अन्यदर्शितामारभ्य, 'तत्र कस्यचिदेकस्य' इत्यादिना पूर्वपक्षोपन्यासपुरस्सरं, 'अत्र ब्रूमः' इत्यनेनानुमानिकत्वमुपपाद्य, एवमपि एककर्तृकत्वाजीवकर्तृकत्वादिविषये दृढनिश्चयायोगात् व्यक्तिविशेषनिर्धारणायोगाच्च, 'तदुपपादनन्यायानुगताः पूर्वानुमानभेदाः.... आद्रियन्ते' इत्युपलभ्यमानात्मसिद्धिवचनरीत्या, 'श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः' इति श्रुत्यनुसाराच्चानुमानानां यावत्संभवं संभावनातर्कत्वेन ग्राह्यतामवबोध्य विशिष्टप्रत्यक्षसमधिगम्यत्वं पश्चादुपपादितं स्यात्। न केवलमेतावत्; तदुपरि तत्संबन्धतत्प्राप्त्यादिस्वरूपमपि शोधितं भवेत्। सर्वोपि भागः संप्रति प्रनष्टः। तदिदानीं आत्मसिद्धिः ईश्वरसिद्धिरिति पृथक्प्रबन्धता प्राप्तेति॥

अस्मिंश्च परिहारद्वये प्रायः प्राञ्चमेव प्राज्ञाः रोचयेरन्; यतः सिद्धित्रयमिति चिरन्तनी प्रसिद्धिः। श्रीमति रहस्यत्रयसारेऽपि गुरुपरम्परासारे, एतदनुगृहीताः प्रबन्धाः आगमप्रामाण्यं, पुरुषनिर्णयः, आत्मसिद्धिः ईश्वरसिद्धिः संवित्सिद्धिरिति सिद्धित्रयम्, श्रीगीतार्थसंग्रहः स्तोत्रं चतुःश्लोकी चेत्यष्टाविति स्पष्टमुक्तम्। अतः यथा पुरुषनिर्णयः परमात्मपरोऽपि नारायणपारम्ये श्रुतितात्पर्यवर्णनेदम्परः पृथग्भूतः, तथेश्वरसिद्धिरप्यनुमानादिना तत्साधकः पृथग्भवितुमर्हति। यद्यपि अत्रत्यद्वितीयकारिकाद्यनुसारेण आत्मसिद्धावेव परमात्मनिरूपणमेष्टव्यम्; वक्ष्यति चात्रैव, 'परमात्मनिरूपणेऽतिनिपुणमुपपादयिष्यामः' इति—अथापीश्वरसिद्ध्युक्तावशिष्टं सर्वं परमात्मविषयेऽभिधायेतरांशस्य तत्रैव द्रष्टव्यत्वमुपदिश्य तदुपरि वक्तव्यसंबन्धप्राप्त्यादिकं विमृश्य आत्मसिद्धिः समापिता भवेदिति ग्राह्यमित्यलमनुपलभ्यमानगोचरानिष्कृष्टविमर्शेन। आगमप्रामाण्येऽपि ईश्वरो न्यरूपि। संवित्सिद्धिः पृथग्ग्रन्थ इत्यत्र तु नैव विशयः। यदुच्यतेऽत्रैव, 'प्रकाशश्च चिदचिदशेषपदार्थसाधारणो धर्म इति संवित्सिद्धावेव साधितम्' इति, 'भ्रान्त्यधिकरणसिद्धान्तारम्भे, संवित्सिद्धौ चानुसंधातव्यम्' इति च। अत एवाऽऽत्मसिद्धेः प्राक्कृता संवित्सिद्धिरित्यपि ध्येयम्। नैवमीश्वरसिद्धिः प्राक्तनी। तत्रात्मसिद्ध्यनुवादात्। अत्र धीप्रकरणे संवित्सिद्ध्युक्तसर्वांशनिरूपणस्य प्रसक्तत्वेऽपि प्राक्कृतत्वादेव अत्रानतिविस्तर इति॥

विरुद्धमतयोऽनेकाः सन्त्यात्मपरमात्मनोः ।
अतस्तत्परिशुद्ध्यर्थम् आत्मसिद्धिर्विधीयते ॥ २ ॥

संमतं हि सर्वसमयेषु, 'आत्मज्ञानं निःश्रेयसहेतुः' इति । श्रूयते च, 'पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारञ्च मत्वा जुष्टस्ततस्तेनामृतत्वमेति', 'आत्मानञ्चेद्विजानीयात्', 'तरति शोकमात्मवित्', 'ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्' इत्यादिः परावरात्मतत्त्वज्ञानस्यापवर्गसाधनत्वं प्रतिपादयन् वेदान्तवाक्यगणः ।

तत्रास्मिन् आत्मनि परस्मिंश्चानेकविधाः विप्रतिपत्तयस्तीर्थकराणाम् । तत् यथा—

(जीवात्मविषयविप्रतिपत्तिः)

आत्मविषये तावत्—देहमेव केचिदात्मानमाचक्षते ; इन्द्रियाण्यन्ये ; मन इत्यन्ये ; प्राणमपरे ; अध्यस्तज्ञातृभावम् अनहङ्कारं बोधमात्रमितरे ; देहेन्द्रियमनःप्राणबोधविलक्षणम्

विरुद्धमतयो विप्रतिपत्तयः । विरुद्धमतय इत्यत्र **विरुद्धख्यातय** इति, **यतो विमतय** इति च पा० । **अनेका** इति स्वरूपप्रमाणपरिमाणादिमुखभेदतोऽप्यनेकत्वं विवक्षितम् । **तत्परिशुद्ध्यर्थम्** तयोरात्मपरमात्मनोः अप्रतिपत्त्यन्यथाप्रतिपत्तिप्रतिक्षेपियथावस्थितप्रतिपत्तिसंपत्तये अप्रतिपत्त्यादिक्षेपायेति वा । एतत्कारिकार्थविस्तरः **संमत**मित्यारभ्य आकारिकान्तरारम्भात् । काकदन्तपरीक्षावैलक्षण्यबोधाय बाह्याबाह्यसर्वस्वीकारेण विप्रतिपत्तिप्रदर्शनौचित्याय चाऽऽह **संमतं** हीति । **पृथगि**ति । "सर्वाजीवे सर्वसंस्थे बृहन्ते तस्मिन् हंसो भ्राम्यते ब्रह्मचक्रे" इति पूर्वार्धम् । बृहन्ते-बृहति । हंसः-जीवः । **आत्मानं** जीवं प्रेरयितारं परमात्मानञ्च **पृथक्** मिथो भिन्नतया मत्वेत्यन्वयार्थः । **तेन** परमात्मना **जुष्टः** प्रीतिविषयीकृतः । **आत्मान**मिति । "आत्मानञ्चेद्विजानीयादयमस्मीति पूरुषः । किमिच्छन् कस्य कामाय शरीरमनुसंज्वरेत्" इति पूर्णवाक्यम् । **मन इती**ति । पूर्वापरानुसारादत्रापि इतिकरणं न युक्तमिव ; अथापि प्रामाणिकं यत् मनः तद्व्यतिरिक्ते मनस्त्वारोपेण मनआत्मवादो वादिभिः कृत इति ज्ञापयितुं तत् ।

क्रमप्राप्तं बाह्यबौद्धमतमाह **अध्यस्तेति** । शाङ्करमतं तु, 'अन्ये तु ज्ञानानन्दस्वभावम्' इति वक्ष्यति । वक्ष्यमाणोऽन्तःकरणोपाधिकरागद्वेषाद्यवभासोऽद्वैतमतेऽप्यस्ति । न तु बौद्धमतेऽन्यगतरागादेरात्मन्यारोपः, बाह्यापलापित्वात् बौद्धस्य रागद्वेषादेर्विज्ञानानतिरेकात् । तदुक्तं **तत्त्वकौमुद्याम्** (१०का) 'येत्वाहुः विज्ञानमेव हर्षविषादमोहशब्दाद्यात्मकम्' इति । अयमेव चात्मातिरिक्तसर्वाभावो **बोधमात्र**मिति मात्रपदेन विवक्षितः । अध्यस्तज्ञातृभावमनहङ्कारमिति ज्ञातृत्वाध्यासाहम्प्रत्ययाविषयत्वे उक्ते प्रच्छन्नप्रकटबौद्धयोस्तुल्ये । अत्रैतत्कथनं बौद्धमतापेक्षया नैयायिकमतस्य आत्मनि ज्ञातृत्वाहमर्थत्वे अनुमन्यमानस्यास्मदन्तरङ्गत्वज्ञापनार्थम् । यद्वा जगदपलापाविशेषात् एकहेलयैवात्र प्रच्छन्नप्रकटबौद्धयोर्ग्रहणम् ; तथैव विस्तरे दर्शनात् । एवंसति उपरि 'ज्ञानानन्दस्वभावम्' इति मीमांसकैकदेशिमतम् । यदाहुः—'निजं यत्त्वात्मचैतन्यमानन्दश्चेष्यते च यः । यच्च नित्यविभुत्वादि तैरात्मा नैव मुच्यते'

आकाशादिवदचित्स्वभावम् आगन्तुकबोधसुखदुःखाद्यसाधारणगुणाधारं अहङ्कारगोचरमपरे । अपरे तु बोधैकस्वभावमेव, स्वभावधवलमिव स्फटिकमणिम् उपधानविशेषापादितारुणिमगुणादिनिर्भासम्, अन्तःकरणोपधानापादितरागद्वेषसुखदुःखाद्यशिवगुणनिर्भासम् अनुदितानस्तमितस्वरूपप्रकाशं स्वयंज्योतिषमिममभिदधति ; अन्ये तु ज्ञानानन्दस्वभावम् ; आश्रयानुकूल्यप्रतिलब्धानन्दसुखादिव्यपदेशबोधविशेष एवास्य स्वाभाविक इत्यन्ये(?) ।

(जीवात्मनि प्रमाणादिविषयविप्रतिपत्तिप्रदर्शनम्)

तथा—अनुमानसमधिगम्यः, आगमैकवेद्यः, मानसप्रत्यक्षवेद्यः, ग्राहकतयैव सकलविषयवित्तिषु प्रत्यक्षः, ज्ञानस्वभावतयाऽनुदितानस्तमितस्वरूपप्रकाशः स्वयंज्योतिः ईदृशोऽप्यागमानुमानयोगजप्रत्यक्षैः स्वेतरसकलविलक्षणस्वाभाव्येन विशद-विशदतर-विशदतमतया [विदितः] अन्ततो यथावदपरोक्ष्यते इति । तथा परममहान्, अणुपरिमाणः, शरीरपरि-

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(मी. वा.) ,इति । तथाच ज्ञानानन्दगुणमिति तदर्थः । वैनाशिकमतमुक्त्वा अर्धवैनाशिकवैशेषिकमतमाह **देहे**ति । इदं **पार्थसारथिमिश्रा**दिमीमांसकमतमपि । **अहङ्कारगोचरं** अहम्प्रत्ययविषयम् ; अहमर्थमिति यावत् । सांख्यमतमाह **अपरे**त्विति । वेदासन्निकृष्टपूर्वमतापेक्षया सन्निकृष्टमतपार्थक्यसूचनाय पृथक्तिङन्तप्रयोगेणैतदारभ्य पृथग्वाक्यकरणम् । **बोधैके**त्येकपदेनाऽऽनन्दस्वरूपत्वस्य बोधधर्मकत्वस्य च व्यवच्छेदः । रागद्वेषादिकोटौ ज्ञानस्यापरिगणनात् न रागादिवत् चैतन्यमन्यनिष्ठमारोप्यते इति द्योत्यते । 'तदा द्रष्टुस्स्वरूपेणावस्थानम्' (यो. सू.) इत्यत्र च **वाचस्पत्यम्**, 'स्वरूपस्यचाभेदेऽपि भेदं विकल्प्याधिकरणभाव उक्तः' इति । **उपधानविशेषः** जपाकुसुमसन्निधानम् । **ज्ञानानन्दस्वभाव**मित्यस्याद्वैतमतत्वे **स्व**भावधवलमित्यादेरत्रानुषङ्गः । एवमुपर्यपि, सिद्धान्तेपि रागसुखादेर्मनोधर्मत्वस्य वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् । तस्य मीमांसकमतत्वे तु न तदनुषङ्गः । एवमुपर्यपि ; नानुषङ्गः । इदमुपरिष्टाद्व्यक्तीभविष्यति । मीमांसकमते ज्ञानातिरिक्त आनन्दः ; सिद्धान्ते तु ज्ञानमेवानन्दः । **आश्रयानुकूल्ये**ति । आश्रयं प्रत्यनुकूलत्वात् बोध एवानन्दादिव्यपदेशं प्रतिलभते । अनुकूलं ज्ञानं ह्यानन्दः । बोधः किंविषयकोऽनुकूल इति त्वनुभवप्रमाणाभ्यामवसातव्यम् । सिद्धान्ते आत्मन्यनुभूत्यात्मकबोधरूपत्वस्यानिष्टत्वात् तत्र ज्ञानव्यवहारस्यौपचारिकताया वक्ष्यमाणत्वाच्च बोधरूपत्वानुक्तिः ; स्वयञ्ज्योतिष्टं तु समनन्तरमुच्यत एवेति स्थितनिर्वाहप्रकारः । अत्र **अन्ये**त्वित्यारभ्य कृत्स्नमेकं मतमिति युक्तमिति संभावना । तदनुकूलः द्वितीयं **अन्य** इति पदं विना पाठोऽपि क्वचित् लक्ष्यते, 'अन्ये तु ज्ञानानन्दस्वभावमिमं मन्यमानाः अस्याश्रयानुकूल्य....स्वाभाविक इति' इति मद्रनगरराजकीयपुस्तकभाण्डागारकोशे (४९३३), आन्ध्रमुद्रणे अधस्ताच्च । **ज्ञानस्वभावतया** ज्ञस्वाभाव्येन । वक्ष्यति चेदम् । **अपरोक्ष्यत** इत्यत्रागमानुमानयोरनन्वयात् मध्ये **विदित** इत्येवं पदमपेक्ष्यते । अनुमानस्य श्रुतमननरूपत्वे ततो ज्ञानं विशदतरम् । क्वचिदनुमानं पूर्वमपि निर्देक्ष्यते । **अन्ततः** मुक्तौ । **अन्ततः**-भावनाप्रकर्षपर्यन्त इति वाऽर्थः ; तथोपरि

माणः, स्वतःपरिमाणरहितोऽपि व्याप्यवस्तुपरिमितिकृतपरिच्छेद इति, व्याप्तिरपि चैतन्यमात्रेण स्वरूपेण [मात्रेणैव न स्व(?) रूपेण] इति—तथा क्षणिकः, यावच्छारीरोष्मस्थायी, आप्राकृतप्रलयावस्थायी, आमोक्षस्थायी, कूटस्थो नित्य इति—सर्वशरीरेषु एकः, प्रतिक्षेत्रं नानाभूत इति च तथातथा प्रतिपद्यन्ते।

(परमात्मविषयविप्रतिपत्तिप्रदर्शनम्)

तथा परमात्मविषयेऽपि—केचित् समस्तवस्तुसाक्षात्कारिणं सर्वशक्तिमीश्वरमेव

दर्शनात्। उपरि **नित्यो व्यापीति**निर्देशात् कालावच्छेदपरीक्षाया एव पूर्वत्वाच्च विप्रतिपत्तिस्थलेपि 'तथा क्षणिक' इत्यादिकं पूर्वं, पश्चाच्च, 'तथा परममहान्' इत्यादिकं स्थितं स्यात्। अथवा क्रमानादरः स्यात्। 'व्याप्तिरपि चैतन्यमात्रेण स्वरूपेण' इति पाठो दृश्यते। अत्र पक्षद्वयमभिमतं चेत्, वाकार आवश्यकः। एवं स्वरूपपक्षस्यान्ते निर्देशो न युक्तः, सिद्धान्त्यनभिमतत्वात्। **श्रुतप्रकाशिकायां** जिज्ञासाधिकरणे देहेन्द्रियेत्याद्यत्रत्यकारिकानुवादिभाष्यव्याख्यानावसरे, "ज्ञानेन व्याप्तिरात्मसिद्धावेवोच्यते, व्याप्तिरपि चैतन्यमात्रेणैव, न रूपेणेति" इत्युक्तत्वात् अन्यत्र तद्वाक्यानुपलम्भात् औचित्यादत्रैव तत् नञ्घटितं वाक्यमित्यालोच्यते। ननु स्वयमेवात्मनोऽविभुत्वस्य हृदयायतनत्वस्य च वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् अणुत्वस्य सिद्धान्त्यभिमतत्वाच्च कथं **स्वतः परिमाणरहितो**ऽयमित्युच्यते? सत्यम्—अथापि स्वतश्शरीरादिपरिमाणरहितोपीति तदर्थः। अथवा विभूनां परिमाणाभावस्याऽऽ**गमप्रामाण्ये** उक्तत्वात् अणोरप्यस्य चैतन्यरूपेण विभुत्वात् **स्वतः** स्वचैतन्यविशिष्टवेषेण परिमाणरहितोपीत्युच्यते। यद्वा सिद्धान्ते नैयायिकादिमत इव परिमाणरूपगुणान्तरास्वीकारस्य न्यायतत्त्वानुसारि**न्यायसिद्धाञ्जनोक्त**त्वात् परिमाणानास्थया तथोक्तिरिति। अत्र सिद्धान्त्यभिमताणुपरिमाणत्वस्य शरीरपरिमाणत्वपक्षात्पूर्वं कथनवत् चैतन्यमात्रेणेति सिद्धान्तिपक्षस्यापि पूर्वं कथनसंभवात् स्वरूपेणेति पक्षान्तरपरमेवास्तु; श्रुतप्रकाशिकादृष्टं वाक्यं तु आत्मसिद्धौ स्थलान्तरे स्यादिति मन्तुमवसरोऽस्ति। तथापि सर्वत्र सिद्धान्तिपक्षस्यैवान्ते कीर्तनादिहाप्येवम्। तथाच गुणत्वाद् ज्ञानस्य व्याप्त्यनर्हत्वमभिमत्यैवात्माणुत्वं वदतां नित्योपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिप्रसंगादिना परममहत्त्वमनिच्छतां मतं प्राक् 'अणुपरिमाण' इति प्रस्तुत्य, 'पादे मे वेदना, शिरसि सुखम्' इत्युक्तानुसंधानोपपत्तयेऽणुत्वत्यागिनां शरीरपरिमाणपक्षमुपन्यस्य, ततः व्याप्यवस्त्वनुरूपपरिमाणरहितोपि ज्ञानव्याप्तिस्वीकारात् कृत्स्नशरीरसुखाद्यनुभावी भवितुमर्हतीति सिद्धान्तिपक्षेण निगमनमिति। शरीरपरिमाण इति कुचित्कोशे न। तदा सिद्धान्तिपक्षोऽन्ते इति निर्बाधम्। **क्षणिक** इति। अत्रात्मानित्यत्ववादिनश्चतुर्विधा इति सर्वार्थसिद्धिरनुसन्धेया (जी. १७) स्थैर्यश्चेदिति श्लोके। अत्र **चकार** एवानुक्तसमुच्चायकः स्वतस्सुखित्वादिविकल्पं समुच्चिनोति। **तथातथे**ति पूर्वोक्तसर्वप्रकारपरामर्शी तद्विकल्पस्यापि परामर्शकः। **तथातथे**त्यनेन स्वतस्सुखित्वतदभावग्रहणम्। **प्रतिपद्यन्ते** इति। एवं तत्तद्वादिप्रतिपत्तिकथनात् विप्रतिपत्तिर्दर्शिता भवति।

नाभ्युपगच्छन्ति । अभ्युपगच्छन्तोऽप्येके प्रत्यस्तमितमितिमानमात्रमेयेश्वरेशितव्यादिभेदविकल्पकूटस्थविज्ञानैकरसम् अनाद्यविद्योपदर्शितवियदादिभेदावच्छिन्नज्ञानैश्वर्यादिमहिमविकल्पतया काल्पनिकमाचक्षते । अपरे तु यथोक्तस्वरूपमेवाविद्योपधानेन तद्गुणसारतया प्रकल्पितब्रह्मादिस्थावरपर्यन्तविविधजीवभेदं स्वाधीनविचित्रविवर्तस्वभावमायोपहिततया समासादितसार्वज्ञ्यादिसंपदमुपहितमिममभिदधति । तथाऽन्ये प्रकृष्टसत्त्वोपादाननिमित्तस्वतन्त्रप्रधानपरिणामविशेषमात्रनियमनिर्वाहितसर्वैश्वर्यमर्यादमाद्रियन्ते । अनुपहितमपि परिणामिनमपरे प्रतिपेदिरे । अपरिणामिनमपि स्वमायांशभूतविचित्रान्तःकरणदर्पणतलप्रतिबिम्बिततया प्रतिपन्नविश्वतैजसप्राज्ञभावं तमेकमेव चेतनमितरे रोचयन्ते । अन्ये तु स्वाधीनत्रिविधचेतनाचेतनस्वरूपस्थितिप्रवृत्तिभेदं स्वाभाविकनिरवधिकातिशयज्ञानबलैश्वर्यवीर्यशक्तितेजःप्रभृतिसकलकल्याणगुणगणमहार्णवं पुरुषविशेषमीश्वरमातिष्ठन्ते ।

(तन्मूर्त्यादिविप्रतिपत्तिः)

तथा तद्विशेषेऽपि हरिहरविरिञ्चभास्करात्मना अनभिमततत्तन्मूर्तिपरित्यागेन च चतु-

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मिथ्यावादिमतद्वयं क्रमेणाह **अभी**ति । **आदि**ना ईशनग्रहणम् । एवंरूपाणां भेदानां **विकल्पो** वैचित्र्यम् ; तस्य **प्रत्यस्तमितत्वं** परमार्थतोऽसत्त्वम् । पक्षद्वयेऽपि जीवेश्वरयोर्मिथ्यात्वेपि द्वितीयपक्षे अनाद्यविद्यावत् प्रपञ्चहेत्वनादिमायाङ्गीकारादविद्योपहितजीवतुल्यं मायोपहितेश्वरः सेद्धुमर्हति । ब्रह्मविषयकजीवाश्रिताविद्यावादिप्रथमपक्षे तु अनाद्यविद्यासिद्धेन जीवेन ब्रह्मणि प्रपञ्चेश्वरकल्पना क्रियत इति तस्येश्वरस्य व्यवहारकाले आस्तिकाबाध्यत्वेपि जीवकल्पितप्रातिभासिकमुक्तिकालनिवर्त्यकतिपयशुक्तिरजततुल्यता दुर्वारेत्याशयेनाह **काल्पनिक**मिति । **तद्गुणसारता** आरोपिताविद्यिककर्तृत्वादिकत्वम् । स्वभावमायेत्यत्र **स्वभावं माये**ति पा० । सकलजीवात्मवत् शुद्धचिन्मात्ररूप एवेश्वरः प्रकृतिपरिणामशुद्धसत्त्वचित्तोपहितोऽस्पृष्टाविद्यो जगदुद्दिधीर्षया संप्रदायप्रवर्तकोऽनुग्राहकश्च भवति । प्रलयप्राक्क्षणे शुद्धसत्त्वचित्तसत्ताकाले, 'अहमेतावन्तं कालमतीत्य पुनः प्रवर्तिष्ये' इतीश्वरकृतप्रणिधानवशात् प्रलीनं शुद्धसत्त्वं प्रलयान्ते पुनः प्रकृतितः पृथग्भवति । यथा अहं तदानीमुत्थास्यामीति प्रणिधानवशादभीष्टसमये सुप्तचित्तप्रबोधः, तद्वत् । अतः प्रधानपरिणामभूतचित्तबलसिद्धं प्रलयेऽनीश्वरस्य सृष्टावैश्वर्यमिति पातञ्जलाः ; तन्मतमाह **तथान्ये** इति । प्रकृष्टसत्त्वरूपमुपादानकारणं **निमित्तं** जनकं यस्य परिणामविशेषस्य तन्मात्रे **नियमेन** संकल्पव्यवस्थानुसारेण निर्वाहिता सर्वैश्वर्यमर्यादा यस्य तादृशमित्यर्थः । **अनुपहितमपीति** । सन्मात्रं ब्रह्म समुद्र इव फेनतरङ्गबुद्बुदात्मना चिदचिदीश्वररूपेण परिणमत इति । प्रतिबिम्बेश्वरपक्षमाह **अपरिणामिनमपी**ति । विश्वतैजसादिनिरूपणं **माण्डूक्यो**पनिषदि । चतुर्मूर्तिपक्षमुक्त्वा त्र्यादिपक्षानाह **अनभिमतेति** । **चतु**रिति 'विष्णुर्ब्रह्मा च रुद्रश्च विष्णुरेव दिवाकरः । तस्मात् पूज्यतमं नान्यमहं मन्ये जनार्दनात्' इति मूर्तिचतुष्टयमात्रग्राहि **तात्पर्यचन्द्रिकोद्धृतं** (गी. ८-१३)

स्त्रिव्यकमूर्तितया विवदन्ते । मूर्तिविशेषविषयाश्च नित्यत्वानित्यत्वभौतिकत्वाभौतिकत्व-स्वार्थ[त्व]परार्थत्वादिवितर्काः प्रादुर्भवन्ति ; परिजनस्थानादिगोचराश्च ।

(तत्प्रमाणविप्रतिपत्तिः)

तथा प्रमाणतोऽपि ।—आनुश्रविक एवेत्येके । आनुमानिकश्चेत्यन्ये । विशिष्टप्रत्यक्ष-समधिगम्यश्चेत्यपरे ।

(आत्मपरमात्मसंबन्धविप्रतिपत्तिः)

तथा आत्मपरमात्मनोः संबन्धेऽपि—[1]अनाद्यविद्योपादानभेदास्पदोऽयम् ईश्वरेशित-व्यतादिरूपः संबन्धः; [2]परमार्थतस्त्वेकं तत्त्वमिति केचित् । [3]व्यतिरेकाभावेऽप्यतिरिक्तो जीव इत्यन्ये । स्वतस्तु ऐक्यम् , उपाधितो भेद इति [4]विशिष्ट-स्वरूपभावेन भिन्नाभिन्नत्वमितरे । नानात्वे सत्येवामेदो नामान्वयः अंशांशिभावलक्षण[5]ः, समवायः [6]परतन्त्रतालक्षणः, शेष-शेषित्वरूपः स्वस्वामिभावः भृत्यस्वामि [भाव ?] लक्षण इति च नानाविधाः वादाः ।

(तत्प्राप्तिविषयविप्रतिपत्तिः)

तथा परमपुरुषार्थभूते ब्रह्मप्राप्तिलक्षणमोक्षेऽपि—[7]स्वरूपोच्छित्तिलक्षणः, अविद्याऽस्त-मयलक्षणः, निश्शेषवैशेषिकात्मगुणोच्छेदलक्षणः, कैवल्यरूपः, तद्भावसाधर्म्यलक्षणः, तद्गुणसंक्रान्तिलक्षणः, तच्छायापत्तिलक्षणः, सांसिद्धिकानन्दादिस्वरूपाविर्भावलक्षणः, तद्गुणानुभवजनितनिरतिशयसुखसमुन्मेषोपनीतात्यन्तिकतत्किंकरत्वलक्षण इति तथा तथा विवदन्ते ।

वचनम् । 1. **अनादी**त्यादि अनाद्यविद्यारूपोपादानविशेषमूलक इत्यर्थकम् । 2. परमार्थतस्त्वेकत्वश्रुतेरेकं तत्त्वमिति पा०. 3. **व्यतिरेको** विरहः । परमात्मानं विहाय जीवस्थित्यभावेऽपि तदविभक्तोऽयं ततो भिन्न इति । सिद्धान्ते नाव्यतिरेकित्वमात्रम् , तस्य परं प्रतीव कालादिकं प्रत्यपि भावात् । यद्वा सन्मात्रैकद्रव्यतया विशेषभेदाभावेपि सन्मात्रात् विकृतयोर्जीवेश्वरयोर्भेदः, अग्निविस्फुलिङ्गयोरिव । 4. विशिष्ट-भावेन भिन्नत्वम् , स्वरूपभावेनाभिन्नत्वम् । **नानात्व** इति । अयं सिद्धान्तः । **अन्वयः**इत्यनेन 'शब्द-प्रतीतामेदनिर्वाहप्रकार एवोच्यते; न तु वस्तुनोरभेदः' इति सूच्यते । 5. **अंशांशिभावलक्षणसमवाय** इति पा०. 6. ननु द्रव्ययोरनयोः कथं समवाय इत्यत्राह **परतन्त्रते**ति । वक्ष्यति संयोगविशेषाति-रिक्तः समवायो नास्तीति । अतो नित्यपारतन्त्र्यगर्भस्संयोग एव समवायः । अत्रोत्तरोत्तरं पूर्वपूर्वविवरण-रूपम् । अभेदो नामान्वय इत्यादिकमवान्तरानेकमताभिप्रायेणापि स्यादित्याहुः । 7. **स्वरूपोच्छित्ति-**पक्षो बौद्धस्य । **कैवल्य**मन्तःकरणाद्यनुपहितत्वादिरूपं सांख्यमतम् । **तद्भावे**त्यादौ तच्छब्दो ब्रह्मपरः । तद्भावरूपं साधर्म्यम् ; न तु सिद्धान्त इव गुणकृतं साधर्म्यम् । **स्वरूपाविर्भावलक्षणः** इति पृथक्करणात् उपरितनसिद्धान्तपक्षेणैकीकारे **लक्षण** इति पदस्य व्यर्थत्वात् इदं माध्वमतम् । तैरेतावत एव नियत-त्वस्वीकारात् ; भगवदनुभवकैंकर्ययोस्तन्मते नियतत्वाभावात् ।

(मोक्षसाधनविषयविप्रतिपत्तिः)

तत्साधनतोऽपि—कर्मयोगलभ्यः, ज्ञानयोगलभ्यः, अन्यतरानुगृहीतान्यतरलभ्यः, उभयलभ्यः, उभयपरिकर्मितस्वान्तस्य ऐकान्तिकात्यन्तिकभक्तियोगलभ्य इति ॥

तत् एवम् अनवसितविशेषविमर्शकजनविमतिदर्शनात् तत्तत्पक्षसाधनबलाबलानवगमाच्च ततस्ततः संदिहानाः प्रेक्षावन्तः न तावत् परमपुरुषार्थाय घटेरन्, यावत् अयमात्मा परमात्मा च स्वरूपतः प्रमाणतः संबन्धतः प्राप्तितः तत्साधनतश्च न निर्णीयेतेति तत्प्रतिबोधायेदमारभ्यते ॥

(स्वप्रबन्धस्यागतार्थत्वम्)

यद्यपि भगवता बादरायणेन इदमर्थान्येव सूत्राणि प्रणीतानि। विवृतानि च तानि परिमितगम्भीरभाषिणा द्रमिडभाष्यकृता। विस्तृतानि च तानि गम्भीरन्यायसागरभाषिणा भगवता श्रीवत्साङ्कमिश्रेणापि—तथाऽपि आचार्यटङ्क-भर्तृप्रपञ्च-भर्तृमित्र-भर्तृहरि-ब्रह्मदत्त-

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१. अत्र भगवद्बोधायनानुक्तिः स्वयं तद्वृत्तेः साक्षाददृष्टत्वात् स्यात्। अत एव हि स्वयं सूत्रभाष्यं निबन्धुकामैरप्येभिर्नूनं तत्संपादनार्थविलम्बेन स्वान्त्यसमये समापतिते श्रीभगवद्रामानुजमुखेन तत् प्रतीक्षितमासीत्। ते च स्वान्तेवासिश्रीकूरेशसहिताः उत्तरेषु क्वचित् कथञ्चित् बोधायनवृत्तिं समग्रां समीक्ष्य द्रमिडभाष्ये तदैकरस्यमनुभूय श्रीभाष्यं प्राणैषुरितीतिवृत्तविदः। सूच्यते चेदमादौ श्रीभाष्ये, 'भगवद्बोधायनकृतां विस्तीर्णां ब्रह्मसूत्रवृत्तिं पूर्वाचार्याः संचिक्षिपुः। तन्मतानुसारेण सूत्राक्षराणि व्याख्यास्यन्ते'इति। **विवृतानि च तानी**ति वाक्येन द्रमिडभाष्यं ब्रह्मसूत्रस्याप्यस्तीति ज्ञायते। भोक्तापत्त्यधिकरणादौ श्रीभाष्योपात्तमत्रत्यमेव स्यात्। अयं **द्रमिडाचार्यः** छान्दोग्यव्याख्यारूप—**ब्रह्मनन्दिकृत-वाक्यग्रन्थोपरि** भाष्यकर्ता। वाक्यशब्दो वार्तिकपर्यायः। यस्य भाष्यस्योपरि वामनटीकेति श्रुतप्रकाशिकातो ज्ञायते (श्रीभाष्यद्वितीयश्लोके,लघुसिद्धान्ते च)। **भगवता श्रीवत्साङ्कमिश्रेणे**ति पुरस्कृतान्मिश्रादन्य एव सितासितनिबन्धकारिपङ्क्तिनिविष्टः श्रीवत्साङ्क इति अनुक्तिसिद्धम्।

टङ्कः प्रशंसितो यतिराजसप्ततौ 'निरातङ्काः टङ्कद्रमिडगुहदेवप्रभृतयः' इति। एवं **वेदार्थसंग्रहेऽपि** (१५४ पु.), भगवद्बोधायन-टङ्क-द्रमिड-गुहदेव-कपर्दि-भारुचिप्रभृति.....व्याख्यानेत्यादि। एवंभूतस्य सितासितनिबन्धनकारिमध्यप्रवेशनमिह परममुख्यार्थेऽवैषम्येप्यन्यत्रान्यथात्वादिना स्यात्। अत्राप्याचार्येति विशेषणेन टङ्कस्यांशतः प्रशंसाऽपि स्यात्। अत्र सितनिबन्धनकारिणः केचित्; असितनिबन्धनकारिणश्चान्ये इत्यप्यभिप्रयन्ति। अद्वैतप्रत्यर्थित्वमात्रेण वेदार्थसंग्रहादौ तत्कीर्तनमिति च युक्तम्।

भर्तृप्रपञ्चोऽद्वैती स्यात्। तदुक्तमनूक्तं प्रकरणपञ्चिकायाम् (८. प्र.) 'यत्त्विदं **प्रपञ्चेन** साधितम्-प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधेऽप्याम्नायस्य बलीयस्त्वम्, तद्वशेन प्रत्यक्षादीनामेव भ्रान्तता कल्पनीयेति' इति। **'न दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारं पश्येः'** (बृ. ३ ४ २) इत्यत्र **शाङ्करो**पनिषद्भाष्ये **प्रपञ्चकृतं** व्याख्यानं दूषितमस्ति। तदौचित्यविमर्शश्चास्मत्कृत**परमार्थप्रकाशिका**ग्रन्थे (१७४ पु.) कृतो द्रष्टव्यः।

शङ्कर—श्रीवत्साङ्क-भास्करादिविरचित-सितासित-विविध-निबन्धनश्रद्धाविप्रलब्धबुद्धयः, न यथावत्, अयथा च प्रतिपद्यन्ते इति तत्प्रतिपत्तये च युक्तः प्रकरण[1]प्रक्रमः । तत्र—

(जीवात्मनिरूपणम्)

[2]देहेन्द्रियमनःप्राणधीभ्योऽन्योऽनन्यसाधनः ।
नित्यो व्यापी प्रतिक्षेत्रमात्मा भिन्नः स्वतस्सुखी ॥ ३ ॥

(देहात्मभावपूर्वपक्षः । तस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वम्)

ननु देहमेवाऽऽत्मानं प्रत्यक्षतः प्रतिपद्यामहे । अहं जानामीति ज्ञाता ह्यात्मा अहमिति चकास्ति । देहश्चाहङ्कारगोचरः ; स्थूलोऽहं, कृशोऽहमिति दर्शनात् । देहस्य हि स्थौल्यादियोगः । अतस्तत्स[3]मानाधिकरणतयाऽयमहङ्कारः शरीरालम्बन इत्यवश्याश्रयणीयम् । इतरथा सकललौकिकपरीक्षकव्यवहारोपरोधश्च । [4]न चायं लाक्षणिको व्यवहारः ; [5]मुख्य वृत्तिभूमेः पृथगसिद्धत्वात् । न[6]चानेकावयवयोगिशरीरालम्बनत्वे ज्ञात्रवभासस्य, तदीय-

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भर्तृमित्रं मनसिकृत्यैवाऽऽदौ श्लोकवार्तिके 'प्रायेणैव हि मीमांसा लोके लोकायतीकृता' इति, 'इममेव च संस्कारं श्रोत्रग्रहणकारणम् । केचित्तु पण्डितंमन्याः श्रोत्रमित्यभिमन्वते (१-६-१३०) इति चोक्तमिति **न्यायरत्नाकरादवसीयते** । तदयं नित्यनिषिद्धयोरिष्टानिष्टं फलं निषेधति, श्रोत्रेन्द्रियञ्च यथावन्नेच्छति । वेदान्तवादोऽस्य कीदृश इति विमृश्यम् । **भर्तृहरिः** स्फोटस्थापकः शब्दाद्वैतवादी प्रसिद्धः । **ब्रह्मदत्तो** भेदाभेदवादीति **परमतभङ्गे** भास्करभङ्गाधिकारे । **सर्वार्थसिद्धौ** च जीवसरे (१६) ब्रह्मदत्तादिभिरुक्तं जीवानां स्वरूपतस्सृष्टिसंहृतिविषयत्वमिति । तदयं **यादवप्रकाशतुल्यः** ।

1. 'न्यायतत्त्वशास्त्रप्रकरणं ह्यात्मसिद्धिः इति **न्यायसिद्धाञ्जने** बुद्धिपरिच्छेदे । 'शास्त्रैकदेशसंबद्धं शास्त्रकार्यान्तरे स्थितम् । आहुः प्रकरणं नाम ग्रन्थभेदं विपश्चितः' इत्याहुः । 'प्रक्रियते आरभ्यतेऽनेनेति प्रकरणम्' इति च ।

2. 'बुद्धीन्द्रियशरीरेभ्यो भिन्न आत्मा विभुर्ध्रुवः । नानाभूतः प्रतिक्षेत्रमात्मवित्तिषु भासते ॥' इति **पञ्चिका** (त. प्र) । अत्रोक्तं वित्तिभास्यत्वादि 'अनन्यसाधन' इत्येतद्विवरणादौ निराकरिष्यते । एतदात्मसिद्धिकृता देहेन्द्रियादिभेदप्रतिपादनसरणिर्नन्दीश्वरकृते **प्रभाकरविजयेपि** । विशिष्य देहेन्द्रियविषयमात्रे, न केवलं प्रमेयतः, पदवाक्यपरिस्थितितश्च बहुलमनयोस्संवादो विस्पष्टमस्ति । परन्तु नन्दीश्वरग्रन्थादत्र गाम्भीर्यं संदर्भसौष्ठवमधिकांशबोधनञ्च स्थितमपह्नोतुमशक्यम् । नन्दीश्वरश्च **शालिकनाथ-भवनाथ**रूप नाथद्वयादर्वाचीन इति 'नाथद्वयात्तसारे' इति तच्छ्लोक एव दर्शयतीत्यलमत्राल्पके विस्तरेण । **अनन्यसाधनः** स्वप्रकाशः । **व्यापी**—ज्ञानद्वारा सर्वव्यापनशीलः ; अतिसूक्ष्मतया तत्तत्र कालभेदेनान्तःप्रवेशसमर्थ इति वा । एतत्पदद्वयार्थोऽत्रैव विस्तरे व्यक्त इति **तत्त्वटीका** । 3. स्थूलाद्यभिन्नाहमर्थविषयकतयाऽयम् अहम्प्रत्ययः । 4. प्रतीतिविरोधमुक्त्वा व्यवहारविरोधमाह **नचे**ति । 5. **मुख्यवृत्तिः** शक्तिः ; **तद्भूमेः**—शक्यार्थस्य । 6. शरीर-

रूपावयवाद्यवभासेनान्वयिना भवितव्यम्, येन तदन्वयाभावात् जानामीति प्रत्ययः शरीरातिरिक्तमवगमयेत्; बाह्येन्द्रियप्रत्यक्ष एव तथानियमदर्शनात्; स्वान्तस्याऽऽन्तर-गुणाधारतावभास एव सामर्थ्यनियमात्। [1]अनवधृतावयवविशेषस्याप्यनेकावयवयोगिनो महिमगुणशालिनस्त्र्यणुकस्य(2) प्रथमप्रत्यक्षाभ्युपगमात्; वायोश्च त्वगिन्द्रियेण स्पर्शाधिष्ठान-मात्रतयोपलम्भदर्शनाच्च। देहव्यतिरिक्तात्मगोचरत्वेऽपि यथा तदीयगुणान्तराग्रहणम्, तथेहापि; यथा (च) तत्र बाह्यप्रत्यक्षगोचर एव संख्यापरिमाणादिग्रहणनियमः॥

(देहाचेतनत्वानुमाननिरासः)

एवञ्च 'प्रत्येकं परमाणुषु चैतन्यानुपलब्धेः तदभ्युपगमे च एकशरीर एवानेक-सहस्रचेतनापातात् अकारणगुणपूर्वकस्य कार्यद्रव्यवर्तिनो विशेषगुणस्यासम्भवान्न शरीर-विशेषगुणश्चैतन्यम्; अयावच्छरीरभावित्वाच्च' इत्यादयोऽनुमानभेदाः प्रत्यक्षबाधितविषय-तया न पराक्रमितुं क्षमन्ते। विशेषगुणत्वे च प्रतिक्षिप्यमाने देहगुणत्वाभ्युपगमप्रसङ्गश्च[2]। [3]अपिचेच्छानुविधायिक्रियत्वेन्द्रियवत्त्वा(श्रयत्वा ?)दयः शरीरे दृश्यमानाः संप्रतिपन्नाचै तन्याद्घटादेरत्यन्तव्यावर्तमानाः शरीरमेव चेतनमवगमयन्ति। [4]क्रमुकफलताम्बूलदलावय-वादिषु प्रत्येकमविद्यमानस्यापि रागस्येव अवयविनि संयोगविशेषात्, देहारम्भकपरमाणु-संश्लेषविशेषादेव देहे चैतन्यस्याप्याविर्भावो नानुपपन्नः। [5]चर्वणजनितहुतवहसंयोगसंपादित-पाटलिमभिः परमाणुभिः द्व्यणुकादिक्रमेण कारण(गुण)पूर्व एव तत्र रागोदय इति चेन्न; प्रमाणाभावात्। अपिच सितासितादितन्तुषु प्रत्येकमविद्यमानमपि चित्ररूपं विशेषगुणं

रूपावयव्यविषयकत्वसाधकहेतुमाभासयति। जानामीति प्रत्ययः न शरीरविषयकः तदवयवाद्यविषयक प्रत्यक्षत्वादित्यत्र सामान्यमुखव्यासौ बाह्यप्रत्यक्षत्वमुपाधिरिति भावः। 1. तदवयवाविषयकत्वरूपहेतोर्व्यभिचारं बाह्यएव दर्शयति **अनवधृतेति**। **महिमगुणः** महत्त्वम्। **गुणान्तरं** परिमाणादि। चैतन्यं न शरीर-विशेषगुणः शरीरसमवायिकारणसमवेतगुणाजन्यत्वात् शरीरसत्ताकालाव्यापित्वाच्चेति प्रयोगद्वयम्। तत्र प्रथमहेतुसिद्धये शरीरकारणपरमाण्वाद्यसमवेतत्वं चैतन्यगुणस्योच्यते **प्रत्येकमिति**। 2. **प्रसंग** इति। विशेषनिषेधस्सामान्याभ्यनुज्ञानार्थ इति न्यायादिति भावः। 3. शरीरं न चैतन्यरूपविशेषगुणवत् तद्रहितद्रव्यारभ्यत्वात् घटवदित्येवं प्रथमानुमानस्थानापन्नानुमाने इमे व्यतिरेकिणस्सत्प्रतिपक्षहेतवोऽपि। 4. कण्ठोक्तानुमानस्यानैकान्तिकत्वं स्थलत्रये आह। 5. पीलुपाकमतेन हेतोरदुष्टत्वं शङ्कते। **अपिचेति** वाक्यं काठिन्यानेकान्तनिगमनानन्तरं स्यात् **प्रभाकरविजये** ह्ययमंशस्ततःपश्चादेव लक्ष्यते।

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(2) त्र्यणुकप्रत्यक्षं हि अवयवाविषयकम् अवयवे महत्त्वाभावात् तत्प्रत्यक्षायोगात्। वायोश्चेति। वैशेषिकमते तत्प्रत्यक्षेऽपि न्यायादिमते वायुस्पार्शनप्रत्यक्षमिष्टम्। नन्ववयवग्रहणा-भावेऽपि त्रसरेणुस्थले संख्यापरिमाणादि गृह्यत एव। एवं वायावपीत्यत्राह यथा चेति।

तथेहापि इत्यस्य पूर्वस्थितस्य **'ग्रहणनियम'** इति वाक्यसमनन्तरं पाठःस्थितस्स्यात्।

तदारब्धे पटे स्फुटमुपलभमानाः कथं कारणगुणपूर्वकत्वमुक्तगुणस्याध्यवस्येम। नचा[1]वयव-रूपातिरेकेणावयविनि चित्रं नाम रूपान्तरं नास्त्येव; अवयविनोऽचाक्षुषत्वप्रसङ्गात्। अवयवरूपैरेव तदुपपादने सर्वमेव कार्यद्रव्यं नीरूपमापद्येत। (ततः) अनुभवविरोधः, सर्व-व्यवहारविरोधश्च। विशेषगुणश्च काठिन्यं करकाद्रव्यवर्त्ति अकारणगुणपूर्वकं दृश्यत इत्यने-कान्तश्च। न च संयोगविशेषः काठिन्यम्, तस्य द्विष्ठत्वात्। अस्य तु कारकाद्रव्यैकवर्ति-त्वात्, स्पर्शविशेषतया पदा[2]र्थविद्भिरभ्युपगमाच्च।

(कर्मकर्तृविरोधपरिहारः)

दृश्यस्य देहस्य कथं द्रष्टृत्वमिति चेत्—को विरोधः? अयमेव, यदेकस्यां क्रियाया-मेकस्य कर्मत्वं कर्तृत्वञ्च न घटत इति(चेत्)—यद्येवम्, व्यतिरेकवादे वा कथमात्मनि अहमिति प्रत्ययः? रूपभेदादिति चेत्—समानमिदं देहात्मवादेऽपि। अपिच परसमवायि-क्रियाफलभागि कर्म, स्वसमवेतज्ञानफ[3]लभागिनश्शरीरस्य कर्मत्वमेव नास्तीति न पर्यनुयो-गावकाशः।

(सप्रमाणं चार्वाकमतोपसंहारः)

अतो देह एवात्मेति बार्हस्पत्याः। तथाच, 'पृथिव्यापस्तेजो वायुरिति तत्त्वानि। तेभ्यश्चैतन्यम्। किण्वादिभ्यो मदशक्तिवत्' इति सूत्र[4]म्।

(देहातिरिक्तत्वसिद्धान्तः)

[5]अत्र प्रतिविधिर्देहो नात्मा प्रत्यक्षबाधतः।
न खल्वहमिदङ्कारावेकस्यैकत्र वस्तुनि ॥ ४ ॥

[6]अहञ्जानामीति प्रत्यग्वृत्तिरहमिति मतिः इदङ्कारगोचराच्छरीरान्निष्कृष्टमेव स्वविषय-

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1. नच नास्त्येवेत्यन्वयः। प्रथमानुमाने स्थलान्तरेणानैकान्तिकत्वमाह विशेषगुणश्चेति। 2. वैशेषिकैः; न्यायतत्त्वशास्त्रकृद्भिश्च। न्यायसिद्धाञ्जने द्रवत्वरूपाद्रव्यप्रस्तावे निर्विरल-संयोगप्रयुक्तस्पर्शः कठिन इति विशेष उक्तः॥ 3. ज्ञानस्य फलं प्रकाशः व्यवहारः। आत्मानं जाना-मीति द्वितीया तु नैयायिकादिमत इव गौणकर्मत्वे। कर्मणि द्वितीयेत्यनुशासनं मुख्यगौणसाधारणम्। कर्मकर्तृविरोधव्यवहारस्तु मुख्यकर्मविषये इति भावः। 4. इदं सूत्रत्रयमिति क्वचित्। किण्वमङ्कुरः सुराबीजम्। 5. अनया कारिकया देहात्मवादे प्रत्यक्षबाधः काणादानुरोधेन कथ्यते; उत्तरकारि-कया च स एव साङ्ख्यानुरोधेन। प्रायः कारिकोपरितनानि वाक्यानि कारिकाविवरणरूपाणीति ध्येयम्। प्रतिविधिः प्रत्युत्तरम्। अहमिदङ्कारौ अहमिति इदमिति च प्रतीती। स्वस्य परात्मनि अय-मिति धीसत्त्वादेकस्यैकत्रेत्युक्तम्। 6. अहं जानामीतिस्थाने अहमिदं जानामीति स्यात्? । न्याय-सिद्धाञ्जने, गीताद्वितीयाध्याय चन्द्रिकायाञ्च देहात्मवादनिरासविस्तरः।

मुपस्थापयति घटादेरिव ; परागवृत्तिरिदमिति शरीरविषयिणी च शेमुषी स्वविषयमहङ्कार-गोचराद् विवेचयति, यथा अयं घट इति । इतरथा स्वपरविभागानुपपत्तेः । न चैकस्मिन्नेव रूपभेदादेवं प्रतीतिः । न हि देवदत्तो दण्डिनमात्मानं दण्डयमिति प्रत्येति ।

(अहमितिप्रत्यक्षस्यावयवाविषयकत्वात् देहाविषयकत्वोपपादनम्)

अन्यच्च—नियमितबहिरिन्द्रियवृत्तेरवहितमनसः अहमिति स्वात्मानमवयतः[1] कर-चरणोदराद्यवयवा न भासन्ते । स्थवीयसि चावयविनि शरीरे अहमितिमतिगोचरेऽभ्युपगम्य-माने अवश्यमवयवप्रतिभासेनाप्यन्वयिना भाव्यम् । न ह्यस्ति संभवः, 'अवयवी स्थवीयान् प्रच-कास्ति, 'अवयवास्तु न केचन प्रथन्ते' इति । यत्तु त्र्यणुके व्यभिचार इति—तन्न—वातायनविवरदृश्यनिर्भागत्रसरेणु[2]व्यतिरेकेण परमाणुस्वीकारे कारणाभावात्, [3]प्रत्यक्ष-योग्यावयवस्य तथाप्रतिभासनियमाद्वा न व्यभिचारः । न चावयविनि बहिरिन्द्रियग्राह्य एवायं नियम इत्युत्प्रेक्ष्यम्, प्रमाणाभावात् ; अन्तःकरणस्य च केवलस्यावयविनि वृत्त्यसंभ[4]वाच्च । वायोस्तु रूपाद्यभावात् केवलस्पर्शाधारतयोपलम्भः । तत्रापि तादृशाने-कावयवप्रतिभासोऽस्त्येव स्पृश्यमान इव घटादाविति न तेन व्यभिचारः ।

(स्थूलोऽहमित्यत्राप्यतिरिक्तभानम्)

यत्तु स्थूलोऽहं, कृशोऽहमिति शरीरेऽहंप्रत्ययो दृश्यत इति-तदपि पर्यालोचनीयम् । तत्राप्यन्तःशरीरमहमाकारमेव[5] किमपि वस्तु अहङ्कारो गोचरयति ; न पुनश्चाक्षुष इव देह-प्रत्ययः स्थौल्यबाल्यादियोगिदेहमात्रम् । अत एव ममेदं गृहमितिवत् ममेदं शरीरमिति भेदप्रतिभासो व्यवहारश्च । न ह्यसौ साक्षात्प्रतीतभेदनिमित्तः प्रतायमानः [6]शिलापुत्रकशरीर-व्यपदेशवदौपचारिको युक्त आश्रयितुं ममात्मेतिवत् । तत्रात्मशब्दस्यात्मनि वृत्तेरैकार्थ्याद-

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निष्कृष्टम्–अतिरिक्तम् । 'अहमिति प्रत्यगात्मनि भावात् परत्राभावादर्थान्तरप्रत्यक्षः' इति सूत्रम् (वै. ३. २-१४) । अहंबुध्या परागर्थात् प्रत्यगर्थो हि भिद्यते । अतः पराक्त्वाविशेषात् घटादित इव देहादपि भेदो गृह्यते ; एवं इदम्बुद्ध्या प्रत्यगर्थात्परागर्थश्च भिद्यत इति अयं देह इति धिया देहेऽहमर्थ-भेदग्रह इत्याह **परागिति** । 1. **अवतयः**—जानतः पुरुषस्य ।

2. अतोऽवयवाभावादेव त्रसरेणुप्रत्यक्षे तदप्रतीतिः । अतस्तत्र त्र्यणुकव्यवहारोऽप्ययुक्त इति भावः । 3. अभ्युपगम्यवादेनाह **प्रत्यक्षेति** । 4. यत् अवयविप्रत्यक्षं तत् बहिरिन्द्रियजन्यमिति व्याप्तेरिति भावः। सिद्धान्तेऽवयवातिरिक्तावयव्यनङ्गीकारात् सुतरामवयविप्रतिभासानुपपत्तिरिति ध्येयम् । 5. तथा च स्थौल्यादियोगिदेहावच्छिन्नात्मा प्रत्यक्षविषय इति भावः । स्थूलोऽहमिति वाक्ये तु स्थूलाभेदोपपत्तयेऽहंशब्दो लाक्षाणिक इति वक्ष्यति । देहाभेदस्वीकारापेक्षया लक्षणाकल्पनं ज्याय इति तदाशयः । वेदान्तव्युत्पत्तौ तु स्थूलशब्दस्य स्थूलावच्छिन्नात्मपरत्वान्न लक्षणाऽपि ।

6. **प्रतायमान** इत्यत्र **प्रतीयमान** इति पा. तथैव च **नीतिमाला** ।

विवा[1]दाच्च युक्तं तथाश्रयणम् । न चैवमत्र । अतो देहव्यतिरेकिणश्चेतनस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात् तत्सम्बन्धिनि लाक्षणिको देहेऽहंशब्दप्रयोगः ।

(अभेदभ्रमनिर्वाहः)

बाह्यविषयेषु परस्परविरुद्धरूपपरिमाणसंख्यासंनिवेशग्रहणेन व्यतिरेकस्य स्फुटत्वात् [2]आत्मनि तादृशरूपान्तराग्रहणेन देहाभेदप्रतिभासभ्रमोऽविवेकिनाम् । इतश्च—इच्छानुविधायिस्वव्यापारोऽयमात्मा । इच्छयैव हि सङ्कल्पयति [3]स्मरत्यभ्यूहति च । शरीरमपि तदिच्छानुविधायिशयनासनोत्थानादिचेष्टमिति भवत्यभेदभ्रमः, शुक्तिरजतादाविव ।

(योगजप्रत्यक्षेण भेदग्रहः)

[4]प्रणिहितमनसस्तु ज्ञातृतया सिद्ध्यन्तमहमाकारमर्थमनवयवम्, इदमिति परिस्फुरतः स्थूलादवयविनः शरीरात्पृथगपरोक्षयन्त्येव ।

(उक्तार्थे प्रयोगनिष्कर्षः)

[5]भवन्ति च (प्रयोगाः ?)—जानामीति प्रत्ययः शरीरविषयो न भवति, अर्थान्तरविषयो वाऽयम्, [6]अप्रकाशमानतदवयवप्रतिभासत्वात्, य एवंप्रकारः स तथा, यथा अयमिति प्रतिभासः[7]; यत् शरीरविषयम्, न तत् तथा, यथा उभयसंमतं शरीरज्ञानम् । तथा—शरीरमहम्प्रत्ययगोचरो न भवति, इदमिति गृह्यमाणत्वात्, बाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वाद्वा घटादिवदिति ।

(साङ्ख्यरीत्या देहात्मवादे प्रत्यक्षबाधः)

किञ्च— अपरार्थं स्वमात्मानमात्मार्थेऽन्यच्च जानतः ।
सङ्घातत्वात्परार्थेऽस्मिन् देहे कथमिवाऽऽत्मधीः ॥ ५ ॥

सर्वस्य बाह्याभ्यन्तरभोग्यवर्गस्य शब्दसुखादेरात्मार्थतां, भोक्तुश्चात्मनोऽनन्यार्थतां सर्वस्य शेषितां प्रत्यक्षतः प्रतिपद्यामहे । न च शरीरमनन्यार्थं संघातत्वात् । संघाता हि सर्वे परार्था दृष्टाः शयनासनरथादयः । न च संघातास्संहतशरीराद्यर्था दृश्यन्त इत्यात्मनोऽपि संहतत्वमापद्यत इति वाच्यम्, तथासति तस्यापि परार्थत्वप्रसङ्गात् । अपरार्थश्चायमात्मा

1. अविवादात् देहात्मवादिनापि तत्र तथैव निर्वाह्यत्वात् । स्फुटत्वादिति । भेदप्रतिभासाभावेपीति शेषः । 2. घटादौ मिथोभेदकत्वेन बहिस्सिद्धो य आकारस्तत्तुल्याकाराग्रहणात् समानाकारग्रहणाच्च भ्रम इति । 3. स्मरत्यप्यूहतीति पाठान्तरमयुक्तमिव । उपसर्गादस्त्यूहेर्वेति वार्तिकम् । 4. लौकिकप्रत्यक्षमुक्त्वा योगजप्रत्यक्षं दर्शयति । 5. एवमुपवर्णितं प्रत्यक्षस्यातिरिक्तग्राहित्वं प्रयोगाभिनयेन निष्कर्षति भवन्ति चेति । भवन्तिचेत्येतावन्मात्रोक्तावपि प्रयोगा इत्यर्थसिद्धम् । ईदृशसूक्तिशैल्या ईश्वरसिद्धौ बहुलमुपलम्भात् । 6. प्रकाशमानशरीरावयवकप्रतिभासभिन्नप्रतिभासत्वात् । 7. घटादाविति शेषः। न हि घटाविज्ञानं शरीरावयवविषयकम्; तद्वदिति भावः । 'यथा घटोऽयमिति प्रतिभास' इति प्र. । 'यथाऽयं घट इति प्रतिभास' इति आत्मसिद्धावेव पा० क्वचित् (डि. १५२८४)

प्रत्यक्षतः प्रकाशत इत्युक्तम् । योग्यानुपलम्भबाधितं चात्मनि संघातत्वम् । संघातान्तरार्थत्वे च, तस्यापि तथा, ततोऽन्यस्यापि तथेति न व्यवतिष्ठेत । न च व्यवस्थायां सत्यामव्यवस्था युक्ता । न च संघातस्य परार्थत्वे परस्य संहतत्वमपि प्रयोजकम् ; भोक्तृतयैवात्मनस्तदर्थ-संघातं प्रति पर[1]त्वोपपत्तेः । व्याप्त्यनुपयोगिनोपि दृष्टान्तदृष्टधर्ममात्रस्यानुरोधेनानु-मानमिच्छतः सर्वानुमानोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः ।

(चार्वाकदूषितानुमानोद्धारः)

अस्फुटत्वेपि भेदस्य शरीरे तदसंभवात् ।
तद्गुणान्तरवैधर्म्यादपि[2] ज्ञानं न तद्गुणः ॥ ६ ॥

[3]सर्व एव कार्यद्रव्यगतविशेषगुणः कारणगुणपूर्वक इति कथमतत्पूर्वकः शरीरे चैतन्य-गुणस्संभवेत् ।

(शक्तिदृष्टान्तभङ्गः)

यत्तु बार्हस्पत्यं वचनम्, 'पृथिव्यापस्तेजो वायुरिति तत्त्वानि तेभ्यश्चैतन्यं किण्वादि-भ्यो मदशक्तिवत्' इति—तदनुपपन्नम् । शक्तेरविशेषगुणत्वेन तथोपपत्तेः । सर्वद्रव्येषु [4]तत्कार्यसमधिगम्यस्तत्प्रतियोगी शक्त्याख्यो गुणः साधारणः ; नैवं चैतन्यम्, देहैकगुण-त्वाभ्युपगमात् ; [5]कार्यत्वे सति एकविधप्रत्यक्षसिद्धतया च विशेषगुणत्वात् । द्रव्यान्तर-संयोगसमासादितमदशक्तिभिरकार्यभूतैः परमाणुभिर्निजगुणपुरस्कारेण स्वकार्यद्रव्येषु मद-शक्त्युत्पादोऽपि नानुपपन्नः ।

(रागदृष्टान्तभङ्गः)

ताम्बूलरागस्तु पूर्वद्रव्यावयवविभागानन्तरं द्रव्यान्तरसंयोगजनितरक्तिमगुणैः कारणैः क्रियते । दृश्यते हि तत्रावयवेष्वपि प्रत्येकं रक्तिमगुणः । न च शरीरावयवेषु प्रत्येकं चैतन्यगुणः प्रज्ञायते प्रतिज्ञायते वा । तदुपगमे च एकशरीर एवानेकचेतनापा-तादङ्गाङ्गित्वाभावः [6]प्रतिसन्धानव्यवहारलोपश्च,[7] देवदत्तदृष्ट इव यज्ञदत्तादेः ।

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1. उद्देश्यत्वोपपत्तेः । सङ्घातं प्रत्युद्देश्यत्वे भोक्तृत्वशक्तिरेव प्रयोजिका ; न सङ्घातत्व-मिति । 2. अयावद्द्रव्यभावित्वादिरूपात् । 3. कारिकायां तदसंभवादिति संगृहीतं विवृणोति सर्व इति । 4. तेषां द्रव्याणां यत्कार्यं तत्समधिगम्यः । अयं न्यायसिद्धाञ्जनदृष्टः पाठः । (४२५. पु.) पा० तत्तत्कार्येति । तत्प्रतियोगी कार्यविषयकः । 5. चैतन्यं विशेषगुणः कार्यत्वे सत्येकेन्द्रिय-गुणत्वादिति । रूपत्वज्ञानत्वादौ व्यभिचारवारणाय सत्यन्तम् । अत्र गुणपदमद्रव्यार्थकम् । अतश्च कार्यत्वे सतीति मूलोक्तसार्थक्यम् । द्वीन्द्रियग्राह्यसंयोगादिवारणाय एकेति । त्वक्चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्ययोर्वायु-प्रभयोर्वारणाय गुणत्वम् । मास्तु वा तत् सामान्यगुणभिन्नत्वस्य साध्यत्वे । 6. उपकार्योपकार-कभावाभावः । 7. प्रतिसन्धानस्य व्यवहारस्य च लोपः ।

(चित्ररूपदृष्टान्तभङ्गः)

यत्तु—अकारणगुणपूर्वकं चित्ररूपं पटे इति—तन्न। [1]नानारूपता हि चित्रता। सा च नानारूपैस्तन्तुभिः क्रियत इति किमनुपपन्नमिति। प्रत्येकमविद्यमानमपि तच्चित्ररूपं तन्तुषु संहतेषु दृश्यत एव, चित्रा इमे तन्तव इति। संभूय च तेषां पटारम्भकत्वम्। एवं तत्कारणेष्वपि तदिति न क्वचिद्व्यभिचारः। न चैकरूपनियमाभावेनावयविनोऽचाक्षुषत्वम्, महत्त्वैकार्थसमवायिना रूपवत्त्वेनैव चाक्षुषत्वसिद्धेः। अस्तु वा चित्रं नाम एको रूपविशेषः। स तु रूपैरेव कारणगतैर्नानाविधैरारभ्यत इति दृष्टम्। न चैवमवयववर्तिभिरेव [2]चैतन्यैरवयविनि शरीरे चैतन्यविशेषारम्भः, चितितन्मात्रस्यैव तेष्वसंभवात्[3]। अतो न देहगुणश्चैतन्यम्। एतेन सुखादयोपि शरीरगुणाः प्रत्युक्ताः।

(तद्गुणान्तरवैधर्म्यरूपहेतूपपादनम्)

अपिच[4] दृढ एव शरीरे विरोधिगुणापातमन्तरेण कुसुम—विलेप[5]नगन्ध इव निवर्तमानः चैतन्यसुखादिर्न तद्गुणो भवितुमर्हति, न खलु तद्विशेषगुणा रूपादयस्तथा निवर्तन्ते। [6]आत्मनः परेषाञ्च शरीरगुणाः प्रत्यक्षयोग्याः, बाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्याश्च; न च तथा ज्ञानादिरिति नासौ तद्गुणः।

(अनेकहेत्वन्तरोपन्यासः)

किञ्च— उत्पत्तिमत्त्वात् पारार्थ्यात् सन्निवेशविशेषतः।
रूपादिमत्त्वात् भूतत्वात् देहो नात्मा घटादिवत् ॥ ७ ॥
सच्छिद्रत्वाददेहित्वात् देहत्वान्मृतदेहवत्।
इत्यादिसाधनैर्न्याय्यैः[7]निषेध्या वर्ष्मणश्चितिः ॥ ८ ॥

(देहात्मभावसाधकोक्तव्यतिरेकिदूषणम्)

एवं [8]प्रत्यक्षविरोधात्, अन्वयमुखेन साध्यमुपस्थापयद्भिरुदीरितसाधनैरपह्नु[9]तविषय-

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1. अनेकविजातीयरूपत्वं चित्रशब्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम्; न रूपसमुदायत्वम्। नीलादिरूपाण्येव चित्ररूपम्। तत् अवयविनीवावयवेष्वप्यस्तीति भावः।

2. अनुद्भूतचैतन्यैरित्यर्थः। 3. अनुद्भूतानामुद्भूताजनकत्वाच्च। 3. तद्गुणान्तरवैधर्म्यादित्युक्तमुपपादयति। स्वविरोधिगुणाभावविशिष्टस्वाश्रयसत्ताकालाव्यापित्वं हेतुः। काठिन्यादौ व्यभिचार इति विशिष्टान्तम्। 5. विलेपनं मृगमदादि। 6. चैतन्यं न शरीरगुणः पराग्राह्यत्वात् बहिरिन्द्रियाग्राह्यत्वाच्चेति वैधर्म्यान्तरद्वयमाह। 7 प्रतिज्ञादिसमुदायो न्यायः, तदनपेतैः। 8. अनिदमर्थभूतानन्यार्थात्मविषयकप्रत्यक्षविरोधात्; नेशत इत्यत्रावन्यः। 9. विषयः साध्यं तदपहारो नाम बाधः। अन्वय्यपेक्षया व्यतिरेकिणो दुर्बलाः, व्यतिरेकव्याप्तेरन्वयव्याप्तिसंपादनमुखेन कार्यकरत्वस्वीकारात्। समबलत्वेपि प्रत्यक्षोपष्टब्धत्वात् प्रकृते प्राबल्यम्।

तयेन्द्रियाश्रयत्वादिव्यतिरेकिहेतवो न साध्यमुपस्थापयितुमीशते ॥

(इन्द्रियात्मत्वशङ्का)

सन्तु तर्हीन्द्रियाण्येवाऽऽत्मा। न च तानीदन्तया प्रथन्ते, येन देहवत् अहङ्कारगोचरात् बहिष्क्रियेरन्। नापि तथोद्भूतरूपादिगुणानि, स्थूलानि; येन तत्प्रतिभास इवेन्द्रियगोचरत्वे अहम्प्रत्ययस्य रूपावयवादिप्रतीतिः प्रसज्येत। तद्व्यापारफलञ्च ज्ञानं तद्वामि युक्तम्, [1]स्नानाध्ययनादिफलवत्। अत एव सत्यतपाः, 'द्रष्टुश्चक्षुषः' इति।

(तत्खण्डनम्)

तन्न — विकल्पासहत्वात्। तथाहि—किं प्रत्येकमिन्द्रियाणि चेतनानि, संभूय वा? यदि प्रत्येकम्, इन्द्रियान्तरदृष्टस्येन्द्रियान्तरेण प्रतिसन्धानं न स्यात्। अस्ति च तत्—यमहमद्राक्षं, तमहं स्पृशामीति। अत एव न संभूयापि चेतनत्वम्। न हि पञ्चभिरिन्द्रियैस्संभूयैकं वस्त्वनुभूयते, अनुसन्धीयते वा। एकेन्द्रियविगमे च प्रा[2]यणप्रसङ्गश्च। इन्द्रियचैतन्ये च तत्तदिन्द्रियापाये तत्तदिन्द्रियार्थस्मरणमपि न भवेत्। न च तद्व्या[3]पारफलतया तत्समवायित्वं ज्ञानस्य, शस्त्रादिव्यापारजन्मनोऽपि पापादेः परसमवायित्वात्। अन्य[4]था च प्रष्टुः मृत्युप(मृत्याः?)पत्तिं शरणागतपरित्यागस्य नृशंसताञ्चालोच्य सत्यतपसस्तथावचनम् ॥

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1. उक्तं हि, 'ज्योतिष्टोमे तीर्थे स्नातीति विहितस्नानफलं स्नातृगतमालिन्यापनयादि; न तु क्रतुगतोपकारः (मी. ६-४-९); अध्ययनफलञ्चाध्येतृगतार्थज्ञानाक्षरग्रहणादि; न त्वाचार्यस्याचार्यकसिद्ध्यादि (मी०. १ १-१) इति। 2. प्रायणं मरणम्। 3. ज्ञानमिन्द्रियनिष्ठं तद्व्यापारजन्यत्वादिति शस्त्रावृत्तिनि आत्मनिष्ठे पापेऽनेकान्तिकम्। 4. अन्यथा–अकथने। कुत्र वराह इति प्रष्टुः तदकथने क्षुधा मृत्यापत्तिः; कथने चाश्रमागतवराहत्यागाच्छरणागतत्याग इत्यालोच्य किमपि सत्यतपसोक्तम्। अतो न तत् तत्त्वसाधकमिति। इमौ व्याधवराहौ ऋषिगुणपरीक्षार्थमागताविन्द्राविष्णू। प्रभाकरविजये, "अत एव वचनं सत्यतपसः, द्रष्टुश्चक्षुषो नास्ति जिह्वेति" इति, "यत्तु सात्यतपसं वचनम्, तत् शरणागतपरित्राणस्यावश्यकर्तव्यतामन्यथा च व्याधस्य प्राणयात्रापत्तिञ्चाऽऽलोच्योक्तमिति न दोषः" इति च। श्रीवराहपुराणे (९८ अ.) 'यदि तं दर्शयाम्यस्मै वराहं हन्यते तदा। नो चेत् कुटुम्बः क्षुधया सीदत्यस्य न संशयः', 'द्रष्टुश्चक्षुर्निहितं जङ्गमेषु जिह्वा वक्तुं मृगयौ तद्विसृष्टम्। द्रष्टुश्चक्षुर्नास्ति जिह्वेह वक्तुं जिह्वायास्स्यात्तत्त्वतोऽस्तीह चक्षुः' इति। अत्रैवं शुद्धपाठः स्यात्, 'द्रष्टुश्चक्षुर्निहितं जङ्गमेषु जिह्वा वक्तुं मृगयो। तद्विसृष्टम्। द्रष्टुश्चक्षुषो नास्ति जिह्वेह वक्तुं जिह्वाया वा....इत्येवम्। द्रष्टृत्वं चक्षुषः; वक्तृत्वं जिह्वायाः न चैकाधीनमन्यदिति तदर्थः। स्वानुपयुक्तमिदमिति व्याध उपेक्ष्य गच्छतु इति धिया कालहरणार्थं कृतोऽयं वादः स्वस्यासत्यवचस्त्वपरिहाराय।

(मनआत्मवादोपक्षेपः)

अस्तु तर्हि मन एव चेतनम् । तथासति हि पूर्वोक्ता दोषाः परिहृता भवन्ति । तद्धि सर्वेन्द्रियाध्यक्षं प्रज्ञायते प्रतिज्ञायते च । उपपद्यते चेन्द्रियान्तरेण प्रतिसन्धानम्, दर्शनानुसन्धानाधारस्य मनस एकत्वात्। तत्तदिन्द्रियापायेपि स्मरणमप्युपपद्यत एव, मनसो नित्यत्वात्।

(तत्खण्डनम्)

तदपि न—करणत्वात् चक्षुरादिवत् । बाह्यान्तरसकलविषयसंवेदनकरणतया हि मनः प्रकल्प्यते । [1]बाह्येन्द्रियेषु यथायथं निजविषयसन्निकर्षभागिष्वपि यतो न युगपदेव सर्वे विषयाः प्रतीयन्ते, अतोऽवगच्छामः, 'अस्ति किञ्चिदपरमपि साधनम्, यत्साहायकविरहान्न सर्वे प्रकाशन्ते; कश्चिदेवैकः प्रतीयते' इति । तथा सुखादिसंवेदनान्यपि करणवन्ति क्रियात्वात्, संवेदनत्वाद्वा रूपादिज्ञानवदिति । तदेवं ज्ञानकरणतयाऽवगतस्य मनसः कथमिव ज्ञाने कर्तृत्वम् । स्वातन्त्र्यलक्षणं हि तत् । तच्च[2] स्वच्छन्दानुरोधेन साध्यसिद्ध्यनुगुणोपकरणसंपादनसामर्थ्यम्, स्वसमवेतमेव वा गुणान्तरं तन्त्रीकृत्य प्रवृत्तिः । करणत्वं तु पराधिष्ठानाधीनव्यापारतारूपपारतन्त्र्यनियतं साधकतमत्वमिति कथमिवैकत्र मनसि परस्परविरुद्धतदुभयधर्मसम्बन्धं प्रतिपद्येमहि । अथ तदपि मनः करणान्तरेण स्मरणादिषु कर्तृभावमनुभवति, तथासति संज्ञामात्रे विवादः। य एव हि चक्षुरादिभिः रूपादीन्, अन्तःकरणेन च सुखादींश्चेतयते, स एवात्मा। तस्मिन्नेव चेन्मनस्संज्ञा निवेश्यते, कामं निवेश्यताम् । न नः किञ्चित् हीनम् । किन्तु तदा सर्वलौकिकव्यवहारो बाध्येतेत्यलमनेन ।

(उक्तमनस्सिद्धिप्रकाराक्षेपः)

[3]आह—किमिदं मनो नाम ॥ ननूक्तमान्तरं ज्ञानकरणं द्रव्यमिति ॥ किं पुनरस्य साधनम् ? ॥ ननूक्तं "युगपद्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गम्" इति ॥ उक्तं नाम । तथापि कथं तत्त्वान्तरसिद्धिः । कल्पयित्वाऽपि हि तत् युगपत्स्मरणानुत्पत्त्युपपत्तयेऽवश्याश्रयणीयमेव निमित्तान्तरम् । सन्ति हि [4]युगपदस्य स्मर्तुर्नानार्थानुभवभाविताः संस्काराः; अथ च न सर्वे स्मर्यन्ते; किञ्चिदेव कदाचित् स्मर्यते । संस्कारोन्मेषहेतूपनिपातक्रमात् तथात्वमिति चेत्, एवमपि प्रणिधानमात्राद्बोधनीयसंस्कारस्य स्मृतियौगपद्यमापद्येत । यावदनुभूतसकलविषय-

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1. बाह्यान्तरेत्यत्र बाह्यमादावुपाद्यते । इन्द्रियं ज्ञानजनने मनस्संयोगरूपकारणसापेक्षमित्यर्थः । तदुक्तम्-युगपद्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गम् (न्या० १-१-१६) इति । तथेत्यादिना आन्तरेत्येतदुपपाद्यते । 2. स्वतन्त्रः कर्तेत्युक्तं स्वातन्त्र्यं शक्तिविशेषः, स्वेच्छाधीनप्रवृत्तिर्वा । अचेतनगतप्रवृत्तिवारणाय तन्त्रीकृत्येत्यन्तम् । 3. उक्तं मनस्साधनप्रकारमाक्षिपति आहेत्यादिना, 'उच्यते-यदि बुद्धिरेव मन (२४-पु.)' इत्यतः प्राक्तनेन ग्रन्थेन । 4. युगपदिति सन्तीत्यत्रान्वेति ; स्मर्यन्त इत्यत्रानुषज्यते ।

सुस्मूर्षया [1]सर्वतः प्रत्याहृतचेतसस्साधारण्येन प्रणिदधतोऽपि न सर्व एवार्थाः स्मृतिमधिरोहन्ति। यदि तु शुभाशुभरूपतया स्मरणानामदृष्टवशात् व्यवस्था, क्रम[2]ज्ञानस्वाभाव्याद्वा (व्यवस्थाक्रमः ज्ञानस्वाभाव्याद्वा) आत्मनः, तथासति बहिरिन्द्रियेषु च यथायथं स्वविषयसंप्रयुक्तेषु तथैव युगपद्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिरुपपद्यत इति कृतमिन्द्रियान्तरेण।

(सुखाद्यसमवायिसंयोगाश्रयतया मनस्सिद्ध्याक्षेपः)

स्यान्मतम्--कादाचित्कस्य सुखादेरात्मसमवायिनो बाह्यविषयादृष्टादिनिमित्तकारणस्यासमवायिकारणेन भाव्यम्। तच्चात्ममनस्सन्निकर्ष इति मनोद्रव्यसिद्धिरिति—तदसत्—सुखदुःखादिपूर्वकालजन्मनोऽभिमतानभिमतविषयसंपर्कजज्ञानस्याऽऽत्मसमवायिन एवासमवायिकारणत्वात्। [3]तस्य च विषयसंप्रयुक्तेन्द्रियसंप्रयोग एवात्मसमवेतोऽसमवायिकारणम्। तद्धेतुरपीन्द्रियव्यापारः प्रयत्नमदृष्टञ्चात्मसमवेतमपेक्षमाणादात्मेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादसमवायिकारणात्। प्रयत्नस्य तु स्वपूर्वक्षणवर्ति कर्तव्यताज्ञानम्। प्रयत्न एव त्वदृष्टस्यापीति नात्मविशेषगुणानां बुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छादीनामसमवायिकारणसापेक्षतयापि द्रव्यान्तरपरिकल्पनं न्याय्यम्।

(आत्मगुणस्य संयोगैकासमवायिकारणकत्वसाधकभङ्गः)

यत्तु—नित्यद्रव्यविशेषगुणस्य द्रव्यान्तरसंयोग एवासमवायिकारणम्, पार्थिवपरमाणुषु अग्निसंयोगादसमवायिकारणात् रूपोत्पत्तेरिति-तदपि स्थवीयः। पार्थिवपरमाणुषु रूपादयो दहनसंयोगादिति कुतोऽवगतम्? कार्यद्रव्ये तथा दर्शनादिति चेत्—इह वा तर्हि किं न दृश्यते, [4]इष्टानिष्टप्राप्त्यवगमानन्तरं सुखादिर्जायत इति। दृष्टकारणव्यभिचारे हि कारणान्तरानुमानावसरः। न चेहास्ति व्यभिचारः। अतः प्रसिद्धकारणभावेष्वेव यत्र

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1. सुस्मूर्षया-स्मर्तुमिच्छया। 2. एकदा एकज्ञानजनकत्वमात्मनस्स्वभावः। समबलनानाज्ञानसामग्रीकाले ज्ञानविशेषप्राथम्येऽदृष्टं नियामकम्। 3. तस्यचेत्यादि। अत्रायं (प्रकरणपञ्चिका. तत्त्वा) ग्रन्थोऽनुसंधेयः-"तच्चात्ममनस्संनिकर्षाख्यम्। तस्य चासमवायिकारणं मानस एव परिस्पन्दः। तस्याप्यात्ममनस्सनिकर्षान्तरमात्मसमवेतं प्रयत्नमदृष्टञ्चापेक्षमाणमसमायिकारणम्। प्रयत्नादृष्टयोश्चात्मनस्सन्निकर्षान्तरमेवेत्यनादिरेषा कार्यकारणपरम्परा" इति। आत्मसिद्धिग्रन्थे चात्र मनःस्थाने इन्द्रियमेवोक्तम्। विभुतयाऽऽत्मेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षस्य सूपपादत्वात् तद्धेतुरित्यनेन विशेषणसंप्रयोगहेतुत्वं विवक्षितं स्यात्। यद्वा विशेष्यभूतेन्द्रियसंप्रयोगपरत्वमेवाऽस्तु; तस्यापि क्रियामन्तरेणायोगात् इन्द्रियक्रियाजन्यतया पञ्चिकाग्रन्थ इवार्थवर्णनसंभवात्।

4. रूपादि प्रति रूपाद्येवासमवायिकारणमिति नियमः क्वचिदग्निसंयोगान्वयव्यतिरेकबलात् यथा भज्यते, तथा नित्यगतगुणस्य संयोगासमवायिकारणकत्वमपि आत्मनि पूर्वपूर्वगुणान्वयव्यतिरेकबलात् भज्यताम्; किमप्रसिद्धसंयोगतदाश्रयकल्पनेन असमवायिलक्षणे ज्ञानादिभिन्नत्वनिवेशेन चेति भावः।

कार्यसमवायः, तत् समवायिकारणम् । यत्तु तत्प्रत्यासन्नम्, तत् असमवायि ; यत् अन्यत्, तत् निमित्तमिति व्यवस्थाश्रयणमुचितम् ; न त्वनपेक्षितप्रसिद्धद्रव्यान्तरसंयोगाभ्युपगमेन तस्यासमवायिकारणत्वाश्रयणम् ; कारणान्तरानुपलब्धेः । दृष्टानुसाराच्चाणुगतरूपादौ तथाभ्युपगमः । इह तु तद्विपर्ययः प्रदर्शित एव ।

(संयोगासमवायिकारणकत्वेप्यभीष्टमनोऽसिद्धिः)

एव[1]मपि व्याप्तिबलेन यो (यदि) द्रव्यान्तरसंयोगोऽनुमातव्यः, स तर्हि स्पर्शवद्द्रव्यसमवेतो भौतिक[2] एव चोपलब्ध इति प्रसिद्धदेहादिसंयोग एवानुमानपर्यवसानान्न नवमद्रव्यसिद्धिः । अथोच्येत—भौतिकत्वे हि मनसः पृथिव्याद्यन्यतमत्वेन भवितव्यम् । तच्चानुमानान्तरैर्व्यतिरेकमापादयद्भिः प्रत्यासिद्धम् । तथा[3]हि—न पार्थिवं मनः, रसावगमनिमित्तेन्द्रियत्वात् रसनावत् ; न पाथसीयम्, गन्धग्रहणनिमित्तेन्द्रियत्वात् घ्राणवत् । एवमतैजसत्वाद्यपि तत्तदिन्द्रियागोचरग्रहणनिमित्ततया शक्याध्यवसानमित्यभौतिकत्वं मनस इति-तत् अनुपपन्नम्, धर्मिविशे[4]षविपरीतसाधनात् । रसावगमनिमित्तेन्द्रियत्वमपार्थिवत्वमिव पाथसीयत्वमपि समर्थयते(ति) । एवं साधनान्तराण्यपि भूतान्तरव्यतिरेकमिवाऽऽत्मीयभूतभावमापादयन्ति । अथ शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धेषु यद्गुण[5]ग्राहि यदिन्द्रियम्, तदेव तद्गुणकभूतारब्धम्—हन्त तर्हि तदेव तदितरभूतव्यतिरेकितयाप्यवगतमिति [7]न तदवगमकतामात्रेणाभिमतव्यतिरेकसिद्धिः । अपि च शब्दादिगुणावगमसाधारणसाधन[4]तया शरीरमिव पाञ्चभौतिकम्, एकद्वित्रादिमयं वेतरभूतसंसृष्टमस्तु मनः । तथाऽऽम्नायते, 'अन्नमयं[8] हि सोम्य मनः' (छा. ६. ४) इति ।

ननु तन्न तत्प्रकृतित्वप्रतिपादनपरम्, अपितु तदधीनप्रवृत्तितामात्रप्रदर्शनार्थम्, 'आपोमयः प्राणः' इत्यादिवत् । अत एवापवर्गदशायामपि मनोऽनुवृत्तिः । दर्शितं हि तत्रैवाष्टमे,

1. संयोगासमवायिकारणकत्वाऽऽग्रहेपि मनसो भौतिकत्वापत्त्येष्टासिद्धिरित्याह एवमपीति । 2. भौतिके भूतपरिणामे । अनेन स्पर्शवद्द्रव्यस्य तस्यानित्यत्वमप्युक्तम् । 3. ज्ञानासमवायिकारणसंयोगाश्रयवस्तु न भौतिकं पार्थिवादिव्यतिरिक्तत्वादित्यनुमानम् । तत्र प्रत्येकव्यतिरेकं साधयति तथाहीति ।

4. धर्मिणि पक्षे अभिमतो यो विशेषः अभौतिकत्वम्, तद्विपरीतपाथसीयत्वादिसाधनात् हेतुर्विशेषविरुद्ध इति । 5. यद्गुणग्राहि-यद्गुणमात्रग्राहि । 6. गन्धमात्रग्राहिता पृथिवीमात्रारब्धत्वे प्रयोजिका, घ्राणे पृथिवीतरानारब्धत्वविशिष्टपृथिव्यारब्धत्ववर्गनात् । अतो मनसि गन्धमात्रग्राहित्वाभावात् तन्मात्रारब्धत्वाभावसिद्धावपि न तदारब्धत्वासिद्धिरिति भावः । 7. साधनतयेति । इयं शरीरदृष्टान्तेन भौतिकत्वसाधकहेतुः । भौतिकत्वं सकलभूतोपादानकत्वं वा किञ्चिद्भूतोपादानकत्वविशिष्टान्यभूताप्यायितत्वं वा । 8. उपनिषद्वाक्यमिदं उपरि उदाहरिष्यते । तत्र यथासिद्धान्तं धर्मभूतज्ञानपरत्वे मनःपदं स्वरसम् । वक्ष्यति च मनश्शब्दस्येह बुद्ध्यनतिरेकं स्वयमेव ।

'मनसैतान् कामान् पश्यन् रमते', 'मनोऽस्य दैवं चक्षुः' इति । तथा परस्याश्च देवतायाः, "सोऽन्यं कामं मनसा ध्यायीत" इति महोपनिषदि । 'मनसैव जगत्सृष्टिम्' इति च पुराणे ।

(मनसो बुद्ध्यन्तर्भावः)

उच्यते, सत्यमेवम् । द्रव्यान्तरपरिकल्पनातो वरमेवं वाऽऽश्रयणमित्युक्तम् । परमार्थतस्तु न भौतिकम् ; नापि [1]नवमं द्रव्यम् । क तर्हीदानीं मनश्शब्दः ; बुद्धावेव । अत एव हि बुद्धिमान् मनस्वीति व्यपदिश्यते । मनसोऽवस्थाभेदाश्च द्रागेवापरोक्ष्यन्ते, क्षुभितं मे मनः, प्रसन्नं मे मनः' इति । एवञ्च मनसः करणतया [2]व्यपदेशो बुद्ध्यहंकारयोरिव वृत्तिभेदप्रदर्शनपरः पूर्वेषामिति । (मनोऽचैतन्यनिगमनम्)

[3]उच्यते—यदि बुद्धिरेव मनः, यदि वा द्रव्यान्तरम्, उभयथापि तस्य न चेतनत्वमिति किमनेनाप्रतिज्ञातस्वरूपविमर्शेन ॥

(प्राणात्मवादोपक्षेपः)

अस्तु तर्हि प्राण [4]एवाऽऽत्मा, तथासति तदन्वयिनि शरीरे सात्मकत्वप्रतीतिः, तद्विरहिणि निरात्मकत्वप्रतीतिश्चोपपद्येयाताम् । देहादुत्क्रान्तिर्लोकान्तरगमनं देहान्तरसञ्चारश्चोपपद्यन्तेतराम्, गत्वरस्वाभाव्यात् प्राणस्य । [5]इतरथा परममहतो महतश्च स्पर्शविरहिणः परिस्पन्दानुपपत्तेरुत्क्रान्तिगत्यागतिश्रुतयो भाक्तास्स्युः ।

(तत्खण्डनम्)

इदमप्यसत्, वायुत्वादेव बाह्यवायुवत् प्राणस्य चैतन्यानुपपत्तेः । [6]वृत्तिहीनेऽप्यात्मनि

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1. नवमिति तार्किकं प्रति तदनुसारेण । 2. बुद्ध्यपेक्षया पृथक्करणतया व्यपदेशः इत्यर्थः । एकमेव करणं मत्यध्यवसायाभिमानचिन्तावृत्तिभेदान्मनोबुध्यहङ्कारचित्तशब्दैर्व्यपदिश्यत इति । यद्वा मनसो भौतिकत्व इव सात्त्विकाहङ्कारजन्यत्वेऽपि मोक्षदशानुवृत्त्ययोगादत्र बुद्धिपदं धर्मभूतज्ञानपरम् । तदेव मन इति । अतएवात्रावस्थाभेदानामपरोक्षत्वकथनमपि सुश्लिष्टम् ; **मनसः करणतयेत्यत्र** पृथगिति शब्दाश्रवणच्च । अयमर्थः-धर्मभूतज्ञानस्य कार्यगुणात्मकस्य करणतया व्यपदेशो वृत्तिभेदात् । ज्ञानद्रव्यमेवेन्द्रियसंयोग-संस्कारादिव्यापारं सत् करणम् । तदेव प्रत्यक्षस्मरणाद्यवस्थापन्नं कार्यम् । करणावस्थायामेव मनश्शब्दः ; यथाऽहङ्कारे बुद्धिशब्दस्तत्पदविवक्षितवृत्त्यन्यवृत्तिविवक्षयेति । 3. एवं द्रव्यान्तरप्रतिक्षेपे सिद्धान्त्येकदेशिना कृते स्वयमुपयुक्तमुत्तरमाह **उच्यत** इति । 4. प्राणस्येन्द्रियादिसर्वनिर्वाहकतया श्रैष्ठ्यं लोकवेदप्रसिद्धम् । 5. **इतरथेति** । आत्मा न स्वयमुत्क्रान्तिगत्यागतिमान् परममहत्त्वात्, महत्त्वे सति स्पर्शरहितत्वाच्चेति उत्क्रान्त्यादिरहितोऽप्यात्मा शरीराद्युपकरणगतमुत्क्रान्त्यादिकमादाय तद्वत्तयोपचर्यत इति वक्तव्यमतिरिक्तात्मवादे । प्राणात्मवादे न स क्लेश इति भावः । 6. ज्ञानादिक्रियाहीने ।

सुषुप्तौ प्राणस्य वृत्तिमत्त्वाच्च । तद्वृत्त्या हि सुप्तस्यापि सप्त[1]धातुभावेन [2]अशितपीतद्रव्यपरिणामः, श्वासप्रश्वासौ च । [3]तनुतरतेजोऽवन्नानुविद्धः कौष्ठ्यमारुतो हि प्राणः । स च कण्ठमुखनासाभ्यन्तरे बहिश्च रेचितः त्वचा स्पृश्यमानो घटादिरिव स्फुटमनात्मतया चकास्ति ।

[4]किञ्च—निरस्तो देहचैतन्यप्रतिषेधप्रकारतः ।
प्राणात्मवादो न पृथक् प्रयोजयति दूषणम् ॥ ९ ॥

[5]अविभुत्वेनास्याऽऽत्मनः (अविभोरात्मनः) स्पर्शविरहिणोऽपि प्रय[6]त्नादृष्टप्रेरणानुगुण्येन मनस इवोत्क्रान्तिगत्याद(त्यागत)यो युज्यन्त इति न तन्निर्देशानाममुख्यार्थता । परिमाण[7]-निरूपणेऽप्येतत् भविष्यतीत्यलमधुना ॥

(धिय आत्मत्वशङ्का-भाष्यार्थदर्पणसहित भाष्यग्रन्थे पु. 43)

भवतु तर्हि संविदेवाऽऽत्मा अजडत्वात् । जडत्वप्रति[8]बद्धं ह्यनात्म्यं घटादिषु दृष्टम् । जडत्वञ्च संविदो निवर्तमानं तदपि निवर्तयति । अजडत्वञ्च संविदः सत्तयैव प्रकाशमानत्वात् । न हि सती संवित् घटादिरिवाप्रकाशमानाऽवतिष्ठते, येन परायत्तसिद्धिरास्थीयेत ।

(भाट्टमतेन धियो जडत्वशङ्का)

स्यान्मतम्—जातायामपि संविदि विषयमात्रं प्रथते । न खलु नीलमिति प्रतियन्तः तदैव अनील[9]मनिदंरूपमपि संवेदनं प्रतीमः । अतः स्वरूपसत्यैव संविदा इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षेणेव

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1. रसासृङ्मांसमेदोऽस्थिमज्जाशुक्राणि धातवः । अन्नादेःरसाद्युत्तरोत्तरात्मना क्रमेण परिणामः । 2. प्राणविशेषो हि समानाख्यो जाठराग्नेः सहायीभूय भुक्तपीतयोः परिणामं जनयति । उक्तञ्च प्रश्नोपनिषदि, कानि स्वपन्ति सुषुप्तौ, कानि जाग्रतीति पृष्ट्वा, प्राणविशेषाः अग्निश्च जाग्रतीति । 3. तनुतरेत्यत्र तनुगतेत्यपि स्यात् । कौष्ठ्यमारुतः शरीरे जठरसंबन्धी समानोपि प्राण एव । स हृदयादिप्रदेशे त्वगिन्द्रियाग्राह्योपि कण्ठान्तरे मुखान्तरे नासिकान्तरे च अहमिदं स्पृशामीति आत्मभिन्नत्वेन इदन्त्वेनानुभूयत एवेत्यर्थः । 4. किञ्चेति । सावयवे देहे किं प्रत्यवयवं चैतन्यम् अवयविनि वेत्यादि विकल्पदूषणादिकं भाव्यमिति । 5. अविभुत्वेनेति । परममहत्त्वादिर्हेतुरसिद्ध इति भावः । 6. स्वप्रयत्नस्य, अदृष्टस्य, मुक्तावीश्वरादिप्रेरणायाश्चानुरोधेन । 7. व्यापीत्येतद्विवरणासरे । 8. जडत्वप्रतिबद्धं जडत्वव्याप्यम् । प्रतिबन्धः-व्याप्तिः । व्यापक निवृत्तौ व्याप्यनिवृत्तिरनुभवसिद्धा । अतो व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिमुखेनास्य हेतुत्वमिति भावः । सत्तयैव प्रकाशमानत्वात्-स्वेतरानधीनप्रकाशवत्त्वात् । अयं हेतुरसिद्धः अनुमानाधीनप्रकाशत्वादिति भाट्टः शंकते स्यादिति । न खल्विति । (भा. भा. ३९.) नीलमिदमिति ज्ञानं न ज्ञानप्रकाशकम् नीलेदमर्थमात्राकारवत्त्वात् । ज्ञानस्य नीलात् इदमर्थाच्च भिन्नत्वादित्यर्थः ।

विषयः प्रकाश्यते । ततश्च तद्गतागन्तुकप्रका[1]शातिशयदर्शनेन पश्चात् संविदनुमास्यत इति ।

(ज्ञातताखण्डनेनाजडत्वोपपादनम्)

तन्न ; ज्ञानव्यतिरेकिणोऽर्थधर्मस्य प्रकाशस्य निपुणमपि निरीक्षमाणानां रूपादिवत् अनुपलब्धेः । उभयाभ्युपेतसंविदैव संकलव्यवहारोपपत्तौ च तत्कल्पनानुपपत्तेः । वित्तिवेदितृप्रतिभासशून्यायां च विषयवित्तावभ्युपगम्यमानायां, 'घटस्तावदयम्, अहं तु जानामि न वेति न ज्ञायते' इति च कदाचित् प्रतिभासः स्यात् । न चैवमस्ति ॥

[2]अतीतानागतविषयग्रहणस्मरणेषु व्याहारव्यवहारयोरभावे, भावेपि, ततः प्रागेव विदितत्वप्रतीतेः नानुमानिकी तत्र विषयप्रकाशसिद्धिः, नतरां तत्पूर्विका तत्र बुद्धिसिद्धिः । तथाहि-केनचित् प्रेरितः प्रणिधाय स्मृत्वाऽनन्तरमेव प्रतिवदति, स्मृतमद्य मयेति । न चायमेव व्याहारस्तत्र लिङ्गम्, तत्पूर्वक[3]त्वात्, अन्योन्याश्रयणापत्तेश्च । स्व[4]व्याहारेण स्वज्ञानानुमानं क इव निरपत्रपः प्रतिजानीत ?

(स्वयंप्रकाशत्वे हेत्वन्तरम् भा. भा 40-42)

अन्यच्च—यत्सम्बन्धादर्थान्तरे यो व्यवहारः, [5]धर्मभेदो वा, स तस्मिन्नुपलभ्य

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1. **प्रकाशः** प्राकट्यं मीमांसकसंमता ज्ञातता ; तद्रूपोऽतिशयः । **अनुमास्यत** इति । नीलेदमर्थ प्रकाशः कारणजन्यः कादाचित्कत्वादित्यनुमाने, स तत्पुरुषगतकारणजन्यः, तं पुरुषं प्रत्येव भावात् इति कारणस्य पुरुषगतत्वसिद्धौ परिशेषात् ज्ञानमेव तदिति सिद्ध्यतीति भावः । इदमेव ज्ञातता ज्ञानजन्या ज्ञाततात्वादित्यादिरूपेण कैश्चिल्लिख्यते ॥ घटः प्रकाशते, घटो ज्ञातः इत्यादिव्यवहारेण ज्ञानघटयोः संबन्धमात्रं सिद्ध्येत् । ज्ञानजन्यः प्रकाशो नाम विलक्षणो धर्मस्तु न सिध्यति । अतस्तदसिद्धौ न तेन ज्ञानानुमानमित्याह **तन्ने**ति । **वित्ती**ति । विषयेण सह ज्ञानं ज्ञाता अहमर्थश्च भासत इति प्राभाकरपक्षः । तदुभयभानं विना विषयभानमात्रस्वीकारे इत्यर्थः । **इति चे**ति चकारेण ज्ञानं जातं न वा, जातस्य ज्ञानस्याश्रयोऽहं वाऽन्यो वेति प्रतिभासावपि स्यातामिति च दर्श्यते ।

2. किञ्चातीताद्यर्थानुमानादिस्थले प्राकट्यदर्शनायोगात् कथं प्राकट्येन बुध्यनुमानम् ? तत्र वाचिकव्याहारेण कायिकहानोपादानादिना वा प्राकट्यानुमानमिति न ; तत्र तयोरभावेपि विदितत्वज्ञानसत्त्वात् । तयोर्भावेपि, तदुत्पत्तेः प्रागेव विदितत्वज्ञानाच्च । 3. अयं शब्दप्रयोग एतज्ज्ञानजनक इति ज्ञात्वा किल व्याहारः क्रियते । ततो ज्ञानज्ञानं प्रागेवापेक्षितमिति । 4. परव्याहारं श्रुत्वा तेन परज्ञानानुमानमिष्टम् । यस्मादहमेवं व्याहरामि, तस्मादेतद्विषये मे ज्ञानमस्तीति ज्ञायते इति स्वज्ञानानुमानं तु न कश्चिदिच्छेदिति । 5. **धर्मभेद**-प्राकट्यम् । अतिरिक्तात्मसत्त्वे तदधीनप्रकाशा संवित् स्वयंप्रकाशा न स्यादिति च भावः । अत्र अनुभूतिरनन्याधीनस्वव्यवहारा अनभूतिरनन्याधीनस्वधर्मा च, स्वसंबन्धादर्थान्तरे तथाव्यवहारहेतुत्वात् तथाविधधर्महेतुत्वाच्चेति अनुमानद्वयम् । अत्र विस्तरः श्रुतप्रकाशिकादौ ।

मानस्तत्स्वरूपप्रयुक्तः, न तु तत्सम्बन्धनिबन्धनः । यथा सत्तासंबन्धात् पृथिव्यादिषु सद्व्यवहारः रूपसम्बन्धाच्च चाक्षुषत्वं [1]सत्तायां रूपे च । एवं संवित्सम्बन्धात् प्रवर्तमानो घटादिषु प्रकाशत(?) इति व्यवहारः, प्रकाशमानत्वं वा धर्मः संविदि तु परिदृश्यमानो न संवित्सम्बन्धापेक्षः, अपितु तत्स्वरूपप्रयुक्त इति स्वयंप्रकाशत्वात् सैवात्मेति ।

(लाघवादपि संविदतिरिक्तात्मनिरासः)

किञ्च योऽपि संविदोऽन्यं संवेदितारमभ्युपगच्छति, अभ्युपगच्छत्येवासौ संविदम् । न ह्यसत्यामेव संविदि, संवेत्तीत्युपपद्यते । एवं चेत्, उभयवादिसंप्रतिपन्नतया सैव [2]वरं वेदित्री भवतु ; किमन्येन कल्पितेन ।

(अहं जानामीत्यस्यातिरिक्तात्मासाधकत्वम्)

ननु अहं जानामीति ज्ञानातिरिक्तस्तदाश्रयभूतोऽयमात्मा प्रतीयते ॥ सत्यम् ; स तु विकल्परूपतया साक्षात्प्रत्यक्ष[3] इति न शक्यः संश्रयितुम् । भेदज्ञानसिद्धवत्कारेण पृथग्वस्तुतया – [4]गृहीताव्यभिचारेण सहोपलम्भनियमेन, [5]अप्रकाशात्मनश्च स्वभावविरोधादेव प्रकाशायोगात् प्रकाशस्वाभाव्ये च संवेदनत्वमित्यादिना वा प्रकाशात्मनोऽहमित्यंशस्य तत्त्वमेव दुरुपगमम् । (ग्राहकवत् ग्राह्यस्याप्यसत्यत्वमुक्त्वा निगमनम्)

ग्राह्यविक[6]ल्पप्रत्युद्धारेऽप्येष एव प्रकारः । अतो वासनाभिधानसमनन्तरप्रत्यय-

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1. सत्तायां रूपे चेत्यत्र, 'उपलभ्यमान' इत्यादिपूर्ववाक्यांशानुषङ्गः । प्रकाशत इतीति । प्रकाशत इति पदार्थघटकः प्रकाशः संवित् । तत्संबन्धात् घटः प्रकाशत इति व्यवहारः । सैव चानुभूतिः । अतः अनुभूतिः प्रकाशत इत्यत्र न प्रकाशः कर्तृभूतानुभूत्यतिरिक्त इति ध्येयम् ।

2. (प्र. प. तत्त्वा--) 'सैव परं वेदित्री भवतु । कृतमन्येन बोद्धा' इति पूर्वम्, पश्चात्तु, 'बुद्धिरेव वरमस्तु ; अलं बोद्धेति यदुक्तम्' इति च परमिति वरमिति च दृश्यते ।

3. मुख्यप्रत्यक्षत्वसंश्रयणमशक्यम्, विकल्परूपत्वादित्यर्थः । 4. दृष्टव्याप्तिकेन संवित्सहोपलम्भनियमरूपहेतुनाऽहमित्यंशस्य प्रकाशात्मत्वं संविद्रूपत्वं सिद्धम् । अहमर्थः संविदभिन्नः नियमेन तया सहोपलम्भादिति । एममहमर्थस्याप्रकाशरूपत्वे प्रकाशायोगः, प्रकाशाप्रकाशयोर्विरोधात् ; प्रकाशरूपत्वे च संवेदनत्वापत्तिरिति हेतुनापि । एवं संविदभिन्नस्याहमर्थस्य संविद्भिन्नत्वज्ञानं पारमार्थिकतया सिद्धवत्कृत्य संविदपेक्षया पृथग्वस्तुतया स्थितिर्दुरुपगमेत्यर्थः । पृथग्वस्तुतयेत्यन्तस्य तत्त्वमेव दुरुपगममित्यत्रान्वयः । 5. अप्रकाशात्मन इत्यादि अद्वैतिभिरुच्यत इति प्रकरण प. त. प्रकरणे । 6. ग्राहकरूपस्य विकल्पस्याहमर्थस्येव ग्राह्यरूपस्य घटादेरपि घटमहं जानामीति सहोपलम्भनियमादिना पृथग्वस्तुत्वनिरासे इत्यर्थः । विकल्पो नाम व्यावर्तकांशः समनन्तरेति । अव्यवहितपूर्वेत्यर्थः ।

सामर्थ्यात् अनाद्यविद्यावशाच्च [1]समारोपितावास्तवग्राह्यग्राहकविकल्पोल्लेखिनी स्वयंप्रकाशा संविदेव परमार्थसती ; सैवाऽऽत्मेति सौगताः प्रकटाः प्रच्छन्नाश्च । यथाहुः प्रकटाः—

"[2]अविभागोऽपि बुद्ध्यात्मा विपर्यासितदर्शनैः ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्तिभेदवानिव लक्ष्यते ॥" इति ।

यथा वा प्रच्छन्नाः—"शुद्धं तत्त्वं प्रपञ्चस्य न हेतुरनिवृत्तितः[3] ।
ज्ञातृज्ञेयविभागस्य मायैव जननी ततः ॥" इति ।

(प्रकटबौद्धमतखण्डनम्)

अत्राह— क्षणभङ्गिनी प्रतिविषयमन्यान्या च संवित् चकास्ति । सैव चेदात्मा, पूर्वेद्युर्दृष्ट[4]मपरेद्युः 'अहमिदमदर्शम्' इति कथमिव प्रत्यभिजानीयात् । न च निरालम्बन-प्रतिभाभेदमात्रतया इह समाधेयम्, निरालम्बनत्वप्रतिज्ञायाः प्रत्यक्षादिसकलप्रतीति-बाधितविषयत्वात् । साधनस्य[5] च सालम्बनत्वे, तदविशेषादशेषशेमुषीणां तथात्वापत्तेः । निरालम्बनत्वे च साधनाभावादेव साध्यासिद्धेः । प्रपञ्चितश्च पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसाभाग[6]योः निरालम्बनत्वप्रतिषेधः ; यथार्थख्यातिसमर्थनेन च शास्त्र[7] इति न व्यावर्ण्यते ।

(सन्तानाश्रयणेपि प्रत्यभिज्ञाऽनिर्वाहः)

अत एव न सन्तानाश्रयणेनापि प्रत्यभिज्ञोपपादनं साधीयः । विज्ञान[8]क्षणव्यतिरिक्तस्य स्थायिनोऽनुसन्धायिनः सन्तानस्याभ्युपगमे स्वसिद्धान्तत्यागः, परसिद्धान्ताभ्युपगमश्च । अनभ्युपगमे प्रत्यभिज्ञानुपपत्तिः । न ह्यन्येनानुभूते अन्यस्य प्रतिसन्धानसम्भवः । न च

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1. ग्राहकरूपस्य विकल्पस्याहमर्थस्येव, ग्राह्यस्य घटादेरपि पृथग्वस्तुत्वनिरासे घटमहं जानामीति सहोपलम्भनियमादिहेतूपन्यास एवाभिमतः । **विकल्पो** नाम व्यावर्तकांशः । 2. बुद्धिरूप आत्मा ग्राह्यग्राहकाभिन्नोपि भ्रान्तैर्भेदवानिव दृश्यत इत्यर्थः । 3. **अनिवृत्तिप्रसंगात्**—अनिर्मोक्षप्रसंगात् । 4. **दृष्ट**मिति, **अपरेद्यु**रिति च **प्रत्यभिजानीया**दित्यत्रान्वेति । 5. **साधनस्य** निरालम्बनत्वगमक-परामर्शस्य । 6. **भाग**पदेन पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसयोरैकशास्त्र्यं दर्शितम् । पूर्वभागे १-१. सत्संप्रयोगसूत्र-वृत्तौ, उत्तरभागे च २-२. पादे । 7. **शास्त्रे**—**न्यायतत्त्वे** स्वपितामहपादप्रणीते । तत्समर्थनप्रपञ्चः श्रीभाष्ये द्रष्टव्यः, "यथार्थं सर्वविज्ञानम्" इत्यादौ ।

8. **विज्ञानलक्षणे**ति प्रायिकः पाठः । **विज्ञानक्षणे**ति क्वचित् (४५९७) । प्रभाकर विजये (९०), 'विज्ञानलक्षणसंतानस्थायितया' इति, 'अथ विज्ञानक्षणानां भेदेपि सौसादृश्यात् इति च लक्षणपदं क्षण-पदञ्चोपलभ्यते । बौद्धाः स्वलक्षणपदेन व्यक्तिस्वरूपं व्यवहरन्ति । योगसूत्रे (३-१-३) लक्षणपदमतीतवर्त-मानाद्यवस्थापरं दृष्टम् (भावागणेशवृत्तौ) । अतो विज्ञानलक्षणेति पाठप्रमाण्ये अतीताद्यवस्थविज्ञान-व्यक्तीत्यर्थः स्यात् । क्षणशब्दार्थस्तु स्फुटः ; क्षणिकानामेव क्षणत्वेन व्यवहारात् ।

सुसदृशतया भेदाग्रहणेन प्रदीपादाविव प्रमातरि प्रत्यभिज्ञा भ्रान्तिः। [1]युज्यते हि तत्र एकस्यैव पूर्वापरव्यक्तिदर्शिनः तुल्यसंस्थानतया व्यक्तीनां भेदमविदुषस्तथाभ्रमः; इह तु संविद्व्यक्तयः परस्परवार्तानभिज्ञाः निरन्वयविनाशिन्यश्च सुगतमते इति न तास्वेकत्व-भ्रमस्याश्रयता विषयता वा संभविनी। न च सदृशत्वेपि, अन्येन कृतमात्मकृततयाऽन्योऽनु-सन्धातुमलम्-इत्यागमापायिसंवित्सन्तानाश्रयः प्रत्यभिज्ञानक्षणस्थायी चेतनोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः।

(एतद्दोषोद्धाराय प्रच्छन्नेन संविदजत्वनिर्विकारत्वनिर्भेदत्वस्थापनम्)

[2]कश्चिदाह-न संवित् अनित्या, प्रागभावाद्यसिद्धेः। तदसिद्धिश्च तस्याः स्वतस्सिद्धत्वात्। न हि स्वतस्सिद्धस्य प्रागभावादयः स्वतोऽन्यतो वा सिद्ध्यन्ति। स्वयं हि स्वाभावमवगमयत्, सद्वा असद्वा साधयेत्। सत्त्वे, अभाव एव नास्तीति कथं साधयेत्? असत्त्वादेव साधकस्य, पक्षान्तरे नतरां साधकत्वम्-इति न स्वतस्तावत् तत्सिद्धिः। नाप्यन्यतः, अनन्यगोचरत्वा-दनुभूतेः; [3]अनुमाव्यत्वे च घटादिवत् अननुभूतित्वप्रसङ्गात्। अतः सा न जायते। जन्मा-भावादेवेतरेऽपि भावविकारा निराकार्याः; तत्प्रतिबद्धत्वात् तेषाम्। अत एव नानात्वमपि संविदि प्रत्युक्तम्। उत्पत्तिमत्त्वव्यापकनिवृत्त्या तद्व्याप्यभूतनानात्वस्यापि निवृत्तिसिद्धेः। न ह्यजं विभाग्यस्ति। चेत्यत्वाच्च भेदेतरेतराभावादयो न तद्धर्माः, रूपादिवत्। अतोऽस्याः

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1. प्रदीपदृष्टान्तेन प्रत्यभिज्ञानोपपादनं ग्रहीतैक्यमङ्गीकृत्य ग्राह्यमात्रभेदस्वीकारे स्यात्। ग्रहीतैक्यस्याप्य-स्वीकारे तु पूर्वप्रतिसन्धानाद्यभावेनाऽऽत्मनः प्रत्यभिज्ञाश्रयत्वायोगान्न किमपि प्रत्यभिज्ञाविषयीभवेदिति।

2. **कश्चित्** इष्टसिद्धिग्रन्थकारो **विमुक्तात्म**नामा आगमापायिसंवित्सन्तानेत्युक्तमसहमानोऽद्वैती। **इयं संविदात्मशङ्कासमाधानसरणिः प्रायो जिज्ञासाधिकरणभाष्येऽनूदितैव। अनित्या**—उत्पन्ना। **स्वतस्सिद्धत्वात्** स्वयंप्रकाशत्वात्। स्वयंप्रकाशत्वं हि स्वेतराप्रकाश्यत्वविशिष्टस्वप्रकाश्यत्वम्। तत्र स्वकाले स्वप्रागभावाभावात्, स्वप्रागभावकाले च स्वाभावात् स्वप्रागभावस्य स्वप्रकाश्यत्वं न संभवति। नापि ज्ञानान्तरप्रकाश्यत्वम्, स्वप्रागभावस्य स्वात्मकप्रतियोगिनं विहाय प्रकाशनायोगात्, स्वस्य च स्वान्यग्राह्यत्वे स्वयंप्रकाशत्वघटकस्वेतराप्रकाश्यत्वदलभङ्गापत्तेरिति भावः॥ 3. तद्दलप्रवेशावश्यकतां दर्शयति **अनुमाव्यत्व** इति। **इतरे**—ऋद्धिपरिणामापक्षयविनाशाः। जन्मसत्तापरिणामवृद्ध्यपक्षयविनाशाः खलु षट् भावविकाराः। **तत्प्रतिबद्धत्वात्**-जन्मव्याप्यत्वात्। **अत एव** जन्माभावादेव। **उत्पत्ती**ति। उत्पत्तिमत्त्वरूपस्य व्यापकस्याभावेन। **नानात्वस्य** सजातीयभेदस्य। स एव **विभागः**। **भेदः** वैजात्यम्। "भेदः प्रसिद्धतरो लोके, इतरेतराभावश्च" (२ पु) **इतीष्टसिद्धि**वाक्यानुरोधेन भेदेतरेतराभावयोः पृथग्ग्रहणम्। यद्वा **विभागः** सर्वविधभेदः; 'अजस्यैवात्मनो देहेन्द्रियादिभ्यो विभागस्य' इति अत्र वक्ष्यमाणत्वात्। **इष्टसिद्धि**ग्रन्थे **विभाग**शब्दस्य देशपरिच्छेदपरत्वप्रतीतावपि तत्रापि अजत्वहेतुना **अमेयानन्ते**ति कारिकोक्तमेयशून्यत्वत्रिविधपरिच्छेदराहित्ययोः साधनान्न तात्पर्यविरोधः। संवित्पक्षकानुमानमुक्त्वा धर्मपक्षकानुमानमाह **चेत्यत्वा**दिति। **चेत्यत्वं** चेतना-

न[1] मेयः कश्चिदपि धर्मोऽस्ति । अतो निर्धूतनिखिलभेद(दा)विकल्पनिर्धर्मप्रकाशमात्रैकरसा कूटस्थनित्या संविदेवाऽऽत्मा परमात्मा च । यथाह, "[2]याऽनुभूतिरजाऽमेयाऽनन्तात्मा" इति । सैव च वेदान्तवाक्यतात्पर्यभूमिरिति तेषां परिभाषा । यथाह तद्वार्तिककारः—

'परागर्थप्रमेयेषु या फलत्वेन संमता । संवित् सैवेह मेयोऽर्थो वेदान्तोक्तिप्रमाणतः ॥
अप्रामाण्यप्रसक्तिश्च स्यादितोऽन्यार्थकल्पने । वेदान्तानामतस्तस्मान्नान्यमर्थं प्रकल्पयेत् ॥' इति ।

(प्रच्छन्नमतभङ्गः)

तदिदमलौकिकमवैदिकं च दर्शनमित्यात्मविदः । तथाहि—

(लोकानुभवापेतत्वोपपादनम् भा. भा. 66. 62. 63)

'संविदिति स्वाश्रयं प्रति सत्तयैव कस्यचित्प्रकाशनशीलो ज्ञानावगत्यनुभूत्यादिपदपर्यायनामा सकर्मकः संवेदितुरात्मनो धर्मः प्रसिद्धः । तथैव हि सर्वप्राणभृत्प्रत्यात्मसिद्धोऽयमनुभवः, 'अहमिदं संवेद्मि' इति । तस्यास्योत्पत्तिस्थितिनिरोधाश्च सुखदुःखादेरिव प्रत्यक्षाः प्रकाशन्ते । स्वापमदमूर्च्छादशासु च योग्यानुपलम्भनिराकृतस्तत्सद्भावो नाभ्युपगममर्हति । यदि हि तास्वपि दशासु संवेदनमवर्तिष्यत, ततः प्रबोधसमयेऽनुसमधास्यत । न चानुसन्धीयते । अत एव हि, 'इयन्तं कालं न किञ्चिदहमज्ञासिषम्' इति प्रबुद्धः प्रत्यवमृशति । यावदनुभूतपदार्थस्मरणनियमाभावेपि, संस्कारविच्छेदनिमित्तप्रायणादिप्रबलहेतुविरहेपि नित्य[3]वदस्मरणमनुभवाभावमेव साधयति । न च सत्यपि संवित्प्रकाशे विषयावच्छेदविरहादहङ्कार[4]गोचरापायाद्वा तत्स्मृत्यनुदयः; [5]अर्थान्तराभावस्य तदग्रहणस्य चार्थान्तरप्रकाश

विषयत्वम् । 1. **अतो नास्यानुमेयः** इति, **अतोऽस्यानुमेय** इति च पाठः 'अनु' इत्यस्य व्यर्थत्वादप्यशुद्धः ; 'यदपि नास्या मेयो धर्मोऽप्यस्ति' इति वक्ष्यमाणानुवादानुसाराच्च ; **इष्टसिद्धि**ग्रन्थानुरोधाच्च । तद्ग्रन्थे आदौ **या** इत्यनेन स्वतस्सिद्धत्वसूचनात् मेयभिन्नत्वस्य लब्धत्वात् **अमेयेत्यत्र** बहुव्रीहिः। तत्रामेयत्वं प्राक्विवृतम् ; अनन्तत्वं पश्चात् ; अत्रतु अमेयत्वं पश्चादिति भेदः। **भेदविकल्पः** भेदप्रकारः । 2. "याऽनुभूतिरजाऽमेयानन्तात्माऽऽनन्दविग्रहा । महदादिजगन्मायाचित्रभित्तिं नमामि ताम्" इतीष्टसिद्धिमङ्गलश्लोकः उपरि तद्वक्तव्यार्थसंग्रहरूपः । **परागर्थेति** । प्रमेयभूतबाह्यार्थविषये प्रमाणफलत्वेन कल्पिता, प्रमाणवृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बतया साङ्ख्यमता वा संविदेव वेदान्तोक्तं चिद्रूपं ब्रह्म । अन्यथा शशविषाणादिवदत्यन्ताप्रसिद्धार्थपरत्वे वेदान्तस्याप्रामाण्यापत्तिः । तस्मा**दतोऽन्यं**—प्रसिद्धसंविद्भिन्नमर्थं न कल्पयेदिति कारिकाद्वयार्थः । यद्वा सा संविदेवेह व्यवह्रियमाणो **मेयः** ग्राह्यग्राहकरूपोऽर्थः । तदध्यस्तताद्दगर्थापेक्षया अन्यवास्तवमेयकल्पने चाद्वैतवेदान्ताप्रामाण्यं स्यादिति ॥

3. **नित्यवत्** नित्येन तुल्यमस्मरणम् ; नित्यं तदस्मरणमिति यावत् । 4. अहमितिप्रतीतिविषयस्य विलयात्-अहमर्थविलयादित्यर्थः । 5. सुषुप्तौ अहमर्थाभावो विषयाग्रहणञ्च सुषुप्तिकालाभ्युपगतसंवित्प्रका-

प्रयुक्तकार्यप्रतिबन्धकत्वायोगात्। [1]त्रितयावभासेऽपि यथास्वमवभासानां स्वगोचरस्मरणहेतुत्वात्। न च [2]प्रत्यभिज्ञाबललब्धस्येमा अहमर्थाः, स्वापादिदशासु निधनमुपगत इति शक्योऽभिधातुम्। अत एव हि, 'इयन्तं कालमहमस्वाप्सम्' इति प्रबोधे परामर्शः। न च निर्विषया निराश्रया वा संविन्नाम काचित् संभवति, अत्यन्तानुपलब्धेः। सम्बन्धिशब्दाश्च संविदनुभूतिज्ञानप्रकाशादिशब्दा इति शब्दार्थविदः। न ह्यकर्मकस्य जानात्यादेरकर्तृकस्य वा प्रयोगो लोके वेदे वा।

(संविदा स्वप्रागभावाद्यग्रहनिरासः)

यत्तु स्वतस्सिद्धस्य सत्त्वे तद्विरोधादेव प्रागभावादेस्तदानीमवस्थानासंभवान्न तत स्सिद्धिरिति—तदतिस्थवीयः। न हि संविदा स्वकालवर्तिन एवार्थाः सिद्ध्यन्तीत्यस्ति नियमः, अतीतानागतयोरसंवेद्यत्वप्रसङ्गात्। [3]अथ संवित्प्रागभावादेः सिद्ध्यतस्तत्समकालतया भवितव्यमिति; किमेवं[4] क्वचिद्दृष्टम्? हन्तैवं सति तत्सिद्धेर्न प्रागभावाद्यसिद्धिः॥ तत्प्रागभावः तत्समकाल इत्युन्मत्तवचः। ऐन्द्रियकप्रत्यक्षस्वभावो ह्ययं स्वसमकालपदार्थप्रकाशकत्वं नाम; न ज्ञानमात्रस्य, प्रमाण[5]मात्रस्य वा। एतेन (एतेनै?) तदपि पराकृतम्—

[6]'मानं स्वयंप्रकाशत्वात्' [7]स्वतस्सच्चेत् सदाऽस्त्यतः।
तन्मेयं च सदाऽस्त्येव मानं मेययुगेव हि ' इति।

शाधीनजागरकालिक संवित्स्मरणरूपकार्यप्रतिबन्धके न भवतः; भिन्नविषयत्वात्। अन्यथा पृष्ठताडनेन दन्तभङ्गापत्तेरिति। 1. ननु सर्वस्मिन्नपि ज्ञाने ज्ञातृज्ञेयज्ञानत्रयभानस्य घटमहं जानामीत्याद्याकारबलादभ्युपेयत्वात् अन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानवशात् ज्ञात्रादिभानमपि ज्ञानस्मरणे हेतुः कल्प्यत इत्यत्राह' **त्रितयेति**। एकानुभवस्यान्यस्मृतिहेतुताया लोके अदर्शनेन तत्स्मरणं प्रति तत्प्रकाशो हेतुरित्यस्यैव बलवतया कल्पनान्तरे मानाभावात् ज्ञात्राद्यभानात् तदस्मरणेऽपि ज्ञानस्मरणं स्यादिति। **अपीत्यनेन** तदसंमतिः, तदादरे सुषुप्तौ ज्ञानस्याप्रकाश एव स्यादिति च सूच्यते। 2. **प्रत्यभिज्ञा**—योऽहं पूर्वेद्युर्गामपश्यम्, सोऽहमिदानीं क्रीणामीत्येवंरूपा। **निधनं** नाशम्।

3. नन्वर्थान्तराणामतीतानागतानां ग्रहणमस्त्येव। संवित्प्रागभावतद्ध्वंसादिविषय एवायं नियमः, यत्र गृह्यमाणत्वविशिष्टसंवित्प्रागभावत्वादि, तत्र तत्समकालत्वमित्याकारक इति शङ्कते **अथेति**। 4. **एवमिति**। संवित्प्रागभावस्य परं समकालवर्तिसंविदा ग्रहणमितीदमित्यर्थः। 5. **प्रमाणमात्रस्य**—प्रमितिसामान्यस्य। 6. **मानमिति**। माने स्वयंप्रकाशत्वस्य अत एव स्वतःप्रामाण्यस्य च इष्टत्वात् तस्य सत्त्वे, यत् सत् तत् सर्वदैव सदिति न्यायेन सदा सत्त्वमिति तत्प्रमेयस्यापि सदातनत्वमेव, मानस्य मेयाव्यभिचारित्वादित्यर्थः। अतो मानमेव न स्वीकार्यम्; नित्यमेयमात्रं वा स्वीकार्यमिति भावः। 7. स्वयंप्रकाशत्वात् स्वतो मानभूतं सच्चेत्, सदाऽस्तीत्यर्थः। स्वतस्सदित्यन्वयो वा।

न हि मानस्य स्वसत्ताकालेऽर्थाविनाभावो [1]मेययोगः, किन्तु यद्देशकालादिमत्तया मेयमवभासते, तादृशतद्रूपमिथ्यात्वविरोधित्वम् ।

(भा. भा. 59. पु.)

अत एव 'स्मृतिर्न बाह्यविषया नष्टेऽप्यर्थे स्मृतिदर्शनात्' इत्यपि प्रलापः ।

(प्रमाणाभावात् प्रागभावासिद्धिरित्यस्य भङ्गः)

अथ संवित्प्रागभावादेरवर्तमानतया न प्रत्यक्षत्वम् । लिङ्गाद्यभावाच्च न प्रमाणान्तरतस्सिद्धिरिति—यद्येवम्, [2]अकारणं तर्हि स्वतःसिद्धत्वं प्रागभावाद्यसिद्धेः । प्रमाणाभाव एव हीदानीं वाच्यः ; न च तदभावः शक्योऽभिधातुमित्युक्तमेव, योग्यानुपलब्ध्यैवाभावस्य समर्थितत्वात् । (कादाचित्कत्वे युक्त्यन्तरम् भा. भा. 61)

अपिच[3] प्रत्यक्षसंवित् स्वसत्ताकाले स्वविषयस्य सद्भावं साधयन्ती यत् तस्य न सर्वदा सत्तां साधयति, तदवसीयते, 'अहमिदानीमेवास्मि नान्यदा' इति कालविशेषावच्छिन्नैव सा चकास्तीति । [4]इतरथा घटादेरपि नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् । [5]एवमनुमानादिसंविदोपि । न च

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1. **मेययोगः** मेयेन नियतयोगः । मानस्य मेययुक्तत्वं न स्वसत्ताकालव्यापिस्वमेयकत्वम्, किन्त्वबाधितमेयरूपकत्वम् । अयमपि कश्चिदविनाभावप्रकार इति **श्रीभाष्ये** । नायं समानकालिकत्वघटितः, किन्तु तन्मितिः तन्मेयनिरूपितप्रकारतासंबन्धेन यद्देशकालादौ, तन्मेयं दैशिककालिकस्वरूपादिसंबन्धेन तत्रेत्येवंरूप इति । प्रसिद्धश्च प्रमायाः प्रमेयाविनाभावः । अत एव न्यायसूत्रादौ 'अव्यभिचारि' इति भ्रमवारणं क्रियते । अत्रापि **युगेव हीति** हिशब्दैवकाराभ्यां मेययोगनियमप्रसिद्धिर्दर्शिता । **प्रलाप** इति । स्मृतेरप्रामाण्यं सर्वेष्टम् । तत् कस्मात्? न याथार्थ्याभावात्; किं तु अतीतादौ अर्थसंबन्धाभावात् । वर्तमानार्थस्मृतावप्यप्रामाण्यादेवार्थासंबन्ध एष्टव्यः । स्मृतिस्थले इन्द्रियद्वाराऽर्थसंबन्धो दुर्वच एवेत्यादिप्रलाप इत्यर्थः ॥ यथाहं स्मृतावपि प्रामाण्यमिष्टमिति सिद्धान्ती । 2. **अकारणमिति** । **असिद्धेः**-प्रागभावो नास्तीत्येतत् प्रति स्वतःसिद्धत्वं न हेतुर्भवेत्; किन्तु प्रमाणाभाव एव । स च नास्ति ; प्रागभावस्यानुपलब्धिप्रमाणकत्वात् संविदनुपलब्ध्यैव संवित्प्रागभावस्योक्तत्वात् (पु. २७-२८) । 3. प्रत्यक्षं कालविशेषावच्छिन्नं भाति ; स्वकाल एव विषयप्रकाशकत्वे सति कालविशेषावच्छिन्नतया तत्प्रकाशकत्वादिति युक्त्यन्तरमाह **अपिचेति** । ज्ञानस्वप्रकाशस्य ज्ञानविषयकप्रत्यक्षतुल्ययोगक्षेमत्वात् प्रत्यक्षेणेव तेनापि प्रकृतकालावच्छिन्नतयैव ज्ञानभानम् । तत्रानया युक्त्या प्रत्यक्षसंवित् स्वस्मिन् किञ्चित्कालावच्छिन्नत्वभानं कालान्तरानवच्छिन्नत्वविशिष्टमनुमापयतीति । **अहमिति** संविदुच्यते । संविदिदानीमेवास्ति नान्यदेति पुरुषो मन्यत इति वस्तुस्थितिरिति तथैव प्रमेये वक्तव्ये, अहमिदानीमेवास्मीति प्रतीतिपराहंपदघटितवाक्यनिर्देश औपचारिकः ; घटो गुणमाकाङ्क्षति, भावना अंशत्रयमपेक्षते इत्यादिवत् । सर्वत्राऽऽकांक्षाया इच्छारूपतया पुरुषनिष्ठत्वात् । 4. **इतरथेति** । प्रत्यक्षसंविदः सर्वकालेऽपि भाने इत्यर्थः । सर्वकालावच्छिन्नत्वे इति वा । 5. **एवमिति** । अनुमानादिसंविदोऽपि कालविशेषावच्छिन्ना

प्रत्यक्षानुमानादिभेदशून्या निर्विषया निराश्रया धीः सम्भवतीत्युक्तमेव ।

(संविदोऽननुभाव्यत्वभङ्गः भा. भा. 55. 56)

नचान्याविषयत्वात् संविदः अन्यतस्तत्प्रागभावाद्यसिद्धिः ; अज्ञासिषमिति प्राक्तन-संविदोऽद्यतनधिया विषयीक्रियमाणत्वात् । प्रतिकूलानुकूलविषयनियतहानोपादानादि-लिङ्गावगम्यत्वाच्च[1] परसंविदः । तदनभ्युपगमे च [2]शब्दार्थग्रहणासंभवेन वैदिकलौकिक समस्तव्यवहाराभावप्रसङ्गः । गुरूपसर्पणाद्यनुपपत्तिश्च ; ज्ञानवत्त्वेन तस्याप्रतीतेः ।

(अनुभाव्यत्वेऽनिष्टापादनपरिहारः)

न च अन्यविषयत्वेऽननुभूतित्वम् । स्वाश्रयस्य स्वसत्तयैव प्रकाशमानत्वं स्व[3]विषय साधनत्वं वा अनुभूतित्वम् । ते च संविदन्तरविषयभावेपि स्वानुभवसिद्धे न भ्रश्यत इति कथमननुभूतित्वप्रसङ्गः ? घटादेस्तु तथास्वाभाव्यादेवाननुभूतित्वम्, नानुभाव्यत्वात् । अपिचाननुभाव्यत्वेपि समानस्तत्प्रसङ्गः[4], गगनकुसुमवत् । न चाऽऽत्मनोऽनुभूतित्वम्, अनुभवितृत्वात् । नाप्यसावनुभाव्यः, अनुभवस्येव स्वतस्सिद्धयतोऽप्यस्य स्वपरसंवेद्य[5]त्वाभ्यु-पगमात् । वेद्यत्वेऽनात्मत्वापादनमवेद्यत्वेऽपि समानं [6]पूर्ववत् । यदि तु गगनकुसुमस्या-सत्त्वमेवानात्मत्वाननुभूतित्वप्रयोजकमास्थीयेत, आस्थीयतां तर्हि घटादेरप्यसंविदाश्रयत्वा-ज्ञानाविरोधित्वयोरेव तत्प्रयोजकत्वम् । अथ ते[7]अपि विषयत्वे स्यातामिति चेत्, अविषय-

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एव चकासतीत्यर्थः । ननु भूतभविष्यद्विषयकानुमितेरपि संभवात् प्रत्यक्षस्येव न समकालवर्तित्वं तत्रेति चेत्—न ; अनुमानादिसंविदां नित्यत्वे तदपेक्षया भूतत्वभविष्यत्त्वयोः कुत्रापि दुर्वचत्वात् । किञ्च धूमादिरूपहेतुप्रत्यक्षबलात् धूमनित्यत्वे तद्व्यापकस्याग्नेरपि नित्यत्वमवर्जनीयम् । अतः तासां सर्वकाला वच्छिन्नत्वेपि विषयनित्यत्वापत्तिः । यत्रानुमितिः शाब्दधीरन्या वा संवित् स्वकालवर्तमानतया घटादि-ग्राहिणी, तत्र तस्याः सर्वकालावच्छिन्नत्वे तद्वस्तुनित्यत्वापत्तिरिति च । पूर्वकालाद्यवच्छिन्नतयाऽभान-रूपयोग्यानुपलब्ध्या संवित्सामान्यानित्यत्वं प्रागेवोक्तम् । तत्र सति इयमपि यथासंभवं युक्तिः । एवञ्च एवमित्यस्य प्रत्यक्षवत् वर्तमानविषयग्राहिण्य इत्यप्यर्थो भवेत् । तदोद्देश्यविशेषणम् । एवं कतिपय-संविदनित्यत्वे तत्सामान्यादितरत्रापि तथात्वं युक्तमिति च भावः । विस्तरस्त्वन्यत्र ।

1. लिङ्गेति । अयमेतद्विषयकप्रतिकूलताज्ञानवान् एतत्कर्मकहानकर्तृत्वात्, एतद्विषयकानुकूलता-ज्ञानवान्, एतदुपादानकर्तृत्वादित्येवम् । 2. शब्दार्थग्रहणेति । अस्य शब्दस्यायमर्थ इति ग्रहणेत्यर्थः; शब्दार्थसंबन्धग्रहणेति यावत् । तथैव पाठो वा । वृद्धव्यवहारादेः प्रयोज्यवृद्धादिज्ञानानुमापकत्वमुखेनैव शब्दार्थग्राहकत्वादिति भावः । 3. जडभूतज्ञानवादिनैयायिकादिसाधारण्यायेदम् । 4. तत्प्रसंगः अननुभूतित्वप्रसङ्गः । 5. स्वकीयपरकीयधर्मभूतज्ञानविषयत्वोपगमात् । 6. पूर्ववत् गगनकुसुमवत् । 7. संविदात्मनोर्वित्तिविषयत्वाङ्गीकारे घटादेरिव क्रमेणाज्ञानाविरोधित्वासंविदाश्रयत्वे स्यातामिति चेत्-

स्वेपि तथैवेत्यलमप्रतिष्ठितकुतर्कापहसनेन ॥

(अजत्वस्य विकारान्तरावारकत्वम् भा. भा. 64)

यदपि जननविरहादनुभूतेर्विकारान्तरनिरसनम्, [1]व्यभिचरति तदपि प्रागभावे। जन्माभावेपि तस्य विनाशदर्शनात्। भावविशेषणोपादानेपि भवदभिमताविद्ययाऽनैकान्त्यम्। सा ह्यनादिरपि विविधविकारवती; विनाशवती च तत्त्वज्ञानोदयात् ॥ अपरमार्थास्तद्विकाराः सन्तीति चेत्—परमार्थाश्च ते[2] किं विकाराः सन्ति, जन्मवन्तो [3]वा परमार्थाः, येन पारमार्थ्येन विशेषणं साध्यस्य साधनस्य वाऽर्थवत्तामश्नुवीत? तथा च सति साधु समर्थितं तर्ककुशलेनेत्यलमनेन ॥ (अजत्वेन निर्भेदत्वानुमानायोगः)

यदपि, 'न ह्यजं विभाग्यस्ति' इति—तदपि न; [4]अजस्यैवात्मनो देहेन्द्रियादिभ्यो विभागस्य समर्थितत्वात्[5]। अनादित्वेनाभ्युपगतस्याज्ञानस्य, आत्मनो व्यतिरिक्ततयाऽवश्याश्रयणीयत्वात् ॥ अपरमार्थः स विभाग इति चेत्—परमार्थभेदः किं जन्मप्रतिबद्धः क्वचिद्दृष्टः? निर्बाधप्रतीतिसिद्धश्च[6] दृग्दृश्यभेदः परमार्थ एवेत्यनन्तरमेवोपपादयिष्यामः।

(संविदो निर्धर्मकत्वानुमाने व्यभिचार-व्याघातादि भा. भा. 65)

यदपि 'नास्या मेयो धर्मोऽप्यस्ति', 'चेत्यानां न चिद्धर्मत्वम्' इति च—तदपि शास्त्रानुमानादिप्रमाणसिद्धैः स्वयंप्रकाशत्वनित्यत्वादिधर्मैः स्वयमभ्युपगतैरनैकान्तिकम्। न च ते चितिमात्रमिति वाच्यम्—तत्सिद्धावपि तेषु विमतिदर्शनात्। अभ्युपगम्यैव हि संविदं तदनुमेयत्वक्षणिकत्वादि प्रतिजानते वादिनः। [7]स्वरूपभेदाच्च;-स्वाश्रयं प्रति सत्तयैव कस्यचित्प्रकाशनं हि संवेदनम्। स्वयंप्रकाशता तु सत्तयैवाऽऽत्मने प्रकाशमानता। प्रकाशश्च चिदचिदशेषपदार्थसाधारणो [8]धर्म इति संवित्सिद्धावेव साधितम्। तदनभ्युपगमे तु व्यवहारानुगुण्यवचनः प्रकाशशब्दः। नित्यता तु सर्वकालवर्तमानता। एकसंख्यावच्छेदः एकत्वम्-इति। न [9]च जडत्वकालदेशनानात्वाद्यवच्छेदशून्यतारूपत्वात् तेषां न यथोक्तदोष

अवेद्यत्वपक्षेपि गगनकुसुमवत् तत्र तत्र तत्तत् स्यादित्यर्थः।

1. स्वरूपासिद्धौ सत्यां दोषान्तरमप्याह व्यभीति। तदपीति। अपिना अनुभूतित्वसमुच्चयः। यथा अननुभाव्यत्वसाधकोऽनुभूतित्वरूपहेतुर्व्यभिचरति, अज्ञासिपमित्यनुभाव्यव्यक्तावापि सत्त्वात् तथेति। 2. ते-तव। 3. किं सन्तीत्यनुषङ्गः। 4. विभाग इत्यनेन भेदसामान्यविवक्षायामनुपपत्तिमाह अजस्येति। सजातीयभेदराहित्यं संविन्नानात्वदर्शनाद्बाधितमित्युक्तम्। 5. समर्थितत्वात्; अत्र, इष्टसिद्धौ च। 6. सिद्धत्वादित्यर्थः 7. धर्म्यभिन्नाभिन्नस्य तदभिन्नत्वनियमात् धर्माणां मिथस्स्वरूपभेदोपि न स्यादिति भावः। 8. धर्मः प्राकट्यरूपः; यद्वा तस्य मीमांसकमतस्य पूर्वं पश्चाच्च खण्डनात् वक्ष्यमाणो ज्ञानादूरत्वरूपोऽर्थधर्मः। अस्य धर्मिरूपत्वं न भवति, किन्तु धर्मत्वमेवेति संवित्सिद्धौ 'संविदेव न ते धर्माः सिद्धायामपि संविदि' इति साधितम्। 9. जडत्वानवच्छिन्नत्वं स्वयंप्रकाशत्वम्, कालानवच्छिन्नत्वं नित्यत्वम्,

इति युक्तम् ; तथारूपैरपि तैश्चितिधर्मभूतैरनैकान्त्यस्यापरिहार्यत्वात् । संविदि च निषेध्यत्वा-मिमतजडत्वानित्यत्वनानात्वादिविविधधर्माभावे निषेधोक्तिरुक्तिमात्रमेव ॥ चेत्य[1]श्चाज्ञान-मात्मनि दृष्टमिष्टश्च भवताम् ॥ अपिच 'अस्याः' इति षष्ठ्या अनुभूतेस्सम्बन्धमभिधाय निर्धर्मत्वं प्रतिज्ञायमानं, वन्ध्यात्वमिव जननयाः, विरुद्धार्थमापद्येत ।

सिद्धिश्चेदभ्युपेयेत संविदः, स्यात् सधर्मता ।
न चेत्, तुच्छत्वमेवोक्तं भवेच्छशविषाणवत् ॥ १० ॥

ननु-सिद्धिरेव [2]सा ; कस्य भोः ? यदि न कस्य चित्, न तर्हि सिद्धिरेव । सा हि पुत्रत्वमिव कस्यचित् किञ्चित् प्रति । आत्मन इति चेत्-कष्षष्ठ्यर्थः ? तदेवं व्योमारविन्द-सदृशवपुषि यथोदितदृशि वेदान्ततात्पर्यवर्णनं [3]वेदान्तायैव स्यात् ।

(प्रच्छन्नपक्षेपि प्रत्यभिज्ञानुपपत्तिः भा. भा. 66)

[4]अपिच नित्यत्वेऽप्यनुभूतेः प्रत्यभिज्ञानुपपत्तिस्तदवस्थैव । स ह्यनुभवितारं पूर्वापर-कालावस्थायिनमुपस्थापयति, अहमिदमन्वभूवमिति । अनुभूतिस्त्वनुभूतिरेव भवताम्, न तां प्रति सा कर्त्री कर्म वा ।

(आत्मनि ज्ञातृत्वस्याध्यस्तत्वानुपपत्तिः भा भा. 72)

यद्युच्येत-परमार्थतस्तथाभूतापि भ्रान्त्या अनुभवितृतया परिस्फुरति, रजततयेव शुक्तिः । [5]न हि तथ्यमनवलम्ब्य मिथ्यावभासस्योत्थानमिति-तन्न, तथासत्यनुभव-समानाधिकरणतया अनुभविताऽहमर्थः प्रकाशेत, 'अनुभूतिरह'मिति, [6]पुरःस्थितभास्वरद्रव्य-शङ्ख-मुख-चन्द्रादेराकारतयेव रजत-पीत-मुकुरस्थता-'द्वित्वादि । पृथगवभासमान एव त्वय

देशानवच्छिन्नत्वं विभुत्वम्, नानात्वानवच्छिन्नत्वमेकत्वमित्येवमभावरूपत्वात्, अभावस्य चाधिकरण-रूपत्वान्न दोष इत्याशङ्क्य अभावरूपत्वेपि नाधिकरणस्वरूपत्वमित्याह संविदीति । 1. अनभ्युपगताधि-करणस्वरूपताकमपि किञ्चिद्दर्शयति चेत्यश्चेति । विरुद्धार्थम् — पक्षनिष्ठस्वविरुद्धधर्मकम् । 2. सिद्धि-संविदोरैक्यात् संविदः सिद्धिरिति व्यधिकरणप्रयोगो न कार्य इति भावः । 3 वेदान्ताय-वेदविना-शाय । 4. एवं, 'कश्चिदाह' इत्यादिनाऽनूदितं क्रमेण निरस्य, अथ ज्ञानमात्रनित्यत्ववाद्यद्वैतिमतेपि बौद्धमत इव प्रत्यभिज्ञानुपपत्तिः, तया ज्ञातुर्नित्यत्वस्यानुभूतेरनित्यत्वस्य चावगाहनादित्याह अपिचेति । 5. अनुभूतिरपि परमार्थतो मा भूदित्यत्राह नहीति । अधिष्ठानं तु सत्यमपेक्षितमिति नानुभूतेरप्य-पारमार्थ्यमित्यर्थः । 6. भास्वरद्रव्यस्याऽऽकारतया रजतता, शङ्खस्याऽऽकारतया पीतता, मुखाकारतया मुकुरस्थता, चन्द्राकारतया च द्वित्वं यथा प्रकाशते, तथाऽनुभूतिविशेषणतयाऽनुभवितृत्वं प्रकाशेत, ज्ञानमह-मिति । अहंशब्दवाच्यादनुभवितुर्भिन्नतया त्वनुभूतिरवभासते, अहमर्थविशेषणतया च । अनुभवामीत्येतद्धि दण्डीतिवत् विशिष्टपरम्, न विशेषणमात्रपरमित्यर्थः । एतेन-अहंशब्देनाध्यस्तज्ञातृताकमनुभवमेवोक्त्वा

मनुभवः, दण्ड इव देवदत्तमर्थान्तरमहमर्थं विशिषन् आलक्ष्यते, अनुभवाम्यहमिति। तदेवमनुभवविशिष्टमस्मदर्थमवभासयन् [1]अयमहम्प्रत्ययः कथमिव विशेषणभूतानुभूतिमात्रावलम्बनः प्रतिज्ञायेत, दण्डमात्र इव दण्डी देवदत्त इति प्रत्ययः ?

(अध्यासयुक्तिभङ्गः)

कुतश्चैष निश्चयः, अध्यस्तं ज्ञातृत्वमिति ? स्थूलोऽहमितिवत् देहात्माभिमानवतः प्रतिभासनादिति चेत्—नन्वात्मतयाऽभिमताऽनुभूतिरपि तद्वत एवावभातीति साऽपि तथा[2] स्यात् ॥ तत्त्वज्ञानोदयात्परतोपि तदनुवृत्तेर्न तथा सेति चेत्—किं भोः ! तत्त्वज्ञानात्परम् अबोद्धैवायमात्मा ? हन्तैवं वरमितोऽतत्त्ववेदित्वम्। भ्रान्त्याऽपि हि तत्र बहु भद्रं पश्यतीति।

(ज्ञातृत्वस्याहङ्कारस्थत्वशङ्का भा. भा. 74)

ननु ज्ञातृत्वं ज्ञानक्रियाकर्तृत्वं विक्रियात्मकं जडमहङ्कारग्रन्थिस्थम्। [3]तत्फलभुक् अकर्ता अविक्रियः साक्षी प्रकाशमात्र आत्मा। कर्तृत्वादिर्हि दृश्यत्वात् रूपादिवन्नात्मधर्मः।

धात्वर्थानुभूतौ विषयविषयिण्यां तदभेदभानस्वीकारोऽप्यपास्तः, तिङन्तस्यानुभूतिमात्रपरत्वाभावात्; यदि जानामीति ग्रहणात् ज्ञातृतया भानम्, तर्हि तथाभानमहमर्थस्यैव, नानुभूतेः। न चाहंशब्दोऽनुभववाची। अहंशब्दस्यानुभवपर्यन्तार्थकत्वे मानाभावाच्च। अत एव—अहंशब्देनाहमर्थत्वमुखेन गौण्याऽनुभूतिरुच्यते सिंहशब्देनेव माणवकः। तत्रानुभवामीति ज्ञातृत्वभानमित्यपि—निरस्तम्; गौण्यां मानाभावात, अहमर्थे वास्तवानुभवितृत्वग्रहणेन प्रतीत्यभ्रमत्वस्य युक्तत्वात्। घटमनुभवामि, पटमनुभवामीत्यनुवृत्तधात्वर्थः परतत्त्वरूपानुभूतिरिति भवदुक्ततया स्वाभिमतिविरुद्धतया तस्या अहंशब्दार्थत्वायोगाच्च। एवम्-अहंशब्दोऽहमर्थविशिष्टानुभूतिपरः; तत्रानुभवामीत्यनुभूतिवैशिष्ट्यं भासमानं विशेष्यभूतायां धात्वर्थाभिन्नायामनुभूतौ बाधात् विशेषणेऽहमर्थे पर्यवस्यतीत्यपि अनुभवविरोधादिना निरस्तमेव। अहंशब्दः प्रत्यग्वाची; तत्र प्रतीचि अनुभवामीति वास्तवमनुभवितृत्वमित्येवानुभवात्। 1. अवभासयन्नयं प्रत्यय इत्येतावत् स्यात्। अहमित्यधिकम्। 2. **तथे**ति। अध्यस्तेत्यर्थः। **कि**मिति। 'निरस्ताखिलदुःखोऽहमनन्तानन्दभाक् स्वराट्। भवेयमिति मोक्षार्थी श्रवणादौ प्रवर्तते' इत्युक्तं स्मर्तव्यम्। अनुभवाभावे किं चिदानन्दरूपत्वस्वीकारेण ? **भ्रान्त्ये**ति। अत एव प्रलयापेक्षया सृष्टिः श्रेयसी। **बह्वि**ति। दुःखेपि सुखभ्रान्त्या सुखित्वमेव प्रायः। 3. नन्वहङ्कारस्य ज्ञातृत्वे तदतिरिक्ते आत्मनि किं मानम् ? तत्राह **तत्फले**ति। 'पुरुषोस्ति भोक्तृभावात्'। 'पुरुषस्सुखदुःखानां भोक्तृत्वे हेतुरुच्यते' इति ह्युच्यते। ज्ञानस्यान्तःकरणवृत्तेर्व्यापारात्मनोऽहङ्कारस्थता। भोगस्सुखदुःखगोचरस्साक्षिप्रकाश इत्यात्मनो भोक्तृत्वम्। **तत्फलभुगकर्ते**ति विवक्षितमनुमानं विवरिष्यति **दृष्टश्चे**त्यादिना। ज्ञानकर्ता स्वान्यभोक्तृविशिष्टः कर्तृत्वात् अहम्प्रत्ययगोचरत्वाच्च देहवदित्यनुमानम्। अनात्मत्वं वा साध्यम्। अहमर्थे भोक्तृत्वमात्मसंबन्धबलादौपचारिकमिति पश्चान्निश्चीयत इति भावः।

कर्तृत्वे[1] ह्यात्मनः अहंप्रत्ययगोचरत्वेपि, देहस्येवानात्मत्वपरा[ग ?]र्थत्वजडत्वादिप्रसंगो दुर्निवारः । दृष्टश्च लौकिकवैदिककर्मसु कर्तृतया प्रसिद्धात् देहात् तत्क्रियाफलभुजः प्रमातुरहम्प्रत्ययिनः पृथक्त्वम् । तथेहापि प्रमातुरहमर्थाद्विलक्षणस्साक्षी प्रत्यगात्मेति युक्तम् ॥

(तत्र लोकानुभवविरोधप्रदर्शनम्) ·

नैवं युक्तम् ; अहं जानामीति ज्ञातृतया सिध्यतः प्रत्यगात्मनो व्यतिरेकेण साक्षिणो नाम प्रकाशमात्रस्यात्मनोऽनुपलब्धेः । [2]देहेन्द्रियमनःप्राणविज्ञानेभ्यो ज्ञानाश्रयतया विविच्यमाने प्रतीपमञ्चतीव निर्भासमानोऽहंभाव एव हि प्रत्यक्त्वं नाम ; साक्षित्वमपि तस्य साक्षाज्ज्ञातृत्वम् । न ह्यजानन्[3] साक्षीत्यपदिश्यते । सर्वश्च प्रकाशमानं ज्ञात्रे अहमिति चकासते[4] प्रकाशत इति प्रत्यात्मसिद्धोऽयमनुभवः, अहं जानामि, मह्यं प्रकाशत इति ।

(अहङ्कारस्थत्वेऽनुपपत्तिः)

[5]न चाव्याकृतपरिणाममेदस्याहंकारनाम्नो बुद्धिनामधेयस्य वा ज्ञातृत्वम्, देहस्येव अचेतनत्वपरिणामि(म ?)त्वजडत्वपरार्थत्वादिहेतुभिस्तदनुपपत्तेः ।

(छायापत्तिसंपर्काभ्यां ज्ञातृत्वारोप इत्यस्य भङ्गः भा. भा. 75)

[6]न च चितिच्छायापत्त्या तयोस्तत्संभवः, अचाक्षुषस्यच्छायाऽदर्शनात् ।

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1. **कर्तृत्व** इत्यादि । आत्मनः कर्तृत्वेऽहम्प्रत्ययगोचरत्वे च सतीत्यन्वयार्थः । 2. **साक्षी प्रत्यगात्मे**ति वदतः, **प्रमातुरहमर्थाद्विलक्षण** इत्युक्तिर्व्याहतेत्याह **देहे**ति । **अञ्चती**ति शत्रन्तं सप्तम्यन्तम् ; वस्तुनीति शेषः । **इवे**त्युक्तिरञ्चुधातुमुख्यार्थाविवक्षासूचनाय । प्रतीपगामित्वञ्च वैलक्षण्यं ज्ञानाश्रयत्वमेव । 3. **अजानन्नि**ति । न हि कर्ता साक्षीति व्यपदिश्यते, किं तु निर्व्यापार इति परे । तन्न–न ह्याक्षिसाकर्तृत्वरूपार्थरक्षणाय द्रष्टृरूपवाच्यार्थत्यागः ; दर्शनकर्तैव च साक्षिशब्दवाच्य इति भावः । 4. **चकासत** इति शत्रन्तं चतुर्थ्यन्तम् । 5. देहदृष्टान्तादिस्त्वदुक्तस्त्वदनिष्टसाधक इत्याह **नचे**ति । अहंकारशब्दो बुद्धिशब्दश्चाहमर्थभिन्नत्वं बुद्धिमद्भेदश्च साधयतः । अहमर्थः किं महत्तत्त्वरूपा बुद्धिः, तज्जन्योऽहङ्कारो वा, बुद्ध्यहङ्कारशब्दवाच्यमन्यत् मनस्तत्त्वं वा ; सर्वथा अव्याकृतपरिणामत्वान्न ज्ञातृत्वमिति ॥ 6. ननु साङ्ख्यरीत्या वृत्त्याश्रयत्वरूपं ज्ञातृत्वं प्रकृतिपरिणामे नानुपपन्नम् । एवमपि नित्यचैतन्यस्यैव ज्ञाधात्वाद्युपात्तताया अस्मदभिमतत्वात् ज्ञानानुभूत्यादिशब्दमुख्यार्थाश्रयत्वमनुभवसिद्धं कथं निर्वाह्यमिति भवत्प्रश्नः । तत्र चिच्छायापत्त्या वा चित्संपर्केण वा चिदाश्रयत्वभ्रान्तिरिति समाधिरिति शङ्कां क्रमेण क्षिपति **नचे**त्यादिना । **तयोः**–अहङ्कारे बुद्धौ च । यद्वा चिदहङ्कारयोः । अहङ्कारे छायापत्त्या ज्ञातृत्वम् । अथ तस्य चिति अपि अध्यास इति भावः । **छाया** प्रतिबिम्बः । चैतन्ये अहङ्कारः प्रतिबिम्बितः ; अतो दर्पणस्थमालिन्यस्य मुख इवाहङ्कारे तत्प्रतीतिः ; यद्वा चैतन्यमहङ्कारे प्रतिबिम्बितम् ; तेन जले चन्द्रवत्त्वस्येवाहङ्कारे चिदाश्रयत्वस्य प्रतीतिः—इतीदमुभयमपि न भवतीति भावः ।

न च [1]ज्ञातृत्वं चितावपि ते वास्तवमस्ति, येन, अग्निसंपर्कात् अयःपिण्ड इवौष्ण्यम्, तत्संपर्कादर्थान्तरे ज्ञातृत्वं जायेत, ज्ञायेत वा ॥

(अहङ्कारस्य व्यञ्जकत्वात् ज्ञातृत्वभ्रम इति शङ्का भा. भा. 76)

[2]यद्युच्येत—ज्ञप्तिमात्रमेवात्मानमभिव्यञ्जन् अचेतनोऽप्यहंकारः [3]स्वाश्रयतया तमभिव्यनक्ति। स्वभावो ह्ययं व्यञ्जकानाम्, यत् आत्मस्थतयाऽभिव्यङ्ग्यमभिव्यञ्जन्ति, दर्पण—जल—खण्ड मुण्डादय इव मुख—मिहिरबिम्ब—गोत्वादीन्। तत्कृतश्चायम्, अहं जानामीति भ्रमः। अत [4]एव खल्वहमुल्लेखविगमे सुषुप्तिमुक्त्योः स्वाभाविकविशदानुभवमात्ररूपेणाऽऽत्मनः प्रकाशः, तत एव चानात्मत्वमहमर्थस्य। तथाच सौरेशं वचः—

'आत्मनश्चेदहं[5] धर्मो यायान्मुक्तिसुषुप्तयोः।
यतो नान्वेति तेनायमन्यदीयो भवेदहम्' ॥ (नैष्क. २-३२) इति—

(तत्परिहारः भा. भा. 77)

तदिदमसंबद्धम्[6], यतः—

शान्ताङ्गार इवाऽऽदित्यमहङ्कारो जडात्मकः।
स्वयञ्ज्योतिषमात्मानं व्यनक्तीति न युक्तिमत् ॥ ११ ॥

[7]आत्मत्वाभिमताजडानुभवाधीना हि सर्वपदार्थाभिव्यक्तयोऽभिप्रेयन्ते। तादृशम् अशेषार्थसाधकम् उदयास्तमयविपरिवृत्तिशून्यप्रकाशस्वभावं तमनुभवं तदधीनसिद्धिरचित् अहंकारोऽभिव्यनक्तीत्युपहास्यमिदमात्मविदाम्।[1]

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1. सम्पर्कपक्षं खण्डयति **नचे**ति। **वास्तव**मिति। अग्नावौष्ण्यमिवेति शेषः।

2. व्यञ्जकत्वपक्षं शङ्कते **यदी**ति। 3. **स्वाश्रयतया** स्वाश्रयकतया। **आत्मस्थतया** स्वगततया। 4. **अत एवे**ति। व्यञ्जकत्वकृतत्वादेवेत्यर्थः। व्यञ्जकविलयादिति शेषः। 5. **अहम्**—अहन्त्वम्। **सुषुप्ते**ति भावे क्तः। **भवे**दित्यस्य **अयम्**इति कर्ता; अतः प्रथमपुरुषः। 6. **असंबद्ध**मिति। अहङ्कारस्य चैतन्यव्यञ्जकत्वाच्चैतन्येऽहङ्कारवृत्तित्वभ्रम इत्युच्यते। तत्र व्यञ्जकत्वं, व्यक्तिस्वरूपं, व्यञ्जकत्वस्य तादृशभ्रमनियामकत्वं, सुषुप्तावहमुल्लेखविगम इत्यादि सर्वं दुर्वचमिति भावः। 7. ननु जडस्यापि दर्पणगोवृतादेर्मुखकुङ्कुमगन्धादिव्यञ्जकत्वं दृष्टम्; प्रकाशरूपादित्यादेश्चक्षुर्व्यङ्ग्यत्वञ्च। अतः कथमयुक्तिरित्यत्र दृष्टान्तद्योत्यं विशदयति **आत्मत्वे**ति। दर्पणादिदृष्टान्तायोगो भाष्ये (७९) द्रष्टव्यः। अहङ्कारो नानुभूतिव्यञ्जकः तद्व्यङ्ग्यत्वात् अङ्गारवत्, अनुभूतिर्नाहङ्कारव्यङ्ग्या तन्निरपेक्षप्रकाशत्वादिति प्रयोगद्वयं विवक्षितम्।

1. ननूपकार्योपकर्तृभाव-स्तव्यस्तोतृभावादिकमिव व्यङ्क्तृव्यङ्ग्यभावोपि मिथः किं न भवति? न खल्वादित्याङ्गारस्थले अदर्शनमात्रेण निषेधसंभवः! एवं सिद्धान्ते निरपेक्षप्रकाशस्यात्मादेर्ज्ञानादिव्यङ्ग्यत्वस्यापि स्वीकारात् कथं व्यङ्ग्यत्वनिषेधोऽपीति हेत्वोरप्रयोजकत्वशङ्कायां प्रयोगद्वयमर्धद्वयेन समर्थयते

किञ्च—व्यङ्क्तृव्यङ्ग्यत्वमन्योन्यं न च स्यात् प्रातिकूल्यतः ।
व्यङ्ग्यत्वेऽननुभूतित्वमात्मनि स्यात् यथा घटे ॥ १२ ॥

दिनकरकरव्यङ्ग्यकरतलं तदभिव्यञ्जकं दृष्टमिति मा वोचः, करतलस्य तद्बाहुल्यमात्रहेतुत्वात् । तथाभूताश्च दिनकरमरीचयः स्फुटमुपलभ्यन्त इति न करतलव्यङ्ग्यत्वम् ॥

(अहङ्कारकृताभिव्यक्तेस्त्रेधा विकल्प्य निरासः भा. 77)

अपिच केयमभिव्यक्तिः, याऽनुभूतिरूपस्यात्मनोऽहङ्कारेण क्रियत इत्युच्यते ? न तावत् तत्सिद्धिः ; [1]तस्य स्वतस्सिद्धत्वेनानन्याधीनसिद्धित्वाभ्युपगमात् । नापि तद्विषयज्ञानम्, ज्ञानान्तराननुभाव्यत्वात् । अनुभाव्यत्वे हि घटादिवदननुभूतित्वप्रसङ्गः । अत एव[2] न ज्ञानकरणानुग्रहः ।

(तत्र तृतीयविकल्पस्य त्रेधा विकल्प्यापि निरासः)

स[3] हि वेद्यगतज्ञानोदयप्रतिबन्धकापनयनेन वा, दीपेनेव सन्तमसनिरसनेन चक्षुषः ; वेद्यसन्निकर्षोपाधित्वेन वा, व्यक्तिदर्पणादेरिव जाति-निजमुखादिबोधकस्य नयनादेः ; वेत्तृ[4](बोद्धृ ?)(वेदितृ ?)गतकलङ्कक्षालनेन वा, शमदमादिनेव परावरात्म-

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किञ्चेत्यादिना । प्रातिकूल्यतः विरुद्धत्वात् । अत्र यादृशं व्यञ्जकत्वं व्यङ्ग्यत्वञ्च विवक्षितम्, तादृशं मिथोविरुद्धम् । अन्योन्यव्यङ्क्तृव्यङ्ग्यत्वे सति यत्र परस्परव्यक्त्यधीनव्यक्तिकत्वप्रसक्तिः, तत्रान्योन्याश्रयदोषात् । तथाहि व्यञ्जकं हि व्यक्तिकारणं व्यक्तेः प्रागावश्यकम् । तत्र यद्यहङ्कारः स्वरूपसन्नेवानुभूतिव्यञ्जकः, तर्ह्यहमुल्लेखाभावात् तत्स्थतयाऽनुभूतिग्रहणमिष्टं न सिध्येत् ; अहमर्थस्य यावत्सत्तं साक्षिद्वयेभास्यत्वसिद्धान्तभङ्गश्च । अतोऽहङ्कारो व्यक्तस्सन्ननुभूतिव्यञ्जको वाच्यः । तथाऽनुभूतिरप्यहङ्कारव्यक्तेः हेतुरव्यक्ता पूर्वं न स्यातुमर्हति, प्रकाशस्वभावत्वात् । नाप्यहङ्कारं विना व्यक्ता, तथासति तस्याहेतुत्वापत्तेः । अतो व्यक्त्योः परस्परपूर्वकत्वमिति । अतोऽनुभूतेर्व्यञ्जकत्वमात्रम् ,अहङ्कारस्य व्यङ्ग्यत्वमात्रमिति प्रकृतप्रथमहेतोः प्रकृतविवक्षितव्यञ्जकत्वविरुद्धत्वात् प्रकृतसाध्यव्याप्यत्वमक्षतम् । द्वितीयानुमानमपि त्वन्मतानुसारेण प्रयुक्तं त्वया दुर्निषेधम् ; एवमनिष्टस्यैवापादनादिति । यद्वा प्रथमकारिकायाम् अहङ्कारो न प्रकाशव्यञ्जकः अप्रकाशत्वात् , संवित्त्र जडव्यङ्ग्या प्रकाशत्वादिति सामान्यतो विवक्षितम् । पूर्वोक्तानुमानद्वयं तूत्तरकारिकायाम् । पूर्वव्याख्याने **तमनुभवं तदधीनसिद्धिरिति** वाक्यस्वारस्यम् ; द्वितीये **किञ्चेत्युत्तरत्रारम्भस्वारस्यम्** ।

1. **सिद्धिः** उत्पत्तिः । 2. **अत एव** तद्विषयकज्ञानाभावादेव । 3. तद्विषयकज्ञानमस्ति न वेत्यस्त्वेतत् ; करणानुग्रहोऽपि प्रकृते दुर्वच इत्याह **सहीति** । **चक्षुष** इत्यादौ अनुग्रह इति विभज्यानुषङ्गः। 4. मुख्यो गौणो वा ज्ञातृरूपार्थे वेत्तृशब्दश्शास्त्रदीपिकादावात्मवादे । अत्र तु वेदितृशब्द एव सर्वत्र । एतत्प्रमेयीय श्रीभाष्यानुसारे तु बोद्धृशब्दः ।

तत्त्वज्ञानोपायस्याऽऽगमादेः। न तावत् अनुभवगतमहङ्कारापनेयमस्ति किंचित् ज्ञानोदयपरिपन्थि। (1) अज्ञानं तु ज्ञानसमानाश्रयविषयतया न तदुभयभावविरहिणि भवदभिमतसाक्षिणि निक्षेपमर्हति। न खलु ज्ञानप्रसक्तिशून्यो घटादिरज्ञानीत्युच्यते। तथैव न जातुचित् ज्ञातृत्वं ज्ञानमात्रस्येति न तस्याप्यज्ञानं भवेत्। (2) भवदपि तत् अहङ्कारापनेयं नेष्यते, ज्ञानैकनिवर्त्यत्वादज्ञानस्य; तथाऽभ्युपगमाच्च। (3) ज्ञानञ्च स्वविषय एवाज्ञानं निवर्तयति। न च तद्विषयत्वमात्मतयाऽभिमतस्यानुभवस्येष्यत इति तत्रत्यमज्ञानं न केनचित् कदाचिदुच्छिद्येत। (4) ज्ञानप्रागभावरूपञ्चाज्ञानं न ज्ञानोत्पत्तिप्रतिबन्धकमिति शक्यं व्यपदेष्टुम्। भावरूपमज्ञानमनिर्वचनीयं जगदुपादानमित्यादि प्रलापमात्रमिति [1]संबन्धनिरूपणे प्रतिपादयिष्यते। अतो न वेद्यदोषापनयनरूपा अहङ्कारेणानुभवाभिव्यक्तिः॥

करणानामभूमित्वान्न तत्संबन्धहेतुता।
अहमर्थस्य बोद्धृत्वान्न स तेनैव शोध्यते॥ १३॥

(व्यञ्जकस्य स्वनिष्ठतया व्यङ्ग्यप्रकाशनस्वभावविरहः (भा. भा. 79.)

न च स्वाश्रयतयाऽभिव्यङ्ग्यप्रकाशनमभिव्यञ्जयितुः स्वभावः; प्रदीपादौ अदर्शनात्। यथावस्थितवस्तुप्रकाशानुकूलस्वभावत्वाच्च ज्ञान-तत्साधन-तदनुग्राहकाणाम्। तच्च स्वतःप्रामाण्यन्यायात्; तदनभ्युपगमे च सर्वत्रानाश्वासप्रसङ्गात्॥ [1]व्यक्तेस्तु जातिराकार एवेति तथा प्रत्यायनम्; न व्यञ्जकत्वप्रयुक्तम्, उक्तादेव व्यभिचारात्। दर्पणादिस्तु नायनमहःप्रतिफलनलक्षणदोषहेतुर्नाभिव्यञ्जको वदनादेः। व्यञ्जकस्त्वालोकादिरेव। व्यञ्जकत्वेऽपि प्रतीपगमनदोषप्रयुक्तः तत्रान्यथाऽवभासः। न चेह तथाऽहमर्थस्य तादृशदोषापादकत्वं स्वभावः; तथासति सर्वस्यापि प्रत्यक्षादेरप्रामाण्यप्रसंगान्न [2]किञ्चित् तथ्यं स्यात्॥

नन्वज्ञानमेवापनेयमस्त्वित्यत्राह अज्ञानमिति। तदुभयभावविरहिणि-ज्ञानाश्रयत्वज्ञानविषयत्वरहिते। वेद्यगतज्ञानोदयप्रतिबन्धकेत्यनेनाज्ञानग्रहणे (1) तस्य वेद्यगतत्वं तद्वृत्तित्वरूपं तद्विषयकत्वरूपं वा नास्ति, (2) अज्ञानस्याहङ्कारापनेयत्वमपि नास्ति, (3) अनुभवगतस्य तस्योच्छेद्यत्वमपि त्वन्मते न भवति, (4) अज्ञानमभिमतं प्रागभावरूपं वा भावरूपं वा। आद्यं प्रतिबन्धकमपि न भवति। अन्त्यं तु त्वदिष्टमप्रसिद्धम्। (भावरूपाज्ञाने प्रत्यक्षानुमानादिप्रमणाभावप्रपञ्चनं श्रीभाष्यादौ द्रष्टव्यम्।) इत्येवं वेद्ये किञ्चित्कारमुखेनानुग्रहरूपं प्रथमशिरः खण्डितम्। अथ, वित्तिकरणे वेदितरि वा किञ्चित्कारमुखेनेति शिरोद्वयं शिष्टमर्धद्वयेन खण्डयिष्यति करणानामिति। [1] संबन्धनिरूपणे-ग्रन्थोपक्रमदर्शितात्मसंबन्धविषयविप्रतिपत्तिविषयनिरूपणावसरे। करणानामभूमित्वात्=अनुभूतेरिन्द्रियासंबन्धित्वात्। अहमर्थस्येति काकाक्षिन्यायात् प्रागप्यन्वेति! तेनैवेति। स्वस्वरूपस्यैव स्वकल्मषप्रतिभटत्वे कल्मषप्रसक्त्यभावादिति भावः। [2]. न किञ्चिदिति। अद्वैतज्ञानमप्यप्रमा स्यात्।

तस्मात्[3] ज्ञातृतया सिद्ध्यन् अहमर्थ एव प्रत्यगात्मा, न ज्ञप्तिमात्रम् ॥

(सौरेशवचोर्थदूषणम् —सुषुप्तावहमर्थस्यैव भानम् भ. 79)

यत्तु—सुषुप्तिमुक्तयोर्ज्ञप्तिमात्रतया स्फुरणम्; अहमिति तु न प्रतिभातीति—तत्र सुषुप्तौ तथावस्थितिः पुरस्तादेव निरस्ता। अहमित्येकरूपेणाऽऽप्रबोधात् तत्राप्यात्मनः स्फुरणात्। [1]यदिपरं परागर्थाननुभवात् तमोगुणाभिभवाच्च न विविच्य स्फुटं चकास्ति। भवदभिमतानुभूतिरपि तदानीं तथैव[2] हि प्रथत इति वाच्यम्। नाहमहं (नाहम्?), नाप्यर्थान्तरम्, अपितु अनुभूतिमात्रमज्ञानसाक्षितयाऽवतिष्ठत इत्येवंविधं स्वापसमयभवमनुभवं न हि सुप्तोत्थितः कश्चित् परामृशन् उपलब्धचरः॥ 'एतावन्तं कालं न किञ्चिदहमवेदिषम्' इति परामर्शनादेव तथात्वं लभ्यत इति चेत्—कथमिव? न किञ्चिदिति निर्देशादिति चेत्—नन्वेवमनुभूतिप्रतिभासोपि प्रत्याख्यातस्स्यात्।

(उक्तपरामर्शस्य विपरीतसाधकत्वम् भा. भा. 80.)

अपिच सुषुप्तिसमयसिद्धमात्मानम् अहमिति परामृश्य, 'न किञ्चिदवेदिषम्' इति तस्य वेदने प्रतिषिध्यमाने तात्कालिकीं वित्तिसिद्धिम् अहमर्थस्य चासिद्धिमभिदधानोऽनुभवविरोधमपि न जानाति देवानांप्रियः। निर्विषया निराश्रया च वित्तिर्नास्तीत्युक्तमेव।

(अहमर्थप्रकाशबाधकपरामर्शान्तरनिर्वाहः भा. भा. 81.)

ननु मामप्यहं न ज्ञातवान् प्रसुप्त इत्यस्ति हि प्रबोधे प्रत्ययः॥ सत्यम्; स तु वर्णाश्रमादिविशिष्टतया प्रबोधसमयसंवेद्यमानं देहिनं मामित्यादाय स्वाप्ययावस्थाप्रसिद्धाविशदस्वानुभवैकतानाहमर्थस्य तेन रूपेणाज्ञातत्वं प्रज्ञापयति, न पुनर्ज्ञस्वभा[3]वस्याहमर्थस्यापि; एवमेव खल्वयमनुभवः, 'अत्र सुप्तोऽहम् ईदृशश्चेत्येवं मामपि न ज्ञातवानहम्' इति॥

(परोक्तिशोधनेपि सुषुप्तावहमर्थसत्ताप्रकाशयोरवर्ज्यत्वम्)

अपिच आत्मा सुषुप्तावज्ञानसाक्षित्वेनाऽऽस्ते इति यौष्माकी स्थितिः।

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3. तस्मादिति। अहमर्थस्याहङ्कारत्वे तत्र देह इव वास्तवज्ञातृत्वायोगस्य, छायापत्त्या संपर्केण वा ज्ञातृत्वाध्यासायोगस्य च पूर्वमिव, इदानीं व्यञ्जकत्वाधीनज्ञातृत्वाध्यासायोगस्य चोक्तत्वादित्यर्थः। 1. सुषुप्तिगतं वैलक्षण्यं दर्शयति यदिपरमिति। यदिपरमित्यव्ययं समुदितं 'परन्तु'पर्यायकल्पम्। अतोऽत्र तर्हीत्येवं वाक्यापेक्षा नास्ति। यदि विशेषो विमृश्यः, तर्हि वक्ष्यमाणं परमस्तीति यदिपरमित्यस्यार्थः। इयं प्राचीनप्रयोगसरणिर्न्यायसिद्धाञ्जनेऽपि जडद्रव्यपरिच्छेदे (५७), 'यदिपरं तन्निमित्तत्वमात्रं महतः' इति। 2. तथैव अस्फुटतयैव। 3. ज्ञस्वभावस्य–त्वदुक्तज्ञानस्याश्रयापेक्षत्वात्संमन्तव्यस्य, अतएव प्रभातुल्यप्रकाशाश्रयत्वात् स्वयंप्रकाशस्य। वक्ष्यति च, 'चैतन्यस्वभावतया स्वयञ्ज्योतिष्ट्वात्' इति। अतएव 'चैतन्यस्वभावता हि स्वयम्प्रकाशता' इति भाष्यं चैतन्यस्वभावत्वात्स्वयम्प्रकाशतेति [1]व्याख्यातम्।

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1 अत्र विशेषो भाष्यार्थदर्पणे द्रष्टव्यः।

साक्षित्वञ्च साक्षाज्ज्ञातृत्वमित्युक्तम् । स चायं जानामीति प्रतिभासमानोऽस्मदर्थ एवेति कथमिव तदानीमहमर्थो न प्रथेत ? स्वस्मै स्वयंप्रकाशमानोऽहमित्येव हि प्रकाशत इति ॥

तद् सिद्धं स्वापादिदशास्वपि आत्मा प्रकाशमानः अहमित्येव प्रकाशत इति ॥

(मुक्तावहमर्थसमर्थनम् भा. भा. 81. 82.)

यत्तु—मुक्तावहमर्थो नोपावर्तत इति—तत्[1] वार्तम्, यतस्तथासति वैनाशिकदर्शन इवात्मनाश एवापवर्गः प्रकारान्तरेण प्रतिज्ञातस्स्यात् । नो [2]स्वस्वहमिति धर्ममात्रम्; येन तदपगमेऽप्यविद्यानिवृत्त्यामिवाऽऽत्मनः [3]स्वरूपेणावतिष्ठत इत्युच्यते (च्येत ?) । अहमित्येव हि तस्य स्वरूपम् । ज्ञानमपि हि तद्धर्मत्वेन तस्यैव प्रकाशते, 'ज्ञानं मे जातम्' इति । [4]का कथा पुनः अर्थान्तरस्यात्मत्वे ?

(मोक्षशास्त्रमुमुक्षुप्रवृत्तिबलतोपि मोक्षेऽहमर्थसत्त्वम् भा. भा. 82.)

अन्यच्च[5]—यः सांसारिकदुःखैर्दुःखित्वेनात्मानं तत्त्वतो भ्रान्त्या वा प्रत्येति, दुःख्यहमिति, सः, 'सर्वमिदमनिष्टजातं कथमहमपुनरुदयमपनुद्य अव्याकुलः(लं) स्वस्थो भूयासमिति संजातमुमुक्षस्तत्साधने प्रवर्तते । स यदि, 'साधनानुष्ठानादहमेव न भविष्यामि' इत्यवगच्छति, अपगच्छेदसौ मोक्षकथाप्रसङ्गादपि । ततश्चासंभवदधिकारितया सर्व एव वेदान्तविधयः, सर्वाणि च मोक्षशास्त्राणि प्रामाण्यादेव प्रच्यवेरन् ॥ अहमुपलक्षितः प्रकाशोऽवपवर्गेऽवस्थास्यत इति चेत्-किमतः? न हि मयि नष्टेऽपि कोऽपि प्रकाशः स्थास्यतीति कश्चित् प्रेक्षावान् प्रपत्स्यति ॥

(अहमर्थस्य युष्मदर्थत्वभङ्गः भा. भा. 67.)

एतेन[6] (एतेनै ?)तदपि परास्तम्, 'अस्मत्प्रत्यये योऽनिदमंशश्चिदेकरसः प्रकाशः,

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प्रकाशमानं वेति । नन्वज्ञानसाक्षित्वम् 'अहमज्ञानं जानामीत्येवंरूपं नेष्यते, किन्तु 'न जानामी' त्येवंरूपमिति चेत्-एवमपि जानामीत्युत्तमपुरुषेणास्मदर्थप्रकाशो दर्शित एवेति । 1. **वार्तम्** असारम् । **वैनाशिकदर्शने** क्षणिकज्ञानसंतत्युच्छेदो मोक्ष इति **बौद्ध**मते । 2. नन्वात्मन्यविद्याया इवाहमर्थस्याप्यध्यस्तत्वात् अध्यस्तनाशेप्यधिष्ठानभूतात्मस्थितिरपवर्गे निर्बाधेति शङ्कां क्षिपति **नो** इति । **धर्ममात्र**मिति । अविद्यापि नाध्यस्ता, किन्त्वात्मधर्मः । अहमर्थस्तु न धर्मोपि । अतो 'धर्मनाशेपि धर्मिस्थितिः' इति रीतिरपि न भवतीति । 3. **आत्मा स्वरूपेणे**ति वा, **आत्मनः स्वरूप**मिति वा, आत्मन इत्यस्याविद्यानिवृत्त्यामित्यत्रान्वयविवक्षया, **अविद्यानिवृत्त्यामिवात्मनः, आत्मा स्वरूपेणे**ति वा पाठः स्यात् । अन्यथा **आत्मे**त्यध्याहारः स्यात् । 4. **के**ति । ज्ञानस्यावस्थितिरेव तदाऽहमर्थनाशे न सिद्ध्यतीति स्थिते कुतस्तस्याहमर्थभिन्नस्यात्मत्वप्रसक्तिरिति । 5. "यद्यात्मधर्मोऽहङ्कारो नित्यत्वं तस्य बोधवत् । नित्यत्वे मोक्षशास्त्राणां वैयर्थ्यं प्राप्नुयाद्ध्रुवम्" इति सौरेशोक्तदोषस्तस्यैवेत्यभिसंधायाह **अन्यच्चे**ति । (प्राप्नुयात् —प्रसजेत् ।)

6. **एतेन** मुक्तावहमर्थानुवृत्तेरावश्यकत्वेन । **अस्मदि**त्यादि । अहमिति प्रतीताव-

स आत्मा । तस्मिंस्तद्बलनि[1]र्भासिततया लक्षणतो युष्मदर्थ एव अहं जानामीति सिध्यन्नर्थ' इति । [2]प्रत्यक्षविरोधात्—अहं जानामीति सिध्यंश्चेतनो युष्मदर्थ इति माता वन्ध्येति-वत् व्याहतार्थं वचः । न चासा[3]वन्याधीनावभासः ; चैतन्यस्वभावतया स्वयंज्योतिष्ट्वात् । प्रकाशश्च प्रकाशत्वादेव कस्यचिद्भवेत् दीपादिप्रकाशवदिति नात्मा भवितुमर्हति । अतो ज्ञातृतयाऽहमिति सिध्यन्नर्थ एवात्मा ।

(मुक्तेऽप्यहन्त्वसाधकन्यायः)

स [4]च मुक्तावप्यात्मने अहमित्येव प्रकाशते, स्वस्मै प्रकाशमानत्वात् । योयः स्वस्मै प्रकाशते, स सर्वोऽहमित्येव प्रकाशमानो दृष्टः ; यथा तथ प्रकाशमानत्वेनोभयवादि-सम्मतः संसार्यात्मा । यः पुनः अहमिति न चकास्ति, नासौ स्वस्मै प्रकाशते ; यथा [5]घटादिः । स्वस्मै प्रकाशते चायं मुक्तात्मा । तस्मात् सः अहमित्येव प्रकाशते ।

(अहन्त्वप्रकाशस्योपाधिकृतत्वभङ्गः)

नचैवं[6] प्रकाशमानत्वे मुक्तस्याज्ञानित्वसंसारित्वादिप्रसङ्गः आपादनीयः, मुक्तत्व-विरोधात् ; अतदुपाधित्वाच्च तत्प्रत्ययस्य । न ह्यज्ञानोपाधिरहंप्रत्ययः, ब्रह्मात्मापरोक्षज्ञान-क्षपितनिरवशेषाविद्यानाम प वामदेवा[7]दीनामतत्प्र(महम्ग ?)त्ययदर्शनात् । श्रूयते हि—"तद्धैतत् पश्यन् ऋषिर्वामदेवः प्रतिपेदे, अहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्च", "अह[8]मेव च (मेकः

हङ्कारोऽनुभूतिश्चेति द्वयं भासते । तत्रानुभूतिश्चिद्रूपा स्वयंप्रकाशतया प्रत्यग्रूपोंशः परारूपेदमंशादन्या । 1. **तद्बलनिर्भासिततया** चिदधीनप्रकाशतया । **लक्षणतः** पराधीनप्रकाशत्वरूपपराग्लक्षणवत्तया । अहम्प्रतीतिगोचरत्वाहंशब्दार्थत्वयोः सत्त्वेऽपि सोऽर्थो लक्षणथो **युष्मदर्थ एव**-इदमंश एव, परागर्थ एवेति । **सिध्यन्**-ज्ञातृत्वेन सिध्यन् । अत्र अनुभूतिरात्मा प्रत्यक्त्वात्, अनुभूतिः प्रतीची स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वात्, अनुभूतिः स्वयम्प्रकाशा चित्त्वादिति व्यतिरेकिहेतुत्रयम्, अहमर्थो नात्मा पराक्त्वात्, अहमर्थः पराक् ज्ञानाधीनप्रकाशत्वात्, अहमर्थो ज्ञानाधीप्रकाशः चिद्भिन्नत्वादित्यन्वयि-हेतुत्रयञ्चाभिसंहितमिति **श्रुतप्रकाशिकादौ** । 2. उत्तरेणैकवाक्यमिदम् । यद्वा यथाभाष्यमत्र वाक्यच्छेदः । 3. **असौ** अहमर्थः । **स्वयंज्योतिष्ट्वात्**—स्वयंप्रकाशत्वात् । ननु प्रकाश-तदाश्रययोस्स्वप्रकाशत्वे उभयोः प्रत्यक्त्वापत्तिः ॥ नैवम्, अहन्त्वस्यैव प्रत्यक्त्वरूपतया केवलप्रकाशे तदप्रसक्तेरिति । 4. अन्वयिव्यतिरेकिपञ्चावयवन्यायेन मुक्तावहन्त्वानुवृत्तिकथनमुखेनाहन्त्वरूपप्रत्यक्त्वस्य स्वरूपं विवृणोति **सचे**ति । स्वस्मै प्रकाशमानत्वं प्रत्यक्त्वम्, पराक्त्वञ्च परस्मै भासमानत्वमिति शिक्षितं भवति । 5. आदिना ज्ञानस्यापि परिग्रहः । 6. **एवं प्रकाशमानत्वे**-अहमिति प्रकाशमानत्वे । 3. **वाम-देव**शब्दोऽत्र महर्षिं महादेवञ्चाभिप्रेत्य । **आदि**शब्देन वा रुद्रग्रहणम् । ४७-९ **अतत्प्रत्यय-दर्शनादित्यशुद्धम्** । तत्प्रत्ययदर्शनादिति वा पाठस्स्यात् । 4 .ऋषिमध्ये वामदेवानुसन्धानं बृहदारण्यकवाक्येन प्रदर्श्य, देवमध्ये सर्वज्ञस्य वामदेवस्य महादेवस्यानुसन्धानमप्यथर्वशिरोवाक्येन

प्रथममासम् ?) वर्तामि [च] भविष्यामि" इत्यादि । तथा कथंचिदप्यविद्यादिक्लेशैर्लेशतोपि जातुचिदपरामृष्टस्य परमपुरुषस्यापि अहमित्यात्मपरामर्शः प्रज्ञायते, 'हन्ताहमिमास्त्रिस्रो देवताः', 'बहु स्यां प्रजायेय', 'स ईक्षत लोकान्नु सृजै' इति, तथा 'यस्मात् क्षरमतीतो ऽहमक्षरादपि चोत्तमः । अतोऽस्मि लोके वेदे च प्रथितः पुरुषोत्तमः ॥', 'तेषामहं समुद्धर्ता', 'अहं बीजप्रदः पिता', 'वेदाहं समतीतानि' इत्येवमादिभिः ॥

(अनात्मगोचराहङ्कारशब्दस्यान्यथानिर्वाहः)

एवञ्च[1] साक्षादहमर्थादात्मनो विलक्षणेऽपि देहे येन आव्यक्तिकपरिणाममेदेनाहमिति भ्रमः, तदभिप्रायोऽहंकारस्य क्षेत्रान्तर्भावोपदेशो भगवतः, 'महाभूतान्यहङ्कारः' इति । बहुमन्तव्यजनावधीरणहेतुश्चासौ गर्वापरपर्यायस्तत्रतत्र शास्त्रेषु प्रायशो हेयतयोपदिश्यते ।

(आत्मनोऽहमर्थत्व एवाविद्यानिर्वाहसंभवः)

तस्मादहमितिमतिर्बाधकापेता साक्षादात्मगोचरैव ; अनात्मनि तु शरीरे भवन्ती अविद्येति युक्तम् । उक्तञ्च, "श्रूयताञ्चाप्य(तच्छ्रूयताम्?)विद्यायाः स्वरूपं कुलनन्दन । अनात्मन्यात्मबुद्धिर्या" इति महर्षिणा वासिष्ठनन्दनेन । न च ज्ञप्तिमात्रप्रतिभासः कस्यचिच्छरीरेऽस्ति, येन तन्मात्रात्मवादिनोऽप्यनात्मबुद्धिरुपपद्येत ॥

[2]अतः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वादुक्तन्यायागमान्वयात् ।

भविष्यामीति इति । अत्र तत्त्वटीकायाम्, 'अथर्वशिरसोऽप्येवमेव निर्वाहो वेदार्थसंग्रहे स्थापित' इति वाक्यम्, अहमेवेत्यादेरथर्वशिरोवाक्यत्वस्य तत्र भगवद्भाष्यकृत्संमतेश्च सूचनायेति ज्ञायते । अविद्येति । अविद्याऽस्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशाः क्लेशाः (यो. सू.) । 'महाभूतान्यहङ्कार इत्येतत् क्षेत्रमुच्यते' (२-४३) इति सौरेशकटाक्षेणाह एवञ्चेति । आत्मन एवाहन्त्वे स्वतएव सर्वदाऽहमिति भासमानत्वे च सतीत्यर्थः । अहङ्कारशब्दे भावे करणे च घञ् । कृञर्थश्च प्रकृते ज्ञानक्रिया । तथाच अहंबुद्धिस्तत्करणञ्च तदर्थः । तत्राऽऽत्मन्यहम्बुद्धिस्तात्त्विकी । तदभिप्रायेण क्वचित्प्रयोगः । यथा, 'अथातोऽहङ्कारादेशः' इति । अनहमर्थे अहमिति बुद्धिरप्यहङ्कारः । अयमेव देहादावात्मभ्रम इत्युच्यते । अयं सर्वप्राणिसाधारणः । अयमेव यदा प्रशस्तदेहादिविषयकात्मभ्रमरूपो भवति, तदा गर्व इत्युच्यते । आत्मगुणादिभिरुत्कृष्टस्य जनस्य यत् देहादि, ततः स्वदेहादौ प्राशस्त्यमभिमत्य देहात्मभ्रमवशादात्मानमेव तादृशप्राशस्त्यविशिष्टतया गृह्णन् हि परात्मनस्तदभावमाकलय्य तमवधीरयतीति । 'अहङ्कारं बलं दर्पम्' इत्यादौ बलदर्पादिसाहचर्यात् अयमेव गुणविशेषो हेयत्वेनोपदिष्ट इति ज्ञायते । आत्मन्यहम्बुद्धेस्स्वतसिद्धत्वान्न तत्र करणापेक्षा । करणेघञन्तस्त्वहङ्कारशब्दः अनहमर्थे देहादावहम्बुद्धिकरणे क्षेत्रज्ञार्थचतुर्विंशतिक्षेत्रतत्त्वान्तर्गते अहङ्कारतत्त्वे प्रवर्तत इति तस्य क्षेत्रान्तर्भावोपपत्तिरिति । 2. अद्वैतिमतदूषणं निगमयति अत इति । अत्र संविदनित्यत्वसाश्रयत्वादि निरूप्य, बौद्धमत इवैतन्मतेपि प्रत्यभिज्ञानुपपत्तिं प्रस्तुत्य, 'अहं जानामीति प्रत्यक्षं न ज्ञप्तौ ज्ञातृत्वभ्रमरूपम् ; नाप्यन्तःकरणे वस्तुतो भ्रान्त्या वा ज्ञातृत्वसंभवः,

अविद्यायोगतश्चाऽऽत्मा ज्ञाताऽहमिति भासते ॥ १४ ॥

(संविदात्मत्वसाधकाजडत्वहेतुभङ्गः)

[1]**यदुक्तमजडत्वात् वित्तिरेवात्मेति, तत्रेदं वाच्यम्-किमिदमजडत्वं नामेति । यद्युच्येत, सदपि यन्न प्रकाशते, तत् जडम् ; तद्विपरीतमव्यभिचरितप्रकाश[2]सत्ताकमजडमिति-तथासति सुखादिभिर्व्यभिचारी हेतुः । [3]न खलु सुखदुःखेच्छादयो विद्यमाना अपि कदाचिदनवभासमाना भवन्ति । स्वसत्ताप्रयुक्तप्रकाशत्वमपि दीपादिभिरनैकान्तिकम् ; ज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तप्रकाशानङ्गीकाराच्चासिद्धता, विरुद्धता च ॥ यदि मतम्, अव्यभिचरितप्रकाशोपि सुखादिरन्यस्मै प्रकाशत इति घट इव जडतां नातिवर्तते ; तेनानात्मेति—ज्ञानं वा किं स्वस्मै प्रकाशते ? अन्यस्यैव हि तदपि जानतोऽहमर्थस्य प्रथते, अहं जानामीति, अहं सुखीतिवत् । तेन स्वस्मै प्रकाशमानत्वमभिप्रेत्य प्रयुज्यमानोऽजडत्वहेतुरसिद्धः संविदि । अतः सत्तयैव स्वमात्मानं प्रति सिद्ध्यन् अजडोऽहमर्थ एवात्मा । तत्संबन्धायत्ता तु ज्ञानस्यापि प्रकाशता । अत एव हि स्वाश्रयचेतनं प्रति प्रकटता, इतरं प्रति अप्रकटता च ज्ञानस्य, सुखदुःखादेरिव । न चैवम् आत्मान्तरसंबन्धमर्थान्तरं वाऽपेक्ष्य अयमात्माऽऽत्मने प्रकाशते । एतच्चानन्तरमेवोपपादयिष्यते ॥**

अतो ज्ञाताऽहमर्थ एवात्मा, न ज्ञप्तिमात्रम्' इति वर्णनेन आत्मनि ज्ञातृत्वाहन्त्वयोः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धिर्दर्शिता । अथ सुषुप्तौ मुक्तौ चाहमर्थस्फुरणोपपादने प्रवृत्य, अन्यथा वैनाशिकमताविशेषः, मोक्षशास्त्रमुमुक्षुप्रवृत्तिवैघट्यञ्चेति तर्कमुक्त्वा, आत्मनि स्वस्मै भासमनत्वेन सर्वदाऽहमिति भानं साधयतः पञ्चावयवन्यायस्य कथनादहम्भाने न्यायोऽप्युक्तः । एवमहम्भाने वामदेवादिविषय आगमोप्युक्तः । ज्ञातृत्वविषये तु आगम उपरिष्टाद्वक्ष्यते । **अविद्यायोगो** नाम अविद्याया अनात्मनि देहादावात्मभ्रान्तेर्योगः उपपत्तिः । यद्वा तस्या **अयोगो**ऽनुपपत्तिः ; आत्मनि वस्तुतोऽहन्त्वसत्त्व एव स्थूलोहमित्यहम्भ्रमस्यात्मभ्रमत्वोपपत्तिः ; तत्र वस्तुतस्तदसत्त्वे च तस्य तद्भ्रमत्वायोग इति । अयमनन्तरमेवोक्त इति ।

1. एवं विशिष्य प्रच्छन्नबाह्यमतं निरस्य प्रकटप्रच्छन्नसाधारण्येन प्रथममनूदिते संविदात्मवादे शिष्टं खण्डनं वर्तयिष्यन् तद्वादारम्भोक्तमजडत्वहेतुमाभासीकरणायानुवदति **यदुक्त**मिति । 2. अव्यभिचरितः प्रकाशो यस्याः सा सत्ता **अव्यभिचरितप्रकाशा** । अत्र स्वसत्तात्यापकप्रकाशवत्त्वं, स्वसत्ताप्रयुक्तप्रकाशवत्त्वं, स्वस्मैभासमानत्वमिति पक्षत्रये मध्यमपक्षः प्रथमपक्षत्वेन भाष्ये आदृतः, औचित्यविशेषात् । 3. संवित् आत्मा स्वसत्ताप्रयुक्तप्रकाशवत्त्वादित्यत्र, स्वमते अहमर्थे आत्मत्वसद्भावात् साध्यतदभावसाधारणतया हेतुरनैकान्तिकः स्वमतरीत्या । परेण संविदतिरिक्तस्य सर्वस्यानात्मत्वस्वीकारात् हेतुः साध्याभावैकसमानाधिकरण इति तद्रीत्या विरुद्धत्वम् । तेन प्रकाशरूपधर्मास्वीकारात् प्रकाशवत्त्वरूपहेतोरसिद्धिश्चेति ।

(अभेदसाधकाभिमते सहोपलम्भनियमे अशेषहेत्वाभासवचनम्)

न [1]च ज्ञानेन सहोपलम्भनियमोऽहमर्थस्यार्थान्तरतां वारयति, ज्ञानस्यापि तथात्वप्रसङ्गात् । तदपि हि तेन[2] नियतेन सहोपलम्भमिति अहमर्थादनर्थान्तरं मिथ्यारूपमेवाऽऽपद्येत[3] । असिद्ध[4]श्च संविद्विशेषैस्सहोपलम्भनियमः, प्रत्येकं व्यभिचारदर्शनात् । न च विशेष[5]मात्रं (?) निर्धूत निखिलविषयविशेषोपश्लेषं वा वित्तिमात्रमस्ति, येन सहोपलम्भनियमः संवेदितुरभिधीयेत । [6]सामान्यं तु सदपि सौगतैर्न वस्तुतयाऽऽस्थीयते ॥ समस्त[7]वृत्तिप्रत्यस्तमयेऽपि स्वयञ्ज्योतिः अयमात्माऽवतिष्ठत इति च वक्ष्यामः ।

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1. अथ संविदात्मवादोक्तस्य प्राकट्याभावादेः स्वसंमतत्वात् तदुपर्युक्तमेव विब्रूक्ष्यन्, 'संविद एवात्मत्वे लाघवात् किमन्येन कल्पितेन' इति तदुक्तविषये समाधानरूपं, 'कल्पनायां ह्येष दोषः, प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वादन्यो दुरपलपः' इत्यर्थपरं नन्वित्यादिग्रन्थं दूषयितुं तेनोपन्यस्तं यत् सहोपलम्भनियमादि, तत् खण्डयति **न चे**ति । 2. **तेन** अहमर्थेन । सह उपलम्भो यस्य तदिति बहुव्रीहिः । **नियमेन सहोपलम्भ**मिति वा **नियतसहोपलम्भ**मिति वा पाठः स्वरसः । 3. अभेदं साधयतश्च संविदि अहमर्थस्य कल्पितत्वसाधन एव तात्पर्यम् । नीलतद्धियौ, अहमर्थतत्संविदौ वा अभिन्ने परस्परोपलम्भनियतोपलम्भकत्वादिति प्रयोगे मिथ्यात्वरूपपर्यवसितसाध्यस्य पक्षैकदेशे बाधादिकमत्र विवक्षितम् ; अहमर्थो ज्ञानाभिन्नः स्वोपलम्भव्यापकसंविदुपलम्भकत्वादिति प्रयोगे च यत् स्वोपलम्भव्यापकयदुपलम्भकं तत् तदभिन्नमिति सामान्यमुखव्याप्तिविवक्षायां, संविदि स्वोपलम्भव्यापकाहमर्थोपलम्भकत्वरूपहेतुसत्त्वात् साध्याभावाच्च तद्दृष्टान्तेनात्रापि साध्याभावसाधनसंभवाद्धेतोर्विरुद्धता, तत्रैव व्यभिचारश्चेति ज्ञापितम् । अत्र सहत्वघटितहेतुनिर्देशस्तु सहत्वस्य भेदाधिष्ठानत्वात् स्वभिन्नाहमर्थोपलम्भव्यापकोपलम्भगोचरसंवित्कत्वादिति ग्राह्यः । स्वं संवित् । एतदनुसारेण सामान्यमुखव्याप्तिवचनप्रकारोऽप्यूह्यः । 4. घटपटाद्येकैकसंविदुपलम्भेपि चालिनीन्यायेनाहमर्थोपलम्भव्यापकत्वरूपविशेषणाभावात् साधनाप्रसिद्धिरिति । 5. अत्र विशेषातिरिक्तमित्येतदर्थपरः पाठस्स्यात् । प्रत्यक्षादिवित्तिविशेषमादाय व्यापकत्वाभावेपि वित्तिमात्रमादाय व्यापकत्वं भवतीति न, निर्विशेषं न सामान्यमिति न्यायेन विशेषातिरिक्तसामान्याभावात् । एवं घटसंविदित्येवं विषयवैशिष्ट्यं विसृज्य निर्विषयवित्तिमात्रग्रहणमपि दुष्करम्, तादृशवस्त्वभावादिति । 6. ननु सविषयव्यक्त्यतिरिक्तवित्त्यभावेपि प्रकृते तादृशव्यक्तीनामेव संवित्त्वेन रूपेण सामान्यतो ग्रहणेन व्यापकत्ववर्णनान्न दोष इत्यत्राह **सामान्य**मिति । अतद्व्यावृत्त्यात्मकापोहातिरिक्तभावरूप जातिः सौगतासंमता । अतद्व्यावृत्तिश्च व्यक्त्यनतिरिक्तेति । 7. प्रकारान्तरेण साधनाप्रसिद्धिमाह **समस्ते**ति । सुषुप्तिप्रलयादावहमर्थप्रकाशोस्ति, न संवित्प्रकाश इति न व्यापकत्वमिति भावः ॥

अभिन्नं सहोपलभ्यत्वादिति साध्यहेतुनिर्देशः एकं द्वाविति निर्देश एव, सहेति द्वयोरुक्तेः । तथाच

स्ववाग्विघातश्च—एकं द्वाविति निर्देशात् । द्वयोर्हेकक्रियानुप्रवेशे सहशब्दः; शिष्येण सहाऽऽगच्छत्याचार्य इति यथा ॥ अपिच नीलतद्धियोरिति द्वे उपादाय, अभेद इत्येकत्वविधिः सवित्रीवन्ध्यात्वविधिरिव । [1]अनेकान्तश्च संविदि प्रतिषिध्यमानैर्जडत्वादिभिः, सर्वज्ञज्ञानेन सहोपलम्भनियममागिभिः संसारिज्ञानैश्च[2] । तेषामभेदाभ्युपगमे ज्ञानस्य जडत्वमूर्तत्वादि, बुद्धस्य बद्धत्वमित्यापद्येत ।

(एकज्ञानमात्रविषयत्वरूपसहोपलम्भनियमदूषणम्)

नियमेनैकज्ञानसिद्धत्व[3]मप्युक्तप्रकारेण प्रत्युक्तम् ॥ [4]विपक्षव्यतिरेकश्चासिद्धः । भवतु नियमेनैकज्ञानसिद्धत्वं ज्ञानज्ञेयज्ञातॄणाम्, मा च भूदभेदः : को विरोधः ?

पूर्वोक्तसहत्वघटितहेतावयं वाग्विघात इत्याह **स्ववागिति** । **अपि चेति** । सहोपलम्भनियमादभेदो नीलतद्धियोरिति तत्कारिकातः नीलतद्धियौ अभिन्ने इति प्रतिज्ञानिर्देशः प्रतीयते । तत्र पक्षतावच्छेदक हेत्वोर्द्वित्वैकत्वयोर्विरोधात् प्रतिज्ञाविरोधोपीत्यर्थः । 1. जडत्वमूर्तत्वादिकं हि सौगतैरपि संविदि नेष्टम् । तत्र जडत्वादेरपि संवित्प्रकाश्यतया संवित्सहोपलम्भनियमसत्त्वात् तत्र संविदभेदरूपसाध्याभावाद्व्यभिचारः । अभेदस्वीकारे च तस्याः जडत्वाद्यापत्तिः। ननु जडे व्यभिचार इति वक्तव्यम्, न तु जडत्वे इति; तथा हि सति संविदो जडत्वत्वापत्तिरेव स्यात्-सत्यम्-सौगतमते धर्मधर्म्यभेदादेवमुक्तम् । ननु जडे व्यभिचार इति वा कथं सुवचम्, नीलादेर्जडस्य पक्षत्वात् ॥ सत्यम् । जडत्वादेस्संविदि बौद्धैः प्रतिषिद्धत्वाज्जडस्य पक्षत्वे बाधस्यादिति नीलत्वादिना पक्षता, न तु जडत्वेनेत्युक्तौ जडत्वेन जडेपि हेतुसत्त्वाद्व्यभिचार इति तात्पर्यम् । 2. **सर्वज्ञस्य** सुगतस्य ज्ञानं हि संसारिज्ञानविषयकम् । तथाच तस्य ततो भेदे व्यभिचारः, अभेदे बुद्धस्य बद्धत्वापत्तिरिति । ननु संसारिज्ञानोपलम्भव्यापकत्वं सर्वज्ञज्ञानोपलम्भस्य कथम्, जीवेपि व्याप्यस्य सत्त्वादिति चेत्-उच्यते, संविद्विशेषैर्नियतसहोपलम्भाभावस्योक्तत्वात् तदर्थं संवित्त्व-सामान्येन व्यापकत्वविवक्षया पक्षे स्वविषयकसंविदभेदसाधनेऽयं दोषः । यद्वा व्यापकत्वं नियमश्चेत् पूर्वदोषः, व्याप्यत्वरूपश्चेत्, अयं दोष इति । 3. अयं हेतुस्सहत्वाघटित इति पूर्वोक्तकिञ्चिद्दोष-परिहारः । एवं पूर्वं सहोपलम्भे विषयोपलम्भस्य संविदुपलम्भस्य चैकत्वनिर्बन्धो नासीत् । विषयो-पलम्भव्यापकत्वं संविदुपलम्भे तदभिन्ने भिन्ने वा यथायथमिति विवक्षितम् । अत्रोभयोरेकज्ञान सिद्धत्वमुच्यते । तच्च स्वप्रकाशकज्ञानमात्रप्रकाश्यसंवित्कत्वं वा संवित्प्रकाशकज्ञानमात्रप्रकाश्यत्वं वा । आद्यं नीलादावसिद्धम्, संविदो नीलाप्रकाशकपीतज्ञानप्रकाश्यत्वात् ॥ घटसंविद्व्यक्तेः घटज्ञानमात्र-प्रकाश्यत्वमस्तीति चेत्, जडगोचरसंविद्व्यक्तेर्जडज्ञानमात्रप्रकाश्यत्वस्य, सर्वज्ञसंविद्व्यक्तेस्संसारिज्ञानज्ञान-मात्रप्रकाश्यत्वस्य सत्त्वादुक्तदोषः । 4. द्वितीयसाधारण्येनाप्रयोजकत्वमाह **विपक्षेति** । हेतोर्विपक्षेऽभावो न निश्चितः, अभेदरूपसाध्यं मास्तु, संवित्प्रकाशकमात्रप्रकाश्यत्वमस्त्विति शङ्कासत्त्वादिति । तदुपपाद यति **भवत्विति** । संविदं विना अप्रकाश्यत्वं जडत्वप्रयुक्तम्, नाभेदप्रयुक्तमिति ।

किमप्रकाशरूपत्वात् प्रकाशमनुरु[1]ध्यते ।
व्यवहाराय नीलादिराहोस्वित् तदभेदतः ॥ १५ ॥
इति सन्दिह्यमानत्वान्नाभेदः शक्यनिर्णयः ।
बोध्यस्यश्चैष नियमो न पुनर्बुद्धि बोद्धृगः ॥ १६ ॥

स्पष्टश्च प्रत्यक्षबाधः, सर्वज्ञानेषु वेद्यादिव वित्तेरपि वेदितुर्भेदस्यापरोक्षत्वात् । न च प्रतियोगिनः [2]प्रत्यक्षत्वं दृश्यत्वं वा भेदस्याऽऽपरोक्ष्ये त्वपेक्षितव्यम्, सिद्धि[3]मात्रेण तदुपपत्तौ अप्रयोजकत्वेन तद्विशेषस्यानाक्षेपात् (?) । अ[4]नवभासमानेऽपि प्रतियोगिनि भावाः स्वरूपत एव विलक्षणाः प्रत्यक्ष्यन्त इति सर्वलोकस्वसाक्षिकमेतत् ॥

(ज्वालादृष्टान्तेनाबाधितत्वशङ्का)

ननु जीवतो भेदप्रत्यक्षस्य शिरसि [5]पदनिधानेन सहोपलम्भनियमस्याभेदेन प्रतिबन्धग्रहणमिति कथमिव ततस्तद्बाधसंभवः ? तथासति हि [6]ज्वालाभेदानुमानमपि तदेकत्वप्रत्यभिज्ञयाऽपोद्येत ॥

(ज्वालादृष्टान्तवैषम्यवचनम्)

अविशेषज्ञो देवानांप्रियः । तत्र हि कलप्रकारणदोषानुवृत्तौ सत्यां जायमानोऽपरोक्षावभासः न निरवद्यप्रत्यक्षपूर्वकमनुमानं बाधितुमर्हति । तथा हि—अचिरनिर्वापितारोपितेषु एकवर्तिभागवर्तिषु बहुषु दीपेषु तद्भेदादर्शिनः[7] सुसदृशतया, स एवायमिति स्मृतिरुपजायत इति दृष्टम् । अतोऽन्यत्राप्यप्रतिबन्धपुष्कलकारणक्रमोपनिपातादवयवविश्लेषाच्च

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1. दिवादिगोऽयं रुधधातुः 'अनो रुध काम' इत्यनूपसृष्टः कामार्थकः । कर्तरि तिङ् । अत्र अनुरुणद्धीत्यपेक्षया एतत्प्रयोगो युक्ततरः । भवत्विति हेत्वङ्गीकारोपि ज्ञातरि नेत्याह **बोध्येति** । ज्ञानानुरोधनियमो नीलादौ वेद्यमात्ररूपे जडे स्यात्, न बोद्धरि, तस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वात् । अतोऽहमर्थस्संविदभिन्नस्तदेकप्रकाश्यत्वादित्यत्र स्वरूपासिद्धिरिति । 2. **प्रत्यक्षत्वं** प्रत्यक्षरूपज्ञानत्वम् । भेदप्रत्यक्षे प्रतियोगिप्रत्यक्षमेव तन्त्रम् । तत्र वित्तेस्वप्रकाशतया प्रत्यक्षान्तरानपेक्षा प्रत्यक्षवित्तावेव, तत्स्वप्रकाशस्य प्रत्यक्षरूपत्वात् । अनुमित्यादिस्वप्रकाशस्य त्वनुमित्यादिरूपतया प्रत्यक्षान्तरविषयतयैव तन्त्रत्वमिति शङ्कितुराशयः । 3. **सिद्धिमात्रेण** सामान्यतः प्रतियोगिप्रकाशेन । 4. **अनवेति** । गोत्वेन गोज्ञानमप्यश्वरूपप्रतियोग्यभानेप्यश्वभेदज्ञानरूपमेव । प्रतियोगिभाने तु सुतराम् । एतावता, 'भेदज्ञानसिद्धवत्कारः कथम्' इति तेन कृता शङ्का परिहृता । 5. प्रत्यक्षस्यापि तृणीकारेण सहोपलम्भनियमे अभेदनिरूपितव्याप्तिग्रहणमित्यर्थः। 6. ज्वालाभेदानुमानम् इयं ज्वाला पूर्वक्षणवर्तिज्वालातो भिन्ना तत्सामग्रीभिन्नसामग्रीजन्यत्वादिति । 7. **तद्भेदादर्शिनः** निर्वायणारोपणाद्यदर्शिनः । **पुष्कलेति** । वर्त्यवयवः तैलांशश्च ज्वालाकारणम् । तत्र पूर्वक्षणदीपादुत्तरक्षणदीपो भिन्नः पूर्ववर्त्यंशभिन्नवर्त्यंशे तदंशस्पृष्टतैलवलादुत्पद्यमानत्वात् ।

सुसदृशनिरन्तरप्रवृत्तप्रदीपप्रवाहाऽऽलम्बनैव तथामतिरिति निश्चीयते । तथैक[1] [स्मि ?] ज्ञानात्वप्रत्ययः स्वतःप्राप्तेन्द्रियवृत्तिविपर्ययप्रयुक्तः समसमयोपजायमानानेकानवद्यप्रत्यक्ष[2]-प्रतिक्षिप्तविषयश्च द्विचन्द्रादौ दृष्ट इति नासौ तत्रैकत्वानुमानमभिभवितुं प्रभवति ॥ न चैवमिह[3] ज्ञातृज्ञानज्ञेयविवेकसाक्षात्कारी प्रत्यय इति प्रतिरुणद्ध्येवायमिहाभेदानुमानोदय-प्रसक्तिम् । न च उपलब्धि[4]साहित्यनियमादेव तथात्वमत्रानुमेयमिति युक्तम्, विपक्षे बाधकानुपलब्धेः । संविदधीनसिद्धितयापि तथानियमोपपत्तेः । [5]अनैन्द्रियकत्वेन च तद्वृत्तिविपर्ययस्याकिञ्चित्करत्वात् । योग्या[6]नुपलम्भपराकृतत्वाच्च बाधकप्रत्ययस्य । [7]अपिच विषयसिद्धिर्हि संवित् । सा च स्वयंप्रकाशेत्यविवादः । तेनावर्जनीयस्तथा नियमः । न च भेदो[8]पि सिद्धिमन्तरेण सिध्येदित्यनुन्मत्तेन युक्तमापादयितुम्—इत्यलमनेनानुभवपराहत-मतातिव्याकुलीकरणेन ॥ (प्रकाशातिरिक्तवस्त्वसंभवखण्डनम्)

अप्रकाशात्मनश्च नीलादेः प्रकाश इति [9]अनुभवसिद्धत्वान्न समर्थनान्तरं प्रार्थयते ॥ [10]आत्मा तु प्रकाशस्वभाव एव । न च तावता ज्ञानत्वम्, स्वतन्त्रत्वात् । परतन्त्रमागन्तु यावदर्थेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादिकारणसन्निधानमवतिष्ठमानमर्थावच्छिन्नरूपं ज्ञानमिति प्रागेवावो-चाम । आत्मा तु स्वतन्त्रो ज्ञाता अहमिति प्रत्यात्मं प्रथते । यदि पुनरीदृशोऽप्ययम् अनन्या-

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अन्यथा आरोपणसमन्तरं शिष्टवर्ति तैलापनयनेऽपि ज्वालानुवृत्त्यापत्तेः । अवयवविश्लेषः— प्रदीपावयव-विशरणम् । 1. एकस्मिन्निति युक्तम् । एकज्ञानात्वेत्यत्र एकमिति पदच्छेदे आलम्ब्येति पदमा-वश्यकम् । वृत्ति विपर्ययेति । इन्द्रियप्रसरणे अङ्गुल्यवष्टम्भादिकृतान्यथाभावेत्यर्थः । 2. अन्यपुरुषीयाणि प्रत्यक्षाणि अनवद्यानि । 3. घटमहंजानामीति मिथोभेदग्राहिप्रत्यक्षम् एवं कारणदोषजन्यं नेत्यर्थः । 4. सहोपलम्भनियमादभेदसाधनार्थात् तथात्वं कारणदोषजन्यत्वमपीति न ; विपक्षे कारणदोषजन्यत्वरूप प्रकृतसाध्यविपरीतपक्षे बाधकाभावात् । अप्रयोजको हेतुरिति भावः । 5 नन्वत्रापि द्विचन्द्रादा-विवेन्द्रियप्रसरणविपर्यास एव मूलमित्यत्राह अनैन्द्रियकेति । इन्द्रियग्राह्यविषये हि तद्वृत्तिविपर्यासस्य भ्रमहेतुता, न तु तदयोग्याहमर्थादिविषये इति । 6. कारणदोषनिश्चयाभावेपि बाधकप्रत्ययात् भ्रमत्वनिश्चयोऽस्तु इत्यत्राह योग्येति । 7. संविदधीनसिद्धित्वेपि संविदुपलम्भनियमः कुत इत्यत्राह अपि चेति । 8. संविदधीनसिद्धित्वमेव कथमित्यत्राह न चेति । भेदोपि—संवित्प्रयोगि-कभेदरूपत्वेन संप्रत्युच्यमानो घटादिरपि । ज्ञातृज्ञेयग्रहणमेव भेदग्रहणमिति हि प्रागुक्तम् । 'न च भेदोपि सिद्धिमन्तरेण' इत्यत्र, 'नचाभेदोपि सिद्धिमन्तरेण' इति वा पाठस्स्यात् । 9. प्रकाश इतीति । इतीदमित्यर्थः । इदं प्रार्थनाकर्तृ । अतः प्रकाशाप्रकाशयोर्विरोधः प्रागुक्तोऽयुक्तः, कालभेदेनाविरोधात् । प्र. पञ्चिकायां प्रमाणपारायणे, 'अप्रकाशात्मकस्यैव प्रकाशव्यतिरिक्तस्य प्रकाश इति प्रकाशादेव सिद्धम्' इति वाक्यम् । 10. प्रकाशस्वाभाव्ये च संवेदनत्वमित्युक्तं निरस्यति आत्मेति ।

धीनसिद्धितया ज्ञानमभिलप्यते, अभिलप्यतां कामम् । तथापि[1] ज्ञानवदेवेदं ज्ञानम्, न ज्ञप्तिमात्रतया (त्रं तथा) । (ज्ञानातिरिक्तात्मनि श्रुतिप्रमाणोपन्यासः)

अत[2] एव हि च्छन्दोगाः, 'अथ यो वेदेदं जिघ्राणीति, स आत्मा' इत्याद्यामनन्ति । तथा, कतम आत्मेति प्रश्नपूर्वकमिदमेव लक्षणमामनन्ति वाजसनेयिनः, 'योयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्तर्ज्योतिः पुरुषः' इति । अत्र हि, 'योऽयं सर्वलोकानुभवसिद्धो विविधविषयवेदनप्रचुरः प्राणेषु प्रेरकतया स्थितो हृदयायतने अन्तर्ज्योतिरहमिति प्रत्यक्त्वेन प्रकाशते, स पुरुषः' इति यथोदितमेवात्मस्वरूपमुपदिश्यते । 'एष[3] हि द्रष्टा श्रोता घ्राता रसयिता मन्ता बोद्धा कर्ता विज्ञानात्मा पुरुषः' इत्याथर्वणाः । तथा, 'विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात्' इति, 'न पश्यो मृत्युं पश्यति न रोगं नोत दुःखताम्', 'स उत्तमः पुरुषः.....नोपजनं स्मरन्निदं शरीरम्', 'एवमेवास्य परिद्रष्टुरिमाष्षोडश[4] कलाः पुरुषायनाः पुरुषं प्राप्यास्तं गच्छन्ति', 'तस्माद्वा एतस्मान्मनोमयादन्योऽन्तर आत्मा विज्ञानमयः' इत्याद्याः ॥

[5]सत्यं ज्ञानमित्यत्रापि ब्रह्मलक्षणनिर्देशे ज्ञानशब्दो न ज्ञानमात्रवचनः, अपितु तद्वद्वचनः । तद्वचनत्वे 'लिति' (पा. ६-१-१९३) इति [6]आद्युदात्तत्वप्रसक्तेः । अन्तोदात्तश्चायं ज्ञानशब्दः । मत्वर्थीयाच्प्रत्ययान्तत्वे तथात्वं घटते, नान्यथेत्येतत् परमात्मनिरूपणे अतिनिपुणमुपपादयिष्यामः ॥ ऐतरेयोपनिषदपि 'प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म' इत्युक्त्वा, एतेन प्राज्ञेनात्मनेति प्रकृष्टज्ञानवन्तमेवेश्वरं दर्शयति ॥

तत् सिद्धं ज्ञातैवायमात्मेति ॥

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1. **तथापि** अभिलापेऽपि लोकप्रसिद्धसकर्मकसकर्तृकज्ञानरूपत्वाभावात् तद्गतमनन्याधीनप्रकाशत्वरूपं धर्ममादाय गौणोऽयं निर्देशः असिंहे माणवके सिंहवद्भावात् सिंह इतिवदिति भावः । न ज्ञप्तिमात्रमित्येतावदेव पाठस्स्यात् । तथेत्यधिकम् । 2. एवं सौगतोक्तं निरस्य तदनुसारिप्रच्छन्नमतनिरासायात्मनो ज्ञातृत्वे श्रुतीरपि दर्शयति **अत एवेति** । **विज्ञानमयः** तद्गुणप्रचुरः । **अन्तर्ज्योतिः** स्वप्रकाशः । अत्र अयं हृदीति हृदयावच्छेदेनोपलम्भो दर्श्यते । अत एव सिद्धो नासादिगप्राणभेदः प्राणेष्विति तत्पृथक्कारेण ज्ञाप्यते । 3. **हि** यतः **द्रष्टा**....दर्शनादिरूपप्रकाशधर्मकः, अत एव **विज्ञानात्मा** प्रकाशस्वरूपोऽपि प्रकाशधर्मकः प्रदीपवदिति । 4. प्रश्नोपनिषदि सप्राणमसृजतेत्यादिना प्राणश्रद्धापञ्चभूतेन्द्रियमनोन्नवीर्यतपोमन्त्रकर्मलोकनामाख्याः षोडश कलाः (६-४) उक्ताः ; पाञ्च भौतिकदेहेन्द्रियाणि वा कलाः । **पुरुषायनाः** पुरुषाधीनस्वरूपस्थितिप्रवृत्तिकाः । **पुरुषं** परमात्मानम् ।

5. जीवात्मनीव परमात्मन्यपि ज्ञातृत्वस्वभावे श्रुतिं दर्शयति **सत्य**मिति । 6. तेन सूत्रेण तादृशप्रत्ययात्पूर्वस्योदात्तविधानादिति भावः । **परमात्मनिरूपण** इति । विप्रतिपत्तिघट्टप्रदर्शितरीत्या इदमपि आत्मसिद्धिग्रन्थानुप्रविष्टम् ।

(अथानन्यसाधनत्वप्रकरणम्)

किं पुनरस्मिन् देहादिव्यतिरेकिणि चेतने प्रत्यगात्मनि प्रमाणम् ?

अनुमानमिति नयविचक्षणोऽक्षपादः यदाह—"इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखज्ञानानि आत्मनो लिङ्गमिति' (१-१-१०) इति ।

(अक्षपादमताऽऽक्षेपः)

किममीषामात्मना अविनाभावो दृष्टः, धूमध्वजविशेषेणेव धूमविशेषस्य ? इन्तैवं तत एव तत्प्रमितेः किमनुमानेन ?

(तार्किकेणाऽऽशयाविष्करणम्)

मा भूत् विशेषतोदर्शनम् ; सामान्यतस्तु भविष्यति । तथाहि—इच्छादयः कार्यत्वानित्यत्वगुणत्वादिभिः शब्दादय इव आश्रिततयाऽनुमीयन्ते । यश्चैषामाश्रयः स आत्मा । गुणत्वञ्च परिशेषात्—न सामान्यविशेषसमवायाभावाः, अनित्यत्वात् ; न द्रव्यं कर्म वा, व्यापकद्रव्यसमवायादिति । विशेषगुणत्वं चानित्यत्वे सति अस्मदाद्येकेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वनियमात् रूपादिवत् ॥ (सामान्यतोदृष्टानुमानात् विशेषसिद्धिप्रकारः)

एवमाश्रयमात्रमुपस्थापयन्तोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकिणो हेतवः द्रव्यान्तरगुणत्वं प्रत्याचक्षाणैः केवलव्यतिरेकिसाधनैरात्मगोचरतया नियम्यन्ते । तथा हि भवति—इच्छादयो न महाभूतगुणाः स्वात्मन एव प्रत्यक्षत्वात् अबाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वाद्वा । ये भूतगुणास्ते स्वात्मपरात्मप्रत्यक्षाः बाह्यकरणप्रत्यक्षाश्च ; यथा रूपादयः ; न तथेच्छादय इति न तद्गुणाः । दिक्कालमनांसि पुनः न विशेषगुणवन्ति ; नापि तद्गुणानां प्रत्यक्षत्वमिति न तेषामपि

एवं देहेन्द्रियमनःप्राणधीभ्योऽन्य इति विवेचितम् । अथानन्यसाधनत्वं विव्रियते । अनन्यत्स्वं साधनं ज्ञापकं यस्येत्यनन्यसाधनः । तत्रानुमानादेस्साधनत्ववादिनां मतं विमृश्यते । विप्रतिपत्त्यवसरदर्शितक्रमेण गौतमकापिलादितार्किक-श्रोत्रिय-कौमारिल-प्राभाकरमतानि उपन्यस्य सिद्धान्तं वक्ष्यति । धूमादाविवेच्छादौ व्याप्तिग्रहणाभावादनुमानमपि नेति शङ्कते **किमिति** । धूमो ध्वजो यस्य सोऽग्निः **धूमध्वजः** । उदर्याद्यग्नेर्धूमादननुमानात् , जलसिक्ताङ्गारजन्यधूमादेरग्न्यसाधकत्वाच्चोभयत्र विशेषपदम् । **ततः** दर्शनात् । विशेषतो दृष्टं सामान्यतो दृष्टमिति द्विविधेऽनुमाने अग्निधूमवत् विशेषतोदृष्टाभावेपि वायुस्पर्शवत् सामान्यतोदृष्टमनुमानं संभवतीति तार्किकःपृच्छति **माभूदिति** । इच्छादेर्गुणत्वमसिद्धमिति तत्साधकं परिशेषानुमानमाह **न सामान्येत्येत्यादिना** । **अनित्यत्वादिति** । अत एव न गगनादिद्रव्यमपि । **न द्रव्यमिति** । अवयवः परमाणुः अवयवि चान्यत् परिच्छिन्नमेव । कर्म च तन्मात्रे । **व्यापकसमवायात्** विभुसमवेतत्वात् । विभुत्वञ्चेच्छाद्याश्रयस्य, सर्वदेशावच्छेदेन शब्दोत्पत्त्या गगनस्येव, सर्वतो जन्मलाभादिकार्येण सिद्धम् । इच्छादयो न दिक्कालमनोगुणाः विशेषगुणत्वात् प्रत्यक्षत्वाच्चेति ।

गुणाः । अकारणगुणपूर्वत्वात् अयावच्छरीरभावित्वादित्यादयः शरीरविशेषगुणत्वप्रतिषेध-हेतवः प्राचीनाश्चात्रानुकृष्टव्याः । [1]तेनेच्छादयो न शरीर [रादि] गुणाः, तद्गुणभावापवादकप्रमाणवत्त्वे सति गुणत्वात् । ये यथोक्तसाध्या न भवन्ति, ते यथोक्तसाधना अपि न भवन्ति, यथा रूपादयः । यथोक्तसाधनाः पुनरिच्छादय इति यथोक्तसाध्या एवेति । विमतिपदास्पदेभ्यः शरीरादिभ्योऽर्थान्तरगुणा इच्छादय इति वा प्रतिज्ञा । यथोक्त एव हेतुः, उदाहरणञ्च[2] प्रयोक्तव्यम् । सामान्येन वान्वयः प्रदर्शनीयः-यो यद्गुणभावापवादकप्रमाणवत्त्वे सति गुणः, स ततोऽर्थान्तरस्य गुणः, यथा पृथिव्यादिभ्यः[3] शब्द इति आकाशसिद्धिवदात्मसिद्धिरिति— (एतत्तार्किकाशयखण्डनम्)

[4]इदमपि न समीचीनमित्येके । तथाहि-अन्वयव्यतिरेकिहेतुभिर्देहादिसाधारणप्राश्रयमात्रमवगमितम् । न च तावताऽऽत्मसिद्धिः ।

(केवलव्यतिरेकिणो हेत्वाभासत्वम्)

केवलव्यतिरेकी तु साधनदशामेव नासादयति, सपक्षान्वयविरहात्, असाधारणवात् । न चैवं केवलान्वयिनो विपक्षव्यतिरेकदर्शनविकलतया [5]साधारणवत् असाधनत्वम्; देश-

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1. एवं तत्तदवृत्तित्वे प्रत्येकहेतुमुक्त्वा अनुगतमेकं विशिष्टप्रयोगमाह तेनेति । 2. यथोक्तमित्यनुषज्यते । पूर्वोक्तरीत्या व्यतिरेक्युदाहरणघटितव्याप्तिप्रदर्शनं कार्यमित्यर्थः । 3. पृथिव्यादिभ्य इत्यतः परम् अर्थान्तरस्य गुण इत्यनुषङ्गपूर्वकमर्थो वक्तव्यः ।

4. एवं तार्किकाशयमनूदितं दूषयति इदमिति । इच्छादयः किञ्चिदाश्रिताः गुणत्वादिति प्रथमानुमानम् । इच्छादीनां शरीराद्यसमवेतत्वसाधकानि अन्यानि अनुमानानि । इच्छादयः शरीराद्यतिरिक्तसमवेता इत्यन्तिमानुमानम् । तत्र प्रथमानुमानेनाऽऽत्मनि साधनीये मध्यानुमानानि सहायभूतानि, अन्तिमानुमानं च प्रथमवत् आत्मसाधकम् । तत्र नाद्यः, साध्यघटककिञ्चित्पदेनात्मरूपविशेषालाभात् । सहायभूतानुमानहेतवस्तु केवलव्यतिरेकित्वादहेतवः । अत एव नान्त्यपक्षोऽपीतित्यर्थः । 5. साधारणेति अनैकान्तिको हेत्वाभासः त्रिविधः साधारणासाधारणानुपसंहारिभेदात् । अतः असाधारणोऽपि हेत्वाभासः । शब्दो नित्यः शब्दत्वादित्यसाधारणहेतुर्हि सपक्षवृत्तित्वरूपाङ्गवैकल्यादसाधक इष्टः । हेतोः पञ्च रूपाण्यपेक्षितानि, पक्षसत्त्वं सपक्षसत्त्वं विपक्षासत्त्वमबाधितत्वमसत्प्रतिपक्षितत्वञ्चेति । पक्षे सत्त्वं हेतोः पक्षसत्त्वम्; एवमुपरि । ३ यथा धूमवान् वह्नेरिति साधारणहेतुः विपक्षे सत्त्वात् तदसत्त्वरूपतृतीयरूपाभावादसाधनम्, तद्वत् केवलान्वय्यप्यस्तु । वह्न्यादौ विपक्षः प्रसिद्धः; तत्र हेतोरसत्त्वं नास्ति; केवलान्वयिनि विपक्ष एवाप्रसिद्धः; एवं मिथोविशेषे सत्यपि विपक्षासत्त्वस्य दुरुपपादत्वमुभयत्र तुल्यमिति शङ्का । देशेति । न हि साधारणस्थल इव व्यभिचारनिश्चयोऽस्ति । तदभावात् केवलान्वयिनि न विपक्षसत्त्वनिश्चयप्रयुक्तं तद्रूपवैकल्यम्; किन्तु विपक्षाप्रसिद्धिप्रयुक्तम् । विपक्षप्रसिद्धिस्थल

कालादिशंकितोपाधिविगमेऽप्यन्वयदर्शनेन साध्यान्वितस्वभावतया परिनिश्चितत्वात् । एवं केवलान्वयिनो हेतुत्वसंभवेऽपि केवलव्यतिरेकिणस्तत् अयुक्तम् । न च[1] साधनाभावे साध्याभावदर्शनमात्रेण साध्यान्वितस्वभावत्वं शक्यं निश्चेतुम् ; अभावस्यानन्तदेशव्यापितयाऽनवयवेन ग्रहणस्यैव दुष्करत्वात् । कलयाऽप्यन्यत्र वृत्तौ[2] संबन्धे नियमासंभवात् । सन्देहग्रस्तत्वाच्च—किं साधनाभावप्रयुक्तः साध्याभावः, किं वा निमित्तान्तरप्रयुक्त इति ॥

[3]पृथिव्यादिभ्योऽर्थान्तरगुणत्वप्रतिज्ञाऽपि द्रव्यान्तराप्रसिद्धेरप्रसिद्धविशेषणा ॥

(साङ्ख्योक्तजीवानुमानसरणिदूषणम्)

एतेन साङ्ख्योदीरितसाधनभेदा अप्यपोदिता वेदितव्याः संघातपरार्थत्वादयः । तथाच तानेव तावत् आदितो [4]व्याकुर्महे— (सांख्याशयाऽऽविष्कारः)

"संघातपरार्थत्वात् त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययादधिष्ठानात् ।
पुरुषोऽस्ति भोक्तृभावात् कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥" (सां. का)

अयमर्थः—देहेन्द्रियादयः परार्थाः संघातत्वात् शयनासन[5]शराणादिवत् । प्रत्यक्षश्च शरीरस्य संघातत्वम्, भूतानाञ्च । अव्यक्तमहदहंकारेन्द्रियाणाञ्च सुखदुःखमोहात्मतया तथात्वमनुमेयं [6]तद्वदेव ॥ न च इन्द्रियाणामाहंकारिकत्वस्याभ्युपेतस्य, साध्यत्वाभिमतपारार्थ्यधर्मस्य चासंहतपरार्थत्वस्यान्यथात्वापादनादुभयविशेषविरुद्धत्वं हेतोः ; अहंकारान्वयव्य-

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एव तत्र सत्त्वं शङ्क्येतेति तत्रैवासत्त्वज्ञानमपेक्षितम् । अप्रसिद्धिस्थले तु न तदपेक्षा ; प्रसक्तौ सत्यामेव प्रतिषेध प्रवृत्तेः । यद्युच्येत—अप्रसिद्धिनिश्चय एव दुर्लभः, देशान्तरे वा कालान्तरे वा हेतोस्सोपाधिकत्वशङ्कया व्यभिचारशङ्कासत्त्वादिति—तर्ह्यनुमानान्तर इवानुकूलतर्केणोपाधिशङ्काविगमः संपाद्यते । एवं शङ्कितोपाधिविगमे सति यत्रकचित्साध्यसाहचर्यदर्शनत एव साध्यव्याप्तिपरिनिश्चयश्चान्वयव्यतिरेकिण्यपि वलतः ; तथैव केवलान्वयिन्यपि । सर्वोपाधिविगमेप्यन्वयो हि न व्याप्तिं विनेति । **विगमेपी**ति । अत्र **अपी**ति न स्यादिति मन्यते । ननु सपक्षसत्त्वमप्यन्वयव्याप्तिग्रहोपयोगित्वान्न प्रकृतेऽपेक्षितवित्यत्र व्यतिरेकव्याप्तेर्दुर्ग्रहत्वमाह **नचे**ति । १. साधनाभावे सति क्वचित्साध्याभावदर्शनमात्रेणेत्यर्थः । अन्वये हेतोः साध्यव्याप्यत्वम् ; व्यतिरेके तु साध्याभावस्यैव हेत्वभावव्याप्यत्वम् । अथापि न्यायभाष्ये समव्याप्तत्वाभिप्रायेण साध्याभावव्याप्यत्वं हेत्वभावे उक्तम् । अत्र यथार्हं ग्राह्यम् । **अनवयवेन** कृत्स्नतः । **दुष्करत्वा**दिति । अनुकूलतर्कश्च व्यतिरेकव्याप्तौ दुर्वच इति भावः । २ हेतौ साध्यसंबन्धः सामानाधिकरण्यरूपः । **निमित्तान्तरे**ति । अत एवोक्तम्, "अन्ये परप्रयुक्तानां व्याप्तीनामुपजीवकाः । तैर्दृष्टैरपि नैवेष्टा व्यापकांशावधारणा" इति । ३. अन्तिमानुमानेऽन्वयिनि दोषोऽयमेव । प्रतिज्ञायां पक्षांशे विशेषणं साध्यम् ; तच्च पृथिव्याद्यर्थान्तरगुणत्वम् । पृथिव्यादिभिन्नवस्तुसमवेतगुणत्वमिति यावत् । तत् अप्रसिद्धमित्यर्थः । ४. पश्चात् तन्निरासस्सुगमत्वायेति शेषः । ५ **शरणं** गृहम् । ६. **तद्वदेव** शरीरादिवदेव । **असंहतपरार्थत्वस्ये**ति । **असंहतः**—असंघातरूपो यः परः तदर्थत्वस्येत्यर्थः ।

तिरेकानुविधानेन, [1]'देवा वैकारिकाः स्मृताः' इत्याद्यागमबलेन, प्रकाशलाघवगुणान्वयेन च वैकारिकाभिधानसात्त्विकाहंकारभेदयोनित्वस्येन्द्रियाणां प्रमाणसिद्धस्यापवादानुपपत्तेः। [2]आत्मनस्तु संघातत्वे तस्यापि संघातान्तरार्थतयाऽनवस्थापत्त्या निष्प्रमाणकानेककल्पना प्रसंगात्। अप्रयोजकत्वाच्च संघातत्वस्य शेषित्वे। दृष्टान्तदृष्टाशेषधर्मोपस्थापनेऽनुमान प्रामाण्यस्यैवासंभवापत्तेस्तदसंघातत्वस्य [3]चाप्रचाल्यत्वात्। न च प्रमाणान्तरबलेनाऽनाहंकारिकत्वसंघातान्तरार्थत्वयोर्बाधे अबाधितेन [4]संघातपरार्थत्वेनापि न भवितव्यम्। एवच संहत[5]त्वव्यापकावरुद्धत्रैगुण्यादिरहितोऽसंहत आत्मा सिद्धः।

[6]तथा देहादयः सुखदुःखमोहात्मकतया परेणाधिष्ठीयन्ते, यन्त्रादिभिरिव रथादयः। [7]अपिचानुकूलप्रतिकूलवेदनीये सुखदुःखे भृत्यभ्रातृव्यवत् अनुकूलनीयप्रतिकूलनीयवती। दृश्यत्वात्[8] देहादयो घटादय इव विलक्षणद्रष्टृका इति।

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१. विरुद्धहेत्वाभासे विशेषविरुद्ध इति कश्चित्प्रभेदः। स च धर्मिविशेषविरुद्धो धर्मविशेषविरुद्ध उभयविशेषविरुद्ध इति त्रेधा। धर्मी पक्षः। धर्मस्साध्यम्। तत्रतत्र सिद्धान्त्यभिमत आकारो विशेषः। तद्विपरीतसाधकत्वं विशेषविरुद्धत्वम्। अत्र च शयनादिदृष्टान्तेनेन्द्रियेषु परार्थत्वसाधकः संघातत्वहेतुः तद्दृष्टान्तेनैव तेष्वनाहङ्कारिकत्वं साधयतु। तथा प्रकृतानुमाने परार्थत्वरूपसाध्यघटकस्य परस्य असंघातरूपत्वमेव सिद्धान्त्यभिमतम्; प्रकृतहेतुस्तु प्रकृतदृष्टान्तेनासंहतपरार्थत्वविपरीतं संहतपरार्थत्वं साधयत्विति हि शङ्का द्वयमत्र। तत्रेन्द्रियाणामनाहङ्कारिकत्वसाधनमनुभवागमबाधितमित्याह प्रथमम्। इन्द्रियोत्पत्तेः प्राक् अहंकारोऽस्ति। अहंकारव्यतिरेके इन्द्रियं नास्ति इति तदन्वयव्यतिरेकानुसरणम्। **देवाः** इन्द्रियाणि। **अहंकारभेदे**ति। वैकारिकस्तैजसश्च भूतादिश्चेति क्रमेण सात्त्विकराजसतामसाहंकाराणां नामानि। तत्र सात्त्विकाहङ्कारजत्वे युक्तिः **प्रकाशे**ति। 'सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकम्' इति ह्युच्यते। २. धर्मविशेषविपरीतसाधनमप्यप्रयोजकत्वेनानिष्टप्रसक्त्या च दुष्टमित्याह **आत्मनश्चे**ति। **शेषित्व** इति। शेषित्वं प्रति अप्रयोजकत्वादित्यन्वयः। ३. **तदसंघातत्वस्य चे**ति **चकारः** क्वचिन्न। अस्ति चेत्, **असंभवापत्ते**रित्यत्रान्वेति; इन्द्रियाहङ्कारिकत्वसमुच्चयार्थो वा। ४. संघातत्वहेतुना संघातस्य पारार्थ्यं साध्यमानमबाधितं देहादौ भवत्येवेति। ५. संहतत्वरूपं यत् व्यापकं तदवरुद्धं तद्व्याप्यं यत् त्रैगुण्यं तदभाववान् सिध्यति, संहतत्वरूपव्यापकाभाववत्त्वादिति। एवं **त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययादि**ति व्याख्यातम्। ६. **अधिष्ठाना**दित्येतत् विवृणोति। **यन्त्रादिभिरि**ति। यन्ता आदिर्येषां ते, तैः। **यन्ता**-सारथिः। ७. **भोक्तृभावा**दित्येतत् व्याख्याति **अपिचे**ति। सुखमनुकूलनीयवत् अनुकूलतया वेदनीयत्वात् भृत्यवदित्येवमनुमानम्। दृष्टान्ते अनुकूलनीयेति देहस्य ग्रहणम्; पक्षे पुंसः। **भ्रातृव्यो** रिपुः। ८. **भोक्तृभावा**दित्यस्य सांख्यग्रन्थस्था द्रष्टृत्वादित्यपरा व्याख्या; तदनुसारेणाह **दृश्यत्वादि**ति।

कारिकागत-अधिष्ठानादिहेत्तत्रयस्य त्रैगुण्यादिरहितात्मसाधनपर्यवसानं पूर्ववत् अनवस्थापरिहारायेत्याह

अधिष्ठातुरनुकूलप्रतिकूलवेदकस्य द्रष्टुस्त्रैगुण्यादिविपर्ययः पूर्ववदेव निर्णेतव्यः । तथा देहादेरव्यक्तान्तस्य कृत्स्नस्य त्रिगुणात्मकतया अत्यन्तदुःखोपशमनलक्षणमोक्षदशानुपपत्तेस्तदर्थश्च शास्त्राणां महाधियाञ्च प्रवृत्तेरस्ति देहादिव्यतिरिक्तोऽसंहतस्त्रैगुण्याद्यसंस्पृष्टः पुरुष इति।

(साङ्ख्यानुमानदूषणम्)

अत्रापि संघातपारार्थ्यादिभिर्यद्यपि परः कोऽप्यधिष्ठाता द्रष्टा सिद्धः, तथापि न तस्यासंहतत्वात्रिगुणत्वादिरभिमतविशेषः शक्यनिश्चयः । तथाहि-संघातस्य संघातान्तरार्थत्वनियमदर्शनबलादापतन्ती परापरा[1] संघातकल्पना न दोषाय, कार्यतयेवानादिकारणपरम्परापरिकल्पना । [2]नचाप्रयोजकत्वमपि, असंघातस्यासंगस्याशेषविक्रियाशून्यस्यानाधेयातिशयकूटस्थचितिमात्रवपुषः पुरुषस्य संघातं प्रति परत्वानुपपत्तेः । तद्धि तस्य शेषि भवति, तच्च तदर्थम्; यत् येनोपक्रियते क्रियते वा, यच्चोपकरोति करोति वा । न च तथा सांख्यपुरुष इति कथं तस्य संघातं प्रति परत्वम्? कथंतराञ्च संघातस्य तादर्थ्यम्? अनुपकार्योऽप्युपकार्यतया आत्मानं मन्यत इति चेत्—कामं मन्यताम्; किमायातमुपकार्यत्वस्य? न खलु बाला[3]स्तलमलिनतादिमत्तया गगनमभिमन्यन्त इति तस्य तथात्वं भवति ।

(शेषित्वारोपस्याप्ययोगः)

अपिच तथाविधभ्रमोऽपि कस्य कथमुदयत इति विवेचनीयम् । न तावत् चितिशक्तेः; सर्वविक्रियाशून्यतयाऽतिविशुद्धायामशुभशतनिदानभूतभ्रमपरिणामासंभवात् । अन्तःकरणं तु बुध्यपरपरिभाषाभिधानमचेतनतया तनुरिव न भ्राम्यति ॥ अचेदपि स्वच्छतया चितिच्छायामापन्नं चेतनायत इति चेत्-न, नीरूपायाः चितेर्बुद्धेश्चच्छा (चिच्छा) यातद्ग्रहणानुपपत्तेः ॥ छायेव च्छायेति चेत्-कः खल्विवार्थः? चितिसरूपत्वमिति चेत्, हन्तैवमशेषविकाररहितचितिसरूपतापत्तौ अन्तःकरणमपि प्रत्यस्तमितसमस्तवृत्तिकमापद्यत इति दुरुपपादतरोऽयं भ्रमसुखदुःखादिविकारयोगः प्रत्यात्मसिद्धः ॥ चेतनत्वेन सरूपत्वमिति चेन्न — चितिरेव हि ते पुरुषः; न चेतयिता । यथाऽऽह तत्रभवान् पतञ्जलिः, "यदा चितिरेव पुरुषः किमत्र केन व्यपदिश्यत" इति ॥ अजडायमानत्वमिवार्थ इति चेत्, अजडत्वमपि न ज्ञातृत्वा-

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अधिष्ठातुरिति । कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेरिति हेतुं व्याचष्टे तथेति । १. परापरेति । अन्यान्येत्यर्थः; उपर्युपरीति यावत् । २. धर्मविशेषविरुद्धतां पूर्वोक्तां स्थापयति नचेति । उपक्रियत इति आरादुपकारकप्रयाजाद्यभिप्रायेण । तत्र यस्येति शेषः । क्रियत इति स्वरूपनिष्पादकसन्निपत्योपकारकावहननपुरोडाशाद्यभिप्रायेण । अत्र यदिति कर्म अध्याहार्यम् । ३. तलम् -तलमन्तः(धः)प्रदेशः कार्योपयुक्तः, मूर्तरूपं वा । तथा ह्युपरि नभो दृश्यते । 'तलमध्यस्यन्ति, अवाङ्मुखीभूतमहेन्द्रनीलमणिमयमहाकटाहकल्पमित्यर्थः इति भामती । अतः तलत्वाध्यासः, मलिनत्वाध्यासश्च पृथक्पृथक् ।

तिरिक्तं किञ्चिदित्युक्तमेव ; तेनैव[1] तद्विवरणमिति च न किंचिदेतत् ॥ अपिच चितिसंनिधानाधीनां बुद्धिसिद्धिमभिदधानः कथमिव तदजडमानं प्रति[2]जानीयात्? न [3]च चितिस्वान्तयोर्बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बाधाराभिमतयोरन्यतरस्मिन्नप्यविद्यमानस्य विषयविशेषोपरक्तज्ञातृत्वलक्षणधर्मभेदस्य प्रतिबिम्बे संभवः । प्रत्युक्तश्चायं प्रतिबिम्बवादः प्रच्छन्नबाह्यमतप्रत्यादेशे[4] । (वृत्त्यारोपसंभवशङ्कापरिहारः)

[5]यदुच्यते-निर्विकारायापि पुंसे तत्संनिधिमहिमसमुत्थापितप्रमाणविपर्ययादिविचित्रवृत्तिभेदं स्वान्तमेव स्ववृत्तिं विषयविशेषांश्चोपदर्शयति, सामन्तचक्रमिव पराक्र[6]मीयः प्रतिबलविलोलनादिवृत्तीः स्वामिने। ततः साक्षी भोक्ता चापदिश्यते, राजेति (राजेव?) विक्रमी विजयी चेति—तदनुपपन्नम्-द्रष्टृ हि दर्शनीयं दृश्यते (दर्श्यते?) । न च दृशिमात्रात्मवादिनां सांख्यानां तदुपजीविनाञ्च प्रच्छन्नानां द्रष्टृत्वं वास्तवमस्ति । न च काल्पनिकेन शेषित्वसंभवः । कल्पनापि न संभवतीत्युक्तमेव । राजा तु सामान्यतो विशेषतो वा तेषु कर्मसु अमात्यान् नियुञ्जानः तत्फलमैश्वर्यादि चाश्नुवानः स्वस्वामिभावहेतुक्रयप्रतिग्रहजननादिव्यापारयोगी न निष्क्रियस्यानाधेयातिशयस्य पुंसो निदर्शनमिति यत्किञ्चिदेतत्[7] ॥ स्थूलोऽहं, गच्छाम्यहमित्यादिप्रत्यक्षमृदितविषयतया प्रसिद्धैवातीतकालता व्यतिरेका[8]नुमानमेदानाम् इति आनुमानिकीमप्यात्मसिद्धिमश्रद्दधानाः श्रौतीमेव तां श्रोत्रियास्संगिरन्ते ।

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१. **तेनैवेति** । कथं चेतनायत इत्यत्र अजडायमानतयेति हेतुनिर्देशे यदेवोपपाद्यं तदेवोपपादकमिति दोष इति । २. 'संप्रतिभ्यामनाध्याने' (१-३-४६) इत्याध्याने परस्मैपदम् । आध्यानमुत्कण्ठापूर्वकस्मरणम् । परायत्तप्रकाशेऽन्तःकरणे कथं स्वप्रकाशत्वरूपमजडत्वं सोत्कण्ठं स्मरेदित्यर्थः । ३. चितिर्बिम्बः, स्वान्तं प्रतिबिम्बाधारः । न तत्र कुत्रापि भ्रान्तिमत्त्वम्, किन्तु चित्प्रतिबिम्बे इत्याशङ्क्याह **न चेति** । ४. **प्रत्यादेशे** इति पूर्वम् **अचाक्षुषस्वच्छायाऽदर्शनादित्युक्तत्वात्** । यदि **नीरूपायाश्चिते**रितीहानन्तरोक्तवाक्य इव तत्रापि किञ्चिदेवोक्तमित्यपरितोषः, तदा **न्यायतत्त्वादि**गतभाग इह विवक्षितोऽस्तु । ५. ननु ज्ञातृत्वमिति न चैतन्यवत्त्वं विवक्षितम् ; किन्तु वृत्तिरूपज्ञानवत्त्वम् । वृत्तिश्चान्तःकरणे वस्तुतोऽस्तीति आत्मनि तदारोपः शक्यवचन इत्याशयेनाह **यदुच्यत** इति । ६. **पराक्रमीय** इति । पराक्रमवत्तरमित्यर्थः । पराक्रमवच्छब्दात् ईयसुन्प्रत्यये द्वयोरेकस्यातिशयार्थे परे, 'विन्मतोर्लुक्' (पा ५-६-६५) इति मतुपो लुक् । **पातञ्जलयोगभाष्ये** (१-१८) "यथा जयः पराजयो वा योद्धृषु" इति । ७. **यत्किञ्चिदेतदि**ति । न च पुंसो द्रष्टृत्वाभावेऽप्यन्तःकरणकर्तृकशेषित्वारोपविषयत्वमेव बद्धत्वमिति वाच्यम्, विषयत्वस्यापि तुल्यनयान्निर्विकारेऽयोगात्, मुक्तस्यापि भ्रान्तकर्तृकतादृशारोपविषयत्वे बद्धत्वापत्तेश्च । ८. **व्यतीत्यादि** । त्रैगुण्यादिविपर्ययसाधकानाम् असंहतत्वाधिष्ठातृत्वभोक्तृत्वरूपाणामनुमानविशेषाणाम् । तेषां व्यतिरेकव्याप्तेरिष्टतया व्यतिरेक्यनुमानत्वमपि । प्रसिद्धेत्यनेन केवलव्यतिरेकिणोऽननुमानत्वमप्यस्फुटं दूषणमस्तीति सूच्यते ।

(आत्मनि श्रुति-श्रुतार्थापत्त्योः प्रदर्शनम्)

श्रुतयो हि साक्षादेवात्मनः शरीरादिव्यतिरेकमादर्शयन्ति-'स एष नेति नेति', 'अकायमव्रणमस्नाविरं शुद्धमपापविद्धम्', 'योनिमन्ये प्रपद्यन्ते शरीरत्वाय देहिनः । स्थाणुमन्ये', 'न जायते म्रियते वा कदाचित्', 'जीवापेतं वाव किलेदं म्रियते', 'न ह वै सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति । अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः' इत्याद्याः । कालान्तरभाविस्वर्गादिसाधनविधयश्चाऽऽक्षिपन्ति देहादिव्यतिरिक्तं नित्यं चेतनमिति श्रुतितदनुपपत्तिप्रमाणकोऽयं प्रत्यगात्मेति ॥ (मीमांसकेनाऽऽत्मनः प्रत्यक्षत्वोपक्षेपः)

[1]ननु हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारमात्रपरस्याम्नायस्य शिरसि किमिति महानयं भारः प्रक्षिप्यते । अनुमानागमाद्यशेषप्रमाणमूलभूतेन प्रत्यक्षेणैव ह्येनं प्रतिपद्यामहे । 'ममेदं शरीरम्' 'इदमहं जानामि' इति घटादिदृश्येभ्य इवायं द्रष्टा देहादपि पृथग्भूतः प्रत्यक्षं परिस्फुरति ।

(तत्खण्डनम्)

मैवं[2] वोचः । इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजं हि विज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् । न चेन्द्रियाणि रूपादिव्यतिरेकिणि निरतिशयसूक्ष्मे प्रतीचि, परागर्थ एव, सन्निकर्षेण ज्ञानं जनयितुमर्हन्ति । यथाऽऽम्नायते, 'पराञ्चि खानि व्यतृणत्[3] स्वयंभूः' इति ।

अचित्त्व[4]प्रतिबद्धश्च सर्वोऽपीन्द्रियगोचरः ।
तेन नैन्द्रियकं ज्ञानमात्मानं स्प्रष्टुमर्हति ॥ १७ ॥

(भाट्टसंमतमानसप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वशङ्का)

स्यान्मतम्-भौतिकत्वात् बहिरिन्द्रियाणि मा नाम आत्मनि प्रवर्तिषत । मनस्तु प्रवर्तिष्यते अभौतिकत्वादिति-तन्न, तस्यापीन्द्रियत्वे भौतिकत्वस्यापरिहार्यत्वात् । यथाऽऽम्नायते 'अन्नमयं हि सोम्य मनः' इति । प्रपञ्चितश्चैतन्नि (श्चैतदेतन्नि?) रूपणे[5] ॥

अथोच्येत-अस्ति तावदहमित्यपरोक्षावभासः प्रत्ययः । नचैन्द्रिय[6]कत्वमन्तरेणासौ

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१. ननु सिद्धपरवाक्यप्रामाण्येऽपि आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वान्न सिद्धवस्तुन्यात्मनि तात्पर्यम् । न च तच्छेषतयापि तद्बोधनैदम्पर्यम् ; अप्राप्ते हि शास्त्रमर्थवत् । आत्मा च प्रत्यक्षप्राप्त इति श्रोत्रियोपरि मीमांसकः शङ्कते नन्विति । प्राभाकरस्तु मीमांसकः कार्यपरतयैव सर्वशब्दप्रामाण्यमाह । भाट्टस्तु वेदस्य प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिमात्रे तात्पर्यमिति । २. श्रोत्रियः खण्डयति मैवमिति । ३. व्यतृणत्-हिंसितवान् अनादृतवानिति वा उतृदिर् हिंसानादरयोरिति धातुः । वीत्युपसर्गबलात् हिंसादिकृद्भूत्वा सृष्टवानित्यर्थो वा । ४. प्रतिबद्धः व्याप्यः । आत्मा नेन्द्रियग्राह्यश्चित्त्वादिति व्यतिरेक्यनुमानमिह विवक्षितम् । तत्र व्यतिरेकव्याप्तौ इन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वमचित्त्वरूपहेत्वभावव्याप्यं भवति । ५. मनस आत्मत्वविचारघट्टे अधस्तात् ।

६ ऐन्द्रियकत्वमिति । अहमितिप्रत्ययः इन्द्रियजन्योः अपरोक्षावभासत्वादिति प्रयोगः ।

संभवति । क्लृप्तश्च बहिरिन्द्रियागोचरेऽपि सुखादौ स्वान्तस्वातन्त्र्यमिति तन्निमित्त एवाय-महम्प्रत्ययो युक्तः । प्रयोगश्च भवति-आत्मा मानसप्रत्यक्षग्राह्यः बहिरिन्द्रियायोग्यत्वे सति प्रत्यक्षत्वात् सुखादिवदिति—

(मानसप्रत्यक्षसाधकस्याभासीकरणम्)

तन्न ; संवेदनेन व्यभिचारात् । [1]न च तत् अप्रत्यक्षम् , जानामीत्यनन्योपाधिकतया प्रतिभानात् । अप्रत्यक्षत्वे च संवेदनस्यासिद्धिरेव[2] स्यादित्युक्तमेव ॥

(ज्ञानस्य मानसप्रत्यक्षाविषयत्वसमर्थनम्)

न[3] च तदपि मानसप्रत्यक्षतया सपक्षे निक्षेपमर्हति, विमर्दासहत्वात् । यदा खलु कुतश्चिदात्ममनस्संयोगात् विषयसंवित् उदयमासादयति, तदैव किं तत[4] एव तद्गोचरमपि वेदनं जन्यते, उतान्यदाऽन्येनेति वाच्यम् । न च युगपदुभयजननं संभाव्यते । तथा हि सति परापरतत्तद्गोचरनिरवधिकधीनिकुरुम्बजन्म [5]तत्कालमेवाऽऽपद्येत । न च तदस्ति । युगपदुत्पत्तौ विषयविषयित्वनियमश्च निर्निबन्धनः ॥ असमसमयजन्मना ज्ञानेन वेद्यत्वे न प्रत्यक्षत्वम् , क्षणिकत्वेनाग्रिम[6]ज्ञानस्य आग्राहकज्ञानोदयमवस्थानाभावात् । भावे च सर्वज्ञानानां सर्वदाऽवस्थानप्रसंगात् । कार्यविरोधित्वे[7] चानन्तरमेव संस्कारोदयान्न कालान्तरे स्थितिः—इति संविदो न मानसप्रत्यक्षवेद्यत्वम् ।

(संवेदने व्यभिचारनिगमनम् , दोषान्तरवर्णनञ्च)

[8]न चाप्रत्यक्षा संविदिति स्फुटो व्यभिचारः ॥ ऐन्द्रियकत्वस्यानात्मत्वप्रतिबद्धत्वाद्विरुद्धता[9] च ॥ साध्यविकलश्च दृष्टान्तः, सुखदुःखयोः प्रत्यक्षत्वानभ्युपगमात् ।

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१. नन्वसत्पक्षे ज्ञानस्यातीन्द्रियत्वात् प्रत्यक्षत्वरूपहेत्वंशाभावात् कथं तत्र व्यभिचार इति भाट्टशङ्कायां तदतीन्द्रियत्वं निरस्यति **न चे**ति । २ **असिद्धिरेवे**ति । ज्ञानस्य या सामग्री तयैव ज्ञानकार्योपपत्तौ ज्ञानमिति वस्त्वेव न सिद्ध्येदित्यर्थः । उक्तमिदं न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलौ न्यायसिद्धाञ्जनादौ च । ३. कथं व्यभिचारः, साध्यस्यापि सत्त्वादिति तार्किकशङ्कां क्षिपति **नचे**ति । ४. किं संवेदनजनकेनाऽऽत्ममनस्संयोगेनैव संवेदनविषयकज्ञानान्तरमप्युत्पाद्यते इत्यर्थः। ५. **जन्मे**ति। घटज्ञान-तद्ज्ञानज्ञान-तद्ज्ञानज्ञानज्ञानेत्येवमनन्तज्ञानोत्पत्तिः स्यादित्यर्थः । **तत्का**लमिति पदे बहुव्रीहिः । **असमसमये**ति । भिन्नकालेत्यर्थः । **युगपदि**ति पूर्वं स्थितमिन्द्रियसन्निकर्षबलात् , पश्चाज्जातेन विषयीक्रियत इति युक्तम् । अन्यथा युगपदनेकोत्पत्तौ एकस्य विषयत्वमन्यस्य विषयित्वमेवेत्यत्र गमकं नास्तीति । ६. **अग्रिमे**ति । पूर्वेत्यर्थः । ७. कार्यनाश्यत्वे इत्यर्थः । कार्यं विरोधि यस्येति बहुव्रीहिः । ८. ननु संवेदने प्रत्यक्षत्वघटितहेतोरप्यभावान्न व्यभिचार इति पूर्वं भाट्टशङ्कायां परिहारं पूर्वकृतं स्मारयन् तत्र व्यभिचारं निगमयति **नचे**ति । ९. व्याप्यस्यैन्द्रियकत्वस्य साधको हेतुर्व्यापकानात्मत्वसाधकोपीति धर्मिविशेषविपरीतसाधनात्सिद्धान्तहानेश्च

(सुखदुःखादिस्वरूपशोधनम्)

अनभ्युपगमश्चेन्द्रियपौष्कल्यनाशयोरेव[1] सुखदुःखत्वात् । न हि तस्मिन्नप्रत्यक्षे तत्पौष्कल्यं वैकल्यं वा प्रत्यक्षं भवति । इन्द्रिय[2]स्वरूप इवाभ्यासपाटवात् तयोरपरोक्षत्वाभिमानः, मनोऽवस्थाभेदेष्विव चानुमेयमनोवादिनाम् । यस्तु सुगतमतावलम्बी विज्ञानाभिन्नहेतुजतया तयोरपि तदन्तर्भावमभिमन्यते ; कणभक्षपक्षाश्रयणेन वा तयोरात्मविशेषगुणत्वम्—ताभ्यां सुखदु.खा[3]धिकरणं व्याचक्षीत ; स्वत[4]स्सुखीत्येतद्विमर्शे वाऽत्रत्यम् । रागद्वेषादयस्तु चैतन्यस्यैवावस्थाविशेषास्तद्वदेव प्रत्यक्षीभवन्तीति न तन्निदर्शनेनानुमानोदयः । सुखप्रयुक्तविषयीकारचैतन्यं रागः ; तद्विरोधप्रयुक्तविषयीकारं तदेव[5] द्वेषः ; भूतदुःखज्ञानेन तच्चलनं (चेतश्चलनं?) शोकः ; आगामितज्ज्ञानेन चेतश्चलनं भयमित्यादि लक्षणग्रन्थादेवावगन्तव्य[6]मित्यलं प्रविस्तरेण ॥

एकस्य चात्मनो निरंशस्य न स्वापेक्षया ग्राह्यग्राहकभावः, विरोधा[7]दित्यप्युक्तमेव । अंशभेदाश्रयणे तत्सिद्धये चांशान्तरमाश्रयितव्यम्, तथा तत्र तत्रेत्यनवस्था ; संघातत्वञ्चा[8]त्मनः॥

(पुनर्भाट्टशङ्का)

ननु[9] च ग्राहकावभासः श्रुत्या(?) स्वसिद्धान्तश्रद्धाविप्रलब्धबुद्धिभिरभिहितः, इन्द्रियादिप्रत्यासन्नतत्तत्पदार्थमात्र[10]स्फुरणात् । तादृशोपि क्वचिदस्तु नाम प्रत्ययः । सत्वागन्तुकात्म[11]

विरुद्धता । न्यायप्राच्यग्रन्थेषु विरुद्धत्वं साध्याभावसाधकत्वरूपंसिद्धान्त विरोधरूपञ्चोक्तम् ।

१. **खम्** इन्द्रियम् । शोभनं खं सुखम् ; दुःस्थं खं दुःखमिति व्युत्पत्तिरपीह भाव्या । २. चक्षुषा पश्यामीत्यादौ । **अनुमेये**ति । अहमर्थभूतमन्तःकरणं मनः साक्षिभास्यमिति पक्षे कामादिमनोवस्थाभानं युज्यते । अन्यमते त्वपरोक्षत्वाभिमान एवेति । ३. अधिकरणमिदं **न्यायतत्त्वस्थम्** । ४. देहेन्द्रियेतिकारिकास्थान्तिमपदविवरणं भावि । तथाच सुखदुःखयोरात्मविशेषगुणत्वेपि धर्मभूतज्ञानावस्थादिरूपत्वेन स्वयंप्रकाशत्वान्मनोग्राह्यत्वानङ्गीकारात् साध्यवैकल्यमेवेति भावः। ५. **तदेव** चैतन्यमेव । ६. तथाच रागादौ स्वयंप्रकाशे साध्यं नास्ति, शोकादौ च चेतोवृत्तौ हेतुरपि नास्तीति न कश्चित् दृष्टान्त इति।

७. कर्मकर्तृविरोधादित्यर्थः । ८. अंशो ह्यवयव एवेति सावयवत्वापत्तिरित्यर्थः ।

९. एवमात्मनो मानसप्रत्यक्षग्राह्यत्वे दूषिते, प्राभाकरसंमतग्राहकावभासपक्षादरेण स्वपक्षदूषणं क्रियत इति मत्वा भाट्टस्तत्रानुपपत्तिं प्रदर्श्य स्वाशयमाह **नन्वि**ति । ग्राहकावभासो नाम इन्द्रियजन्यघटादिविषयग्राहिवित्तिषु आत्मनो गृहीतृत्वेन रूपेणावभासः । अत्र श्रुतिः, 'अथ यो वेदेदं जिघ्राणीति स आत्मा' इत्येवमादिः । **श्रुत्या** अन्यथा गृहीतार्थया । यद्वा **श्रुत्याः** इति षष्ठ्यन्तं **स्वसिद्धान्ते**त्यत्रान्वेति । **श्रुत्ये**ति स्थाने वित्त्येति स्यात् । तदा घटपटादिवित्तिकृतो ग्राहकावभास इत्यर्थः । १०. **मात्रे**ति । घटादिप्रकाश एवानुभवसिद्धः, न ज्ञानज्ञातोरिति । ११. ज्ञाने जातेऽर्थ

प्रतियोगिकप्राकट्यप्रकाशादिपदाभिधेयार्थधर्मानुमितज्ञानविशिष्टमानसप्रत्यक्षसिद्धात्म-निबन्धनः । (तत्र प्राभाकरसमाधिः)

उच्यते । अहो खलु स्वानुभव एव विभ्रमः परीक्षकाणाम्, यत् विषयानुभवसमये पूर्वावस्थातो न कश्चिद्विशेषमयमात्मनोऽवबुध्यत इति । उक्तं ह्येतत्—ईदृश एवायमर्थो ज्ञायते नवेति न विद्मः, मम वा प्रतिभासते परस्य वेत्यपि न विद्मः इति न जातुचिदेवं प्रतीतिरस्ति ; ज्ञानज्ञात्रोरनवभासे तादृश्यपि प्रतीतिरापद्येत-इति । सोयं परसंचेतितात् स्वसंचेतितस्यातिशयः [1]सर्वत्र परिस्फुरन् असति ग्राहकावभासे नोपपद्येत । [2]अनुमितज्ञानाऽऽलम्बनत्वे च अज्ञासिषमित्येव प्रतिभासः स्यात् ; न, जानामीति ; ज्ञानजन्यार्थातिशयदर्शनतद्व्याप्त्यनुसन्धानानुमानोदयसमयेऽनुमितिसतज्ञानस्यातिवृत्तत्वात् । ज्ञानानुमानासंभवः पूर्वमेवोक्तः । मानसप्रत्यक्षत्वञ्च[3]आत्मग्राह्यधीनिरस्तम्(?) । तथासति हि स्वपरवेद्ययोरनतिशयः [4]स्यात् ॥

आत्मानं प्रति प्रकटो भवतीति आगन्तुकः अर्थस्य धर्मः प्राकट्यम् **आत्मप्रतियोगिकः** आत्मनिरूपित इति । तथाच पूर्वम् अयं घट इत्येव ज्ञानं जायते । घटमहं जानामीति तु न सर्वत्र । क्वचिदेव तु ज्ञातत्या, प्राकट्यं, प्रकाश इत्युक्तेन तेनार्थधर्मेण ज्ञानेऽनुमिते अनुमितज्ञानवान् आत्मा मनसा प्रत्यक्ष्यते तथेत्यर्थः । न च कर्मकर्तृविरोधः, अंशभेदेन एकस्यैव तदुभयसंभवात् । न चात्मनस्सांशत्वापत्तिः, आत्मनो देहादिमत्तया ग्राहकत्वं, प्रत्यक्त्वादिमत्तया ग्राह्यत्वमिति रूपभेदादेवोपपत्तेः । रूपमेवात्रांशः । ईदृशस्थले कर्मकर्तृविरोध एव नास्तीति वा स्वीक्रियत इति । १. **अतिशयः**-संदेहप्रतिभटत्वरूपः । ज्ञानज्ञात्रोरभाने यथा परस्य घटज्ञाने सत्यपि, 'घटः परेण ज्ञायते न वा', 'घटस्तस्मै भासते न वा' इति संदेहोऽस्माकम्, तथा स्वविषयेपि स्यादिति भावः । २ नन्वम्भसि पिपासोपशमनशक्तेरिवाप्रत्यक्षस्यापि ज्ञानस्य झटित्यनुमानात् संदेहानुदय इति शङ्कायां तदुपेक्षया दोषान्तरमाह **अनुमितेति** । ३. आत्मा-त्वं ज्ञानस्वरूपं ग्राह्यो यस्यास्सा धीस्तया निरस्तम् । धियो मनोग्राह्यत्वरूपतार्किकपक्षोपि धियस्स्वप्रकाशत्वस्वीकारान्निरस्त इत्यर्थः । यद्वा आत्मा जीवो ग्राह्यो ययेति । जीवस्य मानसप्रत्यक्षत्वं भाट्टोक्तं धिय एव ग्राहकात्मावभासकत्वस्वीकारान्निरस्तमित्यर्थः । अत्र 'मानसप्रत्यक्षञ्चात्मग्राहि अधो निरस्तम्' इति पाठः स्यादिति पूर्वमालोचितम् । स्थितसमर्थनं त्वेवं कृतम् । **मानसप्रत्यक्षत्वमित्यस्य** मानसप्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वमित्यर्थः मानसं प्रत्यक्षं यस्येति बहुव्रीहिं विना न सुलभः । परन्तु पूर्वमपि (६५) तथा प्रयोगोऽस्ति । अत्र ग्राह्येत्यक्षरं पूर्वं संयोज्य, मानसप्रत्यक्षग्राह्यत्वञ्चात्मनो धीव्यभिचारनिरस्तमिति स्यादित्यपि तर्कयन्ति । यदत्र आत्मग्राह्येत्यनन्तरं धीत्यतः प्राक् अक्षरभ्रंशचिह्नं क्वचिदस्ति (१५९८ ः) ४. ज्ञानं स्वस्य वा भवतु, परस्य वा । सर्वथा घटस्य वेद्यत्वमविशिष्टम् । एवं सति परवेद्यात् स्ववेद्येऽ**तिशयः** विशेषः स्वस्मैभासमानवित्तिविषयत्वरूपो वाच्यः । स च ग्राहकानवभासे न भवतीति ।

(पुनर्भाट्टोन्मेषः)

[1]ननु कथमिव ग्राहकानवभासे स्वपरवेद्ययोरनतिशयप्रसङ्गः ? न हि ग्राहकसिद्धिनिबन्धनः स्वपरवेद्यविशेषः ; स्वसमवेतविषयबोधजन्मना परसमवेतबोधजन्मना च तद्विशेषोपपत्तेः । स्वपरसंबन्धिबोधविशेषोदयव्यवस्थाऽपि स्वीयपरकीयेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षादिज्ञानहेतुसामग्रीभेदनिबन्धना । [2]न चात्मसिद्धिरपि तत्सामग्र्यनुप्रवेशमर्हति, इन्द्रियादेरिवानवभासमानस्यैव हेतुत्वसंभवात् । न च विषयबोध एवात्मबोध इति सांप्रतम् । न ह्यर्थान्तरसिद्धिरर्थान्तरस्य सिद्धिर्भवति ; अतिप्रसङ्गात् । अपिच यदधीना भावानां रूपभेदव्यवस्था, तदपि हि संवेदनं तदानीं निलीनरूपमेवेन्द्रियादिवत् । कुतस्तु पुनस्तदाश्रयस्यात्मनः प्रतिभासप्रसक्तिः ? यदाहुः—इदमहं जानामीति त्रितयावभासः सार्वत्रिकः-इति, तदप्यनुभवानारूढमेव, अनन्तरमेव प्रतिक्षिप्तमिति ॥

(भाट्टदूषणेन प्राभाकरस्य स्वमतपरिष्करणम्)

[3]अस्तु तर्हि ग्राहकतयैव सर्वार्थग्रहणसमयेष्वात्मसिद्धिः । अभ्युपगन्तव्या हि संविदः स्वतस्सिद्धिः ; सर्वप्रकारसाधनान्तरनिराकरणात् । सत्याश्च तस्याः कदाचिदनवभासादर्श-

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१. अन्ते उक्तं स्वपरवेद्ययोरनतिशयं परिहरन् ग्राहकावभासं खण्डयति **नन्विति** । परवेद्ये परसमवेतवित्तिविषयत्वं; स्ववेद्ये स्वसमवेतवित्तिविषयत्वमित्ययमतिशय एव स्वपरवेद्ययोरतिशयः; तत्र स्वस्मैभासमानवित्तिविषयत्वं स्ववेद्यत्वमिति न निर्वाच्यमिति शंकार्थः । अत्र स्वपरवेद्ययोरनतिशय इत्यत्रातिशयपदेन पूर्वोक्तस्य संदेहप्रतिभटत्वरूपातिशयस्य ग्रहणे **नन्वित्यादिसमनन्तरवाक्योच्यमानेन** स्वसमवेतबोधोत्पत्तिरूपविशेषेण यथाश्रुते संदेहनिवृत्त्युपपादनायोगात् अत्र विवक्षितोऽतिशयोऽन्यः । **अनुमितेत्यादिपूर्व**ग्रन्थस्तु पूर्वोक्तातिशयानिर्वाहदोषपरिहराभिसंधिपूर्वकः । अस्तु वा पूर्वोक्तातिशय एवात्र विवक्षितः । नन्वित्यादिग्रन्थतात्पर्यं त्वित्थम्-स्वपरवेद्यस्थले हि स्वस्मिन् बोधः, परस्मिन् बोध इति विशेषोऽस्ति । तथाच परगतबोधस्य स्वयं ज्ञाततालिङ्गानुमान-मानसप्रत्यक्षान्यतरग्राह्यत्वायोगेपि स्वगतबोधस्य तथाग्रहणसंभवात् झटित्येव तद्ग्रहणस्वीकारात् क्षणविलम्बस्य दुर्ज्ञानत्वाच्च न कश्चिद्दोष इति । **जन्मना** उत्पत्त्या ।

२. ग्राहकावभासे सत्येव स्ववेद्यत्वरूपोऽतिशयः सुवच इति वदतः को भावः ? किं पूर्वमात्मावभासः, ततस्स्वस्य घटवित्तिरिति, किं वा घटवित्तिरेव घटमिवात्मानमपि गृह्णातीति विकल्प्य द्वयमपि क्रमेण दूषयति **नचेत्यादिना** ।

३. नन्विदमस्मदाकूतम्—विषयवित्तौ नात्मसिद्धिः कारणम्, न वा वित्तावात्मा विषयः ; तस्याः विषयमात्रगोचरत्वात् । किन्तु विषयवित्तिवेलायां वेदितुस्सिद्धिः प्रकाशो भवति ; वित्त्यभावे च न प्रकाश इति वित्तिभास्यत्वमात्मनः, वित्तिश्च स्वप्रकाशेति घटमहं जानामीति त्रितयावभासोपपत्तिः । अत्र वित्तिजनकसामग्र्येव वित्तिं वेदितारञ्च भासयतीति प्राभाकरो भाट्टं खण्डयति **अस्त्विति** ।

नाच्च । यथा च संविदः प्रकाशाव्यभिचारः, तथा प्रपञ्चितं प्रथमा (प्रमाऽ) धिकर[1]ण इति नात्रोपक्षिप्य प्रतिक्षेप्तव्यम् । [2]सतोपि प्रमेयजातस्य स्वापादिसमयेऽनुपलब्धेरभ्युपगतं तावत् संविदस्तत्साधकत्वम् । अतः क्लृप्तार्थान्तरसाधनभावया तयैवात्मनोपि सिद्धिरभ्युपगन्तुं न्याय्या । (स्वापमोक्षयोरहम्भानाभावोपपादनं प्राभाकरीयम्)

यत्तु[3] विषयवित्त्युपरमेऽपि स्वापसमये अयमात्मा प्रकाशत इति, तत् उपपत्ति[4]भिरुपप(पा ?)द्यमानमपि यथाप्रतीति [5]व्यवहरतां न चित्तमनुरञ्जयति ॥

[6]अपवृक्तस्य तु ज्ञानं हेत्वभावान्न संभवि ।
नित्यत्वे नित्यमुक्तिः स्यादर्थवादास्तथोक्तयः ॥ १८ ॥

निर्धूतनिखिलकरणकलेवरज्ञानकर्मवासनानुबन्धस्यापवृक्तस्य न खलु स्वपरसंवेदनोदयनिबन्धनं किंचित् संभाव्यते । न च मनसो नित्येन्द्रियत्वेन तत्संयोगादेव तदा ज्ञानं जन्यत इति युक्तम्; स्वरूपतो गगनवन्नित्यस्यापि सतस्तस्य इन्द्रियभावेन ज्ञानोत्पादकत्वस्य धर्माधर्मावरोधनिबन्धनत्वात् ।

धर्माधर्मावरुद्धं सन्मनो ज्ञानस्य साधनम् ।
सति नित्येन्द्रियत्वेऽपि श्रोत्रवत् करणत्वतः ॥ १९ ॥

न च योगजधर्मानुगृहीततत्संयोगस्य साधनत्वम्, 'क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि', 'तदा विद्वान् पुण्यपापे विधूय निरञ्जनः' इत्यादिशुक्लेतर[7]सकलकर्मप्रक्षयश्रुतिविरोधात् । धर्मफलत्वे चापवर्गस्य पुनरावृत्तिप्रसङ्गः । 'नास्त्यकृतः कृतेन', 'तद्यथेह [8]कर्मजि (चि) तो लोकः क्षीयते, एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यजितो लोकः क्षीयते' इत्यादिश्रवणाच्च । नचात्मा[9] (?)

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१. **अधिकरण** इति । **न्यायतत्त्वे** इति शेषः । २. घटादेरेव स्वप्रकाशत्वं कुतो नेत्यत्राह **सतोऽपी**ति । अनेन वित्तिरात्मसाधनी अर्थान्तरसाधनत्वेन क्लृप्तत्वादिति विवक्षितेऽनुमाने हेत्वसिद्धिशंकापरिहारः । ३. वेदान्तिपक्षं प्राभाकरः खण्डयन् आत्मनो वित्त्येकभास्यत्वं समर्थयते **यत्त्वि**ति । ४. सुखमहमस्वाप्समित्यादिभिः । ५. अहम्भाने तदा सति 'अहमात्मानमन्वभूव'मिति व्यवहारस्स्यात् । "सुषुप्तादुत्थिताश्चैवं निर्विद्यन्ते हि कामुकाः । वृथेयमन्तरेणैव कामिनीं यामिनी गता ॥ आश्लिष्टामप्यबुध्वैनां मृतवच्छयितं मया" (शास्त्रदी. १. १. ५) इत्यपि व्यवहरन्तीति । ६. **अपवृक्तस्य** अपवर्गं धासस्य; मुक्तस्य । एतत्कारिकाविवरणमेव **निर्धूते**त्यादिना । संवेदनोदयस्य **निबन्धनम्** मूलम् । ७. **शुक्लेतरे**ति पुण्यतदितरेत्यर्थः । ८. अत्र **जित** इति पाठ उपलभ्यमानः फलनिर्देशेषु इमान् लोकान् जयतीत्येवं जिधातुप्रयोगादुपनिषदि चित इत्यत्र जित इति पाठं रोचयमानानामनुकूलः । ९. आत्मसत्तैवेति पाठमपीह मन्यन्ते । **आत्मसत्तया** पुष्कलकारणात्ममात्रसत्तया । कारिकोक्त मनः तदिति परामृश्यते । पृथक्पदम् । **तदपीत्यस्यापि** मनोपीत्यर्थः । **आत्मा सत्तये**ति

सत्तयैव तदानीं तज्ज्ञाननिमित्तमिति वाच्यम्, क्लप्तत्यागाक्लप्तकल्पनप्रसक्तेः। तन्मात्रनिमित्तत्वे च सर्वदा आत्मस्वरूपवत् तदपि विद्यत इति संसारानवतारप्रसंगात्। बन्धमोक्षावस्थयोरविशेषापत्तेश्च। न च देहेन्द्रियादिप्रतिबद्धतयेदानीं [1]तदभाव इति वाच्यम्; तत् खलु प्रतिबन्धकम्, यत् सति पुष्कलकारणे कार्योदयं निरुणद्धि। न चाद्याप्यात्मनस्तत्पुष्कलकारणत्वं सिद्धम्, शरीरेन्द्रियवतामेव ज्ञानदर्शनात्। क्लप्तज्ञानकारणभावस्य [2]तस्यैव तद्बन्धकत्ववचनमुन्मत्तवचः। अतो नास्त्यपवर्गदशायां ज्ञानम्। तात्कालिकज्ञानसुखादिवादास्तु[3] आत्मज्ञानविधिशेषतया गुणवादेन नेतव्याः। अतो विषयवित्तिसमय एवात्मसिद्धिर्नियमात् यथोक्तनीत्या अर्थवित्तिषु वेदितृतयैवात्मसिद्धिरिति॥

(प्राभाकरखण्डनमात्मस्वयम्प्रकाशत्वकथनाय)

इदमप्यात्मतत्त्वापरिज्ञानोल्लसितपरिमितमतिविकल्पजल्पितमिति न रोचयन्ते तत्त्वान्तविदः। विषयवित्तिर्हि विषयवित्तिरेव। न हि तया आत्मवित्ति(त्तिः) स्वरूपं वा (आत्मा वित्तिस्वरूपं वा?) सेद्धुमर्हति, अतद्विषयत्वात्। यो हि यत्संविद्विषयो न भवति, नासौ तया सिद्ध्यति, रूपसंविदेव रसः। अविषयौ च विषयवित्तेर्बुद्धिबोद्धाराविति तावपि न तया सिद्ध्यतः॥ ननु[4] वेद्यस्वभावोऽयं यत् स्वविषयसंविदा सिद्ध्यतीति। वित्तिस्तु वित्तिरेव, वेदिता च वेदितैवेति कुतस्तयोर्वेद्यस्वभावानुप्रवेशः? उक्तं हि तयोर्मानसप्रत्यक्षागोचरत्वमनुमेयत्वासंभवश्च। [5]कुतस्तर्हि वित्तिसिद्धिः?॥ स्वत एव। स्वयंप्रकाशा हि संवित्॥

पाठसत्त्वे तज्ज्ञानेत्येकपदमात्मज्ञानार्थकम्। **सत्तयैव** स्वमात्रम्। **तदपि** आत्मज्ञानमपि। **विद्यते** विद्येतेत्यर्थः। १. **तदभावः** ज्ञानाभावः। २. **तस्यैव** देहादेः। ३. **वादाः** 'सुषुप्तस्थान एकीभूतः प्रज्ञानघन एवानन्दमयो ह्यानन्दभुक्', 'सर्वं ह पश्यः पश्यति सर्वमाप्नोति सर्वशः इत्यादयः। **गुणवादेन** गौण्या वृत्त्या। अज्ञानकार्यस्य कस्याप्यभावात् ज्ञानित्वोक्तिः, दुःखस्येषदप्यभावात् सर्वसुखोक्तिरिति भावः। ४. घटवित्तितदाश्रयौ न घटवित्त्यधीनसिद्धिकौ घटवित्त्यविषयत्वादित्यनुमाने हेतौ वेद्यत्वे सतीति विशेषणं देयम्। **यो हि यत्संविद्विषयो न भवतीति** पूर्वोक्तसामान्यमुखव्यासौ हेतुकोटौ वेद्यत्वे सतीति विशेषणमिष्यते। तथा च घटवित्तितदाश्रयावित्यनुमानं हेतौ वेद्यत्वविशेषणमन्तरा दुर्वचम्। तद्विशेषणे च स्वरूपासिद्ध्या न प्रकृतसाध्यानुमानसंभव' इति प्राभाकरश्शङ्कते **नन्वित्यादिना असंभवश्चेत्यन्तेन**। ५. वित्तिवेदितोः प्रकाशे विषयत्वं नापेक्षितमिति सत्यम्। वित्त्यधीना च वेदितृसिद्धिरिति वदता वित्तिसिद्धिः किमधीनेति वक्तव्यमिति सिद्धान्ती पृच्छति **कुत** इति। प्राभाकरः प्रत्याह **स्वत** इति। अत्र तालकोशे 'स्वतन्त्र एतेति विलिख्य 'न्त्र' इत्यक्षरोपरि निरासचिह्नं निक्षिप्तम्। तदनवधानेन तदक्षरमपि गृह्णद्भिः स्त्रीलिङ्गानुसारेण स्वतन्त्रैवेति शोधयित्वाऽन्यत्र मुद्रितम्। स्वत एवेत्येव पाठः।

(वित्तिस्वतस्सिद्ध्याक्षेपः)

मैवम्-सापि हि विषयवदेवान्यस्यैव प्रकाशमानतया न स्वतः सिद्ध्यति। स्वतस्सिद्ध्यन्ती च सा किमिति कंचिदेव प्रति चकास्ति, न सर्वान् प्रति॥ [1]तत्समवायादिति चेत्-यत्समवायिनी हि या संवित् तस्यैव सा चकास्ति, नेतरस्य, तदसमवायादिति—[2]यद्येवम्, आश्रितस्तर्हि आत्मसंम्बन्धनिबन्धन एव संविदः प्रकाशः, [3]तद्भावाभावानुविधानात्। यद्युच्येत-प्रकाशस्वभावाया एव सत्याः प्रतियोगिविशेषाव[4]च्छेदायैव तदपेक्षा, न स्वरूपसिद्धय इति; कुतः खल्वयं निश्चयः? यदि हि प्रतियोगिनिरपेक्षैव कदाचिदात्मस्वरूपमिव संवित् प्रकाशेत, तत एवमध्यवस्येमापि। न च तथाऽस्ति। आश्रयप्रतियोगिसापेक्षैव संयोग[5]पुत्रत्वादेरिव तस्याः स्वरूपसत्तेति न पृथक्सिद्धत्युपेक्षावकाशः॥ सत्यास्संविदः प्रकाशव्यभिचाराभावात् स्वरूपप्रयुक्तः प्रकाश इति चेत्-सत्याः किं तस्याः आत्मसम्बन्धव्यभिचारोऽस्ति? अपिचैवं सुखदुःखादयोऽपि [6]त्वन्मते स्वतसिद्धास्स्युः। न हि तेऽपि सन्तो न प्रकाशन्ते।

अथ अर्थान्तरसाधकतया सर्ववादिसंमतायाः संविद एव परं (वरं?) [7]स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमाश्रितम्; तयैव तथाभूतया तदितरबाह्याभ्यन्तरसकलपदार्थसिद्ध्युपपत्तेः [8]किमनेकस्वयंप्रकाशभावाभ्युपगमेनेति भावः—तथासति, सर्वस्यार्थस्य तद्वित्तेस्साक्षी सर्वत्र संमतः।

आत्मैवास्तु स्वतः सिद्धः किमनेकैस्तथाविधैः॥ २०॥

सिद्धान्त्याह **मैव**मिति। **स्वतःसिध्यन्ती** चेति। स्वतः प्रकाशते चेदित्यर्थः। १. प्राभाकराशयः पुनरपि तदिति। **तत्समवाया**दिति स्वोक्तं स्वयमेव प्राभाकरो विवृणोति **यदि**ति। २. सिद्धान्त्याह **यदी**ति। ३. आत्मसंबन्धादात्मने प्रकाशत इयं संवित्, अन्यसंवित्तु आत्मसंबन्धाभावादात्मने न प्रकाशत इत्यात्माधीनसिद्धिरेव संविदस्त्वित्यर्थः। ४. ममेयं संवित्, मह्यं प्रकाशत इति आत्मवैशिष्ट्यभानाय आत्मापेक्षेति। उपरि **आश्रयप्रतियोगी**ति प्रतियोगिपदेन विषयग्रहणेऽप्यत्र प्रतियोग्यवच्छेदायेत्यत्र तत्पदेनात्मग्रहणम्। अन्ययत्किञ्चिद्भाने आत्मसंबन्धस्यापेक्षितत्ववर्णनापेक्षया स्ववैशिष्ट्यभाने स्वसंबन्धापेक्षावर्णनं ह्युचितम्। अस्तु वा विषयवैशिष्ट्यमेव प्रतियोग्यवच्छेदः स्वारस्यात्। संविदो न स्वप्रकाशायात्मापेक्षा, किन्तु विषयसंबन्धायेति। तथाच भाष्यम्, "स्वसंबन्धितया ह्यस्यास्सत्ता विज्ञप्तितादि च" इति। ५. संयोगादिकं हि अनुयोगिप्रतियोग्युभयापेक्षमत्ताप्रकाशोभयम्, संयुक्तयोर्द्वयोरग्रहे संयोगाग्रहात् तथा पितापुत्राग्रहे पुत्रत्वाग्रहात्। तद्वदिति। ६. त्वन्मत इति। स्वमते तु संविद एव स्वतस्सिद्ध्यभावात् सुखादेर्ज्ञानावस्थारूपत्वाद्वा संवित्तुल्ययोगक्षेमतैवेति भावः। ७. **वर**मिति पाठे आश्रयितुमिति उचितमिव। परन्तु **प्रकरणपञ्चिकादौ** बहुलमदीशः प्रयोगः। ८. **अनेके**त्यादि। सुखादिस्वयंप्रकाशत्वेत्यर्थः। ननु वित्तेस्स्वतस्सिद्धिं विहाय आत्मसंबन्धमात्रात् प्रकाशस्वीकारे आत्मनित्यत्वाणुत्वधर्माधर्मादयोपि तत एव प्रकाशेरन्। अतो वित्तिप्रकाशः स्वरूपप्रयुक्त इत्यास्थेयम्। एवमपि वित्तेरात्मानं प्रत्येव प्रकटत्वादात्म-

(वित्तिस्वतस्सिद्धावप्यात्मनस्तदनपेक्षप्रकाशत्वम्)

किञ्च— यो यस्य साक्षी तेनैव तस्य सिद्धिर्न लौकिकी[1] ।

अर्थस्येवार्थवित्तेरप्यात्मा साक्षी हि लक्ष्यते ॥ २१ ॥

[2]सन्तु नाम अर्थवित्तयः स्वतः सिद्धाः ; तथापि न ताभिरयमात्मा प्रत्यक्षीभवति, तत्साक्षित्वात् । यत्साक्षी खल्वयं पुरुषः, न तेनासौ प्रत्यक्षः, घटसाक्षात्कारीव घटेन । अर्थसंविदाञ्च साक्षात्कारी चेतन इति सोऽपि न ताभिरपरोक्षीभवति ॥

(आत्मस्वयम्प्रकाशत्वम्)

[3]सजातीयस्वसाध्यार्थनिरपेक्षात्मसिद्धयः ।

सर्वे पदार्थास्तेनात्मा निरपेक्षस्वसिद्धिकः ॥ २२ ॥

न हि कश्चित् पदार्थः स्वप्रकाशायासाधारणसजातीयार्थन्तरापेक्षो दृष्टः । न खलु घटः स्वसिद्धये घटान्तरमपेक्षते ; अपेक्षते तु विजातीयमालोकादि । एवमालोकोऽपि प्रकाशमानो नालोकान्तरमपेक्षते; नापि स्वापेक्षप्रकाशं घटादिकमपेक्षते; अपेक्षते तु विजातीयमिन्द्रियम् । एवमिन्द्रियमपि नेन्द्रियान्तरं स्वापेक्षप्रकाशमालोकादि घटं वाऽपेक्षते; अपेक्षते तु विजातीयं संवेदनम् । एवं संवेदनमपि संविदन्तरं स्वाधीनसिद्धिकमिन्द्रियादिकं वा नापेक्षते स्वसिद्धौ; अपेक्षते तु विजातीयं स्वाश्रयभूतं स्वतन्त्रमात्मानम् । एवमात्माप्यात्मान्तरं, स्वाधीनसिद्धि संविदिन्द्रियादिकमपि स्वापरोक्षे(क्षाय) नापेक्षते इत्यन[4]न्यापेक्षा ह्यात्मस्वरूपसिद्धिः ।

(आत्मनि नित्यचैतन्यस्थापनम्)

तदेवं चित्स्वभावस्य पुंसः स्वाभाविकी चितिः ।

संबन्धोऽपि कामं तत्प्रकाशसामग्रीप्रविष्टोऽस्तु । न चैवं विषयं विना वित्तिप्रकाशाभावाद्विषयस्यापि वित्तिप्रकाशकारणत्वापत्तिः, अतीतानागतादिरूपतया तस्य तदयोगादित्याक्षेपे, वित्तिस्वतस्सिद्धिं संमत्यैवाह **किञ्चेति** । १. **न लौकिकी** लोकानुभवोपेता न । वित्तिर्नात्मसाधनी तत्साक्षिकत्वात् घटादिवदिति प्रयोगः । २. कारिकां विवृणोति **सन्त्विति** । ३. ननु संविदप्रकाश्यत्वेप्यन्याधीन आत्मप्रकाशोऽस्तु ; तत्रेयं कारिका । **सजातीयस्वसाध्यार्थत्वन्नाम** साध्यत्व-सजातीयत्वान्यतरसंबन्धेन स्वविशिष्टार्थत्वम् । **साध्यत्वं** प्रकाश्यत्वम् । **आत्मसिद्धिः** स्वरूपप्रकाशः । तथाचात्मा निरुक्तसंबन्धेन स्वविशिष्टार्थनिरपेक्षप्रकाशः पदार्थत्वात् घटादिवदिति प्रयोगः । साध्यत्वसजातीयत्वैकैकघटनया प्रयोगद्वयं वा । एतत्कारिकाविवरणं **तत्त्वटीकायां** (२७५ पु.) **न्यायकुलिशे** (७५ पु) च द्रष्टव्यम् । ४. **अनन्यापेक्षेति** । न च विजातीयापेक्षा आत्मसिद्धिः, तस्यापि वित्तिवेद्यान्यतरतया स्वसाध्यत्वात् तदपेक्षणायोगात् । एवमात्मनः स्वरूपेण प्रकाशे नानुमानं, नागमः, न मानसप्रत्यक्षं, नापि विषयवित्तिः कारणमिति स्वरूपांशेऽन्याप्रकाश्यत्वं स्वप्रकाश्यत्वञ्चोक्तम्, नित्यत्वाणुत्वाद्याकारान्तरवत्तयाऽऽगमानुमानप्रत्यक्षप्रकाश्यत्वमपि वक्ष्यते । **तदेव-**

नानापदार्थसंसर्गात् तत्तद्वितित्व[1]मश्नुते ॥ २३ ॥

यथैव खलु सूर्यालोकस्तेनतेनार्थभेदेन संसर्गात् तत्तत्प्रकाशो भवति, घटप्रकाशः, पटप्रकाश इति—एवमात्मनः प्रकार(स्वभाव)भूतं चैतन्यमर्थविशेषसंसर्गात् घटसंवित् पटसंविदित्यादि[2]प्रख्योपाख्ये प्रतिपद्यते । ते च चैतन्यस्य दशाविशेषाश्चेतयितुरात्मनो [3]धर्मविशेषत्वादेव तस्यापरोक्षा भवन्ति, कादाचित्कबोधवादिनामिव बोधस्य विषयभेदा-[4]वच्छेदादयः ।

(अनित्यं चैतन्यमिति पूर्वपक्षः = तत्र नित्यत्वेऽनुपपत्तिः)

ननु[5] आत्मनश्चैतन्यमागन्तुकमिति न्यायवैशेषिकविदः, तन्मतोपजीविनश्चाभिनवमीमांसकाः ; अर्थेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाद्यन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानात् ; गच्छामि, अगच्छमित्यादिवत् जानामि, अज्ञासिषमित्यादिकालावच्छेदप्रतीतेः । स्वापतुरीयादिदशासु च बोधाधारत्वे सुप्तप्रबुद्धबद्धमुक्तादिव्यवस्थाऽभावप्रसंगाच्च । नित्यस्य च ज्ञानस्यात्मसमवायिनः[6] प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थाऽपि दुरुपपादैव । तदा हि प्रकाशनशीलतया तस्याः, एकस्यां संविदि सर्वमेव प्रकाशेत ; न वा किंचित्, अविशेषात् । [7]अन्यदा तु यदर्थसन्निकर्षजुषा इन्द्रियलिङ्गादिना या धीर्जन्यते, तदीयैव सेति व्यवस्था युक्तिमती ।

(सिद्धान्त्याशयखण्डनम्)

[8]स्यान्मतम्-इन्द्रियादिप्रणाडिकया चैतन्यमेव तेनतेनार्थेनानुरज्यमानं तत्प्रकाशतया तदीयत्वेन व्यवतिष्ठते, अनुरागस्य चागन्तुकतया इन्द्रियाद्यनुविधानं कालावच्छेदः स्वापादिव्यवस्था चोपपद्यत इति— तदसत् ; अर्थान्तर[9]सन्निकर्षेऽर्थान्तरस्यानुरागासंभवात् ॥ चैतन्यमपि तथा निष्क्रम्य सन्निकृष्यत इति चेन्न—अमूर्तस्याकाशस्येव निष्क्रमणप्रवेशा-

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मित्यस्य चित्स्वभावस्येत्यत्रान्वयः । उक्तहेतुना स्वरूपेण स्वयंप्रकाशतयासिद्धस्येत्यर्थः । संप्रति 'चैतन्यप्रयुक्त एवात्मप्रकाशः । स चैतन्यानित्यतया स्वापमूर्च्छामोक्षादौ नानुवर्तत इति वादं चैतन्यनित्यत्वस्वीकारेणापि निरसितुमारम्भः । तदाह पुंसः स्वाभाविकीति । १. तत्तद्वितित्वमिति पाठ ईशावास्यकूरनारायणीयभाष्ये १६ मन्त्रे दृष्टः, 'तत्तच्चितत्वम्', 'तत्तच्चिह्नत्वमिति पाठद्वयमुपेक्ष्येहाऽऽदृतः । २. प्रख्या बुद्धिः । उपाख्या शब्दः । ३. चैतन्यगतावस्थाविशेषाणामात्मधर्मत्वं परम्परया । यद्वा आत्मनो यो धर्मस्तदीयविशेषत्वादित्यर्थः । ४. विषयभेदावच्छेदः विषयविशेषवैशिष्ट्यम् । आदिना ग्राह्याः प्रत्यक्षत्वानुमितित्वादयः । ५. अथ चैतन्यमनित्यमिति पूर्वपक्षी प्रत्यवतिष्ठते नन्वित्यादिना अत्राहुरात्मेतिकारिकाप्राग्ग्रन्थेन । ६. प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्था प्रतिविषयव्यवस्था नियतविषयकत्वम् । ७. अन्यदा अनित्यत्वपक्षे । ८. सिद्धान्तिप्रश्नानुवादः स्यान्मतमिति । तन्निरस्यति तदसदिति । ९. अर्थान्तरेति । इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षे हीन्द्रियानुरक्तत्वमेव वस्तुनस्स्यात्, न ज्ञानानुरक्त-

द्यनुपपत्तेः । गुणश्च चैतन्यं गुणिनमपहाय कथमन्यतो यास्यति ? न चार्थोऽन्तः प्रविशति । स हि बहिर्देशसंबद्धः सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्षः । [1]जात्यादिषु चानुपपत्तिस्तुल्यैव ।

(आत्मनश्चैतन्यस्य चैकप्रत्यगर्थद्रव्यत्वशङ्कापरिहारः)

अथो[2]च्येत-द्वेधा खल्वयं प्रत्यगर्थोऽवतिष्ठते बहलो विरलश्च । तत्र बहलः प्रत्यक् चेतनक्षेत्रज्ञादिपदपर्याय आत्मा । विरलस्तु चैतन्यज्ञानादिपदाभिधेयः प्रत्यगर्थतन्त्रतया गुण इत्युपचर्यते तेजोवत् ; यथा बहलं तेजः प्रदीपः अग्निरिति, विरलं तु प्रभा ज्योतिरिति । अतो विरलात्म[3]प्रदेशतया चैतन्यस्याऽऽलोकस्येव गमनं (गमन ?) संयोगादिकमुपपद्यत इति ॥ इदमनुपपन्नम् ; निरवयवस्यामूर्तस्यासङ्गस्यात्मनो बहलविरलतादिधर्मानुपपत्तेः । यदि हि सावयवत्वमूर्तत्वानित्यत्वसंसर्गित्वादिकमपि धर्मजातमात्मन्यनुमन्वीमहि, तत एवमङ्गीकुर्वीमहि । न च तदनुमन्तुमुचितम्, अचेतनत्वापातादित्यलमनेनाऽऽर्हतमतानुकारदूषितेनाऽऽत्मवादेन । (चैतन्यविभुत्वखण्डनम्)

[4]अथ मतम्-आत्माऽयमनवयवेन सर्वतस्सर्वार्थावभासनसमर्थचैतन्यानुबन्धः सर्वव्यापी। अथ च न सर्वमस्य परिस्फुरति, तमोगुणप्रतिबन्धात् । सत्त्वोत्कटैस्तु करणैः स्वकस्वकपाटवानुसारेण पाटिते तु तमसि तेतेऽर्थाः प्रतिभासन्ते । अतोऽन्तरेणापि ज्ञानार्थयोर्निष्क्रमणप्रवेशौ उपपद्यत एवार्थविशेषोपरागः संविद इति ॥ [5]एवमप्यर्थातिशयमात्रहेतुत्वादिन्द्रियलिङ्गादेः ज्ञानस्येव ज्ञापकत्वं न स्यात्, ज्ञानहेतुत्वाभावात् । न चार्थप्रकाशस्य ज्ञानत्वम्, प्रकाशमानतयाऽर्थस्यापि ज्ञातृत्वप्रसंगात् । यदाहुः, 'आत्मधर्मस्य चैतन्यस्य विषयेण संयोगो ज्ञानमित्युच्यते' इति—तत्रापि संयोगस्योभयनिष्ठतया स एव प्रसङ्गः । अनुभवविरोधश्च, अहमिदमिदानीं जानामि, नेदानीमित्यात्मसमवायिनोरेव ज्ञानभावाभावयोरनुभवात् ॥ [6]अविकृतप्रकाशहेतुकिरणसंहतावप्यहिममहसि [7]प्रकाशकत्वप्रख्योपाख्यानवदुपपद्यत इति मा वोचः । तत्र हि गभस्तीनां द्रव्यतयाऽऽकुञ्चनप्रसारणद्रव्यान्तरसंयोगविभागादेः संभवादुपपद्यते व्यवस्थोपलब्धिः । चैतन्यं तु गुण इति न तथा व्यवस्थामर्हति ।

त्वमिति । १. घटादेर्मूर्तत्वादन्तःप्रवेशः शङ्क्येतापि । अमूर्तजातिगुणादिविषये तु चैतन्यस्येव क्रियानुपपत्तिरेवेति । २. सिद्धान्ते प्रत्यगर्थातिरिक्तं तद्धर्मभूतं द्रव्यं चैतन्यम् । अत्र तु कश्चिदेकमेव द्रव्यमंशभेदेनात्मज्ञानोभयात्मकमिति निष्क्रमणाद्युपपादयन् जैनगन्धी खण्ड्यते । ३. विरलो य आत्मैकदेशस्तत्तया । ४. सक्रियत्वसावयवत्वादिस्वीकारं विना ज्ञानज्ञात्रोर्विभुत्वस्वीकारेण निर्वाहं शंकते अथेति । ५. यथा ज्ञानमर्थे प्राकट्यं व्यवह्रियमाणतां वा जनयत् अतिशयहेतुरेव, न तु ज्ञापकम्, तदेन्द्रियादिकमपि तमःपाटनरूपातिशयमात्रकरं स्यादिति । ६. उक्तं सूर्यालोकदृष्टान्तं खण्डयति अविकृतेति । ७. अत्र अर्थविशेषप्रकाशकत्वेति पाठो भाव्यते ।

(आत्मनि नित्यानित्यज्ञानद्वयभङ्गः)

अथोच्येत[1]-द्विधा हि ज्ञानमात्मनः, स्वस्मिन्नन्यत्र च। तत्राऽऽद्यमुदयास्तमयरहितमात्मस्वरूपप्रयुक्तमनवरतमनुवर्तते। इतरत्तु तत्तदर्थसंबन्धीन्द्रियाद्यागन्तुकहेतुभेदायत्तोत्पत्तिलाभं तत्तद्भावाभावानुविधायि तत्तदर्थप्रकाशतयोदीयते, लीयते च। तदपेक्षयैव स्वापजागराद्यवस्थाव्यवस्थाऽपि सङ्गच्छत-इति॥ उच्यते। अभ्युपगच्छेमाप्येवम्[2], यदि नित्यमात्मविज्ञानमस्तीत्यत्र किमपि साधनमुपलभेमहि।

(सुषुप्तावात्मानुभवसाधक प्रातर्दृष्टतटाकन्यायभङ्गः)

नन्वङ्गीकृतस्तावत् जाग्रदवस्थायां सर्वदाऽऽत्मानुभवः; स्वापादिषु चानु[3]मीयते, तात्कालिकस्य विषयज्ञानभावस्योत्तरोत्तरकालं परामृश्यमानत्वात्। यत्कालीनोऽभावः परामृश्यते, तत्कालीनेन तदाश्रयस्वरूपज्ञानेनापि हि भाव्यम्, मध्याह्नकालपरामृश्यमान[4]इव प्रातस्समयपरिदृष्टतटाकतीरादिवर्तिनि कुञ्जराद्यभावे। यत्कालीनाभावाश्रयतया यः परामृश्यते, स तत्कालीनस्वरूपानु[5]भववान्, यथा प्रातरनुभूततटाकतीरादिः। स्वापादिकालिकार्थानुभवाभावाश्रयतया चायमात्मा परामृश्यते; अतस्तात्कालिकस्वरूपानुभववानिति मैवम्; अनैका[6]न्त्यात् 'प्रातस्तत्र नाहमासम्' इति स्वाभावभूमितया प्रतीतेन प्रातरनवगतगिरितटाकादिना। अभावप्रतिपत्तिसमये प्रतिपित्सिताभावसमकालवर्तिनस्तदाश्रयस्वरूपस्यावगत्या, विद्यमानत्वे तत्कालतयाऽवगमप्राप्तस्य प्रतियोगिनोऽनवगत्या च भवितव्यमभाव-

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१. ननु नित्यचैतन्यमङ्गीक्रियतां स्वमात्रविषये; अन्यविषये चानित्यज्ञानमिति कश्चिच्छङ्कते अथेति।

२. अपिशब्देन, आत्मस्वयंप्रकाशतयैव निर्वाहात् आत्ममात्रविषयकज्ञानकल्पनं व्यर्थमिति सूच्यते।

३ अयमात्मा स्वापकालिकानुभवगोचरः तत्काले ज्ञानाभावाश्रयतया पश्चात्(जागरकाले)परामृश्यमानत्वात्। यत् यत्काले किञ्चिदभावाश्रयतया पश्चात्परामृश्यते, तत् तत्कालिकानुभवगोचरभूतम्, यथा संप्रतिकुञ्जराद्यभाववत्तया परिदृश्यमानं प्रातर्दृष्टतीरादीत्यनुमानम्। ४. प्रातःकालावच्छेदेन तीरवर्तितया कुञ्जराभावे मध्याह्नकाले परामृश्यमाने सति प्रातःकालीनेन तदाश्रयस्वरूपज्ञानेनेवेत्यर्थः; अनुषङ्गात्। ५. अनुभवगोचरः इत्यर्थः; अनुभवगोचरस्वरूपवानिति यावत्। ६. कदाचित् कश्चित्प्रातर्गिरितटाकादिकमज्ञातवानेव मध्याह्ने गिरितटाकादिवृत्तान्तप्रसङ्गे प्रातस्तत्र नाहमासमिति परामृशति। तत्र गिर्यादौ व्यभिचारः, प्रातःकालिकस्वाभाववत्तया परामृश्यमानत्वरूपहेतुसत्त्वात्, प्रातःकालिकावगतिगोचरत्वरूपसाध्याभावादिति॥ यदि तत्कालावच्छिन्नमाश्रयज्ञानं नापेक्षितम्, किं तर्ह्यपेक्षितमित्यत्राह अभावेति। अवगत्या अनवगत्या च भवितव्यमित्यन्वयः। समय इत्यस्य अवगत्येत्यत्रान्वयः। विद्यमानत्वे तत्कालतयाऽवगमप्राप्तस्येति। यदि प्रतियोग्येव तत्काले स्थितं स्यात्, उपलब्धं स्यादिति वक्तुमर्हस्येत्यर्थः। अनवगत्येति। तत्काल इति शेषः। अभावज्ञानस्य-अभावज्ञानं प्रति; यत्कालिकोऽ

ज्ञानस्येत्येतावत् । अन्तरेणापि स्वापकालीनमात्मानुभवमिह तदुभयमुपपद्यते [1]प्रत्यभिज्ञयैव प्रबोधे स्वरूपसिद्धेः, जाग्रदनुभवस्येव पटीयसस्त्वापेऽपि सतोऽनुभवस्य स्मर्तव्यस्य सतस्तदानीमस्मरणाच्च[2] ।

(अस्वाप्समिति ज्ञानस्य नित्यप्रकाशासाधकत्वम्)

सुखमहमस्वाप्समित्यादिवृत्तयश्च तात्कालिकदेहेन्द्रियलाघवपाटवादिपर्यालोचनपूर्विकाः न स्मृतयः, जातिवेषसंस्थानादिष्विव । तेऽपि हि परामृश्यन्ते, 'एवञ्जातीयोऽहमीदृशेन वेषेण अनेन संस्थानेनात्रेयन्तं कालमस्वाप्सम्' इति ।

अपिच स्मृतित्वेऽपि जाग्रदवस्थायामिव निद्रालक्षणया [3]प्रमाणविपर्ययादिवृत्त्यभावकारणतमोगुणालम्बनया प्रतीत्या तत्कालप्रसिद्धस्यात्मनस्स्मरणम्, न तु सहजसंवेदनसिद्धस्य स्वप्रकाशस्य[4] वा ; प्रमाणाभावात् । निद्राऽपि प्रमाणविपर्ययादिवत् वृत्तिविशेष इति तत्रभवान् पतञ्जलिः । यदाह 'अभाव[5]प्रत्ययालम्बना वृत्तिर्निद्रा' इति ।

(वित्त्यधीनात्मप्रकाश—वित्त्यनित्यत्वनिगमनम्)

प्रयोगश्च — विमत्याक्रान्तात्मस्वरूपसिद्धिः, विषयानुभवनिबन्धना आत्मस्वरूपसिद्धित्वात् जाग्रतस्तत्सिद्धिवदिति । तथा आगन्तुकं ज्ञानमात्मविशेषगुणत्वात् सुखादिवत् । न च सुखदुःखादयो नात्मगुणाः अप्रसिद्धाश्रयान्तरत्वे सति अहम्प्रत्ययसामानाधिकरण्येन प्रकाशमानत्वात् ज्ञानवदिति— (नित्यचैतन्यस्थापनारम्भः)

अत्राहुरात्मतत्त्वज्ञाः स्वतश्चैतन्यमात्मनः ।
[6]स्वरूपोपाधिधर्मत्वात् प्रकाश इव तेजसः ॥ २४ ॥
चैतन्याश्रयतां मुक्त्वा स्वरूपं नान्यदात्मनः ।
यद्धि चैतन्यरहितं न तदात्मा घटादिवत् ॥ २५ ॥

भावो यत्र प्रतिपत्तुमिष्टः, तत्कालवर्तित्वेन तस्याश्रयस्यावगतिरभावप्रतिपत्तिसमयेऽपेक्षितेत्युक्तं भवति । १ योऽयं पूर्वेद्युरपश्यम्, सोऽहं स्पृशामीति प्रबोधकालिकप्रत्यभिज्ञया प्रबोधरूपे अभावप्रतिपत्तिकाले स्वापकालस्थतयाऽऽत्मस्वरूपमवगतम् । २. यथा कुञ्जराभावज्ञानं प्रति प्रातस्तीरे कुञ्जरानवगतिरपेक्ष्यते । तथा स्वापे विषयानुभवविरहज्ञानं प्रति स्वापकाले विषयानुभवानवगतिरपेक्ष्यते । तत्र तदातनकुञ्जरानवगतिरिदानीन्तनकुञ्जरास्मरणेन यथाऽनुमीयते तथा, तदातनानुभवानवगतिरिदानीन्तनेन तदनुभवास्मरणेनानुमीयत इत्यर्थः । ३ **प्रमाणं** प्रमितिः, **विपर्ययः** मिथ्याज्ञानम् । "प्रमाणविपर्ययविकल्पनिद्रास्मृतयः" (१-६) इति योगसूत्रम् । विकल्पः=आहार्यज्ञानम् । ४. वेति । आत्मनस्स्मरणमित्यनुषङ्गः । ५ **अभावस्य** प्रमाणादिवृत्त्यभावस्य **प्रत्ययः** कारणं यत् तमः तदालम्बना वृत्तिर्ज्ञानविशेषो **निद्रे**त्यर्थः । ६. स्वरूपमुपाधिः प्रयोजकं यस्य धर्मस्य, तत्त्वात् ; यद्वा स्वरूपस्योपाधिर्नि-

[1]चितिशक्त्या न चात्मत्वं मुक्तौ नाशप्रसङ्गतः ।
[चित्यैवान्यव्यवच्छेदे कुतः शक्त्यन्तधावनम् ?]....
[न च देहाद्यभावे सा, किं वा शक्त्या चितेः स्थितौ । ?].....॥ २६ ॥

[2]बुद्धिसुखदुःखादिनिःशेषवैशेषिकात्मगुणात्यन्तिकोपरमलक्षणो हि मोक्षः कणभक्षाक्षचरणमते । न चात्यन्तलुप्तकार्यं वस्तु तत्कार्यजननशक्तमित्यत्र किञ्चित् प्रमाणं क्रमते ; देहादिविशिष्टसंबन्धितया दृश्यमानसुखदुःखज्ञानादिकार्यं विशिष्टवर्तिनीमेवात्मोत्पादशक्तिं कल्पयति, धूम इवार्द्रेन्धनसंबन्धिनि धूमध्वजे स्वोत्पादनसामर्थ्यम् , व्रीह्यङ्कुर इव च सतुषतण्डुले॥ अपिच[3] बोधे सत्येवाऽऽत्मनोऽनात्मव्यवच्छेदे संभवति कृतं तच्छक्त्याश्रयणेन।

(बोधनित्यत्वेप्यात्मनोऽन्यत्वम्)

न चैवं सति बोध एव [4]वर(पर)मात्मेति युक्तम् , तस्याऽऽश्रयप्रतियोगिसापेक्षस्वरूपत्वात् ; आत्मनश्च तद्विपरीतस्वभावत्वात् । साक्षाच्च चेतयितुरहमर्थस्य स्फुरणात् । अनुभवतर्कागमबलेन चितिमत आत्मभावस्यानन्तरमेव[4] प्रपञ्चितत्वाच्च ।

(चैतन्यविषयसंयोगस्य ज्ञानत्वनिरासः)

न च चितिमात्रात्मवादेऽपि तस्यागन्तुकविषयसंबन्धे बोधत्वमध्यारोप्य बोद्धृत्वसमर्थनं साधीयः-संबन्धस्योभयनिष्ठतयाऽर्थस्यापि बोद्धृत्वप्रसङ्गात् । न [5]च कार्यकारणभाववत् व्यवस्थितत्वम्—तत्र जनिमतो जनयितुश्च परस्परापेक्षानियमलक्षणसंबन्धः ।

(आत्मविषययोः कार्यकारणभावादिसंबन्धायोगः)

इहापि[6] स एवेति चेन्न—अपेक्षाहेत्वभावात् । किमर्थमर्थश्चैतन्यमपेक्षते, चैतन्यं

रूपकः व्यवच्छेदको धर्मस्तत्त्वादिति । १. घटादिष्वनात्मस्वेव सत्सु केषाञ्चिदात्मत्वं चितिशक्तिप्रयुक्तम् , न चैतन्यप्रयुक्तम् । अतश्चैतन्यस्यानित्यत्वेपि न दोष इति चेन्न—तच्छक्तेरप्यात्मनि देहसंबन्धप्रयुक्ततया मुक्तौ नाशापत्तेरविशेषादित्यर्थः । एतदुत्तरार्धं भ्रष्टं 'सतुषतण्डुल' इत्येतदनन्तरविवृतसर्वार्थसंग्राहकम् उपर्युल्लिखिताव्यतरप्रकारेण स्यात् । २. अन्तिमकारिकां विवृणोति बुद्धीति । ज्ञानापरिलोपश्रुत्यादिनिर्वाहाय नित्यशक्तिस्वीकारिणं मीमांसकं प्रत्याह नचेति । ३. न च मुक्तौ साक्षाद्बोधस्वीकारे किञ्चिदनिष्टम् , येन श्रुतिस्वारस्यभङ्गेन शक्तिपर्यन्तधावनमित्यर्थः। वरमित्येव तालपाठः। ४. अनन्तरम्—अद्वैतभङ्गे । ५. 'यथा कार्यकारणोभयनिरूप्यत्वेपि तद्भावरूपसंबन्धस्य, क्वचित्कार्यत्वमन्यत्र कारणत्वञ्च व्यवस्थितम्, तथा बोधात्मकस्संयोग आत्मन्येव, न विषये' इति न युक्तम्; तत्रैकनिरूपितोऽन्यनिष्ठः कार्यत्वादिस्संबन्ध इष्यते, न तु संयोग ईदृशः, अस्य द्विष्ठत्वादित्यर्थः । अत्र विषयसंयोगस्यापि सिद्धान्ते निश्चयादिरूपत्वं वक्ष्यमाणं विमृश्यम् । धर्मधर्मिद्वयनित्यत्वधर्मिनिर्विकारत्वधर्मप्रसारणादिगोचरश्रुत्यादिविरोधरूपं बलिष्ठं बाधकमपि चितिमात्रात्मवादे ध्येयम् । ६. नन्वात्मार्थयोरपि परस्परापेक्षानियमलक्षण एव कश्चित्संबन्धोऽस्त्विति शङ्कते इहापीति ।

वाऽर्थम् ? सिद्ध्यर्थमिति चेत्—कः सिद्ध्यर्थः ? न तावदुत्पत्तिः, [1]तस्याः निर्ज्ञातनिमित्तान्तरत्वात् । घटादयो हि प्रसिद्धमृद्दण्डचक्रभ्रमणादिपर्याप्तनिमित्तान्तरशालिनो न चितिमपि निजजननेऽपेक्षन्ते । निरस्तश्च विज्ञान[2]मात्रवादः । नित्यस्यात्मन उत्पत्त्यर्थमर्थापेक्षेति सुव्याहृतम् ॥ सिद्धिः प्रकाश इति चेत्—किं भोः [3]आत्मा स्वयञ्ज्योतिरप्यर्थाधीनप्रकाशः, यदसौ तदर्थमर्थमपेक्षते ? महनीयमिदमात्मवेदित्वम् । प्रकाशश्च न संविदतिरेकी कश्चिदर्थधर्मस्संभवती(संभवी)त्यावेदितम् । संभवन्नप्यसौ न चितिस्वरूपमात्रनिमित्तः, सर्वदा सर्वार्थप्रकाशप्रसङ्गात् । न हि सदासन्निहितसमग्रकारणं कार्यं कदाचिद्भवति । [4]आगन्तुकातिशयाश्रयणे वा नामान्तरेण ज्ञानमेवाङ्गीकृतमिति तद्वानेवात्मा आयातः ।

(अस्यातिशयस्यागन्तुकक्रियात्वात् स्वाभाविकचैतन्यत्वायोगशङ्का)

नन्वेवमर्थसिद्धिव्यवस्थापकतयाऽभ्युपगतं ज्ञानमागन्तुकं क्रियारूपमिति कथं तत् आत्मस्वभावः ? तथाहि-अर्थान्तरगतत्वे सति जनकद्रव्यान्तरं प्रति कार्यत्वादिकेन रूपेण असाधारणो गन्तव्यदेशप्राप्त्यादिः यं प्रत्यसाधारणस्तत्समवेतागन्तुकासाधारणगमनादिक्रियाजन्यो दृष्टः । तादृशी चार्थसिद्धिर्यं पुरुषं प्रति असाधारणी तत्समवेततादृशक्रियाजन्येति शक्यमनुमातुम्[5] । (तत्परिहारः)

मैवम् । अक्रियाजन्येनाभावप्राप्त[6]क्षेत्रादिस्वत्वेन क्षेत्रिणं प्रति असाधारणेन क्षेत्रजव्रीह्यादिस्वत्वेन चानैकान्त्यात् । न च निर्व्यापारतया क्षेत्रिणस्तत्राजनकत्वम् ; व्यापा[7]रकालादिना व्यभिचारात् । तद्भावभावित्वस्य चाविशेषात् ॥ [8]तज्जीवनमेव तत्र जनकव्यापार इति चेत्—ननु तत् सस्यपालनादिसाधारणमिति कथमसाधारणक्रियाजन्यत्वम् ? अपिचैवं सति

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१. सिद्धिरुत्पत्तिश्चेत्, आत्मार्थयोरुत्पाद्योत्पादकभावस्संबन्धः ; प्रकाशश्चेत्, प्रकाश्यप्रकाशकभावः । तत्र प्रथमे उत्पाद्यो विषयो वा स्यादात्मा वा । नाद्य इत्याह **तस्या** इति ; नान्त्य इत्याह **नित्यस्ये**ति । २. घटादेरपि क्षणिकविज्ञानरूपत्वं विज्ञानरूपात्मजन्यत्वञ्च बौद्धमतं सहोपलम्भनियमदूषणादिना प्राङ्निरस्तम् ३. द्वितीयपक्षेपि किमात्मनोऽर्थप्रकाश्यत्वम्, अर्थस्य वाऽऽत्मप्रकाश्यत्वम् ? नाद्य इत्याह **किमि**ति ; नान्त्य इत्याह **प्रकाशश्चे**ति । ४. ननु सर्वदा सर्वार्थप्रकाशवारणाय तदातदा तत्तत्प्रकाशोपयोगी कादाचित्कोऽतिशय आत्मनि स्वीक्रियत इत्यत्राह **आगन्तुके**ति । ५. अर्थप्रकाश आत्मसमवेतासाधारणक्रियाजन्यः आत्मभिन्नवृत्तित्वे सति कार्यत्वादिरूपेणात्मासाधारणत्वात् गन्तव्यदेशगतगन्तृसंयोगवत् । सामान्यमुखीव्याप्तिः । गन्तृगतगमनक्रियायां व्यभिचारवारणाय सत्यन्तम् । ६ क्रयादिक्रियानिरपेक्षेण पित्राद्यभावे पुत्रादेः स्वतःप्राप्तेन । तद्भावभावित्वस्येत्युपरितनपदानुसारेणात्र अभावप्राप्तेत्यत्र भावप्राप्तेति स्यात् । ७. व्यापारादेर्व्यापारान्तराभावेपि जनकत्वात् । ८. क्षेत्रिजीवनमेव । **तत्र** क्षेत्रादिस्वत्वे ।

तदे[1]वार्थप्रकाशेऽपि जनकव्यापारोऽस्तु ; किमवल्लप्तकल्पनया ॥ सत्यपि तस्मिन्नर्थो न प्रकाशत इति चेत्-स्वन्वं वा किं यथोदितं सति जीवने जायत एव ? ॥ व्रीह्यादिसत्ताऽप्यपेक्ष्यत इति चेत्—इहापीन्द्रियादिप्रत्यासत्तिरिति समानश्चर्चः । [2]अतो यं प्रत्यसाधारणो यथोदितधर्मस्तदीयासाधारणधर्मनिमित्त इत्येतावत् । स चेष्यत एवाऽऽत्मनश्चैतन्यं रवेरिव तेजस्वित्वम् । (अथ पूर्वपक्ष्युक्तार्थदूषणारम्भः)

न [3]च हेतुभेदानुविधायितया, 'जानामि', 'अज्ञासिषम्' इत्यादिकालावच्छेदप्रतीतेर्गमनादेरिव ज्ञानस्याऽऽगन्तुकत्वमनुमेयम् ; आदित्यप्रकाशेनानैकान्त्यात् । अस्ति हि तत्रापि, इमं देशमादित्यः प्रकाशयति प्राचीकशत् प्रकाशयिष्यतीति प्रतीतिः । [4]स्वारसिकत्वेऽप्यादित्यप्रकाशस्य प्रकाश्यदेशसंबन्धकादाचित्कतया अवच्छेदप्रतीतिरुपपद्यत इति चेत्-इहापि तर्हीन्द्रियादिप्रत्यासत्तिसमासादितयोग्यभावोऽनुभाव्यभेदः स्वाभाविकमात्मनश्चैतन्यगुणमवच्छिनत्तीति तदपेक्षयैवेन्द्रियाद्यनुविधानम् अतीतानागतप्रत्युत्पन्न[5]त्वप्रत्ययप्रयोगौ चोपपद्यन्ते। (चैतन्ये गमनादिवैलक्षण्यम्)

कथं पुनरत्र निर्णयः, मणिद्युमणिप्रकाशादेरिवौपाधिकोऽयं भेदः, न तु गमनपचनादेरिव स्वाभाविक इति ? तादूप्येणैव प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । न हि जातुचित् अचिद्रूपोऽयमात्मा लोष्टादिवद् दृष्टचरः । यश्च यद्गुणतयैव [6]साक्षाद्भवति, स तत्स्वभावः, मरुदिव स्पर्शगुणतयैवाध्यक्ष्यमाणः । यो यत्स्वभावो न भवति, स तद्विरहेणापि स्वरूपत उपलभ्यते, गमनादिरहिततयेव देवदत्तादिः । (शरीरदृष्टान्तासिद्धिः)

[7]शरीरवदिति चेन्न, असिद्धत्वात् । स्यादेतत्-यथैव खल्वस्वभावभूतेनापि शरीरेण सधीचीन एवायं चेतनश्चकास्ति, तथा चैतन्येनापीति ॥ तन्नैवम्-असिद्धत्वात् । न हि तनुविशिष्टतयैवायं चेतनः परिस्फुरति । योगिनां प्रणिहितमनसामुपरतबहिरिन्द्रियाणाञ्च देहानुसंधातविरहेणाप्यहमिति स्फुटमनुभवात् । जानामीति प्रत्ययः शरीरवर्णसन्निवेशनिर्भास-

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१. तदेव जीवनमेव। २. नन्वेवमिन्द्रियप्रत्यासत्त्यादिकादाचित्कापेक्षाबलादेव सदासन्निहितसमग्रकारणकत्वाभावेन सर्वदा सर्वार्थप्रकाशप्रसङ्गवारणादात्मन्यागन्तुकातिशयाश्रयणमनावश्यकमिति कथं धर्मभूतज्ञानसिद्धिरित्याशङ्कायां पूर्वपक्ष्यनुमानपरिष्करणपूर्वकनिगमनव्याजेनानुमानतोपि ज्ञानसिद्धिं दर्शयति अत इति । यथोदितधर्मो यं प्रत्यसाधारणः, तदीयेत्येवं योजना । एतावदिति । न तु धर्मे आगन्तुकत्वक्रियात्वादिकं साध्यघटकमिति । ३. एवं चेतनस्वभावश्चैतन्यमित्युपपाद्य तदागन्तुकत्ववाद्युक्तांशान् क्रमेण खण्डयिष्यन् पूर्वपक्षारम्भोक्त हेतुद्वयं निरस्यति नचेति । हेतुभेदोऽर्थेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाद्यात्मा कारणविशेषः । ४. स्वारसिकत्वेपि स्वाभाविकत्वेपि । ५. वर्तमानेत्यर्थः । ६. प्रत्यक्षीभवति। ७. इमावेव शङ्कापरिहारौ स्यादेतदित्यादिना विव्रियेते । ननु स्वापप्रलयादौ चैतन्यप्रकाशं

शून्यतया तत्त्वान्तरगोचर इति च प्रागेवावोचम् । कर्मानुगुण्येन सुरमनुजादिजातीयतया भिद्यमानासु आगमापायिनीषु तनुषु मनस इवैकस्य वर्ष्मणस्स्वभावानुबन्धित्वेनाश्रयितुमशक्यत्वात् । [1]लिङ्गस्य पुनरनुवृत्तावप्यप्रत्यक्षत्वान्न व्यभिचारित्वम् ।

(स्वापादावप्यात्मप्रकाशापत्तेस्त्रेधा विकल्प्य विमर्शः)

बोध[2]स्वाभाव्ये पुंसः स्वापमूर्च्छयोः प्रकाशप्रसङ्ग इति चेन्न—विकल्पासहत्वात् । तथाहि--प्रकाश [3]इति पदार्थमात्रसाधारणं बोधजन्यं प्रकटतादिपदपर्यायं धर्ममभिप्रेत्य वाऽयं प्रसङ्गः, अथ बोधमेव, तदविप्रकर्षं वा । आद्ये, तदभावादेव न प्रसङ्गः, अभा[4]वश्च प्रकटित एव संवित्स्वर्तास्सद्धिसमर्थनसमये । भावेऽपि, तमःप्रतिबन्धादप्यनु[5]दयस्संभवी । इतरयो[6]रभिमतमेवापादितमित्यदोषोद्भावनम् । बोधस्वाभाव्ये हि पुरुषस्य स्वापादिदशासु च तथाभावोऽभिमत एवेति न हि तदापादनं दोषाय ।

(व्यवहाररूपप्रकाशस्य स्वापादावनापत्तिवचनम्)

अथ मतम्—स्वापादावपि स्वानुभवसद्भावे जागर इव व्यवहारप्रसङ्ग इति ॥ मैवम्—व्यवहारागोचरत्वात् । कः खल्वात्मनि व्यवहारः ? न ह्यसावादातुं हातुमुपेक्षितुं वा शक्यः ॥ व्याहारः प्रसज्यत इति चेत्--किमङ्ग ! निर्विकल्पक-बालमूकादिवेदनविषयो व्याह्रियत एव ? ॥ करणपाटवव्यवजिहीर्षादिसहकारिविरहात् तत्र व्याहारानुदय इति चेत्--समानोऽयं विधिरितरत्रापीति निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः ।

(स्वापकालिकात्मानुभवस्य जागरे स्मृत्यापत्तिपरिहारः)

स्मृति[7]प्रसङ्ग इति चेन्न, अवृत्तित्वात् । यद्युच्येत--मूर्च्छादावात्मानुभवाभ्युपगमे, अर्थान्तरानुभव इव, एवमहमन्वभूवमिति परस्तात् स्मृतिः प्रसज्यते---इति, तन्न--अवृत्तित्वात् । न हि मूर्च्छा प्रस्वापो वा बुद्धिवृत्तिविशेषः दर्शनस्पर्शनादिवत् । येन

विना अहमितिप्रकाशस्य संमतत्वात् कथं चैतन्यविशिष्टतयैव तदुपलम्भ इति चेन्न-पूर्वपक्षिणा यदायदाऽऽत्मप्रकाश इष्यते, तदातदा चैतन्यविशिष्टतयैव स्फुरणस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । १. स्थूलशरीरविलक्षणसूक्ष्मशरीरात्मकैकलिङ्गशरीरवैशिष्ट्यस्य सुरमनुजादिसर्वदशास्वप्यात्मनि सत्त्वस्वीकारेपि तच्छरीरस्वभावकत्वरूपसाध्यस्यात्मनि विरहेपि च न व्यभिचारः, तद्विशिष्टतयोपलभ्यमानत्वरूपहेत्वभावादिति । २. **स्वापतुरीये**त्यादिना पूर्वपक्ष्युक्तहेतुं खण्डयितुमाह **बोधे**ति । **प्रसङ्ग** इति । न हि बोधे सत्यपि पुंसोऽप्रकाशो जागरे दृष्ट इति भावः। ३. **इति**-इति पदेन। ४. प्राकट्याभावश्च । ५. स्वापादिकालेऽनुत्पत्तिः । ६. **इतरयोः**-बोधस्तददूरत्वं वा प्रकाश इति पक्षद्वये। ७. अनयोरेव शङ्कापरिहारयोर्यद्युच्येतेत्यादिना विवरणम् । **अवृत्तित्वात्** स्वापकालिकाहमर्थप्रकाशस्य वृत्तिरूपत्वाभावात् । वृत्तिरूपस्सकर्मकानुभवो हि स्मृतौ कारणम्, तस्यास्सकर्मकत्वात् । सिद्धान्ते धर्मभूतज्ञानावस्थारूपस्मृतेः तदवस्थारूपानुभवं प्रत्येव सामानाधिकरण्यवशेन कार्यत्वाच्च ।

स्मृतिबीजं संस्कारमादधीयाताम् । किंतूद्भूतेन तमसोपरतव्यापारेषु करणेषु निर्वृत्तिकसांसिद्धिकबोधस्वरूपेणावस्थानमात्रमात्मनः ॥ न च बोधस्वभावत्वादेवास्य संस्काराधायकत्वम् ; अनवरतोपचीयमानसंस्कारतयाऽनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गात् । [1]अनुभवे च स्वानुरूपसंस्काराधाननिरुद्धे सदृशसंबन्धिदर्शनादिसमुद्बोधितनिजबीजानुसारेण स्मरणमुपजायते । न चेहात्मस्वरूपबोधस्य जातुचिन्निरोधो जन्म वा ; नित्यात्मसत्ताप्रयुक्तत्वात् । निमित्तान्तराभावश्चानन्तरमेव[2] व्याकरिष्यते । तदेवमनुवर्तमान एवानुभवे कथं स्मृतिरुदयमासादयेत् ॥ [3]य एवाहं पूर्वेद्युरासम्, स एवाहमद्यापीति स्मृतिसंभिन्नप्रत्ययोऽपि कालावच्छिन्नस्वरूपगोचरः, न स्वरूपमात्रे । [4]अविशदश्च स्वापादौ स्वानुभवः, निर्विकल्पश्च । पटीयसा सविकल्पकेनावगमेन स्मृतिबीजमाधीयत इति [5]च कुतस्तत्प्रसङ्गः ? साम्याच्चाननुभवाभिमानः शरीरतद्धारण(शरीरधारण?)प्रयत्नाननुसंधानवत्[6] ।

(सुप्तमुक्तादिव्यवस्थाभावप्रसङ्गभङ्गः)

न चाविकृतस्वाभाविकबोधमात्रेणावस्थाने स्वापमोक्षयोरविशेषापत्तिः, क्लेशवासनानां गुणा[7]भिभवस्य चैकत्र भावात् ; इतरत्र तदत्यन्तनिवृत्तेः [अतः ?] [अ?] संप्रज्ञातसमाधावपि[8] परमवैराग्यशालिना पटुतरनिरोधसंस्कारेण चरिताधिकारिणा अपवर्गिणा विशेषः ।

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१. एवं संस्कारासंभवात् स्मृतिर्न भवतीत्युक्त्वा, अनुभवस्यैवानुवर्तमानतयापि स्मृतिर्न भवतीत्याह **अनुभव** इति । २. 'बोधकारणानुवृत्त्यापि बोधानुवृत्तिरुपपद्यते' इत्येतद्दूषणावसरे । ३. कथं तर्हि स्मर्तुमनर्हस्यात्मनोपि स्मरणविशेष इत्यत्राह **य**इति । **संभिन्ने**ति । संवलितेत्यर्थः । ४. आत्मरूपज्ञानस्य क्लृप्तकारणरूपत्वाभावादपि न संस्काराधायकतेत्याह । देशकालावच्छेदाद्यनवगाहनादवैशद्यं निर्विकल्पत्वञ्च । **इति चे**ति । तद्विषयकस्मरणं प्रति तद्विषयकानुभवस्यैव हेतुत्वात् स्वरूपात्मकबोधं प्रति चाऽऽत्मनोऽकर्मत्वादिति च भाव्यम् । ५. अनुभूतस्याप्यननुभूतस्येव पश्चादस्मर्यमाणत्वाविशेषात् । ६. न हि स्वशरीरस्वरूपमात्रं तद्धारणप्रयत्नञ्च कश्चित् स्मरतीति ।

७. तमोगुणादिनाऽभिभूयमानत्वस्य । इदं सिद्धान्तमोक्षस्वरूपमप्रतिबोध्यैवोत्तरम् । ८. समाधिर्द्विविधः संप्रज्ञातोऽसंप्रज्ञातश्च । आद्यः स्थूलाचेतन-सूक्ष्माचेतन.सात्त्विकानन्दांश.चेतनरूपचतुर्विधालम्बनभेदाच्चतुर्धा । अन्त्यो निरालम्बनः । एकाग्रतासंस्कारपर्यन्तसर्वोपमर्दनेन निरन्तरवाहित्वं निरोधसंस्कारस्य पटुतरत्वम् । **चरिताधिकारम्** अवसितभोगापवर्गरूपोद्देश्यं चित्तम् । **अपवर्गिणा** अपवर्गिकृतः । अत्र **संप्रज्ञातसमाधावपी**त्येव पाठो दृश्यते । तदा च **इतरत्रे**त्यारभ्य **विशेष** इत्यन्तमेकं वाक्यमित्युचिततरम् । अयमर्थः-मोक्षे क्लेशादेः अत्यन्तं निवृत्ततया, प्रमाणादिवृत्तिषु संप्रज्ञातसमाधिविषयेपि योऽत्यन्तं विरक्तो निरोधसंस्कारपाटवेन चित्तं चरिताधिकारमकरोत्, तादृशापवर्गिकृतो विशेषस्तद्विलक्षणपुरुषसुषुप्त्यपेक्षयाऽस्तीति । **निवृत्ते**रित्यन्तस्य पूर्वान्वयस्वारस्ये असंप्रज्ञातेति च पाठो

(निद्राया वृत्तित्वे उपपत्तिस्तन्निरासश्च)

[1]कथं पुनर्निद्राया अवृत्तित्वे प्रबुद्धस्य प्रत्यवमर्शाः, 'सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' इत्याद्याः ? न ह्यननुभूतगोचराः स्मृतयः संभवन्ति । [2]सत्त्वसचिवसमुल्लसिततमोगुणानुभवभावितभावनायोनिः खलु, 'सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्, प्रसन्नं मे मनः, लघूनि मे गात्राणि' इति प्रत्यवमर्शः । रजस्तमस्समुद्रेके तु, 'दुःखमहमस्वाप्सम्, भ्रमत्यनवस्थितं मे चित्तम्' इति । सत्त्वरजसी त्वभिभूय नितान्तमुद्भूते तमसि, 'गाढं (ढ) मूढं सुप्तोऽस्मि, गुरूणि मे गात्राणि, मुषितमिव मनः, मीलितमिव' इति ।

सत्यमेवम् । [3]दत्तोत्तरं ह्येतत्—नैवामी वासनायोनयः प्रत्ययाः ; अपितु तात्कालिकशरीरेन्द्रियमनोवस्थाविशेषपर्यालोचननिमित्ता आनुमानिका इति । एवंरूपा हीमे, 'यतः प्रसन्नं मे मनः, सम्यगाहारपरिणामवशाल्लघूनि चाङ्गानि ; अतस्सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' इति । स्वापावस्थायां वेन्द्रियोपरमतारतम्यवशाद(दा)विशद-तात्कालिक-तत्तदनुकूलप्रतिकूलविषयानुसंधाननिबन्धनतयाऽपि स्मरणमुपपद्यत इति न वृत्त्यन्तरत्वं निद्रायाः ।

(निद्राया अवृत्तित्वेऽपि योगसूत्राविरोधः)

कथं तर्हि पारमर्षं सूत्रम्-'अभावप्रत्ययालम्बना वृत्तिर्निद्रा' इति ? ॥ निरोधपरत्वात् प्र[4]करणस्य न वृत्तिस्वरूपे तात्पर्यं विप[5]र्ययवत् । नह्यतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठं मिथ्याज्ञानं किञ्चिदस्ति,

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हनेऽयमर्थः—नन्वस्तु स्वापमोक्षयोर्विशेषः ; स्वापसमाध्योः कथम् । संप्रज्ञातसमाधौ सालम्बनवृत्तिरूपविशेषसत्त्वेऽप्यसंप्रज्ञातस्य सर्ववृत्तिनिरोधात्मकतया स्वापतुल्यत्वादित्यत्राहासंप्रज्ञातेति । तत्र हि पुंसो वैराग्यं निरोधसंस्कारश्चरिताधिकारचित्तत्वमपवर्गभाजनत्वञ्च ; नैतानि सुप्त इति । **निवृत्तेः संप्रज्ञातेत्येव** सर्वत्र पाठः । निवृत्तेरित्यत्र वाक्यसमाप्तौ असंप्रज्ञातेति पाठान्तरोल्लेखो दर्शितः । तथावाक्यसमाप्तावपि संप्रज्ञातेत्येव पाठरक्षणाय मध्ये 'अत' इति पदमुचितं तर्कितम् ।

१. निद्राया अवृत्तित्वस्य पूर्वपक्षीष्टत्वेपि सिद्धान्त्येकदेशी तत्त्वं पृच्छति **कथमिति** । २. सत्त्वेन सहोद्रिक्तं यत् तमः, तदनुभवजनितसंस्कारजन्यः । प्रत्यवमर्शाश्चात्र दर्शितप्रकारा योगभाष्ये (१·१०) द्रष्टव्याः । ३. पूर्वपक्षिकृत एतन्निर्वाहप्रकारोऽस्मदिष्ट एव । जागरारम्भकालिकसुखदुःखमोहोपयोगिमनःप्रसादास्थैर्यस्तैमित्यपरामर्शाधीनास्तथाऽनुमितय इति भावः । उक्तत्रिविधप्रत्यवमर्शेषु गाढस्वापप्रत्ययस्यानुमितिरूपत्वेप्याद्ययोर्जागरवदविशदनिद्राकालिकसुखदुःखलवगोचरप्रमाणादिरूपानुभवजन्यस्मृतित्वमस्तु ; तथाच सुखदुःखविषये स्मृतित्वेपि स्वापांशेऽनुमितिरेवेति न निद्रा नाम वृत्तिरिति । ४. उक्तं हि 'योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः' (१-२), 'अभ्यासवैराग्याभ्यां तन्निरोधः' (१-१२) इति । प्रमाणादिवृत्तिगतनिरोद्धव्यत्वसादृश्याद्गौणो निद्रायां वृत्तिशब्दः । ५. 'विपर्ययो मिथ्याज्ञानमतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठम्' (१-९) —अतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठत्वञ्च तद्रूपाप्रतिष्ठत्वम् । तेन संशयस्यापि संग्रहः । यथार्थे सर्व-

सर्वसंविदामर्थाव्यभिचारात् । स चाधिकरणसिद्धः ; साधयिष्यते चोपरिष्टात् । कैवल्यभागि यच्चित्त (भागि यच्चित् तत ?) (भागीय[1]चित्त?) प्रत्यनीकतया निद्रादेर्निरोध्यत्वेनोपदेशः ।

(निद्राया वृत्तित्वे तत एव सहजचैतन्यसिद्धिः)

अस्तु[2] वा पूर्वोक्तप्रमाणादिवृत्त्यभावकारणभूतप्रचिततमतमोगुणावलम्बना वृत्तिरेव निद्रा । सन्तु च प्रबुद्धप्रत्यवमर्शाश्च स्मरणानि । तथासति अनवरतानुवृत्तबोधतया स्थितमेव पुंसो बोधस्वभावत्वम् ॥

[3]आह-बोधकारणानुवृत्त्याऽपि बोधानुवृत्तिरुपपद्यत इति कथं तथास्वाभाव्यनिश्चयः ? इत्थम्— यतः स्वतस्सतो बोधात् ऋते पुंसो ययोदितम् ।

तमः स्वापादिकालीनं न सिध्येत् हेत्वसिद्धितः ॥ २७ ॥

उपरतानि हि प्रस्वापकाले सर्वाण्येवेन्द्रियाणि सह मनसा । संस्कारस्य च न स्मृतेरन्यत्र सामर्थ्यम् । न च स्वप्रकाशं तमः; अर्थान्तर(अर्थान्त)(अन्तर)वर्तिनोऽप्यनिशं प्रकाशप्रसंगात् । क्लृप्तश्च सर्वार्थसाधनतया बोध इति तेनैव कारणविरहिणा सता स्वभावभूतेनोद्भू-(द्भूतेनोद्भू)तवृत्तेस्तमसोऽन्यस्य वाऽऽत्मवर्तिनो [4]गुणस्य स्फुरणमिति बलादभ्युपगमनीयम् ॥

विज्ञानमिति हि सांख्ययोगादिमतम् । अतो रजतभ्रमो नाम शुक्तिदर्शनरजतस्मृतिसंवलितो रजतभेदाग्रहः अख्यातिः । तत्र दर्शनं स्मृतिश्च प्रमाणादौ अन्तर्भवतीति अग्रहः शिष्यते । स चाभावरूपत्वान्न वृत्तिरिति । **अधिकरणे**ति । न्यायतत्त्वशास्त्रगताधिकरणेत्यर्थः । 1. योगभाष्ये कैवल्यभागीय शब्दस्य तत्रतत्र प्रयोगात्, 'चित्तनदी वहति कल्याणाय पापाय च' इति भाषणाच्चात्र संसारभागं विहाय कैवल्यभागसंबन्धिनश्चित्तस्य निद्रादयः प्रत्यनीका इत्यर्थो युज्यते । 2. अत्रेदं बोध्यम्—निद्राया वृत्तित्वे तया सह तदाऽऽत्मप्रकाशस्स्यात् ; स च नित्यचैतन्याधीनो वा स्वरूपप्रयुक्तो वा कथ्येतेति भिया पूर्वपक्षिणा तस्या वृत्तित्वं पूर्वं निरस्तम् । पश्चात् तस्याः वृत्तित्वेपि नित्यचैतन्यमात्मनो नास्तीत्युक्तम् । सिद्धान्तिना च तस्या वृत्तित्वे तदधीनप्रकाशः आत्मन आपद्येतेत्यालोच्य पूर्वं तन्निरस्तम् । पश्चात् तद्वृत्तित्वमभ्युपगम्य तत एव सहजचैतन्यं समर्थ्यत इति ॥ ननु सुखमहमस्वाप्समिति स्मृतिरिति सिद्धान्तः ; अत्रानुमितिरित्युक्तमिति विरोधः॥ न ; स्वापांशे ह्यवृत्तित्वपक्षेऽनुमितित्वमुच्यते । तत् सिद्धान्तसंमतमेव । अहमर्थप्रकाशस्तु मूलग्रन्थेऽपीष्टः । परन्तु दुःखमहमितिवत् सुखांशेऽप्यनुमितित्वं वैषयिकस्वल्पसुखस्मृतित्वं वा लक्ष्येत । तत्र तु, दुःखविषये अगत्या तथास्वीकारेऽपि आत्मनोऽनुकूलत्वस्यानुभवप्रमाणसिद्धतया तत्प्रकाशमादाय प्रत्यवमर्शनिर्वाहे बाह्यानुकूलवस्तुग्रहादेर्निद्राकाले कल्पने मानाभाव इत्युत्तरम् । इदं स्वतस्सुखीन्येतद्विमर्शावसरे वक्तव्यमिति नात्रोच्यत इति । 3. जागरवदनित्यः कारणसंपाताधीन एवास्तु तदापि बोध इति शङ्कते आहेति । 4. **गुणस्य** सत्त्वादेः । अनुकूलत्वस्येति वा ।

(आत्मप्रकाशनित्यत्वानुमानम्)

[1]नित्यप्रकाशश्चात्मा प्रमातृत्वात् । अप्रमातृत्वव्यापकबद्धं ह्यनित्यप्रकाशत्वं व्यापक-विरुद्धप्रमातृत्वभागिनि आत्मनि नात्मानं लभते ।

(आत्मप्रकाशस्य स्वरूपप्रयुक्तत्वानुमानम्)

स्वतस्सिद्धप्रकाशत्वमप्यस्य ज्ञातृभावतः ।
अज्ञातृत्वेन हि व्याप्ता परायत्तप्रकाशता ॥ २८ ॥

(प्रकाशपदार्थनिष्कर्षाय प्रश्नः)

[2]कः पुनरयं प्रकाशः, योऽस्य नित्योऽभ्युपेयेत, स्वाभाविकश्च ? कश्चास्यात्मना संबन्धः?

यदि ज्ञानमेव ; संबन्धश्चाश्रयाश्रयित्वम् ;-ततो हेत्वभावेन साध्याभावस्य व्याप्तिमुप-दर्शयितुं निदर्शनतया घटादि उपादातव्यम्—यत् अनित्यप्रकाशमन्याधीनप्रकाशं वा तत् अप्रमातृ, यथा घटादीति । तत्र च विशेषनिषेधस्य सामान्याभ्यनुज्ञाऽऽक्षेपकत्वादागन्तुकं ज्ञानं घटादावनुमतमापद्येत । (आत्मनस्स्वरूपप्रकाशविषयत्वानुपपत्तिः)

अथ[3] तन्मा भूदिति विषयविषयिभाव एव संबन्धस्संगीयेत (संगीर्येत?)—ततो नित्य-वद्ज्ञानविषयत्वमात्मनः प्रसज्येत । ज्ञानविषयीकारश्च साधनविशेषायत्तत्वेन नियत इति न स्वाभाविकत्वसंभवः ॥ अचेतनगोचर एव तथा नियम इति चेन्न-चेतनान्तरविषयीकारेऽपि तथाभावदर्शनात् । न च अनात्मगोचर[4] एव साधनसापेक्षत्वनियम इति वाच्यम्-आत्मनोऽ-प्यानुमानिकागमिकयोगज्ञानविषयीकारे तत्सापेक्षत्वदर्शनात् । विरुद्धे चैक(क्रिय)स्य एकक्रियायां कर्मकर्तृत्वे, सूच्यग्रस्येवात्मनि वेध्यवेधकत्वे । [5]नित्यत्वनिरतिशयसूक्ष्मत्व-

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1. एवं वृत्तिस्वीकारेऽप्यात्मप्रकाशो न पूर्वपक्ष्युक्तरीत्या वृत्तिप्रयुक्तोऽनित्यः ; किन्तु नित्यः स्व-रूपप्रयुक्तश्चेत्यंशद्वयं प्रयोगद्वयेन साधयति नित्येत्यादिना । 2. इतःपरम् उक्तप्रयोगघटकप्रकाशप-दार्थशोधनव्याजेन आत्मनि नित्यचैतन्यस्वीकारे पूर्वपक्ष्युद्भावितप्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थानुपपत्तिपरिहाराय परसंमतप्रकाशपदार्थखण्डनेन स्वाभिमतं प्राक् सूचितं बोधाविप्रकर्षरूपप्रकाशपदार्थं स्थापयितुं प्रवृत्तः पृच्छति क इति । 'अयमर्थः प्रकाशते' इत्यत्र प्रकाशो धात्वर्थो ज्ञानम्, आख्यातार्थो विषयिविषय भावः संबन्ध इति तार्किकाः । प्राकट्यं प्रकाशः, आश्रयत्वं संबन्ध इति भाट्टाः । ज्ञानमेव प्रकाशः, तदधीनव्यवहारानुकूलत्वं संबन्ध इति प्राभाकराः । सिद्धान्ते ज्ञानं प्रकाशः, अदूरत्वं संबन्धः ; अदूरत्वपर्यन्तस्य वा तदधीनव्यवहारक्षमत्वस्य वा प्रकाशपदार्थत्वे तु आश्रयत्वं संबन्ध इति विवेकः। तत्र तार्किकादिभिरात्मनित्यप्रकाशोऽसंमतः। तदर्थं साध्यमानोऽयं तेषु कतमस्यच्छायावलम्बनेनेति प्रश्नाशयः। 3. तार्किकच्छायया ज्ञानेनात्मनो विषयविषयिभावसंबन्धस्वीकारे उक्तसाध्यासिद्धिमाह अथेति । 4. अनात्मेति । आत्मा स्वात्मा । 5. तर्हि कर्मकर्तृविरोधे आनुमानिकादिज्ञानकर्मत्वं कथमित्यत्र वैषम्यं दर्शयति नित्यत्वेति ।

व्यापित्वचित्स्वाभाव्यादिरूपेण प्रत्यगर्थस्य औपदेशिकत्वमानुमानिकत्वं वा; न स्वरूपतः। स्वरूपापेक्षयैव स्वतस्सिद्धिरभ्युपेयत इत्यसमाधेयो विरोधः। [1]रूपभेदेन गम्यगमकत्वाङ्गीकारपक्षेऽपक्षस्येव (?) शब्दादेर्न स्वतस्सिद्धत्वम्।

(प्राकट्यपक्षेण शङ्का)

अथोच्येत-न प्रकाशो ज्ञानम्; अपितु तन्निमित्तश्चेतनेतरसर्वपदार्थसाधारणो धर्मः, यद्वशात् प्रकाशत इति प्रख्योपाख्ये प्रतायेते सर्वपदार्थेष्वविशेषेण। आश्रयाश्रयित्वलक्षणश्च संबन्धस्तेन सह सर्वभावानाम्; स च यथोदितसाधनबलादेव [2]सांसिद्धिको नित्यश्चात्मन इति—

(तत्परिहारः)

पराकृतोऽयं पक्षः-न ज्ञानातिरेकी प्रकाशो नाम। यद्व्यवहारोपजननानुगुणं ज्ञानं तत् प्रकाशत[3]इत्युच्यते। ज्ञेयस्य ज्ञातुः स्वात्मनश्च व्यवहारानुगुणं ज्ञानमुदयत इति युक्तस्त्रिष्वप्येकप्रकारः 'प्रकाशते'व्यवहारः। तत्त्वान्तरप्रकाशाभ्युपगमे तात्स्वाभाव्येन[4] च पुनः किं चैतन्याश्रयणेन? न च प्रकाश एव तदिति वाच्यम्; घटादेरपि प्रकाशवत्तया चेतनत्वप्रसङ्गात्। यद्युच्येत—सति चेतनावत्त्वे पुंसः प्रकाशमानत्वमिति; संविदीदानीं का वार्ता। चेतनैव हि सा; न चेतयते। अथ [5]संविदस्तत्संबन्धाधीनः स धर्म इति चेत्—कस्तया संबन्धः, यस्तन्निबन्धनम्? [6]नाश्रयाश्रयित्वम्, घटादेस्तदभावप्रसंगात्। न विषयविषयिभावः, तस्यैवानिरूपणात्। अनिरूपणश्च भ्रान्त्यधिकरणसिद्धान्तारम्भे, संवित्सिद्धौ चानुसन्धातव्यम्। आत्मनस्त[7] (स्व?)स्य चाप्रकाशप्रसङ्गश्च॥ [8]ज्ञानाधीनप्रकाशाश्रयतैव सिद्धिः, तया चानुमेयं ज्ञानमिति पक्षःप्रागेव प्रतिक्षिप्तः।

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1. नन्विहापि रूपभेदेन निर्वाहोऽस्त्वित्यत्राह रूपेति। शब्दशब्दो हि गोशब्दादेरिव स्वात्मकशब्दस्यापि गमकः। एवं पदपदम्। स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्य इति विधिवाक्येन वाक्यान्तरमिव स्वात्मापि गृह्यते। तत्र सर्वत्र न स्वतःसिद्धिः; गम्यत्वं सामान्यरूपेण; गमकत्वं विशेषरूपेणेति भेदादित्यर्थः। अत्र वाक्यान्वयानौचित्येन पक्षस्येति पदायोगादधिकाक्षरानुपलम्भाच्च अपक्षस्येतिच्छेदः। न हि शब्दादावपि स्वतःसिद्धिसाधनमेष्टुं शक्यमिति तस्य पक्षत्वायोगसूचनाय अपक्षस्येति तद्विशेषणम्। 2. प्रमातृत्वादिहेतुबलात्। 3. प्रकाशमानत्वेनोच्यते। 4. प्रकाशः स्वाभाविक इति पूर्वानुमानेनोक्तत्वेन। सिद्धान्ते आत्मनि नित्यप्राकट्यसंमतौ तस्य ज्ञानाधीनत्वे स्वाभाविकत्वं न स्यात्। अतः लाघवाच्च स्वाभाविकचैतन्यगुण एव स्वाभाविकं प्राकट्यमिति भाट्टच्छाया नालम्ब्येति। न प्रकाशसामान्यं चैतन्यम्; किन्त्वात्मप्रकाशव्यवहारश्चेतनावत्त्वाधीन इति शङ्कते यदीति। 5. चेतनया संबन्धात् संविदि प्राकट्यमिति तत्र प्रकाशव्यवहारोपपत्तिः चैतन्याश्रयत्वाभावेऽपीति। 6. चेतनाया आश्रये आत्मन्याश्रितत्वं संविदः। 7. विषयत्वं घटादौ स्यात्; नात्मनि, न वा स्वस्मिन् ज्ञान इति। स्त्रीलिङ्गप्रक्रमात् तस्येति पाठो न युक्तः। यद्वा आत्मनः स्वस्य ज्ञानस्य, तस्य पुंस इति व्याख्येयम्। 8. प्राक्कृतं प्राकट्यखण्डनप्रकारमपि स्मारयति।

(गुरुभाट्टदूषणेनार्थज्ञानसन्निकर्षस्थापनम्)

[1]स्वप्रकाशसंविद्वादिनोऽपि व्यवहारानुकूल्ये [2]वैरूप्यमशक्य(ङ्क्य)परिहारम् । [3]आत्मनि समवेतं ज्ञानमसम्बन्धिन्यर्थे प्रकाशं व्यवहारं वा कथं प्रसुवीतेत्यपि चिन्त्यम् ॥ इन्द्रियलिङ्गादिस्वकारणप्रत्यासत्तिवशादिति मा वोचः । न खलु लब्धात्मकं कार्यं स्वनिमित्तकारणमनुरुध्य कार्यमारभते । [4]मा भूदुदकाहरणादि घटादेः कुलालादिसमानाधिष्ठानम् । न च निमित्तकारणनाशे कार्यनाशः । नश्यति चेन्द्रियसंप्रयोगादिनाशे रूपादिज्ञानम् । अथ इन्द्रियेण सह चैतन्यमपि निःसृत्य तेन तेनार्थेन सन्निकृष्यते, [5]हस्तादिनेव त्वगिन्द्रियम्, तथासति हि तदुपाधिकत्वात् तज्ज्ञानस्य युक्तं तद्भावानुविधायित्वम् । अन्यथा उत्पन्नं ज्ञानमिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षनिवृत्तौ किमिति निवर्तते ? ।

(निमित्तनाशात्कार्यनाशायोगस्य ज्ञातानाशेप्यतिदेशः)

ज्ञानजन्यार्थधर्मप्रकाशवादिनोऽपि समानोऽयं दोषः । निमित्तकारणं हि ज्ञानम् । कुतस्तन्निवृत्तावर्थप्रकाशो निवर्तते ? कुतो वा यावत्तद्भावमवतिष्ठते ?

(द्वित्वादेरपेक्षाबुद्धिनाशानाश्यत्वम्)

[6]न च संख्यादिनिदर्शनेनात्र प्रत्यवस्थानं युक्तम्—

असिद्धत्वेन नाशस्य संख्याया बुद्धिनाशतः ।
एकसंख्येव संख्यात्वात् अन्याऽप्याद्रव्यभाविनी ॥ २९ ॥
सर्वा ह्येकाश्रया संख्या नित्यानित्यार्थवर्तिनी ।
यावदाश्रयसत्येव संमता सर्ववादिनाम् ॥ ३० ॥
द्वित्वादिका परार्धान्ता संख्या याऽनेकवर्तिनी ।
साऽपि संख्यात्वसामान्ये सति कस्मान्न तादृशी ॥ ३१ ॥

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1. तर्हि प्राभाकरसरणिरेवास्तु, तत्राह स्वेति । २. वक्ष्यति 'अपर्यनुयोज्यं निमित्तवैरूप्यम्' इति। संवित् घटादिकमिन्द्रियप्रत्यासत्तिवशाद्व्यवहारयति, तदभावेपि वेदितारमिति वैरूप्यं निमित्तवैरूप्यम् । यद्वा कार्यान्तरनिमित्तकारणवैलक्षण्येनात्र परं निमित्तानुरोधेन कार्यारम्भो निमित्तवैरूप्यम् । व्यवहारानुगुणसंवेदनत्वरूपप्रकाशपक्षे वक्ष्यमाणं प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तवैरूप्यं वा । घटज्ञानफलस्य व्यवहारक्षमत्वस्य घटे ज्ञानज्ञात्रोश्चाविशेषे घटस्यैव कर्मत्वं, न तयोरिति वैरूप्यमपीह सुवचम् । ३. अथ प्रकाशपदार्थत्वेन स्वसंमतस्यार्थज्ञानसंबन्धविशेषस्यावश्यकत्वोपोद्घाततया भाट्टप्राभाकरयोरनुपपत्त्यन्तरमाह आत्मनीति । 4. अन्यथा घटस्य कुलालवत्येव देशे उदकाहरणकरत्वं स्यादित्यर्थः। 5. अस्ति ह्यर्थहस्तसन्निकर्षे त्वगर्थसन्निकर्षोपि। 6. ननु द्वित्वादिसंख्या अपेक्षाबुद्धिनाशान्नश्यन्ती दृष्टेत्याशङ्कां संख्यारूपकिञ्चित्पदार्थान्तरस्वीकारपक्षेऽप्यनन्तद्वित्वोत्पत्तिपक्षस्य बीभत्स्यतया वक्ष्यमाणरीत्या तत्स्वीकार एव लाघवात् युक्त इत्यभिप्रेत्य परिहरति नचेति।

(एकत्वस्य स्वरूपातिरिक्तसंख्यात्वम्)

ननु नैकत्वं संख्या, स्वरूपानतिरेकात् । अतः साधनविकलमुदाहरणम् ॥ मैवम् । संख्यैव सा ; द्रव्यान्तरेऽप्यनुवृत्तेः । यदि हि घटादेस्स्वरूपमेवैकत्वम्, ततो घट एकः, पट एक इति सर्वद्रव्यसाधारण्यमेकत्वस्य न स्यात् । न हि घटस्वरूपस्य पटस्वरूपेण संभवति सामानाधिकरण्यम्, घटः पट इति । अस्ति तु तत् एकत्वस्य ॥ किंच—

संख्यैकता[1] विरुद्धत्वात् द्विसंख्येवान्यसंख्यया ।
एकं द्वाविति न ह्यस्ति सामानाधिकरण्यधीः ॥ ३२ ॥

(द्वित्वाद्ययावद्द्रव्यभावित्वसाधकभङ्गः)

यत्तु—अनेकद्रव्यवृत्तित्वे सति गुणत्वात् संयोगवत् अयावद्द्रव्यभाविनी द्वित्वादिसंख्येति-तत् नानात्वेऽनैकान्तिकम् । न हि सतोरेव घटपटयोस्तन्नानात्वं नश्यति । न च तद् द्वि[त्व]संख्यैव ; त्रयाणां तदभावप्रसंगात् । न च तत् एकत्वाभावमात्रम् ; तुच्छस्यापि नानात्वापत्तेः । (द्वित्वादिप्रत्यक्षसार्वदिकत्वापत्तिपरिहारः)

[2]आपेक्षिकत्वाद् द्वित्वादेः प्रतियोग्यनवग्रहात् ।
बुभुत्सोपरमाच्चापि सत्या एवानवग्रहः ॥ ३२ ॥

[3]अतश्चैतन्यस्यैवेन्द्रियद्वाराऽर्थसन्निकर्ष एव तद्भावाभावानुविधानोपपत्तिः ।

(प्रकाशकत्वहेतुनापि ज्ञानार्थसंबन्धसाधनम्)

अन्यच्च[4] अर्थस्य प्रकाशकं हि ज्ञानं भवताम् । सर्वश्च प्रकाशकं प्रकाश्यवस्तुसन्निकृष्टमेव प्रकाशकं दृष्टं दीपप्रभादि । अतस्तदपि तथेति युक्तमाश्रयितुम् ॥ [5]व्योमवदमूर्तस्य न क्रियावत्त्वमिति चेत्—केयं मूर्तिर्नाम, यद्विरहिणः क्रियाऽयोगः ? ।

(ज्ञाने परिच्छिन्नद्रव्यत्वरूपमूर्तत्वाभावासिद्धिः)

यदि पारिभाषिकी द्रव्यत्वे सति क्वाचित्कतेति, इष्यत एव सा चैतन्ये ; न हि तत् सर्वगतं द्रव्यम् ; तथासति युगपत्सर्वार्थसिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । क्वाचित्कत्वे तु-तद्धि यदैकदा एकेन्द्रियेण संप्रयुक्तं (संपृक्तं) तदर्थाभिमुखम्, न तदा इन्द्रियान्तरमधितिष्ठति । अत एव हि

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1. एकत्वं संख्या त्रित्वसंख्याविरुद्धत्वात् द्वित्वसंख्यावदित्यर्थः । ननु तर्हि प्रतिद्रव्यमेकत्वसत्त्वात् द्वित्वादि निराश्रयं स्यादित्यत्र विरोधमुत्तरार्धेनोपपादयति । 2. घटादौ द्वित्वस्य पटादिसापेक्षतया तदभावेऽनुत्पन्नत्वादेवाग्रहः ; उत्पन्नस्यापि, निरूपकान्तरस्य पटादेरग्रहादग्रहः ; पटादिग्रहकालेऽपि बुभुत्साविरहादग्रह इत्यर्थः। अपेक्षाबुद्धिः स्थितद्वित्वादिव्यञ्जिकेति तदभावे अग्रह इति भावः । 3. अतः संख्यादिनिदर्शनेन प्रत्यवस्थानायोगात्, इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षनिवृत्तौ ज्ञाननिवृत्त्यनापत्तेः । 4. एवं भाट्टप्राभाकरसंमतप्रकाशव्यवहारयोरप्यसंबन्धिन्यर्थेऽयोगात् संबन्धं प्रसाध्य प्रभावत्प्रकाशकत्वहेतुनापि तं साधयति । 5. 'अमूर्तस्याकाशस्येव निष्क्रमणप्रवेशाद्यनुपपत्तेः' इत्युक्तं निरसितुमनुवदति ।

युगपद्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिः । निरतिशयवेगश्च तत्, युगपदिव अतिशीघ्रमनेकेन्द्रियाधिष्ठान-दर्शनात् । अतो यथोदितममूर्तत्वमसिद्धम् ॥

(अस्पर्शत्वरूपामूर्तत्वस्य शब्दमनसोरनैकान्त्यम्)

स्पर्शवत्ता मूर्तिः ; तद्विरहान्निष्क्रियत्वमिति चेत्—शब्देनानेकान्तः । स खलु शङ्ख-मुखादेर्दवीयसोऽपि [1]देशान्नोदनविशेषेण लोष्टादिरिव यावद्वेगं प्रतिष्ठते स्पर्शविहीनोऽपि । स्पर्शरहितस्यापि मनइन्द्रियस्य क्रियावत्त्वं [2]पदार्थवाक्यार्थविदामुभयेषामपि संमतमेव ॥

(अतीतादावपि चैतन्यसंप्रयोगसंभवः)

कथमतीतानागतयोरसतोश्चैतन्येन संप्रयोग इति चेत्-कथं वा विषयभावः, प्रकाश-मानत्वम् ; [3]संख्यादियोगो वा ? [4]तयोर्यस्तत्र निर्वाहः, स एवात्रास्तु । [5]अपिचातीतया अनागततया च तावप्यद्यापि विद्येते इति तेन रूपेण बोधसन्निकर्षे काऽ(ना)नुपपत्तिः । किंच यथा दवीयसि देशे सता ध्रुवशिशुमारादिना दृक् तु सन्निकृष्यते, तथा दवीयसि काले सता कल्पाद्यन्तवर्तिना स्व(स्वा ?)यंभुवादिनेति [6]नालोकं किंचित् । किंच[7]—

नातीतानागते बुद्धेर्दूरे भवितुमर्हतः ।
बुद्ध्या प्रकाशमानत्वात् बुद्धिवोद्भूस्वरूपवत् ॥ ३४ ॥

(अन्तरालाग्रहणोपपत्तिः)

एवञ्च चैतन्यस्य निरतिशयवेगितया अन्तरालदेशकालाग्रहणाभिमानोऽलातचक्र-[8]गतक्रमवद्देशसंयोगविभागाग्रहणाभिमानवत् । अपिचेन्द्रियलिङ्गसंस्कारादेर्यदर्थप्रतिनियतं रूपम्, तेनैवोपश्लिष्य निस्सरच्चैतन्यमपि [9]तद्गोचरेणैव सन्निकृष्यते ; यथा गवादिपद-शक्तिरेकबुद्धिसिद्धेऽपि [10]सामान्यविशेषात्मके वस्तुनि सामान्यांशेनैव सम्बध्यते ; यथा वा विधिः प्राप्तांशपरिहारेणाप्राप्तांशमेव भावनायाः स्पृशति[11] । अतः इन्द्रियादिद्वारेण चैतन्य-मपि तदर्थाभिमुखं निर्गच्छतीति न्याय्यम्[12] । यथाऽऽह भगवान्, 'तदस्य हरति प्रज्ञां

1. देशादित्यत्र दृशां, दिशामिति पाठद्वयं न्यायसिद्धाञ्जनव्याख्याने । 2. वैशेषिकमीमांसकानाम् । 3. वर्तमानापेक्षाबुद्धिजन्यद्वित्वादियोगः । 4. अतीतानागतयोः । तत्र विषयभावादौ । 5. सिद्धान्ते सर्वस्यापि द्रव्यस्य नित्यत्वादतीतत्वाद्याश्रयद्रव्यं वर्तमानमेवेति संयोगः सूपपन्न इति तात्त्विकं समधि-माह । 6. न लोकानुभवापेतम् । 7. बुद्ध्यपेक्षया दवीयस्त्वमेव नेति साधयति किञ्चेति । 8. अलात-चक्रगतानां क्रमिकाणां देशविशेषसंबन्धिनां संयोगविभागानां वस्तुतो ग्रहणसत्त्वेऽप्यग्रहणाभिमानवत् । 9. तेनार्थेन । यदिति पृथक्पदञ्चेत्, तद्रूपस्य गोचरेणेत्यर्थः । 10. जातिव्यक्त्यात्मके । 11. दध्ना जुहोतीत्यत्र हि दधिहोमोभयविशिष्टभावनान्वयिनो विधेर्दधिरूपे भावनाया अंशे संबन्धः । अत एव हि तदेव विधेयमुच्यते । 12. यदा करणायत्तश्चैतन्यप्रसरः, तदा करणव्यापारोपलक्षित करणयोग्यार्थ-सन्निकर्ष एव चैतन्यस्य, ग्रहणपदार्थ इत्याशयः ।

वायुर्नावमिवाम्भसि' इति । मनुश्च—

'इन्द्रियाणां हि सर्वेषां यद्येकं क्षरतीन्द्रियम् ।
तेनास्य[1] क्षरति प्रज्ञा दृतेः पादादिवोदकम् ॥ २-९९ ॥' इति ।

(चैतन्ये गुणत्वप्रयुक्तपूर्वपक्षनिरासः)

यत्तु[2] गुणश्चैतन्यं गुणिनमपहाय कथमन्यतो यातीति—तदयुक्तम्, प्रहाणानभ्युपगमात् । अप्रहायैवात्मानम् इतस्ततश्चेतना इन्द्रियादिद्वारान्निश्चरति । विच्छिन्नायाश्च तस्याः सन्धानासम्भवः शास्त्र एवोक्तः । दृश्यन्ते च गुणा[3] अपि शब्दगन्धसूर्यालोकरत्नप्रभादयो गतिमन्तः धर्म्यतिवर्तिनश्च । अतिसूक्ष्मो[4] दूरगमनधर्मा भौतिको हि शब्दः ।

(शब्दस्य गुरुमतनित्यत्वविभुत्वगगनीयत्वनिरासः)

[5]ननु नभ इव विभुः शब्दो व्यञ्जकध्वनिवशेन प्रादेशिक इव गत्वर[6] इव चोपलभ्यते । तथाहि-शब्दस्सर्वव्यापी एकद्रव्यवर्तित्वे सति आकाशगुणत्वात् तत्परिमाणवत्—मैवम्, अतद्गुणत्वात् । वायवीयः शब्दः ; तेन नियतसहोत्पत्तिकत्वात् तदीयस्पर्शवत् । यश्च येन द्रव्येण नियतसहोत्पत्तिर्गुणः, स तद्गुण एव, यथा तथाविधाः रूपादयः। नियतसहोत्पत्तिश्च वायुना शब्दः, उभयोरपि भेरीदण्ड-वंशदलनादिसंयोगविभागजत्वनियमात् । [7]उत्पद्यते च शब्दः ; इन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वे सति गुणत्वात् गन्धादिवत् । कृतकश्च ; क्रियोत्तरमेवोपलभ्यत्वात् संयोगादिवत् । न चाभिव्यञ्जकत्वं प्रयत्नादेः कल्प्यम् ; गौरवात् । तत्प्रतीतिकारणत्वकल्पनैव हि लघ्वी । अभिव्यञ्जकाश्चैकदेशावस्थितान्[8] एकेन्द्रियग्राह्यान् युगपदभिव्यञ्जन्ति ; यथा प्रदीपो रूपसंख्यापरिमाणानि [9]करकादींश्चैकप्रदेशवर्तिनः । [10]नचैवं ताल्वादिसंयोग-

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1. अस्य नरस्य तदिन्द्रियद्वारा प्रज्ञा निस्सरति । क्षरतिशब्दो ह्ययं पूर्ववन्निस्सरणार्थक एव । 2. पूर्वकृतं चोद्यं निरस्यति यत्त्विति । 3. गुणत्वमत्यन्तपरतन्त्रत्वम् । तच्चाद्रव्यकतिपयद्रव्यसाधारणम् । तत्राद्रव्ये शब्दादौ, द्रव्ये आलोकादौ च गतिमत्त्वम्, यदीयत्वेनास्य प्रसिद्धिः, तद्धर्म्यनुपलम्भदेशेपि सत्त्वरूपं धर्म्यतिवर्तित्वञ्चानुभविके ; शब्दगन्धयोर्भेरीपुष्पानुपलम्भदेशेपि सत्त्वात् । परन्तु तत्र शब्दगन्धयोरद्रव्यत्वात् गतिमत्त्वदेशान्तरस्थत्वयोस्साक्षादयोगात् द्रव्यद्वारा तत्स्वीकारः। आलोकादेस्तु द्रव्यत्वात् साक्षादेव । प्रकृते चाणोरात्मनो देहान्तरेव स्थितेश्चितेः शब्दादिवद्गुणत्वे गत्याद्यनुपपत्तावप्यालोकादिवद्गुणत्वेष्टौ न कश्चिद्दोष इति भावः । एतदर्थज्ञापनायैतावद्दृष्टान्तकथनम् । 4. ननु कथं शब्दो गुणः ; तथात्वेपि भेरीगुणस्य किन्द्रव्यद्वारा गतिमत्त्वादि सूपपादमित्यत्राऽऽरभते अतीति । भेर्यादिजनितो वायुगुणः शब्दो वायुद्वारैव गत्यादिमानिति विशिष्टार्थः । 5. पूर्ववाक्येन शब्दस्य भाट्टमतनित्यविभुद्रव्यत्वनिरासं सूचयित्वा गुरुमतं गगनगुणत्वे सति नित्यविभुत्वं निरसितुमाह । 6. नभोगुणतया द्रव्यद्वारापि गत्युपपादनायोगादेवमुक्तम् । 7. असिद्धिपरिहाराय हेतुघटकमुत्पत्त्यंशं साधयति । कृतकः क्रियाजन्यः। 8. मिथस्समानाधिकरणान् । 9. कमण्डल्वादीन् । 10. कादिव्य-

विभागजनितपवन इति नासौ व्यञ्जकः ।

नित्यत्ववादिनः [1]शब्दा निर्भागव्योगमवर्तिनः ।
श्रावणाश्चेत्यभिव्यक्तिनियमे नास्ति कारणम् ॥ ३५ ॥
देशैक्ये ग्राहकैक्ये च व्यञ्जकैक्यं हि दर्शितम् ।
तदभावात् प्रयत्नोत्थमारुतः कारणं [2]ध्वनेः ॥ ३६ ॥
अत एव च नानात्वं प्रत्युच्चारणमिष्यताम् ।
कृतस्य करणायोगात् हेतुपौष्कल्यभेदतः ॥ ३७ ॥
किंचोदात्तानुदात्तत्वदीर्घत्वह्रस्वतादयः ।
गादिस्था युगपद्भान्तो न भिन्द्युः स्वाश्रयान् कथम् ॥ ३८ ॥
स्थानैक्यायातसादृश्यात् प्रत्यभिज्ञाऽपि नैक्यतः ।
प्रदीपप्रत्यभिज्ञेव ज्ञापिता भेदहेतवः ॥ ३९ ॥

(विना संबन्धं व्यवहारानुगुण्यवादः प्राभाकरीयः)

[3]नन्वेवं चैतन्यसंयोगः संयोगजो वा कश्चित् प्रकाशः प्राप्तः। उभयमपि तत् न चैतन्ये संभवति ; भेदाषेक्षत्वात् संबन्धस्य । आत्मनोऽपि न चैतन्येन संयोगः ; तद्धर्मित्वात् । न हि धर्मधर्मिणोः संबन्धः संयोगः । समवायो हि सः, अयुतसिद्धसंबन्धत्वात् । संयोगस्तु पृथक्सिद्धयोर्द्रव्ययोः क्रियानिमित्ता प्राप्तिः, [4]अकार्यकारणयोर्वा तयोर्निरन्तरस्थितिः । चैतन्यसंयोगसमवाययोरन्यतरस्य, संबन्धमात्रस्य वा प्रकाशत्वे ज्ञातृज्ञानज्ञेयशरीरेन्द्रियेष्वव्याप्त्यतिव्याप्ती यथायोगमादर्शयितव्ये । तत्त्वान्तर[5]प्रकाशाभ्युपगमस्त्वनुपलब्धिबाधितो न दूषणान्तरं प्रयोजयति । अतो [6]यद्व्यवहारोदयानुगुणं ज्ञानम् , तत् प्रकाशत इत्येवाभ्युपगमो युक्तः। [7]त्रितयव्यवहारानुगुण्यं संविदस्तु स्वभाव इति अपर्यनुयोज्यं निमित्तवैरूप्यम् । न हि स्वभावाः पर्यनुयोगमर्हन्ति । एवञ्चेत् सं(श्चैतत्सं ?) योगसमवायविरहिणोऽपि पदार्थस्य निमित्त[8]भेदानुसारेण व्यवहारहेतुस्संविदिति युक्तमाश्रयितुम् ।

ज्ञकेन गाद्यव्यञ्जनात् । 1. प्राभाकरस्य । 2. शब्दसामान्यं ध्वनिः । 3 एतावता प्रयत्नादेरनभिव्यञ्जकत्वादुत्पादकत्वात् वायुगुणः शब्दस्तद्द्वारैव गत्यादिमानिति सिद्धं शब्दसूर्यालोकादिनयाच्चैतन्यस्य गत्यादिमत्त्वमिति ज्ञानार्थयोस्संबन्धो निराबाध इत्युपपादितम् । एवमर्थविषये उक्तस्य संबन्धस्य वित्तौ वेदितरि च दुर्वचतया संबन्धस्वीकारेऽपि वैरूप्यमस्त्येवेति संबन्धं विना स्वभावत एव प्रतिनियतप्रकाशकत्वं वित्तेरस्त्विति प्राभाकरः शङ्कते नन्विति । 4. अवयवावयविभिन्नद्रव्ययोः ; विभुनोः । 5. प्राक्ठ्यमेव तत्त्वान्तरम् । 6. यस्य वस्तुनो व्यवहारेत्यर्थः । तत् वस्तु । 7. नन्वानुगुण्यमेव केन निमित्तेनेत्यत्राह त्रितयेति । 8. घटवित्तेः पटव्यवहाराजनकत्वं कुत इत्यत इदमुक्तम् ।

(तदुक्तप्रकारानुपपत्तिः)

उच्यते । उक्तमत्र न निमित्तकारणमनुरुध्य कार्यं स्वकार्यमारभत इति । व्यवहारानुगुणसंवेदनत्वेऽपि [1]प्रकाशपदार्थे प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ति (निमित्त ?) भेदो दुष्परिहर एव । बहुव्रीहिसमासाश्रयणे संविदन्तराभावेन तस्यां तदभावप्रसङ्गात् । कर्मधारयाश्रयणे ज्ञातृज्ञेययोरसंवेदनत्वेनाप्रकाशप्रसङ्गः ; व्यवहारोदयानुगुण्यश्च व्यवहारतोऽवगन्तव्यम् ; ततः प्रागेव च भवति [2]विदितत्वप्रतीतिः व्या(व्यव)हारश्च ।

(सिद्धान्तसंमतः प्रकाशपदार्थः)

यद्येवं, कस्तर्हि 'प्रकाशते'पदार्थः । न हि निरवद्यमेकरूपं ज्ञातृज्ञेयज्ञानानुगतं तदुपलभामहे-उच्यते-नूनं भवानश्रुतपूर्वी प्रथमाधिकरणस्य[3] न्यायतत्त्वे । अभिहितं हि तत्रेदमनुभवे स्मृतिमुपपादयद्भिः, 'अनुभवादूरत्वं स्मृतिनिमित्तम्' इति । [4]एतदुक्तं भवति—संविददूरत्वं प्रकाश इति । (अदूरविकल्पेन दूषणं तत्परिहारश्च)

आह—किमिदमदूर इति ? दूरादन्यस्तद्विरुद्धस्तदभावो[5] वा ? तथा विशेषणमुपलक्षणं वा, सदूर इति ? विशेषणत्वे पक्षत्रयेऽपि नियमेन संवेदनदूरत्वानुसंधानपूर्विकया प्रकाश इति प्रतीत्या भवितव्यम् । न च तथाऽस्ति । उपलक्षणत्वे [6]स्वरूपान्तरं वाच्यम् । न च तदवगम्यत इत्युक्तम्—उच्यते । अलमस्थाने संभ्रमेण ।

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1. तादृशसंवेदनत्वं प्रकाशः ; तद्वत्त्वं प्रकाशमानत्वम् । 2. विदितत्वं वित्त्यधीनव्यवहनुरार्हत्वमिति मते हीदं द्वयं न घटते । सिद्धान्ते तु वित्तिसंयुक्तत्वं विदितत्वमिति न दोषः । 3. ना 'क्तस्येन्विषयस्य कर्मण्युपसंख्यानम्' इति वार्तिकप्रवृत्तौ 'प्रथमाधिकरणे' इति सप्तमी स्यात् । पूर्वशब्दश्रवणात् 'इष्टादिभ्यश्च' इत्येतदप्रसक्त्या क्तान्तस्येन्प्रकृतित्वाभावात् तदप्रवृत्तौ च 'कर्तृकर्मणोः कृति' इति कृद्ग्रहणात् 'सपूर्वाच्च' इति विहिततद्धितान्तेऽत्र षष्ठी न स्यात्, किन्तु 'कृतपूर्वी कटम्' इतिवत् द्वितीयैवेति कथं षष्ठी ? उच्यते-कृतीत्यस्य कृदर्थोपसर्जनीभूतक्रियान्वये इत्यर्थः ; न तु वृत्त्यनन्तर्गतकृदन्तयोग इत्यर्थः, भक्ष्याणां पाकशालेत्यादौ षष्ठ्यनापत्त्या द्वितीयापत्तेः । पृथक्प्रयोगार्हकृदन्तयोगे इत्यर्थोऽपि न ; कृतपूर्वमिति भावविवक्षया पृथगप्रयोगे मानाभावेन कटमिति द्वितीयानापत्तेः । अत इह कृदर्थोपसर्जनक्रियान्वयविवक्षया षष्ठी । तद्धितार्थोपसर्जनक्रियान्वये तु न षष्ठी । सा च क्रिया कृदाद्युपात्ता, तद्धितलक्षिता वेत्यन्यदेतत् । अतः षष्ठीद्वितीयान्तप्रयोगद्वयोपपत्तिः । किञ्चेह शेषषष्ठ्या न कश्चिदपवाद इति निरवद्यम् । 4. स्मृतेरनुभूतानुभवोभयगोचरत्वात् तैरुक्तमदूरत्वरूपनिमित्तमुभयसाधारणमभिमतमिति स्वसिद्धेपि संविददूरत्वरूपप्रकाशस्तत्रेष्ट इति सिद्ध्यतीति । 5. 'तदन्य तद्विरुद्धतदभावेषु नञ्' इति स्मृतिः । 6. ज्ञाप्यबहिर्भूतस्यैवोपलक्षणतया, ज्ञाप्यस्य प्रकाशस्य प्रतीतौ दूरविरोधित्वादिरूपस्याविषयत्वे उपलक्ष्येण रूपान्तरेणैव प्रकाशस्य विषयत्वं वाच्यमिति भावः ।

[1]भवत्वनुभवादूरं दूरादन्यत् विरोधि वा ।
तद्भावश्च प्रकाशत्वं (शोऽत्र) किमत्र बहु जल्प्यते ॥ ४० ॥

[2]प्रकाशत इति प्रतिभासोऽपि बुद्धिविप्रकर्षप्रत्यनीकबोधतत्संसृष्टपदार्थस्वरूपविमर्श एव, बाह्यप्रकाशवत् । तत्रापि ह्यालोके तद्व्याप्तभूभागादौ च प्रकटादिप्रख्योपाख्ये आलोकादूरत्वनिमित्ते । यथा च तत्र तन्निमित्ता सन्तमसनिवृत्तिः, एवमिहापि ज्ञानादूरत्वनिमित्ता अज्ञाननिवृत्तिः । अत एव चानुभूते अनुभवे चोत्तरकाल (लं ?) तुल्यवत्स्मरणम् ।

(संबन्धविशेषनिष्कर्षः)

[3]एवंच चैतन्यसंबन्धविशेषविषयविकल्पोऽप्यलब्धावकाश इति निरनुयोज्यानुयोग एव । नैरन्तर्यपदपर्यायमत्यन्तसामीप्यमात्रञ्च संयोगः । स एव परतन्त्राश्रितः समवायपदपरिभाषाभूमिर्वैशेषिकाणामिति नार्थान्तरत्वमूरी(मुरी)कृत्य विकल्पः संभवति । [4]यथा च

1. घटादिकमनुभवादूरमित्यत्राभावरूपार्थपक्षेऽनन्वयात् तमुपेक्ष्याऽऽह ॥ 'प्रकाशत्वं प्रकाशमानत्वम् । प्रकाशोऽत्रेति पाठस्समीचीनः' इति न्यायसिद्धाञ्जनव्याख्या । 2 विशेषणत्वे न किञ्चिद्बाधकम्। स्वरूपत्वात् उपलक्षणत्वेपि प्रकाशमानवस्तुस्वरूपमेव रूपान्तरमिति भावः। 3. अदूरत्वमप्यन्ततः किं संयोगः समवायो वा, भावातिरिक्ताभावाभावादित्यत्राह एवञ्चेति । 4. रूपरूप्यादौ स्वरूपमेव संबन्धः। पृथक्स्थितयोर्द्रव्ययोः संयोगो द्रव्यातिरिक्तः क्लृप्तः । तदत्रापृथक्सिद्धयोर्द्रव्ययोश्शरीरात्मभूतयोरन्यादृशयोर्वा संबन्धः स्वरूपं वा संयोगो वेति विमर्शे धर्म्यतिरिक्तसंबन्धानर्हे अद्रव्ये स्वरसतो नैरन्तर्यबुद्ध्यभावात् द्रव्ये च भावाद्विभुद्रव्यसंयोगवत् संयोगः स्वीकारमर्हति । अतो ज्ञानज्ञात्रोरप्यस्तु संयोगः। वैशेषिकास्त्वेवमपृथक्सिद्धद्रव्यसंबन्धं समवायं परिभाषमाणास्तुल्यनयात् परतन्त्रस्थले सर्वत्र समवायमकल्पयन् । वस्तुतोऽद्रव्ये स्वरूपातिरिक्तसंबन्धाभावात् समवायः परतन्त्रद्रव्यसंयोग एवेति। एवञ्च संविददूरत्वमनुयोगित्वप्रतियोगित्वान्यतरसंबन्धेन संवित्संयोगवत्त्वम् । इदं संविद्यप्यक्षतम् । अस्य च संयोगस्य नियमेन ज्ञानभास्यत्वात्, अहं जानामि, ज्ञातोऽयमर्थ इति विशिष्टव्यवहार इति ॥ 1. ननु-ईदृशज्ञानसंबन्धस्य प्रकाशपदार्थत्वे संबन्धस्य संबन्ध्यधीनतयाऽऽत्मप्रकाशस्य ज्ञानाधीनत्वापत्तिः । किञ्च ज्ञानपदेन अवस्थापन्नज्ञानग्रहणे स्वापे आत्मनोऽप्रकाशापत्तिः । सामान्यतो ज्ञानद्रव्यग्रहणे स्वापेपि धर्मभूतज्ञानप्रकाशापत्तिः । न चेष्टापत्तिः ; अद्वैतनिरसनावसरे तदा संविदप्रकाशस्योक्तत्वात् । विषयप्रकाशनवेलायामिति च भाष्यम् । एवं ज्ञानस्य कृत्स्नदेहादिव्यापितया तत्सर्वांशप्रकाशापत्तिः ; संयुक्ताश्रितत्वरूपसंबन्धबलात् रूपादेरिव सर्वात्मधर्मप्रकाशापत्तिश्च । अतो नायं प्रकाशपदार्थः-इत्याशङ्कायाम्—प्रकाशपदं व्यवहारक्षमत्वार्थकमेवास्तु । स चोक्तानुमानादिवशादात्मनि स्वतः ; अवस्थाविशेषविशिष्टज्ञानमात्रे स्वरूप-आत्मसंबन्धोभयबलात् ; घटादौ तु ज्ञानादूरत्वप्रयुक्तः, अन्यथा विषयनियमायोगात् । अदूरत्वे सत्यपि क्वचित् तादृशप्रकाशाभावः प्रतिबन्धादिना । एवञ्च घटमहं जानामीत्यादाववस्थापन्नज्ञानक्रियाजन्यसंयोगरूपफलाश्रयत्वादेव कर्मत्वम् । आत्मनि तु न तादृशक्रियाजन्यः संयोगः, किन्तु नित्यः । अनुमानादिनाऽऽत्मग्रहणे च प्रसरणावस्थज्ञानेन जन्योऽपि

[4]संयोगान्तर्भावः समवायस्य, तथा संबन्धविमर्शे दर्शयिष्यामः ॥ [1]ज्ञानादूरत्वप्रयुक्तो व्यवहारक्षमतालक्षणो वा परः (?) प्रकाशः । स च सत्यपि स्वनिमित्तपौष्कल्ये प्रतिबन्धात् योग्यताविरहाद्वा व्यापित्वासंगित्वाद्यात्मधर्मान्तरेषु देहेन्द्रियादौ च न संजायते, चक्षुस्सन्निकृष्ट इव कालिन्दीपयसि [2]रूपरसादयः (दिषु ?) ।

अतो [3]यथोक्तनीत्याऽऽत्मा स्वतश्चैतन्यविग्रहः ।
हा (भा ?) (ज्ञा ?) नस्वभाव एवान्यत् करणैः प्रतिपद्यते ॥ ४१ ॥

(पूर्वपक्ष्युक्तसुखादिदृष्टान्तप्रतिक्षेपः)

यत्तु सुखादिनिदर्शनेनाऽऽत्मविशेषगुणतया चितेरागन्तुकत्वमापादितम्, तदपि गुणवृत्तापरिज्ञानेन ; यतः—

स्वरूपोपाधयो धर्मा यावदाश्रयभाविनः ।
नैवं[4] सुखादि बोधस्तु स्वरूपोपाधिरात्मनः ॥ ४२ ॥

यथा च बोधोपाधिरात्मभावः, तथोपपादितम् । सुखदुःखे च (चा) नात्मधर्मौ, इन्द्रियसौष्ठवनाशयोरेव तद्भावोपपादनात् ; [5]व्याकरिष्यते चैतत् अन्तिमपदार्थसमर्थनावसर

स इष्यते । अवस्थाविशेषेत्युक्त्या न तदनापन्नज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वाद्यापत्तिरित्याद्याशय्याह **ज्ञाने**ति । ज्ञानं प्रति अदूरत्वं व्यवधायकराहित्यम् । तत् कार्यैकोन्नेयं पूर्वकर्माधीनम् । अत एव दूरस्थस्य ग्रहणेऽपि मध्यगतस्याग्रहणम् । अत्र पूर्वं **वर**मिति स्थाने **पर**मिति, अत्र पर इति च दर्शनादुत्कृष्टार्थको वरशब्दतुल्यः परशब्दः स्यात् । सर्वानुगत इत्यर्थको वेह ; परजातिरितिवत् । अन्यार्थ एव वा ; तदा **परो वा ज्ञानादूरत्वेत्येवं** योजना । 2. वास्तवशुक्लरूपेत्यर्थः ; चक्षुषा नीलस्य ग्रहणात् । 3 प्रकाशनित्यत्वस्वाभाविकत्वसाधकप्रयोगद्वयेन । उत्तरार्धान्वये तु स्वरूपोपाधिधर्मत्वरूपोक्तहेतुनेत्यर्थः। विग्रहशब्दस्वारस्यात् पूर्वं चैतन्यस्वरूपत्वोक्त्यवगमात् स्वभावपदबलेन च धर्मभूतज्ञानाविवक्षाप्रतीतेर्**ज्ञाने**ति पठनं युक्तम् । 4. सुखादि न स्वरूपोपाधिभूतमित्यर्थः । 5. ननु स्वतस्सुखीत्यात्मनि सुखमुक्तवता कथमनात्मधर्मत्वमुच्यत इत्यत्राह **व्ये**ति । अयं भावः—तत्रात्मगतस्वाभाविकानुकूल्यप्रकाशरूपं सुखमात्मनीष्टम् । भवदुक्तसुखदुःखयोश्च नात्मस्वरूपप्रयुक्तत्वम्, प्रकृतिसंसर्गकृतकर्ममूलत्वात् । न च भगवद्विभूतित्वप्रयुक्तं वास्तवमानुकूल्यं प्रकाशते ; किन्तु सौन्दर्यादिकृतं कल्पितमिति सुखस्य दुःखात् अविशेषः । एतावता साधनवैकल्यं कथमिति चेत्—अत्रायमर्थः — स्वतस्सुखीत्यात्मनि सुखं वक्ष्यते । ग्रन्थारम्भे च आनुकूल्यप्रतिलब्धानन्दसुखादिव्यपदेशबोधविशेष एवेति सुखस्य ज्ञानरूपत्वमुक्तम् । तुल्यनयात् प्रतिकूलं ज्ञानं दुःखमिति च सिद्धम् । अतो घटादिज्ञानस्येवानयोरपि चितिरूपतया दृष्टान्तत्व मेवासिद्धम् । सर्वत्रावस्थांशे आगन्तुकत्वस्याविशिष्टत्वात् चितिशब्दवाच्यविशेष्यांश एव तद्वार्यते । तदेतद्दृष्टान्तासिद्धिपरिहाराय ज्ञानातिरिक्तसुखदुःखयोरेव त्वयेहोपादानं वाच्यम् । यद्येवं ज्ञानातिरिक्ते सुखदुःखपदप्रसिद्धिर्मन्यते, तर्हि श्रुत्यादिविरोधितार्किकादिप्रसिद्धेरुपेक्ष्यतया इन्द्रियसौष्ठवादिकमेव सुखादीति ।

इति साधनविकलता च निदर्शनस्य । रागद्वेषादयोऽपि मनोवस्थाविशेषाः न साक्षादात्मगुणाः । विज्ञायते हि, 'कामः संकल्पो विचिकित्सा श्रद्धाऽश्रद्धा धृतिरधृतिर्ह्रीर्धीर्भीरित्येतत् सर्वं मन एव' इति । गीयते च, 'इच्छा द्वेषस्सुखं दुःखम्' इति ।

(सिद्धान्तिमतं शरीरलक्षणम्)

"[1]चेतनाधृतिः" इति क्षेत्रलक्षणमैकपद्येन । चेतनया ध्रियमाणः संघातो हि देहः । स्ववृत्त्य(धृत्य ?)नुगुणचैतन्यमात्रादेव प्रवर्तमानं क्षेत्रमिति यावत् । अत एव ह्यन्तर्यामिब्राह्मणे, 'यस्य पृथिवी शरीरं' ; 'यस्याप्शरीरं' ; 'यस्यात्मा शरीरम्' इत्यादिनिर्देशः। "तानि सर्वाणि तद्वपुः" इति च पुराणे ।

(श्रुत्यन्तरविरोधादेतद्धीशब्दस्यार्थान्तरपरत्वम्)

किमिदं धीरिति ? उत्प्रेक्षाभिप्रायं तत् ; न ज्ञप्तिविषयम् ; तस्याः स्वाभाविकत्वस्य तस्यामेव श्रुतौ श्रूयमाणत्वात् । श्रूयते हि, 'न विज्ञातुर्विज्ञातेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते' इति, 'न हि द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते, अविनाशित्वात्' इति च । ज्ञातुरविनाशित्वादेव ज्ञानस्याविनाशमुपपादयन्तीयं श्रुतिर्ज्ञातुस्स्वरूपप्रयुक्तं ज्ञानमिति दर्शयति । न च [2]दृष्टिविशेषणतया द्रष्टुरुपादानमिति सांप्रतम् ; पुंल्लिङ्गनिर्देशविरोधात् । हेतोश्च साध्यसमत्वापत्तेः। द्रष्टुः स्वरूपनिर्देशपरत्वेपि दृष्टिपदस्य, असमाधेयमहेतुत्वम् ; [3]स्वपक्षहानिश्च । आत्मनस्तु नित्यत्वमप्रचाल्यम(ल्या)नेकन्यायागमसिद्धं युक्तं हेतुतया व्यपदेष्टुम् । न हि सति पदार्थे तत्स्वरूपोपाधयो न भवितुमर्हन्ति, सति कनक इव पेङ्गल्यम्, प्रभेव च प्रदीपे । तेनायमर्थः—आत्मस्वभावभूतायाश्चितेर्बाह्याभ्यन्तरविषयविशेषसंबन्धप्रकारप्राप्तदृष्टिघातिरसयतिवक्ति[4]श्रुतिमतिस्पृष्टिविज्ञातिव्यपदेशभेदायाः स्वात्मावभासिन्याः संसारापवर्गावस्थयोर्न जातुचिद्विपरिलोपो विद्यत इति । 'स यथा सैन्धवघनोऽनन्तरोऽबाह्यः

एवं रागादिकमपि ज्ञानातिरिक्तं त्वया निदर्श्यमानं मनोगुण एवेति । इदमुक्तं भवति–प्राकृतं सुखदुःखेच्छादिकं मुक्तिकालासंभवि ; अत एवात्मस्वरूपाप्रयुक्तं नात्मविशेषगुणः। आत्मनि तत्तद्वत्ताव्यवहारस्तु तत्तद्गोचरज्ञानविशेषस्यापि तत्तच्छब्दार्थत्वविवक्षया । स्वरूपप्रयुक्तं तु मुक्तिकालभावि इच्छासुखादिकं केवलज्ञानावस्थाविशेष एव । अत एव द्विविधेप्यर्थे सुखादिपदशक्तौ मानाभावादत्रत्यं सुखादिपदं पूर्वोक्तधीपदनयेन नेयार्थम् । एवमपि ज्ञानातिरिक्तसुखादिपदार्थाऽऽग्रहे श्रुत्याद्यनुसारिणीत्थमेव व्यवस्थेति ।

1. एवं सुखादेः क्षेत्रान्तर्भाववचनादनात्मधर्मत्वे अत एव चेतनारूपपक्षेपि हेत्वसिद्धिस्स्यादित्यत्र **चेतनाधृतिरिति** समस्तमेकं पदमन्यार्थकमित्याह । 2. द्रष्टात्मिका दृष्टिरिति दृष्टिपदस्यात्मपरत्वं निरस्यति **नचेति** । 3. तार्किकादिमते आत्मनो जडत्वात् ; अद्वैतिमते चाहमर्थस्य विनाशित्वात् । 4. **वक्तिरिह** शाब्दबोधः । **श्रुतिः** शब्दग्रहणम् ।

कृत्स्नो रसघन एव, एवं वा अरे अयमात्मा अनन्तरोऽबाह्यः कृत्स्नः प्रज्ञानघनः,' तथा, 'स्वेन भासा स्वेन ज्योतिषा', 'आत्मज्योतिस्सम्राडिति होवाच' इति। तथाऽपवर्गदशायामेवच्छन्दोगाः, 'न पश्यो मृत्युं पश्यति, न रोगं नोत दुःखताम्। सर्वं ह पश्यः पश्यति' [इति?], 'नोपजनं स्मरन्' इति; 'स वा एष एतेन दैवेन चक्षुषा मनसैतान् कामान् पश्यन् रमते' इति च। अन्याश्च, 'जानात्येवायं पुरुषः; ज्ञातव्यं तु न वेद' इत्याद्याः सकलकरणोपरमदशायामप्यात्मनः प्रबोधमभिदधानाः श्रुतयो बोधस्वभावतामस्य द्रढयन्ति। 'निर्वाणमय एवाय(ह)मात्मा ज्ञानमयोऽमलः' इत्यादि च पुराणे। 'ज्योतिषामपि तज्ज्योतिः' इत्यादि इतिहासे। भगवान् शौनकश्च—

"यथा न क्रियते ज्योत्स्ना मलप्रक्षालनान्मणेः।
दोषप्रहाणान्न ज्ञानमात्मनः क्रियते तथा॥
यथोदपानकरणात् क्रियते न जलाम्बरम्।
सदेव नीयते व्यक्तिमसतस्सम्भवः कुतः॥
तथा हेयगुणध्वंसादवबोधादयो गुणाः।
प्रकाश्यन्ते न जन्यन्ते नित्या एवात्मनो हि ते॥" इति॥

अत एव हि सूत्रकारश्च, 'ज्ञोऽत एव' इति॥

(अनित्यगोचरनिश्चयसंशयादिव्यवहारनिर्वाहः)

[1]तदेवमात्मस्वभावभूतस्य चैतन्यस्य विषयसंश्लेषविशेषेषु निश्चयसंशयादिव्यवहारभेदः, [2]तत्तद्विशेषभाजि चैतन्ये वा। चैतन्यस्य विषयेण दृढसंयोगो हि निश्चयः; तस्यैव बहुभिर्युगपद्दृढसंयोगः संशयः, ज्ञानवासनानुसारेण संश्लेषः स्मरणमित्यादिः। उक्तश्च 'आत्मधर्मस्य चैतन्यस्य विषयेण संयोगो ज्ञानमित्युच्यते' इति। नचैवं[3] संयोगस्योभयाश्रितत्वेन विषयस्यापि ज्ञातृत्वप्रसंगः; विषयेण[4] संयोगाभावात्। चैतन्येन हि तस्य संयोगः; [5]बाह्यप्रकाशवत्। यथा खल्वालोकसम्बन्धेऽपि प्रकाशे सूर्यादेरेव प्रकाशकत्वम्, न घटादेः। अथ सूर्यादितन्त्रत्वादालोकस्य स एव तद्धर्मी तत्सम्बन्धेनार्थान्तरस्य प्रकाश [क] इत्युच्यते, इहापि तर्हि चैतन्यस्यात्मधर्मत्वात् तेनार्थान्तरं स्पृशन् स एव जानातीत्युपपद्यते॥

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1. तदेवं पूर्वार्धं विवृत्य नानापदार्थसंसर्गादित्युत्तरार्धं विवृणोति। अनेन पूर्वपक्ष्युक्तः इन्द्रियलिङ्गादेर्ज्ञापकत्वायोगो वारितः। 2. अयमेव सिद्धान्तः, घटादिपदस्येव निश्चयादिपदस्यावस्थाविशेषापन्नधर्मिपर्यन्ते प्रसिद्धेः। 3. एवं—संयोग एव निश्चयादिरिति पक्षे। 4. न हि स्वनिरूपितस्संयोगस्स्वस्मिन्निति भावः। 5. धर्मभूतज्ञानस्य ज्ञातृत्वापत्तिमात्मनस्तदनापत्तिञ्च वारयितुं दृष्टान्तमाह। प्रकाशस्याऽऽन्तरस्य बाह्यो दृष्टान्तः। जानातीति व्यवहारः प्रकाशयतीति व्यवहारेण तुल्यः, न तु प्रकाशत इत्यनेनेति भावः। अनेन पूर्वपक्ष्युक्तोऽनुभवविरोधोऽपि शमितः।

तत् सिद्धं चैतन्यस्वभाव एवायमात्मा आत्मानं विदन्नेवास्ते ; अन्यत्तु निमित्तभेदानुसारेण जानाति, न जानाति चेति ।

(स्वप्रकाशेऽप्यात्मन्यागमाद्यावश्यकता)

तदेवं चैतन्यस्वभावः परिस्फुरन्नप्ययमात्मा गम्भीरजलाशयचरमीनवत् जलसंसृष्टक्षीरवच्च न विविच्य स्फुटं चकास्तीति तदुपपादनन्यायानुगताः पूर्वानुमानभेदाः वचनानि चान्द्रियन्ते । तैरप्ययपरितुष्यन्तो यमनियमादियोगाङ्गानुष्ठानक्षपिताशुद्ध्यावरणमलाः निरोधाभ्यासपुटपाकनिर्धूतरजस्तमःकलङ्कसत्त्वोद्रेकसमुत्थ[1]स्वेतरसकलविषयवैलक्षण्यापरोक्ष[2]ज्ञानाय प्रयतन्ते । भावनाप्रकर्षपर्यन्ते चापरोक्षज्ञानमुदयत इति सर्ववादिनिर्विवादमिति न तदुपपादनायाद्य प्रयत्यते ।

एवमात्मा स्वतस्सिध्यन् आगमेनानुमानतः ।
योगाभ्यासभुवा स्पष्टं प्रत्यक्षेण प्रकाश्यते ॥ ४३ ॥

(आत्मनित्यत्वसाधनारम्भः)

अथास्य कालावच्छेदपरीक्षा । (क्षणिकत्वशङ्का)

[3]तत्र सुगतमतानुसारिणः सन्मात्रानुबन्धिनीं क्षणिकतामाचक्षाणा नित्यात्मदर्शनमेव सर्वानर्थमूलं मन्यमानाः क्षणभङ्गिनमेनं संगिरन्ते, यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकम् ; संश्चायमात्मेति ॥ कथं पुनः सन्मात्रानुबन्धिनी क्षणिकता ॥ अक्षणिकस्य सत्तानुपपत्तेः। यन्न कस्मैचित् कार्याय, अन्ततः सार्वज्ञ्यविज्ञानगोचरत्वायापि न प्रभवति—न तस्य सद्भावः संभाव्यत इत्यर्थक्रियाकारितैव सत्ता भावानाम् । न च सा स्वव्यापकभूतक्रमयौगपद्यविरहिण्यक्षणिके संभविनीति अन्यत्र निरवकाशतया क्षणिकतयैवानुबध्यते[4] ॥ कथं पुनः क्रमयौगपद्ययोरर्थक्रियाव्यापकत्वम् ? कथं वा तयोरक्षणिकान्निवृत्तिः ? श्रूयताम्—

[5]अर्थक्रियासु भावानां कर्तृत्वस्य द्वयी गतिः। क्रमेण युगपद्वेति न विधान्तरसंभवः ॥ ४४ ॥

[6]भावाभाववत् अनयोरन्यतरनिवृत्तावन्यतरव्यवस्थानादर्थक्रियाजनने भावानां न तृतीयप्रकारसंभव इति क्रमाक्रमप्रतिबद्धैवार्थक्रिया । [7]न चाक्षणिके क्रमयौगपद्ये संभवतः[8] ॥ श्रीः ॥

.... ❋÷❋÷❋ ....

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1. स्वशब्दः प्रयतमानात्मपरः । 2. वैलक्षण्यस्यापरोक्षज्ञानायेति विग्रहः । 3. एतावता 'देहेन्द्रियमनःप्राणधीभ्योऽन्योऽनन्यसाधनः' इति विवृतम् ; अथोत्तरार्धे प्रथमनिर्दिष्टं नित्यत्वं परीक्षितुमारभ्य प्रागुक्तकल्पेषु प्रथमं सौगतपक्षं प्रस्तौति । 4. क्षणिकत्वव्याप्या भवतीत्यर्थः । क्षणिकत्वव्याप्यव्याप्यतया तद्व्याप्यत्वम् । 5. प्रथमप्रश्नं समाधत्ते । 6. घट-घटाभावादिवत् । तदुक्तम् 'परस्परविरोधे हि न प्रकारान्तरस्थितिः' (न्या०.कु० ३) इति । 7. द्वितीयं प्रश्नं समाधातुमाह ॥

8. अत्रात्मसिद्धिग्रन्थेपि ग्रन्थान्तरवत् विनष्ट एव भागोऽधिकः ; प्रतिज्ञातबह्वर्थप्रथमांशैकदेशगोचरत्वादुपलभ्यमानस्येति ॥ श्रीगुरुभ्यो नमः ।

॥ श्रीः ॥

श्री भगवद्यामुनमुनये नमः

ईश्वरसिद्धिः

[1]तत्र कस्यचिदेकस्य वशे विश्वं प्रवर्तते ।

इति साधयितुं पूर्वं पूर्वपक्षं प्रचक्ष्महे ॥ १ ॥

तत्र मीमांसकाः प्राहुः—नायं सर्वार्थदर्शनशक्तिसंपन्नः पुरुषोऽभ्युपगमर्हति ; अतिपाततसकलसाधकप्रमाणसंभावनाभूमित्वात्, [2]स्फुटविविधबाधकत्वाच्च । तथाहि—अस्य प्रत्यक्षमन्यद्वा साधकं भवेत् ; प्रत्यक्षमपि लौकिकं यौगिकं वा ।

(लौकिकप्रत्यक्षस्येश्वरासाधकत्वम्)

व्यवस्थितमितस्त्वार्थं[3] न तावदिह लौकिकम् ।

॥ श्रीः ॥

श्रीमते रङ्गरामानुजमहादेशिकाय नमः

गूढप्रकाशः

1. अयं ग्रन्थ आत्मचिन्ताग्रन्थादर्वाचीनः, न संवित्सिद्धिवत् प्राचीनः, अत्र 'देहान्तरप्रापक....उपपादितमात्मचिन्तायाम्' इति वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् । अत्रात्मसिद्धावित्यनुक्त्वा आत्मचिन्तायामित्युक्तिरस्य ग्रन्थस्यात्मसिद्ध्यन्तर्गतत्वपक्षमुपष्टम्भनातीव । निर्विवादपारम्परिकप्रसिद्धिप्रामाण्यात्त्वयं ततोऽन्य एव ग्रन्थः। करिष्यमाणैतदीश्वरसिद्धिग्रन्थविवक्षितार्थस्येत एव द्रष्टव्यतामुपदिश्य अभिसंधाय वाऽन्यांशमात्रचिन्तनेन तं ग्रन्थं समाप्य संगृहीतांशविशेषे विस्तरायायं ग्रन्थ इति पक्षान्तरञ्च प्रागेवावाचि । मन्ये इष्टसिद्धि-नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धि-ब्रह्मसिद्धिरूपप्राक्तनाद्वैतग्रन्थत्रयप्रतिभटभूतमिदं सिद्धित्रयमिति । आस्तामेतत् । अत्र मङ्गलश्लोकाभावात् अथेत्यादिपदं विना तत्रेतिप्रयोगाच्चैतद्ग्रन्थोपक्रमभागोऽपि कश्चिन्नष्टस्स्यात् । अत्र **'पूर्वपक्षं प्रचक्ष्महे'**, इत्युपक्रान्तपूर्वपक्षसमाप्तिः **अत्रब्रूम** इति कारिकातःप्रागेव चेत्-ईश्वरस्यानुमानिकत्वं सिद्धान्तितं भवेत् । **श्रीभाष्य**शास्त्रयोनित्वाधिकरणे त्वयमीश्वरसिद्धिग्रन्थभागःस्पष्टमक्षरशोऽपि पूर्वपक्षमध्ये निक्षिप्त इति, तत्रत्यसिद्धान्तग्रन्थोऽप्येतत्सिद्धान्तभागसंग्रह इत्यवसीयते । अत्रापि मीमांसकेन, 'तत्खल्वनुमानमागमो वे'त्यागमोपि विकल्पमध्ये प्रवेशितः । न च, **अत्रब्रूम** इत्यतः प्राक्तदुपपादनमस्ति । अतः प्रथमं सर्वप्रमाणविरहप्रतिज्ञापूर्वकं मीमांसकेन प्रत्यक्षस्यासाधनत्वोक्तिः, तार्किकेणानुमानप्रस्तावः, मीमांसकेन तद्दूषणम्' पुनस्तार्किकेण अत्र ब्रूम इति तत्प्रतिविधानम्, भूयो मीमांसकादिना तन्निरास आगमनिरासश्च, अथागमप्रामाण्यग्रन्थवदिहापि श्रौतीमीश्वरसिद्धिमादृत्यानुमानप्रत्यक्षयोः पश्चादवसरवर्णनमिति रीतिर्विभाव्यते । **प्राभाकारा** अपीश्वरानुमानिकतामेव निराकुर्वन्ति । उक्तञ्च **प्रभाकरविजये**, 'आनुमानिकत्वमेवेश्वरस्य निराकृतम्....तत्समर्थनञ्च वेदान्तमीमांसायाम्' इति । तथा **नयविवेके**ऽपि । 2. बहुव्रीहिः । 3. कतिपयस्वयोग्यार्थमात्रनियतम् ।

साधनं तेन सर्वार्थतज्ज्ञानादेरसिद्धितः ॥ २ ॥

सर्वार्थदर्शनशक्तिशालिनमवगमयन्तो(ता ?) हि [1]देशकालस्वभावविप्रकर्षव्यवधानजुषः सर्व एवार्थास्तद्दर्शनं शक्तिश्च गोचरयितव्यानि । न च [2]विद्यमानेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षयोग्यकतिपयविषयनियतवृत्तेर्लौकिकप्रत्यक्षस्य निरवधिरयं महिमा संभावनाभूमिरिति कथमिव तदिह साधनमिति मन्येमहि ।

(योगिप्रत्यक्षसामान्यस्यासाधकत्वम्)

नापि योगिप्रत्यक्षमस्य साधकम् ; यतः—

प्रत्यक्षत्वे तदप्येवं[3] विद्यमानैकगोचरम् ।
भूतादिगोचरं नैव (वा न) प्रत्यक्षं [4]प्रतिभादिवत् ॥ ३ ॥

तत् खलु योगिविज्ञानमैन्द्रियकं न वा । ऐन्द्रियकमपि बहिरिन्द्रियसंभवमान्तरकरणजनितं वा । बहिरिन्द्रियाणि तावत् समधिगतनिजविषयसन्निकर्षसहकारीणि[5] तद्गोचरज्ञानजननानीति जगति विदितम् । अतो न रसनादिभिर[6]जातातिवृत्तव्यवहितादिसकलविषयवेदनप्रसंगः । न चाविद्यमानैः रजताभिस्संभवति सन्निकर्षः ; तस्य द्व्याश्रयत्वादाश्रयाभावे तदसंभवात् । अतः अपेक्षितोऽर्थसन्निकर्षः सहकारिविरहे (अपेक्षितार्थसन्निकर्षसहकारिविरहे ?) कथमिन्द्रियाण्यतीतादिविषयसाक्षात्काराय कल्पेरन् ? भवति च—यत् यत्सहकारि यत्कार्यजननं, तत् तदभावे न तज्जनयति ; यथा क्षितिसलिलसहकारि अङ्कुरकार्यजननबीजं क्षित्याद्यभावेऽङ्कुरम् । अर्थसन्निकर्षसहकारीणि बहिरिन्द्रियाणि ज्ञानजननानीति तान्यपि नातीतेऽनागते वाऽर्थे ज्ञानं जनयन्तीति न तदुपजनितं प्रत्यक्षं यथोक्तविषयनियममतिक्रामति । नाप्यान्तरकरणसंभवम्, आन्तरगोचर एव सुखादौ स्वान्तस्वातन्त्र्यात् । बाह्यविषयमितिषु च मनसो निरंकुशकरणताङ्गीकारे हि कुतं चक्षुरादिभिः । अतश्च न कश्चिदन्धो बधिरो वा भवेत् । भवति चात्र—विमतिपदं मनो बहिरिन्द्रियनिरपेक्षं न बाह्यप्रत्यक्षगोचरे प्रवर्तते, तत्र तत्तन्त्रवृत्तित्वात् । यत् यत्र यत्तन्त्रवृत्ति, न तत् तन्निरपेक्षं तत्र प्रवर्तते, यथा आलोकावेक्षप्रवृत्ति चक्षुः स्वगोचरे[7] अन्धतमस इति ।

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1. देशादीनां विप्रकर्षः । देशस्य विप्रकर्षः दूरस्थता । कालस्य पकर्षः अतीतत्वादिः । स्वभाव विप्रकर्षो मिथोविरोधः । 2. विद्यमानः सन्निकर्षो येषामिति बहुव्रीहिः । 3. अतोऽसर्वग्राहित्वात्र सर्वज्ञत्वविशिष्टग्राहीति । 4. इन्द्रियलिङ्गादिप्रसिद्धकारणाभावेऽप्यर्थविशेषस्य कारणविशेषात्प्रतिनियतं भानं प्रतिभा । अत्र 'प्रतिभाति हि' 'प्रतिभाति यत्, इत्यपि पाठः । योगिप्रत्यक्षातिरिक्ततया आर्षं प्रातिभं ज्ञानं प्रशस्तपादभाष्ये भाषितम् । 5. सहकारिपदान्तं सर्वमत्र बहुव्रीहिवृत्तम् । 6. अजातातिवृत्तेति । अनागतातीतेत्यर्थः । 7. स्वविषये घटादौ ।

(सिद्धिसंस्कृतस्याप्यक्षस्यासाधकत्वम्)

न [1]च-सिद्धौषधमन्त्रतपस्समाधिमहिमसमासादितातिशयानीन्द्रियाणि कदाचित् अपजहति समधिगतविषयनियममिति संभवति ; सांसिद्धिकसामर्थ्याविर्भावैकफलत्वात् तेषाम् ; सामर्थ्यस्य च प्रतिनियमात् । न खलु सुप्रयुक्तमेषजशतविहितसंस्कारमपि श्रोत्रं रूपरसविभागावगमाय कल्पते । भवति च-विवादाध्यासितबाह्याभ्यन्तरकरणपाटवातिशयः अनुल्लङ्घितसीमा ऐन्द्रियकप्रकर्षत्वात् दृश्यमानतत्प्रकर्षवत् । इत्यैन्द्रियकं ज्ञानं नातीतादि गोचरयति । (ध्यानजप्रत्यक्षस्यासाधकत्वम्)

भावनाप्रकर्षपर्यन्तजन्मनस्तु सत्यपि विशदनिर्भासित्वे प्राच्यानुभवगोचरात् [2]अनधिकमधिकं वाऽध्यवस्यतः स्मृतिविभ्रमस्रोतसोरन्यतरावर्तपरिवर्तिनः कुतः प्रामाण्यकूलप्रतिलम्भः ; कुतस्तराञ्च प्रत्यक्षतयोत्तम्भनम् ; प्रत्यक्षस्य वा सतः कथमिव विदितविषयनियमव्यतिक्रमः ; अतिक्रामतो वा कुतः प्रत्यक्षत्वमिति न विश्वानुभवैश्वर्यशालिनि प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणम् । (प्रत्यक्षातिरिक्तस्याप्यसाधकत्वम्)

नापि प्रमाणान्तरम् । तत् खल्वनुमानमागमो वा । अनुमानमपि विशेषतोदृष्टं सामान्यतोदृष्टं वा । तत्र सकलपदवीदवीयसि भगवति न तावत् [3]स्वलक्षणसाक्षात्कारपूर्वकाविनाभावावधारणाधीनोदयत्वादिद(त्वादाद्य?)मनुमानमुदेतुमलम् । न ह्यनवगतचरहुतभुजस्तदविनाभावितया धूममनुसंधातुमीशते । न च सर्वार्थनिर्माण[4]साक्षात्कारपटीयसि लिङ्गे सामान्यतोदृष्टमपि किंचन लभ्यते ॥ (तार्किकवादः)

नन्वेकचेतनाधीनं विवादाध्यासितं जगत् ।
अचेतनेनाऽऽरब्धत्वादगोगस्त्वशरीरवत् ॥ ४ ॥
तथा सर्वार्थनिर्माणसाक्षात्करणकौशलम् ।
कार्यत्वादेव जगतस्तत्कर्तुरनुमीयताम् ॥ ५ ॥

सर्वं हि कार्यमुपादानोपकरणसंप्रदानप्रयोजनसंवेदिचेतनरचितमवगतं घटमणिकगृहादि । कार्यश्च विमतिपदमवनिगिरिमहार्णवादीति तदपि तथाविधबुद्धिमद्धेतुकमध्यवसीयते । न च कार्यत्वमसिद्धमिति वाच्यम् —अवयवसन्निवेशादिभिर्हेतुभिस्तत्सिद्धेः । इह चान्त्यावयविभ्यः प्रभृति आद्व्यणुकमखिलमवयवि[5] क्रमनिहीयमाननानावयवव्यति-

1. न च संभवतीत्यन्वयः । 2. अनुभूतमात्रगोचरत्वे स्मृतित्वम् ; अधिकगोचरत्वे च विभ्रमत्वं भ्रान्तित्वमिति प्रामाण्यस्यैवाभावे तदवान्तरप्रत्यक्षप्रमाणत्वं कथमिति । 3. सिसाधयिषितव्यक्तिगोचर (प्राक्कालिक) साक्षात्कारेत्यर्थः। 4. निर्माणे साक्षात्कारे च । सामान्यतोदृष्टं हि व्याप्तिग्रहोपयुक्तदृष्टान्तगत व्यक्त्यनुगतसामान्याकारमात्रेण वस्तु साधयेत् ; न त्वभिमतं सर्वविलक्षणाकारविशिष्टकर्तारमिति भावः । 5. अवयवीति जनितमिति च दृष्टान्ते हेतुसाध्यान्वयप्रदर्शनम् । अत्र "एषा च दिक् क्रमेणान्त्यावय

पङ्गविशेषजनितमवगतमिति अन्तत[1] उपादानं चतुर्विधाः परमाणवः प्रपञ्चस्य । तेषामादि-परिस्पन्दश्च तदनुगुणादृष्टविशिष्टतत्तत्क्षेत्रज्ञसंयोगासमवायिकारणक इति उपकरणमपि समस्त-क्षेत्रज्ञवर्तीनि धर्माधर्मलक्षणानि अदृष्टानि । प्रयोजनं पुनस्तदभिनिर्वर्तितविचित्रार्थक्रिया[2]ऽऽ-कारश्चेतनोपकारप्रकारभेदोऽपर्यन्तः । तदुपभुजस्त एव क्षेत्रज्ञाः संप्रदानम् । न चामी स्वसम वायिनावपि धर्माधर्मौ अलमवलोकयितुमिति तदतिरेकी निखिलभुवननिर्माणनिपुणोऽधि-करण[3]सिद्धान्तसमधिगतनिरतिशयसहजसकलविषयसंविदैश्वर्यशक्त्यतिशयः पुरुषधौरेयकः (रेय एकः ?) किमिति न सामान्यतोदृष्टलिङ्गादनुमीयते ?

(मीमांसकेन तार्किकदूषणम्)

तदिदमविदितानुमानवृत्तस्य स्वमतिरचिततरलतर्कोल्लसितमिति परिहसन्ति मीमांसकाः ।

तथाहि—किमिदमेकचेतनाधीनत्वं नाम अभिप्रेतं [4]तनुभुवनादेः ?

तदायत्तत्वमिति चेत्—

किमस्य तस्मिन्नायत्तं किन्नु जन्माथवा स्थितिः ।

प्रवृत्तिर्वाऽऽद्ययोस्तावत् साध्यहीनं निदर्शनम् ॥ ६ ॥

न खलु शरीरमेकचेतनाधीनोत्पत्तिस्थिति । ये हि यद्देहाधीनसुखदुःखोपभोग-भागिनः, भवति हि तदुचितादृष्टशालिनां सर्वेषामेव तेषां तद्देहिन इव तदुत्पत्तिस्थिति-निमित्तत्वम् । अपिच शरीरावयविनः स्वावयवसमवायलक्षणा स्थितिरवयवव्यतिषङ्गविशे-षात् ऋते न चेतयितारं परमपेक्षते । या पुनस्तदपेक्षिणी प्राणनलक्षणा स्थितिः, न सा पक्षी-कृते क्षित्यादौ संभवतीति स्थितिमपि नैकरूपां पक्षसपक्षानुयायिनीमुदीक्षामहे । एकचेत-नाधीनप्रवृत्तित्वे तु प्रबलबहुजनसरभसप्रयत्नप्रचाल्यैरुपलतरुरथादिभिर्व्यभिचारः । [5]आ-रब्धत्वादेव चैतत्साध्यसिद्धौ अधिकमिदमुपादानविशेषवचनम् ।

विभ्योऽवतरन्ती आद्व्यणुकमवतिष्ठते'' इति प्रकरणपञ्चिकावचनं स्मार्यते। 1. द्व्यणुकादिकं त्वान्तरालिक-मुपादानम्। 2. अर्थक्रिया-कार्यमिति यावत्। 3. 'यत्सिद्धावन्यप्रकरणसिद्धिः सोधिकरणसिद्धान्तः' (न्या यद० १-१-३०)। 'यस्यार्थस्य सिद्धावन्येऽर्था अनुषज्यन्ते ; न तैर्विना सोऽर्थः सिध्यति ; तेऽर्थाः यदधि-ष्ठानाः; सोऽधिकरणसिद्धान्तः' इति न्यायभाष्यम् । न हि सहजसार्वज्ञ्याभावे सर्वपक्षीकारेण प्रवृत्तं सिध्य-तीति। इदमेवानुमानस्थले पक्षधर्मताबलमित्युच्यते । यदाह, 'पक्षधर्मतयाऽधिकरणसिद्धान्तापरपर्याययाः' इति। (नयवि० पु० १८१) । 4. 'तरुभुवनादिकं सर्वं सावयवमवसीयते । यच्च नाम सावयवं तत् अवयवव्यतिषङ्गबलसमासादितात्मलाभम्' इति पञ्चिका (७.प्र.) । अतोऽत्र ग्रन्थे श्रीभाष्ये चेह सर्वत्र तनुशब्दस्तरुशब्दो वेति विमृश्यमिति चेत्-न तनुशब्दोऽनुपपन्नः न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीकायां (४-१-२१) 'तनुतरुमहीधर,' 'तरुमहीधर', 'तनुभुवनादि' इति नानारूपप्रयोगदर्शनात् । 5. हेतुकोटाव चेतनरूपोपादानविशेषोक्तिर्व्यर्थेति व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिमाह आरब्धत्वादिति ।

(सिद्धसाधनवचनम्)

चेतनाधीनता[1]मात्रसाधने सिद्धसाध्यता ।
चेतनैर्भोक्तृभिर्भोग्यः कर्मभिर्जन्यते हि नः ॥ ७ ॥

युक्तश्चैतत् , यत्—उभयवादिसिद्धानामेव चेतनानां कर्तृत्वाभ्युपगमः[2] ; लाघवात् । न च उपादानाद्यनभिज्ञतया तत्प्रतिक्षेपः ।

उपादानं पृथिव्यादि[3] यागदानादि साधनम् ।
साक्षात्कर्तुं क्षमन्ते यत् सर्व एव च चेतनाः ॥ ८ ॥

अद्यवदेव विश्वम्भरादयः क्रमप्राप्तागन्तुकोपचयापचयैकदेशशालिनो न युगपदेव निरवशेषविलयजननभागिन इति अन्तिमपरमाणुसाक्षात्कारो न कर्तृभावोपयोगी ।

कर्मणः शक्तिरूपं यत् अपूर्वादिपदास्पदम् ।
मा भूत् प्रत्यक्षता तस्य शक्तिम[4]द्वयक्षगोचरः ॥ ९ ॥

न खलु कुलालादयः कुम्भादिकार्यमारभमाणास्तदुपादानोपकरणभूतमृद्दण्डचक्रादि-कार्योत्पादनशक्तिं साक्षात्कृत्य तत्तदारभन्ते । यदिपरं[5] शक्तिमविदुषामभिलषितसाधने तदुपादानादिव्यवहारोऽनुपपन्नः । इह तु—आगमादवगम्यन्ते विचित्राः कर्मशक्तयः ।
तेन कर्मभिरात्मानः सर्वे निर्मिमतां[6] पृथक् ॥ १० ॥

(शक्यक्रियत्वाद्युपाधिवचनम्)

अपिच तदेव चेतनकर्तृकं जगति परिदृश्यते, यदेव शक्यक्रियं शक्यज्ञानोपादा-नादि च ; न च तथा महीमहीधरमहार्णवादि इति कथमिव तत् तत्कार्यत्वम्[7] (र्यम् ?) ; कथन्तराञ्च तदुपादानोपकरणादेस्साक्षात्कारगोचरता ? यादृशं हि कार्यमुपादानाद्यभिज्ञ-पूर्वकमवगतं घटमणिकादि, तादृशमेव हि तथाविधबुद्धिमद्धेतुकत्वानुमानाय प्रभवतीति ।

(हेतोर्विरुद्धत्वम्)

अपिचानीश्वरेण परिमितशक्तिज्ञानेन विग्रहवता अनवाप्तकामेन कृतमवगतं घटादि-

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1 उपलादौ व्यभिचारपरिहाराय एकेत्यंशत्यागे इत्यर्थः । 2. इतीति शेषः । 3. न तु परमाणवः । न कदाचिदनीदृशं जगदिति पृथिव्यादेस्सदा स्थितेः ; सृष्टिप्रलयविषये बाधकसत्त्वात् मानाभावाच्च (न्या.कु. २-स्त) । 4. शक्तिमद्वस्तु अक्षगोचरो हि ; तदलमिति । 5. यदिपरं—परन्तु । 6. निर्मान्तु । 7. कार्यत्वमिति पाठे अनुभवेदित्येवं क्रियापदं स्थितं स्यात् । कार्यत्व-साध्यकत्वे शक्यक्रियत्वमुपाधिः, चेतनाधिष्ठितत्वसाध्यकत्वे शक्यज्ञानत्वमुपाधिरिति **नयविवेके** (१९४) **प्राभाकरविजये** (८२, ७९) च । अत्र चेतनकर्तृकत्वे साध्ये उभयमुपाधिरुच्यते ।

कार्यमिति तथाविधं बोद्धारमुपस्थापयन् हेतुरभिमतपुरुषसार्वज्ञ्यसर्वैश्वर्यादिविपर्ययसाधनात् विरुद्धस्स्यात् । न चैवं सति सर्वानुमानव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः शङ्कितव्यः । प्रमाणान्तरगोचरे हि लिङ्गिनि लिङ्गबलादापततो विपरीतविशेषांस्तत्प्रमाणमेव प्रतिरुणद्धि । इह पुनरतिपतितसकलमानान्तरकर्मभावे सर्वनिर्माणनिपुणे सिसाधयिषिते यावन्तोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकावधारिताविनाभावभाजो धर्मास्तानप्यविशेषेणोपस्थापयति ।

(सत्प्रतिपक्षितत्वम्)

अपिच[1]— स्वार्थकारुण्यभावेन व्याप्ताः प्रेक्षावतः क्रियाः ।
ईश्वरस्योभयाभावाज्जगत्सर्गो न युज्यते ॥ ११ ॥

अवाप्तकामत्वान्न तावत् आत्मार्थे सृजति ; प्रलयसमये प्रलीनसकलकरणकलेवरादिभोगोपकरणतया च चेतनानां दुःखाभावात् दुःखिदर्शनजनितकृपाप्रयुक्तिरपि नास्तीति व्यापकभूतस्वार्थकारुण्यनिवृत्तेर्व्याप्यभूतया प्रेक्षावत्प्रवृत्त्यापि निवर्तितव्यम् ।

सुखैकतानं जनयेज्जगत् करुणया सृजन् ।
तत्कर्मानुविधायित्वे हीयेतास्य स्वतन्त्रता ॥ १२ ॥

(अनेकान्तत्वम्)

न [2]चोपादानादिसाक्षात्कारिण एव कर्तृत्वमित्यपि नियमः; उपादानमुपकरणञ्चाविदुष एवाऽऽत्मनो ज्ञानादिषु कर्तृत्वात् । (मीमांसकमतोपसंहारः)

अतः—[3]असिद्धत्वात् विरुद्धत्वादनैकान्त्याच्च वर्णितात् ।
कार्यत्वहेतोर्जगतो न यथोदितकर्तृता[4] (?) ॥ १३ ॥

प्रयोगश्च भवति-महीमहीधरादि कार्यं न भवति, प्रसिद्धकार्यविलक्षणत्वात् गगनवत् ; अशक्यदर्शनोपादानोपकरणत्वाद्वा, व्यतिरेकेण घटादिवत् । परमाणवो न प्रत्यक्षाः निरतिशयसूक्ष्मद्रव्यत्वात्, तथैव घटादिवत् । विमतिविषयः कालो न लोकशून्यः, कालत्वात् इदानीन्तनकालवत् । तनुभुवनादि ईश्वरकर्तृकं न भवति, कार्यत्वात् तद्वदेव । ईश्वरः कर्ता न भवति, प्रयोजनरहितत्वात् अशरीरत्वाद्वा मुक्तात्मवदिति ॥

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1. जगन्न प्रेक्षावत्कर्तृकं स्वप्रयोजनकारुण्यान्यतराप्रयोज्यत्वादिति सत्प्रतिपक्षमाह । 2. न हि-ज्ञानसुखादिकं कुत्रोत्पद्यते, उपकरणञ्च किमिति विविच्य पश्चाद्ज्ञानादिसंपादने यतन्ते ।

3. अनेन स्वरूपासिद्धिर्विशिष्टसाध्यासिद्धिश्चोक्ते । एतदुपपादनं **प्रयोगश्चे**त्यादिना । 4. यथोदितं कर्तृत्वं न जगन्निरूपितमित्यर्थः। अतोऽबहुव्रीहितया न 'नञ्वृतश्च' इति कप् । 'जगती न यथोदितकर्तृका' इति वा पाठः ।

(तार्किकसमाधानम्)

अत्र[1] ब्रूमो न कार्यत्वं क्षित्यादौ शक्यनिह्नवम् ।
[2]सभागत्वात् क्रियावत्त्वान्महत्त्वेन[3] विशेषितात् ॥ १४ ॥
[4]तादृशादेव मूर्तत्वात् बाह्य[5]प्रत्यक्षताऽन्वितात् ।
ससामान्यविशेषत्वादित्यादिभ्यो घटादिवत् ॥ १५ ॥

नचेदृश एव सन्निवेशः कार्यः, नेतरः इत्यवयवसन्निवेशविशेषप्रतिनियतं रूपभेदमुदीक्षामहे । (पूर्वोक्तोपाधिनिरासः)

यत्तु—शक्यक्रियं शक्यज्ञानोपादानोपकरणश्चं क्रियत इति-तदस्तु नाम । किन्तु ते क्रियाज्ञानशक्ती[6] क्रियाज्ञानाभ्यामेव समधिगमनीये; ते च क्षित्यादिषु यथोक्तसाधनबलसमुपस्थापिते इति न विशेषः[7] प्रसिद्धप्राकारगोपुरादिकार्येभ्यः तनुभुवनादेः । नचैतावानेव क्रियागोचर इति विषयनियमः कश्चित् क्रियाया दृष्टः; येनेदमशक्यक्रियमध्यवस्येम । सिद्धे[8]

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1. मीमांसकप्रत्युक्तिं तार्किकः प्रतिक्षिपन् आनुमानिकत्वं समर्थयते ॥ पञ्चिकान्यायग्रन्थाऽऽगमप्रामाण्येषिवात्रापि **कार्यत्वमुत्पत्तिमत्त्वम्** ; तस्यैवाऽऽदितस्साधनदूषणयोः प्रवृत्तत्वाच्च । श्रुतप्रकाशिकाकृतश्रीभाष्ययोजनान्तररीत्येह कृतिसाध्यत्वरूपकार्यत्वपरताऽपि भाव्या । सावयवत्वेन कृतिसाध्यत्वानुमानं **न्यायरत्नाकरे** । सावयवत्वेनोत्पत्तिमत्त्वाद्यनुमाय ततस्तदनुमानमन्यत्र । 2. सावयवत्वात् । 3. महत्त्वे सति क्रियावत्त्वात् । 4. महत्त्वे सति मूर्तत्वात् । 5. बहिरिन्द्रियजप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वे सति सामान्यविशेषवत्त्वात् । **सामान्यविशेषपदं** व्याप्यजात्यर्थकं प्राचीनवैशेषिकप्रसिद्धम् । तन्मात्रोक्तौ मनसि व्यभिचारात् सत्यन्तम् । आत्मनि व्यभिचारात् बाह्येति । सामान्यादावपि भावपदार्थे सदिति व्यवहारात् यथाकथञ्चित्सत्तारूपसामान्याधारत्वसत्त्वात् व्यभिचाराद्विशेषेति । न खलु तत्र सदितिव्यवहारवत् द्रव्यमित्यादिव्यवहारोस्ति, येन विशेषाधारत्वमपि तत्र शङ्क्येतेति । सामन्यादौ जात्यतिरिक्तयत्किञ्चिद्विशेषसत्त्वात् स एव दोष इति जातिरूपविशेषग्रहणाय सामान्येति । विशेषो नाम व्यावृत्तो धर्मः । **प्रतिनियतं**-घटादौ व्यवस्थितं क्षित्यादिव्यावृत्तम् । ननु पक्षे सिध्यतु हेतुः, चेतनकर्तृकत्वे साध्ये पूर्वं शक्यक्रियत्वादिरुपाधिरुक्त इत्यसिद्धयन्तरमस्तीत्यत्राह **यत्त्विति** । **क्रियते** कृत्या साध्यते । 6. कर्तुं शक्यत्वं ज्ञातुं शक्यत्वञ्च । **ते च** क्रियाज्ञाने च । तत्साधकहेतोस्सुतरां तद्व्यापकसाधकत्वमिति साध्यतुल्यत्वान्नोपाधित्वम् । साध्यं हि हेतुना साध्यमानं स्वव्यापककोडीकारेणैव सिद्ध्यतीति । नचैवमयोगोलके धूमसाधने आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगस्यापि नोपाधित्वम् ; मानान्तरेण तद्बाधनिश्चयेन विशेषादिति भावः । 7. अशक्यक्रियत्वादिरूपो विशेषो न । 8. अत्र उपाधिदोषस्य सर्वथैवायोगात् कार्यत्वस्वरूपासिद्धिदोष एव चिन्तनीयः ; स च वारित एवेति कार्यकरमेवानुमानम् । क्षित्यादेरपि कार्यतया परमाणुपर्यन्तोपादानसिद्धौ तत्साक्षात्कारस्यास्मदाद्यवृत्तेः साधनादित्याह **सिद्धे**

च कार्यत्वे तदुपादानादिसाक्षात्करण-तदधिष्ठान-तत्प्रेरणनिपुणः पुरुषविशेषः सिद्ध्यत्येव ।

(उक्ताधिष्ठानादिस्वरूपशोधनम्)

अधिष्ठानश्च तत्प्रवृत्त्यनुगुणसंकल्पवदीश्वरसन्निकर्षः, क्षेत्रज्ञेनेव स्वशरीरादौ । स च द्रव्यैस्संयोगलक्षणः, तद्गुणैस्तु संयुक्तसमवायरूपः । प्रवृत्तिश्च परमाणूनां परिस्पन्दलक्षणा । धर्माधर्मयोस्तु[1] फलोदयानुकूलता [ता?]दृशदेशकालादिसहकारिसहितता । (?) ताभ्यां धर्माधर्माभ्यामेव फलम्, चेतनानधिष्ठितानां सर्वेषामेतेषा[2]मचैतन्येनाकिञ्चित्करत्वात् । न हि चेतनेन वर्धकिनाऽनधिष्ठिता वासी देशकालादिसहकारिशतसमधिगमेऽपि यूपादीनि आपादयितुमलम् । बीजाङ्कुरा[3]दयस्तु पक्षान्तर्भूता इति तैर्व्यभिचारवचनमनभिज्ञतयैव श्रोत्रियाणाम् । एतेन[1] सुखादिभिर्व्यभिचारोऽपि प्रत्युक्तः ।

(क्षेत्रज्ञेषु तदयोगः)

नचोभयवादिसिद्धतामात्रेण क्षेत्रज्ञानामेवेदृशाधिष्ठातृत्वकल्पनमुचितम्, तेषां सूक्ष्म-

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इति । पूर्वोक्तं चेतनाधीनत्वस्वरूपविकल्पदूषणमपि न स्थास्यति, चेतनाधीनत्वस्य चेतनाधिष्ठितप्रेरितोपादानादिजन्यत्वरूपत्वादिति दर्शयितुं **तदधिष्ठाने**त्यादि उक्तम् ।

१. **धर्माधर्मयोः प्रवृत्तिरित्यनुषंगः** । प्रवृत्तिः फलाभिमुख्यम्; तच्च निरुच्यमानरूपम् । **तादृशे**ति चेतनाधिष्ठितेत्यर्थकम्। **ताभ्याम्** उक्तरूपेण स्वसाक्षात्कारिचेतनाधिष्ठिताभ्याम्। **ताभ्या**मित्यत्र 'नाभ्याम्' इति स्यान्न वेत्यपि चिन्त्यम् । आभ्यामेव न फलमित्यर्थः । **तादृशे**त्यत्र तादृशतादृशेति क्वचित्पाठः। सर्वत्र शब्दप्रक्षेपबहुले कोशे, 'धर्माधर्मयोः फलोदयानुकूलता ; सा च तादृशदेशकालादिसहकारिसमवहितता । ताभ्यां धर्माधर्माभ्यामेव फलं चेतनाधिष्ठिताभ्याम् ; सर्वेषामेतेषाम्' इत्येवमस्ति । प्रकृतग्रन्थखण्ड्यः पञ्चिकाग्रन्थस्त्वेवम्, 'प्रवृत्तिरपि कीदृशी ? ....फलदानमिति चेन्न—देशकालावस्थादिसहकारिसहिताभ्यामेव फलम् । न चेतनव्यापारापेक्षम्' इति । एतदर्थपरं किञ्चेत्यादिश्रीभाष्यम् । 2. धर्माधर्मदेशकालादीनाम् ॥ ननूपर्यचेतनत्वहेतुना चेतनाधिष्ठितत्वं सर्वेषां पृथग्वक्ष्यत इति किमिति कार्यत्वहेतुप्रस्तावमध्ये तदुक्तिः । किञ्चोपकरणपदेन धर्माधर्मग्रहणे तयोः कुलालाद्यनधिष्ठितत्वात् दृष्टान्ते साध्यवैकल्यम् ॥ उच्यते—साध्यकोटौ सामान्यत उपकरणेत्येव निवेशाद्दृष्टान्ते यथासंभवं ग्रहणम् ; पक्षे तु धर्मादिकमपि सुग्रहमिति गमयितुं पृथग्वक्ष्यमाणानुमानसिद्धार्थस्यैवेह प्रतिबोधनमिति । 3. **बीजेत्या**दि **सिद्धे**रित्यन्तं वाक्यजातं प्रधानप्रकृतकार्यत्वहेतुकप्रयोगविषयकं संभवानुरोधादवान्तरप्रकृताचेतनत्वहेतुकगोचरमपीष्यते । 'तथाच प्राङ्गणनिकटवर्तिदूर्वाङ्कुरादिषूनवसितपुरुषव्यापारजन्मसु अनेकान्तः' इति अकृष्टजातवस्त्वभिप्रायमा**गमप्रामाण्यम्** । अचेतनत्वहेतुः कार्यत्वहेतुश्च न बीजेऽङ्कुरे च व्यभिचरितः ; तस्यापि पक्षत्वादिति भावः। 1. ननु पुरुषापेक्षत्वमात्रसाधनमुचितम् ; न प्रवृत्त्यनुगुणसंकल्पादेरपि । न हि पुरुषापेक्षमपि ज्ञानसुखादि स्वोपादानादिसाक्षात्काराधिष्ठानाद्यपेक्षम्। अतस्सुखमनधिष्ठितोपादानजन्यमेव, स्वयमनधिष्ठितमेव पुलकादिजनकञ्चेत्यत्राह **एतेने**ति ।

व्यवहितादिदर्शनाशक्तेर्निश्चितत्वात् । दृष्टानुसारिणी हि सर्वत्र कल्पना ; न दृष्टविरोधिनी । नचैवमीश्वरस्याशक्तिर्निश्चिता । [1]प्रमाणान्तरतस्तत्सिद्धेः । यथोदितप्रमाणबलेन सिध्यन् सांसिद्धिक-सर्वार्थदर्शनतत्प्रेरणशक्तिसंपन्न एव सिध्यति ; कार्यत्वस्य [2]समर्थकर्तृपूर्वकत्वेन प्रतिबन्धात् ।

(धर्मविशेषविरुद्धत्वनिरासः)

यत्तु परिमितशक्तिज्ञानानैश्वर्याद्यापादनात् धर्मविशेषविपरीतसाधनत्वमुद्भावितम्— तत् अतिस्थवीयः, अप्रयोजकत्वात् तेषाम् । न हि किंचित् क्रियमाणं कर्तुरर्थान्तरविषयमसामर्थ्यमज्ञानं वा स्वोत्पत्तयेऽपेक्षते ; स्वसंपादनसमर्थकर्तृमात्राक्षेपात् केवल[3]व्यतिरेकासिद्धेः । तावतैवोपपद्यमाने कार्योदये संबन्धिनोऽकिञ्चित्करस्यार्थान्तरविषयस्याभावस्य हेतुत्वकल्पनानुपपत्तेः ।

अपिच किं तदितरसमस्तवस्तुविषयमज्ञानादि व्यापकम् , उत कतिपयगोचरमिति विवेचनीयम् । न तावत् अशेषविषयम् ; अनुपलब्धेः । न खलु कुम्भकारः कुम्भातिरेकि किमपि न विजानाति । अथ कतिपयविषयम्-तदपि न, अनियतविषयतया तस्यतस्य व्यभिचारदर्शनात् । न चास्ति किंचिद्व्यवस्थितम्, [4]यदविद्यादिमानेव कर्तृतामनुभवति । न च शरीरिणैव कर्त्रा भाव्यम् , शरीरग्रहणेनैवानैकान्त्यात् । न खलु शरीरविशिष्टस्सन्नेवायमात्मा शरीरमुपादत्ते, अयोगिनो युगपदनेकशरीरग्रहणायोगात् । पूर्वदेहपरित्यागेन [5]देहान्तरप्रापककर्मप्रेरितप्राणसहाय एव देहान्तरं प्रविशतीत्युपपादितमात्मचिन्तायाम् ।

पक्षान्तर्भूतत्वेनेति तदर्थः । 1. अशक्तिनिश्चयो मा भूत् । न च बाधकाभावमात्रे साधकं विना वस्तुसिद्धिः ; तत्राह **प्रमाणे**ति । इदमेव वाक्यमन्वभाषि-'अतः प्रमाणान्तरतो न तत्सिध्यनुपपत्तिः' इति । **अन्तर**पदं सर्वशक्तेश्वरसाधकप्रमाणे जीवसाधकप्रमाणापेक्षया अबाधितत्वादिरूपं वैलक्षण्यं स्थितं दर्शयितुम् । ननु कार्यत्वहेतुना शक्तिमत्साक्षात्कारतदधिष्ठानादिकमेव सिद्ध्येत् , न तु शक्त्यादिसाक्षात्कार इत्यत्राह **यथे**ति । सिध्यतो ज्ञानस्य देहादिजन्यत्वे तस्य देहादेरपि पुनश्चेतनपूर्वकत्वेनानवस्थापत्त्या सांसिद्धिकत्वसिद्धौ औत्सर्गिकं प्रकृष्टज्ञानत्वरूपसाक्षात्कारत्वम् , असंकोचात् सर्वार्थगोचरत्वञ्च सिद्धमिति शक्त्यादिसाक्षात्कारो निर्बाध इति भावः । यद्वा **प्रमाणान्तरतः** अचेतनत्वहेतुतः । एवं कार्यत्वहेतुरप्युक्तरीत्या स्वाभाविकशक्त्यादिपरः सर्वगोचरशक्त्यादिसाधक एवेत्याह **यथे**ति । 2. न हि किञ्चिदशक्तकर्तृपूर्वकत्वेन व्याप्तिरिति भावः । 3. अनपेक्षितवस्त्वन्तरज्ञानादिव्यतिरेकासिद्धेः । यद्वा व्यतिरेकमात्रासिद्धेरित्यर्थः । 4. यद्विषयकाज्ञानेत्यर्थः । 5. अत्र, 'न हि युगपच्छरीरद्वयपरिग्रहः संभवति । नैवम् ; तत्रापि सूक्ष्मशरीरपरित्यागे सर्वत्र शरीरिण एव कर्तृत्वम्' इति प्रभाकरविजयपरासो भाव्य इव ।

(देहदृष्टान्तेन देहनिरपेक्षाधिष्ठानस्थापनम्)

किंच आत्मनश्शरीरमधितिष्ठतोऽधिष्ठानक्रियाकर्मभूतस्य देहस्याधिष्ठातृदशानुप्रवेशोऽनुपपन्नः, युगपदेककियायामेकस्य कर्मकर्तृत्वविरोधात् । अधितिष्ठासितदेहसंयोगवत एव तत्प्रवृत्त्यनुगुणप्रयत्नयोगलक्षणमधिष्ठानं दृष्टमिति चेत्-अस्त्वेकतत्त्व [1](अस्त्वेवम् ; तत्तु अ ?) संबद्धस्याधिष्ठानानुपपत्तेः । प्रेर्यवस्तुसंबन्धिना प्रेरकेण भवितव्यमिति ; न पुनर्देहसंबन्धेन भाव्यमिति । कुतो निर्णयः ? इत एव ; यतोऽन्यदप्यधिष्ठीयमानं [2]मानदण्डादि स्वसंबन्धिनैवाधिष्ठीयते । तेनाधिष्ठानक्रियापेक्षिताधिष्ठेयपदार्थसंबन्धमात्रातिरेकेण देहसंबन्धो नाम अपरो नादर्तव्यः । अस्ति चेश्वरस्यापि जगदुपादानोपकरणैः संबन्ध इत्युक्तमेव ।

(देहव्यतिरिक्तेपि देहसंबन्धं विना प्रवर्तनप्रदर्शनम्)

अथ-स्वदेहव्यतिरिक्ते वस्तुनि प्रवृत्तिविशेषकरत्वं देहद्वारेणैव । दृष्टं हि दण्डचक्रादिषु करसंयोगादिना कुलालादेः प्रवर्तयितृत्वमित्युच्येत-तदपि न-अभिध्यानमात्रेणैव परशरीरगतगरळनिरसन-विसारणदर्शनात् ॥ कथमसति शरीरे परप्रेरणात्मकः संकल्प इति चेत्-किं शरीरं संकल्पयति, येन तदभावे न भवेत् ॥ करणमिति चेन्न-मनसः करणत्वात् । किमस्तीश्वरस्य मनः ? बाढम् । नन्वेवं[1] विग्रहधर्माधर्मानैश्वर्यादयः साधारणधर्माः प्रादुःष्युः—मैवम् ; कार्यत्वाक्षिप्तसमर्थकर्तृम[3]त्त्वाद्दृढिम्नैवापास्तत्वात् मनसो नित्येन्द्रियतया देहापगमेऽपि संबन्धाभ्युप[4]गमादनैकान्तिकश्च । यावद्धि दृष्टानुगुणं व्याप्त्युपयोगि, तावदनुज्ञायते । न चास्मदादेर्मनसाऽप्यचिन्त्यरचनस्यापर्यन्तविस्तारस्य महाभूतभौतिकप्रपञ्चस्य प्रादेशिकशरीरकः किंचिज्ज्ञः पुण्यपापपरवशगतिरलं निर्माणायेत्यपरितितज्ञानैश्वर्यशक्तिः शरीराद्यनपेक्षः संकल्पादेव सकलभुवननिर्माणक्षमः कर्ता सिद्धः ।

(दृष्टान्तदृष्टवैषम्यायोगशङ्कापरिहारः)

ईदृशेन कर्त्रा घटादिषु कार्यत्वस्य संबन्धो न दृष्ट इति चेत्—अतिगहनगिरितटाधिष्ठानेनातिप्रकृष्टादृष्टचरेन्धननिवहसंबन्धिना हुतवहविशेषेण महानसादौ धूमस्य वा किं संबन्धो दृष्टः, येन धूमविशेषदर्शनाद् गिरिशिखरे तथाविधाग्निरनुमीयते ॥ यादृशो धूमो यत्रावगतस्तत्रैव तादृशस्तत्संपादनसमर्थो दृष्टान्तभूमावपरिदृष्टोऽपि सामान्यव्याप्ति

अधिष्ठातृदशेति । अधिष्ठातृदेहानुप्रवेश इति, अधिष्ठातृन्तरानुप्रवेश इति च पा० 1. अस्त्वेकतत्त्वसंबद्धस्याधिष्ठानेत्यत्र, 'नह्येतत् । किन्तु तदसंबद्धस्य तदधिष्ठाने'ति प्रक्षेपबहुले कोशे पाठः । 2. क्षेत्रादिमानार्थदण्डादि । 3. एवं-समनस्कत्वे । 4 विग्रहादिसापेक्षत्वे असामर्थ्यमेव स्यात्, न पक्षीकृतसर्वनिर्माणसामर्थ्यमिति । इदं यावद्धीत्यादिना विवियते । कुचित् समर्थकर्तृ....र्थद्रढिम्नेति दर्शनात् समर्थकर्तृमत्त्वार्थद्रढिम्नेति पाठ ऊह्यते । 5 मीमांसको मुक्तस्यापि मनोऽभ्युपगच्छति ।

बलेन पक्षधर्मतावशात् सिद्ध्यतीति चेत्--तदिदमस्माभिरभिधीयमानं किमिति न हृदयमधिरोहति भवताम् । इहापि कार्यत्वं समर्थकर्तृपूर्वकत्वेन घटादिषु विदितसंबन्धनियमं क्षित्यादिषु दृश्यमानं स्वसंपादनसमर्थमदृष्टपूर्वमेव बुद्धिमत्कर्तारमुपस्थापयति । यथैव हि देशकालेन्धनपरिमाणादिविशेषानादरेण धूमस्य स्वोदयानुगुणहुतवहमात्रेण संबन्धनियमः, तथैव अनीश्वरत्वकिंचिद्ज्ञत्वशरीरित्वपुण्यपापपरवशत्वमनुष्यत्वादिविशेषप्रहाणेन कार्यस्य स्वनिर्माणसमर्थबुद्धिमत्कर्तृमात्रेण संबन्धनियमनिश्चय इति न कश्चिद्विशेषः ।

(कर्त्रन्तरवैलक्षण्यस्यानेकदृष्टान्तमुखेन स्थिरीकरणम्)

अपिच विभुद्रव्यसंयोगिनः परिस्पन्दवतश्च सर्वत्र स्पर्शवत्त्वाव्यभिचारेऽपि ज्ञानसुखादिनित्यद्रव्यविशेषगुणानुमितात्म[1]संयोगिनो मनसः कथमिव स्पर्शरहितत्वम् ? कथञ्च वायवीयद्रव्यस्य महिमगुणशालिनो [2]नियताधिष्ठानस्पार्शनत्वनियमदर्शनेऽपि त्वगिन्द्रिये तद्विपर्ययः, तैजसस्य[3] वा रूपस्पर्शयोः अन्यतरस्य वा प्राकट्यनियमेऽपि रूपोपलम्भसाधनतानुमिततैजसभावस्य चक्षुषो नियमेन तदुभयानुद्भवाभ्युपगमः ? अथ कार्यदर्शनानुमितसद्भावानां तैजसादिभावेऽपि तत्तद्विशेषाणां योग्यानुपलब्धिबाधितत्वात् तदभ्युपगमेऽनेकनियमभङ्गप्रसङ्गाच्च तथाऽभ्युपगमः, हन्त तर्हि प्रकृतविषयेऽपि प्रसञ्जितधर्मविशेषाणामनुपलम्भ[4]बाधाविशेषात् *अनेकनियमदर्शनविघातप्रसङ्गाच्च तथाऽभ्युपगम इति सर्वं समानमन्यत्राभिनिवेशात् ॥ (ईश्वरसाधकानि अचेतनत्वादीन्यनुमानान्तराणि)

दृश्यन्ते हि नीतयः (नियतयः) यथा[5] (तथा) विवादास्पदं परमाण्वादि प्रेक्षावत्प्रेरितं चेष्टते, अचेतनत्वात्[6] । यदचेतनम् , तत् तथा ; यथा तथाविधं कन्दुकादि । तथा, विवा-

1. ज्ञानादिना नित्यद्रव्यीयेण विशेषगुणेनानुमितो य आत्मसंयोगोऽसमवायिकारणभूतः, तद्वत इत्यर्थः । 2. नियताधिष्ठानेतिच्छेदे नियताधिष्ठानस्यासाधारणस्य स्पर्शस्येत्यर्थः स्यात् । अनियताधिष्ठानेतिच्छेदे नियतशरीराधिष्ठानातीन्द्रियत्वगिन्द्रियवैलक्षण्येन तदन्यवायुद्रव्यसामान्यस्य सदागतेरधिष्ठानानियमः स्पार्शनत्वनियमश्चोच्यत इति स्यात् । 3. तैजसगतरूपस्पर्शयोः प्राकट्यमग्न्यादौ ; अन्यतरप्राकट्यं रत्नप्रभाकापालपावकादौ । 4. ईश्वरस्य विग्रहवत्त्वमनुपलब्ध्या बाध्यते ।

5. तथेति पाठे तथा उक्तनीतिवत् अन्या अपि नीतयो दृश्यन्ते हीत्यर्थः । 6. न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलावपि कार्यत्वानुमानानन्तरं कार्यायोजनेतिकारिकास्थाऽऽयोजनविवरणावसरे अचेतनत्व-

* एतदारभ्य स्थितं पाठान्तरं 'बाधितत्वात्' इत्यारभ्यपाठान्तरत्वेनैव तत्रतत्र मुद्रितम् । तत्तु मद्रनगर राजकीयकोशालयस्थे डि. १५२८४ कोशे दृश्यते । स तु कोश आदितःप्रभृति आन्तमनेकपदवाक्यप्रक्षेपबहुलोऽशुद्धश्चेति, तदीयविलक्षणपाठस्यात्र परं प्रदर्शनं व्यर्थमिति चात्र पुस्तके तन्मुद्रणमुपेक्षितम् ॥

दाध्यासिता बाह्याभ्यन्तरप्रवृत्तयः [1]प्रकृत्युपकरणप्रत्यक्षपूर्विकाः कार्यत्वात्, तद्वदेव ।

प्रत्यक्षं तत् प्रमेयत्वात् पदार्थत्वात् घटादिवत् ।
एकेच्छानुविधायीदम(मा)चैतन्यात् स्वदेहवत् ॥ १६ ॥
एकेनाधिष्ठिताः कार्यं कुर्वते सर्वचेतनाः ।
देहसंबन्धसापेक्षकार्यकृत्त्वात् त्वगादिवत् ॥ १७ ॥
एकप्रधानपुरुषं विवादाध्यासितं जगत् ।
चेतनाचेतनात्मत्वादेकराजकदेशवत् ॥ १८ ॥

(इतःपरमीश्वरसिद्धिग्रन्थो नोपलभ्यते)

श्रीभगवद्यामुनमुनये नमः ।

॥ शुभमस्तु ॥

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हेतुकानुमानं द्वितीयमुक्तं पञ्चमस्तबके । [1]प्रकृतीति । उपादानेत्यर्थः । शक्त्यादेः साध्ये घटने दृष्टान्ते कुलालादौ शक्तिसाक्षात्काराभावात् प्रत्यक्षत्वेन रूपेण ज्ञानस्य साध्यकोटौ निवेशोऽशक्य आसीत् । उपादानोपकरणमात्रग्रहणे तु प्रत्यक्षज्ञानत्वेन निवेशः क्रियत इति भावः ।

श्रीगुरुभ्यो नमः

श्रीः

श्रीमते रङ्गरामानुजमहादेशिकाय नमः

संवित्सिद्धिगूढप्रकाशः

इयं संवित्सिद्धिः सिद्धित्रये प्रथमा । अत्र च परमतसंवित्स्वरूपादि विमृश्य स्वमतं स्थाप्यते । **शतदूषण्याञ्च** संविदद्वैतभङ्गवादे (३३), 'एकैव संविदनेकज्ञातृज्ञेयतदवच्छिन्नज्ञप्तिरूपेण विवर्तते' इति नूनमेतद्ग्रन्थपूर्वपक्षपरमसारः प्रादर्शि । एवमेवोपक्रान्तः **श्रीभाष्ये** महापूर्वपक्षोपि सहसिद्धान्तः प्राय एतद्ग्रन्थशैलीमवलम्ब्य स्यात् । 'प्रकाशश्च चिदचिदशेषपदार्थसाधारणो धर्म इति संवित्सिद्धावेव साधितम्' इत्यात्मसिद्धिवचनाच्चात्र मीमांसकादिमतशोधनमपि कृतं लक्ष्यते । अत्रत्याः साम्प्रतमनुपलभ्यमानाः काश्चित् कारिकाः **श्रुतप्रकाशिकायां** दृश्यन्ते । यथा—यद्यप्रकाशमाना धीः कदाचिदवतिष्ठते । घटादाविव तत्रापि कल्पनीयं प्रकाशनम्, 'घटोऽयमिति विज्ञाने घटमात्रं प्रकाशते । न वित्तिरिति युष्माकं गोष्ठीषु ननु घुष्यते', 'अतीतेऽनागते चार्थे कथं प्राकट्यसंभवः। न हि धर्मिण्यसत्येव धर्मः संभवमृच्छति॥', 'तदेवापश्यतां सर्वशून्यत्वाद्विभ्यतां सताम् । गतिः स्वयंप्रकाशत्वात् ऋते नान्योपलभ्यते॥' इति । एवमन्यदपि । एवं **तत्त्वटीकायामपि** । एवमत्रोपक्रमे मध्ये च भागो बहुर्नष्ट इति एतद्ग्रन्थ एव व्यनक्ति। तथा ह्यत्र वचनानि—'व्यावहारिकसत्यत्वान्मृषात्वेऽप्यविरुद्धता । प्रत्यक्षादेरिति मतं प्रागेव समदूदुषम् ॥' इति ; मायाऽविद्याभेदं प्रस्तुत्य च, 'क्षुद्रब्रह्मविदामेतन्मतं प्रागेव दूषितम्' इति ; अन्यत्र च, 'भेदाभेदविकल्पस्तु यस्त्वया परिचोदितः' इति; 'सदसद्व्यतिरेकोक्तिः

॥ श्रीः ॥

श्रीभगवद्यामुनमुनये नमः

संवित्सिद्धिः

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(अद्वितीयश्रुत्यर्थविचारः)

एकमेवाद्वितीयं त(सी)द्ब्रह्मेत्युपनिषद्वचः ।
ब्रह्मणोऽन्यस्य सद्भावं ननु तत् प्रतिषेधति ॥
अत्र ब्रूमोऽद्वितीयोक्तौ समासः को विवक्षितः ।
किंस्वित् तत्पुरुषः किं वा बहुव्रीहिरथोच्यताम् ॥

(परमतेऽत्र तत्पुरुषायोगः)

(2) पूर्वस्मिन्नुत्तर[1]स्तावत्प्राधान्येन विवक्ष्यते । पदार्थस्तत्र तद्ब्रह्म ततोऽन्यत् सदृशं तु वा ॥
तद्विरुद्धमथो वा स्यात् त्रिष्वप्यन्यन्न बाधते । अन्यत्वे सदृशत्वे वा द्वितीयं सिद्ध्यति ध्रुवम् ॥
विरुद्धत्वे द्वितीयेन तृतीयं प्रथमं तु वा । ब्रह्म प्राप्नोति यस्मात्[2] तद् द्वितीयेन विरुध्यते ॥
अतः सप्रथमाः सर्वे तृतीयाद्या(द्य ?)र्थराशयः ।

पूर्वमेव पराकृता' इति च । आत्मसिद्धिसंविदात्मवादस्थल इव बौद्धमतसहोपलम्भनियमादिप्रस्तावोऽप्यत्रेति, 'नीलाद्युपप्लवापेतस्वच्छचिन्मात्रसंततिः' इति वचनान्निश्चीयते । भेदस्य प्रत्यक्षाविषयत्वं ब्रह्मसिद्ध्युक्तमप्युपर्यनूद्य खण्ड्यते । तथा चात्र ज्ञातृज्ञेयादिभेदमृषात्वम्, एकाविद्यामायाविद्याभेदादिमतभेदः, प्रत्यक्षस्य व्यावहारिकगोचरत्वेन वा भेदस्य प्रत्यक्षागोचरत्वाद्वा अद्वैतागमाविरोधः, संवित्स्वयंप्रकाशत्वप्राकट्यादि, संविदद्वैतस्य युक्तिभिरागमैश्च गम्यत्वमित्यादि बहु एतदनुसारिश्रीभाष्यमहापूर्वपक्षादाविव विचार्य तत्रैव सिद्धान्तः स्थापित इत्यवगम्यते ।

उपलभ्यमानाश्च काश्चित् कारिकास्तत्रतत्रोपात्तास्सन्त्येव । तत्रतत्र शतदूषणीमिमां संवित्सिद्धिञ्च सावधानं सेवमानानामेतद्ग्रन्थसंदर्भविस्तरभूतोऽयमयं शतदूषणीभाग इति सुज्ञानम् । तदिदं बहुषु स्थलेष्वत्रापि दर्शयिष्यते । तत्रायमुपलभ्यमानभागोपक्रमस्थोऽद्वितीयश्रुत्यर्थविचारः, 'स्वतस्सर्वजगत्सूतेः संवित्सिद्ध्यादिभिः स्फुटम् । अद्वितीयपदोक्त्यैव साधिता सविशेषता' इति संवित्सिद्धीति ग्रन्थनिर्देशपूर्वकमेव शतदूषण्यामद्वितीयश्रुतिविसंवादवादे (५९) व्यस्तारि ।

1. **इतरः** उत्तरः । तत्पुरुषपक्षे उत्तरपदार्थप्राधान्यम् ; बहुव्रीहौ त्वन्यपदार्थप्राधान्यमिति । ननु द्वितीयभिन्नमित्याद्यर्थे नञर्थस्यैव प्राधान्यात् कथमुत्तरप्राधान्यमिति चेन्न—अब्राह्मण इत्यादौ भिन्नाद्यर्थलाभस्यार्थिकता, आरोपितब्राह्मणत्ववानिति च वाच्यार्थ इति वर्णयद्भिर्वैयाकरणैर्बहूपपत्तिपूर्वकमुत्तरप्राधान्यस्य नञ्समासे स्थापितत्वात् तदनुसारेणेदम् । अथ वा **इतरः** द्वितीयातिरिक्तः। 2. **तत्** तृतीयप्रथमादिकम् ।

द्वितीयेन तथा[1] स्पृष्टा (ष्टाः ?) (स्प्रष्टा) स्वस्थास्तिष्ठन्त्यबाधिताः ॥
ननु नञ् ब्रह्मणोऽन्यस्य सर्वस्यैव निषेधकम् । द्वितीयग्रहणं यस्मात् सर्वस्यैवोपलक्षणम् ॥
नैवम् , निषेधो[2] न ह्यस्माद् द्वितीयस्यावगम्यते । ततोऽन्यत् तद्विरुद्धं वा सदृशं वाऽत्र वक्ति सः॥
द्वितीयं[3] यस्य नैवास्ति तद्ब्रह्मेति विवक्षिते । सत्यादिलक्षणोक्तीनामपलक्षणता भवेत् ॥
अद्वितीये द्वितीयार्थनास्तितामात्रगोचरे । स्वनिष्ठत्वान्नञर्थस्य न स्याद्ब्रह्मपदान्वयः ॥
द्वितीयशून्यता तत्र ब्रह्मणो न विशेषणम् । विशेषणे[4] वा तद्ब्रह्म तृतीयं प्रथमं तु वा ॥

(बहुव्रीह्ययोगः)

(3) प्रसक्तं पूर्ववत् सर्वं बहुव्रीहौ समस्यति । ब्रह्मणः[5] प्रथमा (मो ?) ये च तृतीयाद्या जगत्त्रये ॥
ब्रह्म प्रत्यद्वितीयत्वात् स्वस्थास्तिष्ठन्त्यबाधिताः । [6]किञ्च तत्र बहुव्रीहौ समासे संश्रिते सति ॥
[7]वृत्त्यर्थस्य नञर्थस्य न पदार्थान्तरान्वयः । सत्या(त्य ?)र्थान्तरसम्बन्धे षष्ठी यस्येति युज्यते ॥
द्वितीयवस्तुनास्तित्वं न ब्रह्म न विशेषणम् । असत्त्वात् ; न ह्यसत् ब्रह्म भवेत् , नापि विशेषणम् ॥
तस्मात् प्रपञ्चसद्भावो नाद्वैतश्रुतिबाधितः । स्वप्रमाणबलात् सिद्धः श्रुत्या[8] चाप्यनुमोदितः ॥

(सिद्धान्ते अद्वितीयश्रुत्यर्थः)

(4) तेनाद्वितीयं ब्रह्मेति श्रुतेरर्थोऽयमुच्यते । द्वितीयगणनायोग्यो नासीदस्ति भविष्यति ॥

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1. **तथा** विरुद्धत्वेन स्पृष्टाः । अद्वितीयमित्यत्र विरुद्धत्वद्वारा द्वितीयस्यान्वयः । तत्राद्वितीयमिति प्रथमविवक्षायां पदार्थद्वयसिद्धिः । तृतीयचतुर्थादिविवक्षायां त्रयचतुष्टयादिसिद्धिः। 2. **निषेधः** अभावः । 3. अस्य श्लोकस्य तत्पुरुषपक्षनिविष्टत्वादेवमर्थः—**यस्य** यत् प्रति द्वितीयं नास्ति, यदपेक्षया द्वितीयाभावोऽद्वितीयपदार्थः, तद्ब्रह्मेत्युक्तौ अद्वितीयश्रुतिर्गुणतोपि सद्वितीयतां न सहत इति सत्यादिवाक्यं लक्षणपरं न स्यादिति । 4. ब्रह्मणो द्वितीयाभावरूपत्वस्वीकारेण विशेषणत्वेपि प्रतियोग्यभावयोरेकत्वायोगेन प्रतियोगिनो द्वितीयत्वे यदपेक्षया प्रकृताभावप्रतियोगि द्वितीयं तत् प्रथमम् ; अभावरूपं ब्रह्म तृतीयम् । अभावापेक्षयैव प्रतियोगिनो द्वितीयत्वे च ब्रह्म प्रथममिति सिद्ध्यतीत्यर्थः । तथाच लोके परमार्थस्यैव प्रतियोगित्वान्नैकमात्रसिद्धिरिति भावः । अत्र प्रागभावप्रध्वंसात्यन्तान्योन्याभावविकल्पेन ब्रह्मणोऽनित्यत्वं कार्यत्वं, प्रपञ्चस्य तुच्छत्वम् , इष्टासिद्धिश्च ; द्वितीयाभावस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वे द्वितीयस्य प्रतियोगिनोऽध्यासायोगश्चेति शतदूषण्याम् । 5. ब्रह्मणो यत् प्रथमं, ब्रह्म प्रति यानि तृतीयादीनि, तानि सर्वाणि ब्रह्मण्यबाधितानि ; कुतः ? तस्याद्वितीयत्वात् । द्वितीयमात्ररहितत्वादिति । तदुक्तम्—'प्रथमादिविधिकटाक्षेणे'ति ।

6. सर्वनिषेधाभिप्रायेण बहुव्रीहौ दोषमाह **किञ्चेति** । 7. क्वचित्तालकोशे त्र्यर्थस्येति पाठः ; अन्यत्र सर्वत्र 'वत्यर्थस्ये'ति । **वृत्त्यर्थस्य** वृत्त्युपस्थाप्यस्य, **नञर्थस्य** निषेधस्य द्वितीयाभावरूपस्य । तदुक्तम्-'द्वितीयनिषेधवत्त्वञ्च ब्रह्मण उपस्थापयन्त्यां वृत्तौ कथं निर्विशेषत्वसिद्धिः' इति । 8. प्रकृतवाक्यस्याप्रशब्द-कर्मकाण्ड-सृष्टिश्रुत्यादिना । चः श्रुत्यर्थापत्तिसमुच्चये ।

[1]समो वाऽभ्यधिको वाऽस्य यो द्वितीयस्तु गण्यते । यतोऽस्य विभवव्यूहकलामात्रमिदं जगत् ॥
द्वितीयवागास्पदतां प्रतिपद्येत तत् कथम् । यथा चोलनृप[2]स्सम्राडद्वितीयोऽद्य (त्र) भूतले ॥
इति तत्तुल्यनृपतिनिवारणपरं वचः । न तु [3]तद्भृत्यतत्पुत्रकलत्रादिनिषेध(निवार)कम् ॥
तथा सुरासुरनरब्रह्मब्रह्माण्डकोटयः । [4]क्लेशकर्मविपाकाद्यैरस्पृष्टस्याखिलेशितुः ॥
ज्ञानादिषाड्गुण्यनिधेरचिन्त्यविभवस्य ताः । विष्णोर्विभूतिमहिमसमुद्रद्रप्सविप्रुषः ॥
कः खल्वङ्गुलिभङ्गेन समुद्रान् सप्त संख्यया । गणयन् गणयेद्मिकेनबुद्बुदविप्रुषः ॥
यथैक एव सविता न द्वितीयो नभस्स्थले । इत्युक्त्या न हि सावित्रा निषिध्यन्तेऽत्र रश्मयः॥
यथा [5]प्रधानसंख्येयसंख्यायां नैव गण्यते । संख्या [6]पृथक्सती तत्र संख्येयान्यपदार्थवत् ॥

(सिद्धान्ते श्रुत्यन्तरोपष्टम्भः)

(5) तथा-'पादोऽस्य विश्वा भूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि' । इति ब्रुवञ्ज(ज्ञ ?) गत् सर्वमित्थम्भावे न्यवेशयत् ॥ तथा-'एतावानस्य महिमा ततो ज्यायस्तरो हि सः', 'यत्रान्यन्न विजानाति स भूमा', 'उदरमन्तरम् ॥

कुरुतेऽस्य भयं व्यक्तम्' इत्यादिश्रुतयः पराः । 'मेरोरिवाणुर्यस्येदं ब्रह्माण्डमखिलं जगत् ॥'
इत्यादिकाः समस्तस्य तदित्थम्भावतापराः[7] । 'वाचारम्भणमात्रं तु जगत् स्थावरजङ्गमम् ॥
विकारजातं ; कूटस्थं मूलकारणमेव सत् । अनन्यत् कारणात् कार्यं पावकाद्विस्फुलिंगवत् ॥
मृत्तिकालोहबीजादिनानादृष्टान्तविस्तरैः ।' 'नाशकद्दग्धुमनलस्तृणं मज्जयितुं जलम् ॥
न वायुश्चलितुं शक्तस्तच्छक्त्याप्यायनात् ऋते ।' '[8]एकप्रधानविज्ञानात् विज्ञातमखिलं भवेत् ॥''

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1. 'अस्मत्पक्षे तु वृत्तिद्वयमपि सम्यक् । द्वितीयव्यतिरेकोक्त्या सतः स्यादग्रगण्यता ।-द्वितीयशून्यतोक्त्या च तत्समाननिषेधनम्' इति श-दू-। निमित्तरूपकारणान्तरनिषेधेन ब्रह्मणस्स्वतस्सर्वजगत्सूतित्वबोधकोऽद्वितीयशब्द इति भाष्यार्थस्य प्रकृतग्रन्थार्थसामरस्यमभिप्रेत्य च 'कारणपरत्वे च सति....अद्वितीयपदस्य स्वतन्त्रभेदनिषेधपरत्वे प्राप्ते सति अविभक्तनामरूपताप्रतिपादकेन एकमिति पदेनोपादानत्वस्य सिद्धत्वान्निमित्तान्तरस्य बुद्धिस्थत्वाच्च निमित्तान्तररूपस्वतन्त्रवस्तुनिषेधपरमद्वितीयपदम्' इति श्रु. प्र. जि. ; एवं शतदूषण्यपि । 2. अस्यैव राज्ञस्सभायां वादिनो विजित्य निजवैष्णवसिद्धान्तस्थापनादेते परमाचार्याः गार्हस्थ्ये 'आल वन्दार्' इत्यभिनन्दनेनार्धराज्यप्रदानेन संमानिताः । 3. 'यथा शरीरजाति....गुणवसनभूषणादि....पुरुषेऽवस्थिते तत्रैक एव तिष्ठति....इति व्यपदिशन्ती'ति शतदूषणी (३६) । 4. 'अविद्याऽस्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशाः क्लेशा ; कर्म पुण्यापुण्यरूपम् , तत्फलं विपाकः, आशयो वासना॥ 5. प्रधानसंख्येयः इति सविसर्गपाठः सर्वत्र । 6. अन्यतया स्थितापीत्यर्थः । अपृथक्सतीतिच्छेदे अपृथक्सिद्धत्वान्न गण्यत इत्यर्थः । 7. प्रकारतापराः । 8. विशिष्टे विशेष्यतयान्तर्गतत्वात् कारणत्वाच्च प्राधान्यम् । कारणदशायां चिदचिदीश्वरत्रयसत्त्वेऽप्येतन्मात्रनिर्देश ईदृशप्राधान्यात् । अन्यत्तु विशेषणं, कारणतावच्छेदकश्चेति ।

इत्यादिवेदवचन--तन्मूलाप्तागमैरपि । [1]ब्रह्मात्मनाऽऽत्मलाभोऽयं प्रपञ्चश्चिदचिन्मयः ॥

(प्रपञ्चनिषेधायोगः)

इति प्रमीयते ब्राह्मी विभूतिर्न निषिध्यते । तन्निषेधे समस्तस्य मिथ्यात्वात् लोकवेदयोः ॥
व्यवहारास्तु लुप्येरन् तथा स्याद्ब्रह्मधीरपि । 'व्यावहारिकसत्यत्वान्मृषात्वेऽप्यविरुद्धता ॥
प्रत्यक्षादे'रिति मतं प्रागेव समदूदुषम् । अतश्चोपनिषज्जातब्रह्माद्वैतधिया जगत् ॥
न बाध्यते विभूतित्वाद्ब्रह्मणश्चेत्यवस्थितम् ।

(प्रपञ्चे सत्वासत्त्वसंकरविचारः)

(7) [2]ननु सत्त्वे प्रपञ्चस्य नास्तीति प्रत्ययः कथम् ॥
[3]असत्त्वे वा कथं तस्मिन् अस्तीति प्रत्ययो भवेत् । सदसत्त्वं तथैकस्य विरुद्धत्वादसंभवि ॥
सदसत्प्रत्ययप्राप्तविरुद्धद्वन्द्वसंगमे । तयोरन्यतरार्थस्य निश्चयाभावहेतुतः ॥
सदसत्त्वं प्रपञ्चस्य जैनास्तु प्रतिजानते । सत्त्वप्राप्तिं पुरस्कृत्य नास्तीति प्रत्ययोदयात् ॥
सदा सत्त्वं प्रपञ्चस्य सांख्यास्तु प्रतिपेदिरे । सदसत्प्रत्ययप्राप्तविरुद्धद्वन्द्वसंकटे ॥
विरोधपरिहारार्थं सत्त्वासत्त्वांशभङ्गतः । सदसद्भ्यामनिर्वाच्यं प्रपञ्चं केचिदूचिरे ॥
सत्त्वासत्त्वे विभागेन देशकालादिभेदतः । घटादेरिति मन्वाना व्यवस्थामपरे[4] जगुः ॥
तदेवं वादिसंमर्दात् संशये समुपस्थिते । निर्णयः क्रियते तत्र मीमांसकमतेन तु ॥
[5]घटस्वरूपे नास्तित्वमस्तित्वं यद्यबूबुधत् (न्?) । स्यादेव युगपत् सत्त्वमसत्त्वञ्च घटादिषु ॥
इदानीमिदमत्रास्ति नास्तीत्येवंविधा यतः । देशकालदशाभेदादस्तिनास्तीति नो धियः ॥
अतो देशादिभेदेन सदसत्त्वं घटादिषु । व्यवस्थितं निरस्तत्वा[6] (स्या?)द्वादस्येह न संभवः॥
[7]ननु देशादिसंबन्धः सत एवोपपद्यते । न देशकालसंबन्धात् असतस्सत्त्वमिष्यते ॥
संबन्धो द्व्याश्रयस्तस्मात्सतस्सत्त्वं सदा भवेत् । असतः कारकैस्सत्त्वं जन्मनेत्यतिदुर्घटम् ॥
[8]आद्यन्तवान् प्रपञ्चोऽतः सत्कक्ष्यान्तर्निवेक्ष्यते । उक्तञ्च—"आदावन्ते च यन्नास्ति नास्ति मध्येऽपि तत्तथा ॥"
अतो निश्चितसद्भावस्सदा सन्नभ्युपेयताम् । असतः सर्वदाऽसत्त्वं जन्ययोगात्[9] खपुष्पवत् ॥
असत्त्वे न विशेषोऽस्ति [10]प्रागत्यन्तासतोरिह ।

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1. ब्रह्मरूपेणात्मनाऽन्तर्यामिणा । आत्मनः स्वरूपस्य लाभो यस्येति बहुव्रीहिः। 2. एतत्प्रघट्टार्थश्च शतदूषण्यां सत्त्वासत्त्वविवेकवाद (६०) तो द्रष्टव्यः । 3. अनेन बौद्धमतनिरासः । 4. मीमांसकाः सिद्धान्तिनश्च । 5. जैनमतं निरस्यति घटेति । धिय इति वक्ष्यमाणत्वादत्रापि धियां कर्तृत्वे अबूबुधन्निति बहुवचनं युक्तम् । 6. स्याद्वादस्येति पाठो युक्ततरः ; जैनवादस्येत्यर्थः । 7. साङ्ख्यमतमुत्थापयति ।

8. आद्यन्तवत्त्वेनाभिमन्यमानः । 9. जन्ययोगात् जनेरुत्पत्तेरयोगात् । 10. प्रागसतः कार्यत्वाभिमतस्य, अत्यन्तासतः खपुष्पस्य च ।

[1] ... . ?

(तत्त्वमसिवाक्यार्थविचारः)

(8) [2]श्वेतकेतुमुपादाय 'तत् त्वम्' इत्यपि यच्छ्रुतम्, षष्ठप्रपाठके तस्य कुतो मुख्यार्थसंभवः॥

कार्पण्यशोकदुःखार्तश्चेतनः त्वम्पदोदितः। सर्वज्ञस्सत्यसंकल्पो निःसीमसुखसागरः॥
तत्पदार्थस्तयोरैक्यं तेजस्तिमिरवत् कथम्।
त्वमर्थस्थे तटस्थे वा [तदर्थस्थे च भेदके]। गुणे तत्त्वंपदश्रुत्योरैकार्थ्यं दूरवारितम्॥
अज्ञत्वसर्ववेदित्वदुःखित्वसुखितादिके। विशेषणे वा [3]चिद्धातोरथवाऽप्युपलक्षणे[4]॥
विरुद्धगुणसंक्रान्तेर्भेदः स्यात् त्वंतदर्थयोः। 'वाच्यैकदेशभङ्गेन चिदेकव्यक्तिनिष्ठता॥
सोऽयं गौरितिवत् तत्त्वंपदयोः' इत्यपेशलम्। देशकालदशाभेदादेकस्मिन्नपि धर्मिणि॥
विरुद्धद्वन्द्वसंक्रान्तेः[5] सोऽयं गौरिति युज्यते। स्वप्रकाशस्य चिद्धातोर्विरुद्धद्वन्द्वसंगतौ॥
[6]न व्यवस्थापकं किञ्चित् देशकालदशादिके। निर्धूतनिखिलद्वन्द्वस्वप्रकाशे चिदात्मनि॥
द्वैतानर्थभ्रमाभावात् शास्त्रं निर्विषयं भवेत्। एतेन[7] सत्यकामत्व—जगत्कारणतादयः॥
मा[योपाधौ] परेऽध्यस्ताः, शोकमोहादयः पुनः। अविद्योपाधिके जीवे [8]विनाशेने (विभागेने?)ति यन्मतम्॥ क्षुद्रब्रह्मविदामेतन्मतं प्रागेव दूषितम्। चित्स्वरूपे विशिष्टे वा मायाऽविद्याद्युपाधयः॥
पूर्वस्मिन् सर्वसांकर्यं परजीवाविभागतः। उत्तरस्मिन्नपि तथा विशिष्टमपि[9] चित् यदि॥
चित्स्वरूपं हि निर्भेदं मायाविद्याद्युपाधिभिः। विभिन्नमिव विभ्रान्तं विशिष्टश्च[10] [अभिमन्यते]॥
तटस्थावस्थिता धर्माः स्वरूपं न स्पृशन्ति किम्[11]। न हि दण्डि (ण्डयी?) शिरश्छेदात् देवदत्तो न

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1. अत्रोक्तानां जैनसाङ्ख्याद्वैतिमीमांसकमतानां मध्ये जैननिराकरणपूर्वकसांख्यप्रस्तावमात्रोपलम्भात् सांख्यदूषणाद्वैतिप्रस्तावतद्दूषणभागो लुप्त इत्यालोच्यते; उत्तरोपलब्धांशेनासङ्गतत्वाच्च। 'सदसद्व्यतिरेकोक्तिः पूर्वमेव पराकृता' इत्युपरितनवाक्यमत्रत्यपराकरणप्रकाराभिप्रायमपि स्यात्। 2. तत्त्वमसिवाक्यादखण्डैकमात्रसिद्धिरिति परोक्तं निरस्यति श्वेतकेतुमिति। 3. मूलभूतं सारभूतं वा वस्तु धातुशब्देन तत्रतत्रोच्यते, आकाशधातुः, तेजोधातुः, विज्ञानधातुरित्येवम्। 4. उपलक्ष्यैक्ये उपलक्षणद्वयवैयर्थ्यादुपलक्षणवैलक्षण्याच्चोपलक्ष्यधर्मभेद आवश्यक इति विरुद्धगुणत्वमवर्ज्यमिति। 5. तथाच तत्रापि न व्यक्तिमात्रे लक्षणेति। 6. विभिन्नोपाधिमप्यन्तरेण चिति अज्ञत्वसर्वज्ञत्वस्वीकारे विरुद्धसमावेशदोषो दुर्वार इति भावः। 7. उपाध्यभावे विरोधपरिहारायोग इति हेतुना। अस्य यन्मतमित्यत्रान्वयः। 8. उपरि परजीवाविभागत इति दर्शनादत्रापि 'विभागेन' इति स्यात्। 9. विशिष्टे मायादिसंबन्धवादिनापि विशिष्टान्तर्गते विशेषणे तदयोगात् विशेष्यांशे तदुक्तौ सर्वसांकर्यदोष एवेति। 10. अतो मायाद्यतिरिक्तं विशेषणमपि दुर्वचमिति। 11. तदुक्तम्, 'न चोपलक्षणं सर्वं बहिःष्ठमिति नियमः, गोत्वपृथिवीत्वाद्युपलक्षणसास्नादिमत्त्वगन्धवत्त्वादेर्बहिःष्ठत्वाभावात्' (श. दू. ३८) इति। न ह्यज्ञत्वादिकमविद्यादिमात्रगतम्; तथासति मायाविद्ययोरेव जीवत्वेश्वरत्वापत्तेः। अत इह तटस्थता-

हिंसितः ॥ [1]अचिदंशव्यपोहेन चिदेकपरिशेषता । अतस्तत्त्वमसीत्यादेरर्थ इत्यप्यसुन्दरम् ॥
[2]अब्रह्मानात्मताभावे प्रत्यक्चित् परिशिष्यते । तत्त्वम्पदद्वयं जीवपरतादात्म्यगोचरम् ॥
तन्मुख्यवृत्तितादात्म्यमपि वस्तुद्वयाश्रयम् । भेदाभेदविकल्पस्तु यस्त्वया परिचोदितः ॥
[3]अभेदाभेदिनोऽसत्त्वे बन्धे सति (?) निरर्थकः। [4]अभेदो भेदमर्दी तु(ति)स्वाश्रयीभूतवस्तुनोः॥
भेदः परस्परानात्म्यं भावानामेवमेतयोः ; स्वरूपमभ्युपेत्यैव भेदाभेदविकल्पयोः ॥
[विधानं] तेन वाग्बाधा[5]विरोधेन निगृह्यसे । भिन्नाभिन्नत्वसंबन्धसदसत्त्वविकल्पनम् ॥
प्रत्यक्षानुभवापास्तं केवलं कण्ठशोषणम् । नीले नीलमतिर्यादृक् उत्पले नीलधीर्हि सा ॥
नीलमुत्पलमेवेदमिति साक्षाच्चकास्ति नः । यथा विदितसंयोगसंबन्धेऽप्यक्षगोचरे ॥
भेदाभेदा[6]दिदुस्तर्कविकल्पाऽऽधानविभ्रमः । तद्वत् तादात्म्यसंबन्धे श्रुतिप्रत्यक्षमूलके ॥
श्रुतिदण्डेन दुस्तर्कविकल्पभ्रमवारणम् । निर्दोषाऽपौरुषेयी च श्रुतिरत्यर्थमादरात् ॥
असकृत् 'तत् त्वम्' इत्याह तादात्म्यं ब्रह्मजीवयोः। [7]ब्रह्मानन्दंह (न्दह ?) दान्तःस्थो मुक्तात्मा सुखमेधते ॥ फले च फलिनोऽभावान्मोक्षस्यापुरुषार्थता । एकशेषे हि चिद्धातोः कस्य मोक्षः फलं भवेत् ॥

(एकस्यास्संविदःप्रपञ्चोपादानत्वेऽनुपपत्तिः)

(8) किञ्च प्रपञ्चरूपेण का नु संवित् विवर्तते । न तावद्घटधीः, तस्यामसत्यामपि दर्शनात् ॥
न हि तस्यामजातायां नष्टायां वाऽखिलं जगत् । नास्तीति शक्यते वक्तुमुक्तौ प्रत्यवाधनात् ॥
नाप्यन्यसंवित्, तन्नाशेऽप्यन्येषा[8]मुपलम्भनात् ॥

वादिना उपहितस्वरूपगत्वमेव वाच्यमिति । दण्डीत्यत्र दण्डचेति स्यात्, अज्ञत्वादौ अविद्याशबलत्वादेरिव शिरश्छेदे दण्ड्यतायाः प्रयोजकत्वसंभवात् । 1. मायाविद्योपाधिपक्षदूषणं निगमयति ॥ अत इत्यस्य तत्त्वम्पदयोः मायाविद्यावच्छिन्नचिद्वाचकत्वाभावादित्यर्थकस्यासुन्दरमित्यत्रान्वयः । 2. त्वमर्थ आत्मनि अब्रह्मत्वस्य, तदर्थे ब्रह्मण्यनात्मत्वस्य चाभावे पदद्वयार्थस्यात्यन्ताभिन्नत्वे केवलचिन्मात्रमर्थः स्यात् । तथा च प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदविशिष्टवेषेण वस्तुभेदप्रयुक्तत्वात् तादात्म्यस्य, तदत्र न भवतीति । 3. यत्र प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तरूपेण भेदः, विशेष्यरूपेणाभेदश्च, तत् भेदाभेदि, तदन्यस्य, घटः पटः, घटो घट इति च तादात्म्यसंबन्धे असति उक्तविकल्पो व्यर्थ इति । सतीत्यत्र 'स तु' इति वा पाठः । 4. ब्रह्मसिद्धिकारादिना भेदाभेदयोस्स्वरूपभेदसिद्धान्तमभ्युपेत्यैव तद्विरोधिवचनान्निग्रहस्थानमित्याह । 5. बाधारूपो विरोधः । बाधादिति पाठो वा । 6. भिन्नयोस्संयोगश्चेत्, विन्ध्यहिमवतोस्स्यात् । अभिन्नगश्चेत्, स्वात्मना सहापि घटादेस्स्यादित्येतादृशः । 7. मोक्षेपि ब्रह्मभिन्नजीवस्थितेरावश्यकत्वं दर्शयति ॥ अन्तःस्थपदेन नदीसमुद्रजलयोरिव मुक्तब्रह्मणोर्भेदः, त्वम्पदस्य प्रकारभूतजीवविशिष्टपरत्वञ्च दर्श्यते । फले फलकाले । फलेनेति पाठे सहयोगे तृतीया । 8. अन्येषां प्रापञ्चिकपदार्थानाम् ।

(अथ पूर्वपक्षः—तत्र सोपपत्ति संविदेकत्ववचनम्)

(10) ननु संवित् अभिन्नैका न तस्यामस्ति भेदधीः । घटादयो हि भिद्यन्ते न तु सा चित् प्रकाशनात् ॥

घटधीः पटसंवित्तिसमये नावभाति चेत् । नैवम् , घटो हि नाभाति सा स्फुरत्येव तु स्फुटम् ॥
घटव्यावृत्तसंवित्तिरथ न स्फुरतीति चेत् । तद्व्यावृत्ति (त्ति?) पदेनापि किं सैवोक्ताऽथवेतरत् ॥
सैव चेत् , भासते,ऽन्यच्चेत् , न ब्रूमस्तस्य भासनम् ।
[1]किञ्चास्याः स्वप्रकाशाया नीरूपाया न हि स्वतः ॥ ऋते विषयनानात्वान्नानात्वावग्रहभ्रमः ।
[2]न वस्तु वस्तुधर्मो वा न प्रत्यक्षो न लैङ्गिकः ॥ घटादिवेद्यभेदोऽपि केवलं भ्रमलक्षणः[3] ।
यदा, तदा तदायत्तो धीभेदावग्रहोदयः ॥ कुतः, कुतस्तरां तस्य परमार्थत्वसंभवः ।

(पूर्वपक्षे संविन्नित्यत्वम्)

(11) किञ्च[4] स्वयंप्रकाशस्य स्वतो वा परतोऽपि वा । प्रागभावादिसिद्धिः स्यात् ; स्वतस्तावत् न युज्यते ॥ स्वस्मिन् सति विरुद्धत्वादभावस्यानवस्थितेः । स्वनिमित्तप्रकाशस्य स्वस्याभावेऽप्यसंभवात् ॥ अनन्यगोचरत्वेन चितो न परतोऽपि च ।

(तत्र संविन्निर्धर्मकत्वम्)

(12) किञ्च[5] वेद्यस्य भेदादेर्न चिद्धर्मत्वसंभवः । रूपादिवत् अतः संविदद्वितीया स्वयम्प्रभा ॥
अतस्तद्भेदमाश्रित्य यत् विकल्पादिजल्पितम् । तदविद्याविलासोऽयमिति ब्रह्मविदो विदुः ॥

(उक्तपूर्वपक्षखण्डनविस्तरः ; संविद्भेदसमर्थनम्)

(13) हन्त ! ब्रह्मोपदेशोऽयं श्रद्धानेषु शोभते । वयमश्रद्धानास्स्मो ये युक्तिं प्रार्थयामहे ॥
[6]प्रतिप्रमातृविषयं परस्परविलक्षणाः । अपरोक्षं प्रकाशन्ते सुखदुःखादिवत् धियः॥ [7]सम्बन्धिव्यंग्यभेदस्य संयोगेच्छादिकस्य नः (च) । न हि भेदः स्वतो नास्ति नाप्रत्यक्षश्च संमतः ॥

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1. एवं वस्तुभेदेपि वित्तिभेदो नास्तीत्युक्तम् । अथ वस्तुभेदोपि मिथ्येति वित्तिभेदसत्यत्वं दूरापास्तमित्याह किञ्चेति । स्वतो नीरूपायाः निराकारायाः । न हि भ्रम इत्यन्वयः। अवग्रहो वैशिष्ट्यमवगाहनं वा । 2. भेदो नाम न वस्तुस्वरूपम् ; वस्तुग्रहणमात्रेण भेदव्यवहाराभावात् । नापि वस्तुधर्मः, तुल्यन्यायेन वस्तुनि धर्मभूतभेदाद् भेदस्यापि धर्मतयाऽनवस्थापत्त्यादिदोषात् । न प्रत्यक्षः, प्रत्यक्षस्य सन्मात्रग्राहित्वात् । अत एव क्वचिदप्यप्रत्यक्षतया अगृहीतव्याप्तिरूपसंबन्धत्वात् अलैङ्गिकोपीत्यर्थः। श्रीभाष्यादावेतद्विस्तरः। 3. भ्रान्तिसिद्ध इत्यर्थः । 4. 5. किञ्चेत्याद्योरनयोर्विवरणमात्मसिद्धौ ।

6. प्रतीत्यादिकारिकाद्वयं श्रु. प्र.जि. व्याख्यातम् । तत्र नः इत्यत्र चेति पाठः । श-दू. संविदद्वैतभङ्ग (३३) वादात् इह प्रायो विंशतेः कारिकाणामर्थो ग्राह्यः । 7. संबन्धिना आश्रयेणैव संयोगादेः संयोगाद्यन्तरात् भेदो ज्ञाप्यते । तावता न विश्वसंयोगैक्यम् ; एवमिच्छादावपीत्यर्थः ।

(नित्यविभुसंविदैक्यपक्षेऽनुपपत्तिः)

(14) यदि सर्वगता नित्या संविदेवा(का ?)भ्युपेयते । ततः सर्वं सदा भायात्, न वा किञ्चित् कदाचन॥ तदानीं न हि वेद्यस्य संनिधीतरकारिता। व्यवस्था घटते वित्तेः व्योमवत् वैभवाश्रयात्॥ नापि कारणभेदेन, नित्यायास्तदभावतः । [1]न च स्वरूपनानात्वात्, तदेकत्वपरिग्रहात् ॥ ततश्च बधिरान्धादेः शब्दादिग्रहणं भवेत् । गुरुशिष्यादिभेदश्च निर्निमित्तः प्रसज्यते ॥

(संविद्भिन्नसर्वापलापेन शङ्का तत्खण्डनञ्च)

(15) ननु नस्संविदो भिन्नं सर्वं नाम न किञ्चन । अतः सर्वं सदा भायादित्यकाण्डेऽनुयुज्यते[2] ॥ इदमाख्याहि भोः किन्तु नीलादिर्न प्रकाशते । प्रकाशमानो नीलादिः संविदो वा न भिद्यते ॥ आदौ प्रतीतिसुभगो[3] निर्वाहो लोकवेदयोः । यतः पदपदार्थादि न किंचित् अवभासते ॥ द्वितीये संविदोऽद्वैतं व्याहन्येत समीहितम् । [4]यद्ययं विविधाकारप्रपञ्चः संविदात्मकः ॥ साऽपि संवित् तदात्मेति यतो नाना प्रसज्यते ।

(अविद्यादेर्भिन्नाभिन्नानिर्वचनीयत्वखण्डनम्)

(16) न [5]चाविद्याविलासत्वाद् भेदाभेदानिरूपणा। सा हि न्यायानलस्पृष्टा जातुषाभरणायते॥

(तत्र अविद्येत्यत्र नञर्थविचारः)

(17) तथाहि—यद्यविद्येयं विद्याऽभावात्मिकेष्यते । निरूपाख्यस्वभावत्वात् सा न किंचिन्नियच्छति ॥ अर्थान्तरमविद्या चेत्, साध्वी भेदानिरूपणा ।
'अर्थानर्थान्तरत्वादिविकल्पोऽस्या न युज्यते। विद्यातोऽर्थान्तरं चासौ' इति सुव्याहृतं वचः ॥ अथार्थान्तरभावोऽपि तस्याः ते भ्रान्तिकल्पितः ।
हन्तैवं सत्यविद्यैव विद्या स्यात् परमार्थतः ॥ किंच शुद्धाऽजडा संवित्, अविद्येयं तु नेदृशी । तत् केन हेतुना सेयमन्यैव न निरूप्यते ॥

(अविद्यापदार्थगतविद्यास्वरूपशोधनम्)

(18) [6]अपिचेयमविद्या ते यदभावादिरूपिणी ॥
सा विद्या किन्नु संवित्तिर्वेद्यं वा वेदिताऽथवा । वेद्यत्वे वेदितृत्वे च [7]नास्यास्ताभ्यां निवर्तनम् ॥

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1. ननु काचित् संवित् कञ्चिदेवार्थं भासयतीति स्वभावत एव व्यवस्थेत्यत्र, एवं संविद्भेदेऽपसिद्धान्त इत्याह नचेति । 2. 'न युज्यते' इति मुद्रितपाठः । 3. अनुभवानुगुण इति परिहासः । 4. इदं पञ्चिकायामपि (८.प्र) ब्रह्मसिद्धिखण्डनावसरे । 5. अविद्याया भिन्नाभिन्नानिर्वचनीयतया तद्विलासे नीलादावपि सेति नेत्यर्थः । इदमेवोक्तं (श. दू) 'अनिरूपितभेदाभेदाविद्याविलासदौर्घटयविश्रमेऽस्मदुक्तदूषणाभ्युपगतिमन्तरेणापसर्पणासिद्धेः' इति । 6. अविद्येत्यत्र विद्याशब्दार्थः क इति विचारयति अपिचेति । 7. अविद्या यन्निवर्त्या सा हि विद्या । न च वेद्यवेदितृभ्यामविद्यानिवृत्तिर्लोके । प्रत्युत तयोरपि विद्यानिवर्त्यत्वात् न विद्यात्वमिति भावः ।

न हि ज्ञानात् ऋतेऽज्ञानमन्यतस्ते निवर्तते । संविदेवेति चेत् ; तस्या ननु भावादसम्भवः ॥
किंचेयं तद्विरुद्धा वा, न तस्याः क्वापि संभवः । यतोऽखिलं जगद्व्याप्तं विद्ययैवाद्वितीयया ॥
अभावोऽन्यो विरुद्धो वा संविदोऽपि यदीष्यते । तदानीं संविदद्वैतप्रतिज्ञां दूरतस्त्यज ॥

(अविद्याया आश्रयानुपपत्तिः)

(19) किंचासौ कस्य ? जीवस्य ; को जीवः ? यस्य सेति चेत् । नन्वेवमसमाधानमन्योन्याश्रवणं भवेत् ॥ न ते (नर्ते?) जीवादविद्या स्यात्, न च जीवस्तया विना । न बीजाङ्कुरतुल्यत्वं जीवोत्पत्तेरयोगतः ॥ (जीवाविद्यानिरासानन्तरं ब्रह्माविद्यानिरासः)

(20) [1]ब्रह्मणश्चेत्-न-सर्वज्ञं कथं तत् बम्भ्रमीति ते । अविद्याकृतदेहात्मप्रत्ययाधीनता न ते ॥
ब्रह्मसर्वज्ञभावस्य, तत्स्वाभाविकताश्रुतेः । [2]भेदावभासगर्भत्वात् अथ सर्वज्ञता मृषा ॥
तत एवामृषा कस्मान्न स्याच्छब्दान्तरादिवत् । यथा[3] शब्दान्तराभ्याससंख्याद्याः शास्त्रभेदकाः ॥
भेदावभासगर्भाश्च यथार्थाः, तादृशी न किम् । सर्वज्ञे नित्यमुक्तेऽपि यद्यज्ञानस्य संभवः ॥
तेजसीव तमः तस्मात् न निवर्तेत केनचित् । सर्वज्ञत्वादिवचनप्रामाण्यं व्यवहारिकम् ॥
तात्त्विकं तु प्रमाणत्वमद्वैतवचसामिति । नियामकं न पश्यामो निर्बन्धात् तावकात् ऋते ॥
आश्रयप्रतियोगित्वे परस्परविरोधिनी । कथं वैकरसं ब्रह्म सदिति प्रतिपद्यते ॥
प्रत्यक्त्वेना[4]श्रयो ब्रह्मरूपेण प्रतियोगि चेत् । रूपभेदः कुतस्तस्योऽयम् ; यद्यविद्याप्रसादजः ॥
ननु सापि तदायत्तेत्यन्योन्याश्रयणं पुनः ।

(अविद्याया वस्तुत्वम्)

(21) अवस्तुत्वात् अविद्यायाः [नैतत् तद्दूषणं यदि] ॥
वस्तुनो दूषणत्वेन त्वया [5]केदं निरीक्षितम् । ससा....उ (स्वसाध्यसिद्धव) त्कारात् दोषोऽन्योन्य-

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1. 'किञ्चासौ कस्य' इति प्रश्ने ब्रह्मण इति समाधिमनूद्य निरस्यति ॥ अविद्येति किं ज्ञानसंसर्गाभावादिरुच्यते, उत ज्ञानान्योन्याभावः ? आद्ये आह सर्वज्ञमित्यादि । अन्त्ये वक्ष्यति **आश्रयप्रतियोगित्वे** इति । तदुक्तं शत. दू. १९. 'नापि ज्ञानान्योन्याभावः, ज्ञानान्तरानभ्युपगमात, स्वप्रतियोगिकभेदायोगाच्च' इति । 2. सर्वज्ञत्वं मिथ्या अयथार्थभेदावगाहित्वात् इति । 3. कर्म भेदकप्रमाणानि षट् पू. मी. द्वितीयाध्याये कथितानि । ददाति, जुहोतीत्यादौ शब्दान्तरम् ; समिधो यजति; तनूनपातं यजतीत्यभ्यासः ; तिस्र आहुतीर्जुहोतीति संख्या ; अथैष ज्योतिरथैष विश्वज्योतिरिति संज्ञा ; वाजिभ्यो वाजिनमित्युक्तः सा वैश्वदेव्यामिक्षेत्युक्तात् अन्यो गुणः; मासमग्निहोत्रं जुहुतीति नित्याग्निहोत्रतः प्रकरणान्तरमिति । एषां कर्मभेदकानां शास्त्रभेदकत्वपक्षानुसारेण **शास्त्रभेदका** इत्युक्तम् । तदुक्तम् श्रु.प्र.जि.'शास्त्रभेदः कर्मभेदो वा' इति । 4. विद्याभेदरूपाविद्याश्रयत्वं प्रत्यक्त्वेन रूपेण ; विद्यारूपस्य तस्य प्रतियोगित्वं ब्रह्मत्वेनेति । **पुनः** जीवाविद्यापक्ष इव । 5. तथाचैषां दोषाणां दोषता कुत्रापि न स्यात् । सर्वमिथ्यात्ववादिना चावस्तुन्येवैषां दोषत्वमेष्टव्यमिति ।

समाश्रयः ॥ न [1]वस्तुत्वात् ; अवस्तुत्वात् इत्यतो नेदमुत्तरम् ।

(अवस्तुत्वासिद्धिवचनम्)

(22) **[2]किञ्चाविद्या न चेत्** (वस्तु व्यवहारः कुतस्त्वयम्) ॥

(न चैष व्योम—(न चावस्तु ख) **पुष्पादिव्यवहारवदिष्य (दीक्ष्य) ते ।**

'नाप्यवस्त्विति चो [क्तिस्ते वस्तुतां तत्र साधयेत्] ॥

[निषिध्यते] **समस्तेन नञा वस्त्विति चेत्** [न तत्] । **समस्तेन नञा वस्तु प्रथमं यन्निषिध्यते ॥**

प्रतिप्रसू[3] (तं ?) **व्यस्तेन पुनस्तदिति वस्तुता ।**

अतो न वस्तुना... ....॥ न कश्चकास्तीति विवक्षिर्या (वा) स्म जातुचित् । (अतो 'न वस्तु नावस्तु याऽविद्या तद्बले सति ॥ भेदो न कश्चकास्ति' इति विवक्षीर्मा स्म जातुचित् । ?)

(अविद्याया जीवस्य चैकत्वनानात्वविकल्पः)

(23) **किञ्च प्रपञ्चनिर्वाहजननी येयमाश्रिता ।**

अविद्या, सा किमेकैव नैका वा तदिदं वद ॥ तदाश्रयश्च संसारी तथैको नैक एव वा ।

(अविद्यैकत्वदूषणम्)

(24) **सा चेत् एका, ततः सैका शुकस्य ब्रह्मविद्यया । पूर्वमेव निरस्तेति व्यर्थस्ते मुक्तये श्रमः॥**

(शुकादिमुक्तिमिथ्यात्वेन एकाविद्यापक्षसमर्थनम्)

(25) **स्यान्मतम् नैव ते सन्ति वामदेवशुकादयः। [4]यद्विद्यया निरस्तत्वात् नाद्याविद्येति चोद्यते ॥**

मुक्तामुक्तादिभेदो हि कल्पितो मदविद्यया । दृश्यत्वान्मामकस्वप्नदृश्यभेदप्रपञ्चवत् ॥

यत् पुनः ब्रह्मविद्यातस्तेषां मुक्तिरभूदिति । वाक्यं तत् स्वाप्नमुक्त्युक्तियुक्ताप्रत्यूहता (युक्त्या प्रत्यूह्यता[5] ?)मिति ॥ (तत्खण्डनम्)

(26) **नन्वीदृशानुमानेन स्वाविद्यापरिकल्पितम् । प्रपञ्चं साधयत्यन्यः कथं प्रत्युच्यते त्वया ॥**

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1. अन्योन्याश्रयदोषो हि स्वस्य स्वसाध्यापेक्षसिद्धित्वप्रयुक्तः, न तु वस्तुत्वप्रयुक्तः । अतः अवस्तुत्वादितीदं नोत्तरमिति । 2. सदसदनिर्वचनीयवादिना, 'अविद्या न वस्तु नाप्यवस्तु' इत्युच्यते । तत्र न वस्तु इत्यंशमत्र दूषयति, अवस्तुत्वात् इति हेतुरसिद्ध इति बोधनाय । इदमेव स्थापयति नाप्यवस्त्वित्यंशशोधनेनोपरितनकारिकाभ्याम् । खपुष्पादिव्यवहारो हि वस्तुशून्यः केवलं शब्दज्ञानानुपाती । न चैष लोकव्यवहारस्तादृशः । अन्यथा अवस्तुनि प्रपञ्च इव खपुष्पादावप्येवं विचित्रव्यवहारप्रसङ्गात् इति । द्वितीयरीत्या पाठक्लृप्तौ तु खपुष्पादीति पृथक्पदम् । तदा **व्यवहारवत्** व्यवहारविशिष्टम् । तथाचार्थक्रियाकारित्वात् वस्तुत्वमेवेति भावः । 3. तत्प्रतिप्रसवो नाम तन्निषेधनिषेधः । 4. **यद्विद्यया**-येषां वामदेवादीनां विद्यया । **चोद्यते**-शंक्यते । 5. **प्रत्यूह्यताम्** बाध्यताम् ।

त्वदविद्यानिमित्तत्वे यो हेतुस्ते विवक्षितः । स एव हेतुः तस्यापि भवेत् [1]सर्वज्ञसिद्धिवत् ॥
इत्यन्योन्यविरुद्धोक्तिव्याहते भवतां मते ।
मुखमस्तीति यत्किंचित् प्रलपन्निव लक्ष्यसे । यथा च स्वाप्नमुक्त्युक्तिसदृशी तद्विमुक्तिगीः॥
तथैव भवतोऽपीति व्यर्थो मोक्षाय ते श्रमः । यथा तेषामभूतैव पुरस्तात् आत्मविद्यया ॥
मुक्तिर्भूतोच्यते, तद्वत् परस्तादात्मविद्यया । अभाविन्येव सा मिथ्या भाविनीत्यपदिश्यताम् ॥
सन्ति च स्वप्नदृष्टानि दृष्टान्तवचनानि ते ।
ननु नेदमनिष्टं मे यत् मुक्तिर्न भविष्यति ॥ आत्मनो नित्यमुक्तत्वान्नित्यसिद्धैव सा यतः ।
तदिदं शान्तिकर्मादौ वेदालावाहनं भवेत् ॥ येनैवं[2]सुतरां व्यर्थो ब्रह्मविद्यार्जनश्रमः ।

(नित्यसिद्धमुक्तयभिव्यक्तये यत्न इति शंका)

(27) अविद्याप्रतिबद्धत्वात् अथ सा नित्यसत्यपि ॥
असतीवेति तद्व्यक्तिर्विद्याफलमुपेयते । हस्तस्थमेव हेमादि विस्मृतं मृग्यते यथा ॥
यथा तदेव हस्तस्थमवगम्योपशाम्यति । तथैव नित्यमुक्तात्मस्वरूपानवबोधतः ॥
संसारिणस्तथाभावो व्यज्यते ब्रह्मविद्यया ।

(अभिव्यक्तिं विकल्प्य तत्परिहारः)

(28) हन्त केयमभिव्यक्तिर्या विद्याफलमिष्यते ॥
स्वप्रकाशस्य चिद्धातोर्या स्वरूपपदे स्थिता । संवित्, किं सैव, किंवाऽहं ब्रह्मास्मीतीति[3] कीदृशी ॥
यदि स्वरूपसंवित् सा, नित्यैवेति न तत्फलम् । अथ ब्रह्माहमस्मीति संवित्तिर्व्यक्तिरिष्यते ॥
ननु ते ब्रह्मविद्या सा सैव तस्याः फलं कथम् । किञ्च सा तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यजन्या भवन्मते ॥
उत्पत्तिमत्यनित्येति मुक्तस्यापि भयं भवेत् ।

(अविद्यायाः ब्रह्मधीप्रतिबन्धकत्वायोगः)

(29) अपिच व्यवहारज्ञाः सति पुष्कलकारणे ॥
कार्यं न जायते येन तमाहुः प्रतिबन्धकम् । इह किं तत्, यत् उत्पत्तुमुपक्रान्तं स्वहेतुतः ॥
अविद्याप्रतिबद्धत्वात् उत्पत्तिं न प्रपद्यते । न मुक्तिः नित्यसिद्धत्वात् ; न ब्रह्मास्मीति धीरपि ॥
न[4] हि ब्रह्माहमस्मीति संवित्पुष्कलकारणम् । संसारिणः तदास्तीति कथं सा प्रतिबध्यते ॥
यतः सा कारणाभावात् इदानीं नोपजायते । न पुनः प्रतिबद्धत्वात् ; अस्थाने तेन तद्वचः ॥

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1. सर्वज्ञोऽस्तीति वादिनः सार्वज्ञ्यपादने सर्वज्ञो नास्तीति तन्निषेद्धुरपि तद्ज्ञानावश्यकतया सार्वज्ञ्यापत्तिः ; तत्रेवेत्यर्थः । यद्वा 'सुगतो यदि सर्वज्ञः कपिलो नेति का प्रमा । तावुभौ यदि सर्वज्ञौ मतिभेदः कथं तयोः' इति रीत्या एकमते सर्वज्ञसिद्धावन्यमतेपि सर्वज्ञान्तरसिद्धिः ; तत्रेवेत्यर्थः ।
2. एवंसति, मुक्तेर्भूतत्वस्येव भविष्यत्त्वस्याप्यभावे । 3. इति पक्षद्वये किंरूपेयमभिव्यक्तिरिति ।
4. अहं ब्रह्मास्मीति संविदो यत् पुष्कलं कारणं, तत् आदौ नास्तीति ।

(जीवैकत्वपक्षस्य पुनर्विशिष्य दूषणम्)

(30) [1]किंचैको जीव इत्येतत् वस्तुस्थित्या न युज्यते। अविद्या-तत्समाश्लेष-जीवत्वादि मृषा हि ते॥ प्रातिभासिकमेकत्वं प्रतिभासपराहतम्। यतो नः प्रतिभासन्ते संसरन्तः सहस्रशः॥ आसंसारसमुच्छेदं व्यवहाराश्च तत्कृताः। अबाधिताः प्रतीयन्ते स्वप्नवृत्त (त्तात्) विलक्षणाः॥ तेन[2] यौक्तिक[3]मेकत्वमपि युक्तिपराहतम्। प्रवृत्तिभेदानुमिता [4]विरुद्धमितिवृत्तयः॥ तत्तत्स्वात्मवत् अन्येपि देहिनोऽशक्यनिह्नवाः। [5]यथाऽनुमेयाद्वह्न्यादेरनुमाना (?)विलक्षणाः॥ प्रत्यक्षं (?) ते तथाऽन्येभ्यो जीवेभ्यो न पृथक् कथम्। न चेच्चेष्टाविशेषेण परो बोद्धाऽनुमीयते॥ व्यवहारोऽवलुप्येत सर्वो लौकिकवैदिकः। न चौपाधिकभेदेन मेयमातृविभागधीः॥ स्वशरीरेऽपि तत्प्राप्तेः शिरःपाण्यादिभेदतः। त (य?)था तत्र शिरःपाणिपादादौ वेदनोदये॥ अनुसंधानमेकत्वे, तथा सर्वत्र ते भवेत्। [6]प्रायणान्न(न्ना)रकक्लेशात् प्रसूतिव्यसनादपि॥ चिरातिवृत्ताः प्राग्जन्मभोगा न स्मृतिगोचराः। युगपज्जायमानेषु (मिथो ह्यस्मरणात्स्थितः)॥ आश्रयासङ्करः, तत्र कथमैकार्थ्यविभ्रमः[7]। (अविद्याजीवानेकत्वपक्षस्यापि दूषणम्)

(31) न च प्रातिस्विकाविद्याकल्पितस्वस्वदृश्यकैः॥ जीवैरनेकैरप्येषा लोकयात्रोपपद्यते। परवार्तानभिज्ञास्ते स्वस्वस्वप्नैकदर्शिनः॥ कथं प्रवर्तयेयुस्तां [8]सङ्गाद्येकनिबन्धनाम्।

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1. किञ्चेत्यादयः कारिका उपदशाः शतदूषण्या(61-2)मर्थतोऽनूदिताः। 2. अबाधितप्रतीतिगोचरत्वात्मकस्वाप्नवैधर्म्यरूपयुक्तिसत्त्वेन। 3. यौक्तिकमिति विवादाध्यासितं चेतनजातमहं चेतनत्वात्, सर्वाणि शरीराणि मयैवात्मवन्ति शरीरत्वादित्यादियुक्तिकल्पितमित्यर्थः।

4. अनुमित्ताः। देहिन इति विशेष्यम्। 5 अनुमेयस्य स्वाभिन्नत्वेऽनुमानवैयर्थ्यम्, प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात्। न च तेषां परोक्षत्वान्मिथोभेदप्रत्यक्षायोगः। तेषु परोक्षेषु स्वभेदप्रत्यक्षायोगेऽपि स्वस्मिन् प्रत्यक्षे तद्भेदप्रत्यक्षसंभवात् इत्याशयेनाऽऽह यथेति। अनुमानाः इतिच्छेदः। महानसादिगतवह्निव्यक्तीनां अनुमितिहेतु व्याप्तिग्रहोपयोगितया तद्विषयतया चानुमानत्वम्। अन्वयार्थश्चैवम्—अनुमेयपर्वतवह्न्यादिविलक्षणा अनुमापकवह्न्यादयो यथा, तथा अन्येभ्यो जीवेभ्यः पृथक् त्वत्स्वरूपं ते न प्रत्यक्षं किमिति। 'प्रत्यक्षस्ते' इति पाठान्तरे त्वत्स्वरूपमितिस्थाने त्वदात्मेत्यध्याहारः। विलक्षणा इति बहुवचनं भूयोदर्शनस्य व्याप्तिग्राहकस्य संभावितत्वाभिप्रायेण। अत्र 'यथाऽनुमेयाद्वह्न्यादेरनुमाना विलक्षणाः। प्रत्यक्ष्यन्ते तथा' इति पाठोप्यभ्यूह्यते। 6. अन्येऽपि अस्मरणहेतवो मूलभावप्रकाशिकायां दर्शिताः। भोगा इत्यत्र भेदा इति श्रु-प्र-पाठः। 7. वस्त्वेकत्वभ्रमः। 8. मिथस्समागमादिसत्त्व एव साध्याम्।

एवं संविदद्वैतखण्डनसिद्धान्तमारभ्य नीलादेः संविद्भेदाभेदविचारं प्रस्तुत्य तद्दुर्निरूपत्ववर्णनार्थप्रसक्ताविद्यादूषणेऽवतीर्य तत्स्वरूप—तदाश्रय—तद्वस्तुत्व—तद्गतप्रतिबन्धकत्व—तदेकत्वनानात्व—

(संविदः सधर्मकत्वादप्यद्वितीयत्वायोगः)

(32) किंच[1] स्वयंप्रकाशत्वविभुत्वैकत्वनित्यताः ॥
त्वदभ्युपेता बाधेरन् संविदस्तेऽद्वितीयताम् । [2]संविदेव न ते धर्माः सिद्धायामपि संविदि ॥
विवाददर्शनात् तेषु ; [3]तद्रूपाणां च भेदतः । न च ते भ्रान्तिसिद्धास्ते येनाद्वैताविरोधिनः ॥
तत्त्वाऽऽवेदकवेदान्तवाक्यसिद्धा हि ते गुणाः । आनन्दस्वप्रकाशत्वनित्यत्वमहिमाद्यथ[4] ॥
ब्रह्मस्वरूपमेवेष्टम्, तत्रापीदं विविच्यताम् । ब्रह्मेति यावन्निर्दिष्टं तन्मात्रं किं सुखादयः ॥
अथवा तस्य ते, यद्वा त एव ब्रह्मसंज्ञिनः । आद्ये तत्तत्पदाम्नानवैयर्थ्यं वेदलोकयोः ॥
पूर्वोक्तनीत्या भेदश्च ; जगज्जन्मादिकारणम् । अभ्युपेत्यैव हि ब्रह्म विवादास्तेषु वादिनाम् ॥
द्वितीये सैव[5] तैरेव ब्रह्मणस्सद्वितीयता । तृतीये ब्रह्म भिद्येत तन्मात्रत्वात् पदेपदे ॥
तत्समूहोऽथवा ब्रह्म तरुवृन्द विनाश (वनादि ?) वत् । [6]प्रकर्षश्च प्रकाशश्च भिन्नावेवार्क (?)-वर्तिनौ ॥ तेन न क्वापि वाक्यार्थो [ऽ] [7]विभागोऽस्ति निदर्शनम् ।

(स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वादेर्व्यावृत्तिरूपत्वेपि दोषः)

(33) [8]जाड्यदुःखाद्यपोहेन यद्वे(दे ?)त्रैव वर्तिता ॥
ज्ञानानन्दादिशब्दानां न सतः सद्वितीयता ॥
अपोहाः किं न सन्त्येव सन्तो वा नोभयेऽपि वा ।
सत्त्वे सत् सद्वितीयं स्यात् जडाद्यात्मकतेतरे । (सत्त्वे सत् सद्वितीयं स्यात् जडाद्यात्म [9]कृतेतरे ?) ॥
सदसद्व्यतिरेकोक्तिः पूर्वमेव पराकृता । [10]तथात्वे च घटादिभ्यो ब्रह्मापि न विशिष्यते ॥
किञ्चापोह्य[11]जडत्वादिविरुद्धार्थासमर्पणे । नैव तत्तदपोह्येत तदेकार्थै[12]: पदैरिव ॥

तदाश्रयजीवैकत्वनानात्वानामनुपपन्नतां प्रदर्श्य संप्रति पराभिमतधर्मवशादपि संविदो नाद्वितीयत्वमित्याह 1. किञ्चेति । 2. ते धर्माः संविद्रूपा एव न भवन्ति । 3. हेत्वन्तरमाह ॥ नित्यत्वविभुत्वादेः मिथोभिन्नत्वाच्चेत्यर्थः । 4 **महिमा** महत्त्वं विभुत्वम् । 5. पूर्वोक्तैव । 6. 'सत्यादिवाक्यमखण्डार्थपरं समानाधिकरणवाक्यत्वात् प्रकृष्टप्रकाशश्चन्द्र इति वाक्यवत्' इति शतदूषण्याम् (३८-१५८. पु) । 7. निर्भाग इति पाठो वा, **विभागो** विगतभाग इत्यर्थो वा, अविभाग इतिच्छेदो वा । अखण्ड इति यावत् । 8. ज्ञानादिशब्दानां व्यावृत्तिपरत्वपक्षं शङ्कते जाड्येति ; अपोहा इत्यादिना तत्परिहारः । **वर्तिता**-वृत्तिः । 9. **कृता** समाहितः पक्ष इतरो यस्मात् तस्मिन् असत्त्वपक्ष इत्यर्थः । बहुव्रीहित्वात् इतरपदमसर्वनाम । गतेतरे इति वा अन्यो वा कश्चित् पाठः स्यात् । 10. वक्ष्यति च, 'घटवत्सदसत्त्वाभ्यामनिर्वाच्यम्' (१४१. पु.) इति । 11. अपोह्यस्य जडत्वादेः विरुद्धभावरूपवत्तयाऽर्थस्याबोधने । 'लब्धरूपे क्वचित्किञ्चित् तादृगेव निषिध्यते' (ब्र. सि) इति त्वयैव किञ्चिद्रूपविशिष्टतया प्रतिपन्ने एव किञ्चिद्रूपविशिष्टस्यैव व्यावृत्तिर्बोधयितुं शक्येत्युक्तत्वात् इति भावः। 12. **तदेकार्थैः** धर्मिमात्रार्थकैः, यद्वा निषेधमात्रार्थकैः । न खल्वनुयोगिप्रतियोगिरूपद्वयाभावे निषेधकथेति भावः ।

[1]प्रतियोगिनि दृश्ये तु या भावान्तरमात्रधीः । सैवाभाव इतीहापि सद्भिस्ते सद्द्वितीयता ॥

(प्रपञ्चस्यापि सदसद्व्यतिरेकित्वायोगः)

(34) भूतभौतिकभेदानां सदसद्व्यतिरेकिता । कुतोऽवसीयते? किन्तु प्रत्यक्षादेरुताऽऽगमात् ॥
प्रत्यक्षादीनि मानानि स्वंस्वमर्थं यथायथम् । व्यवच्छिन्दन्ति जायन्त इति यावत् स्वसाक्षिकम् ॥
यथाऽग्रतः स्थिते नीले, नीलिमान्यकथा न, धीः । [2]एकाकारा ; न हि तथा स्फटिके धवले मतिः ॥ क्षीरे मधुरधीर्यादृक् नैव[3] (वं?) नि (शि) म्बकपायधीः । [4]व्यवहाराश्च नियताः सर्वे लौकिकवैदिकाः ॥ सत्यं प्रतीतिरस्ति ; अस्या मूलं नास्तीति चेत्-न तत् ।
सा चेदस्ति तया मूलं कल्प्यतां कार्यभूतया ॥ बलमश्चेन्द्रियलिङ्गादि तद्भावानुविधानतः ।

(प्रत्यक्षस्य व्यवच्छेदकत्वायोगखण्डनम्)

(35) [5]यौगपद्यक्रमायोगात् व्यवच्छेदविधानयोः ॥
ऐक्यायोगाच्च भेदो न प्रत्यक्ष इति यो भ्रमः । भेदेतरेतराभावविवेका(धीवेगा)ग्रहणेन सः ॥
स्वरूपमेव भावानां प्रत्यक्षेण परिस्फुरत् । भेदव्याहारहेतुः स्यात् प्रतियोगिव्यपेक्षया ॥
यथा तन्मात्रधीर्नानानास्तिव्याहारसाधनी । ह्रस्वदीर्घत्वभेदा वा यदै (थै?) कत्र षडङ्गुले ॥
एवं व्यवस्थितानेकप्रकाराकारवत्तया । प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रपञ्चस्य त [8](स ?) द्भावोऽशक्यनिह्नवः ॥
[9]आगमः कार्यनिष्ठत्वादीदृशेऽर्थे न तु प्रमा । प्रामाण्येऽप्यन्वयायोग्यपदार्थत्वान्न बोधकः॥
[10]नासत् प्रतीतेः, बाधाच्च न सदित्यपि यन्न तत् । प्रतीतेरेव सत् किन्न, बाधान्नासत् कुतो जगत् ॥ तस्मादविद्ययैवेयमविद्या भवताऽऽश्रिता ।

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1. 'यदि घटः स्यात्, सोपि दृश्येत, योग्यत्वात् । अतो दृश्ये घटे यत् भूतलमात्रविषयं ज्ञानं तत् 'घटोऽत्र भूतले नास्ति' इति व्यवहारकारणम् । अतो नाभावरूपं किञ्चित्प्रमेयम्' (शा. दी. १-१-५) इति मतानुसारेणेदम् । **इतीहापि** इत्यस्मिन् पक्षेपि । यदि 'केवलब्रह्मज्ञानमेवापोहः, नान्य इति' पूर्वपक्षी मन्येत, तदापि ज्ञानरूपैरेवापोहैः सद्द्वितीयत्वमवर्जनीयमिति । अपीत्यनेन वस्तुतो ब्रह्मरूपधर्मिज्ञानमात्रेण जडाद्याशङ्कानामनिवृत्त्या भावरूपत्वेप्यपोहस्य ब्रह्मगतकिञ्चिद्धर्मात्मकत्वमेवेति सूच्यते **व्यवच्छिन्दन्तीति** शतृन्तम् । 2. नील इत्येकाकारैव नीले धीः ; न तु नीलिमान्यस्य कथापि । 3. कषायधीर्नैव मधुरविषयिणी । 4. प्रतीतिनियममुक्त्वा व्यवहारनियममाह । 5. **व्यवच्छिन्दन्ति जायन्त** इत्युक्तमयुक्तमित्याक्षेपं निरसितुमनुवदति । अयमर्थो **ब्रह्मसिद्धौ** (२, १ ७) 'आहुर्विधातृ प्रत्यक्षं न निषेद्धृ विपश्चितः' इत्यादौ द्रष्टव्यः । अनेन च न **वस्तु वस्तुधर्मो वे**(१३०)त्युक्तं निरस्तं भवति । **विधानं** स्वरूपग्रहः, **व्यवच्छेदो** भेदग्रह इति **तत्त्वटीका** । विधानकार्यत्वात् व्यवच्छेदस्य न यौगपद्यम् । क्षणिकत्वात् प्रत्यक्षस्य न क्रमेण स्वरूपभेदग्राहित्वे । 8 (?) **तद्भावः** तादृशाकारवत्त्वम् । 9. प्रत्यक्षं विचारितम् । आगमात् सदसद्व्यतिरेकसिद्धिमपास्यति । 10. अनुमानस्यासाधकत्वमाह ।

(मिथ्यात्वमिथ्यात्वविचारेण जगत्सत्यत्वस्थापनम्)

(36) किञ्च भेदप्रपञ्चस्य धर्मो मिथ्यात्वलक्षणः ॥
मिथ्या वा परमार्थो वा नाद्यः कल्पोऽयमञ्जसा। तन्मिथ्यात्वे प्रपञ्चस्य सत्यत्वं दुरपह्नवम् ॥
पारमार्थ्येऽपि तेनैव[1] तवाद्वैतं विहन्यते। [2]सर्वाण्येव प्रमाणानि स्वंस्वमर्थं यथोदितम् ॥
असतोऽर्थान्तरेभ्यश्च व्यवच्छिन्दन्ति भान्ति नः। तथाहीह घटोऽस्तीति येयं धीरुपजायते ॥
सा तदा तस्य नाभावं पटत्वं वाऽनुमन्यते। [3]नन्वस्तीति यदुक्तं किं तन्मात्रं घट इत्यपि ॥
अर्थान्तरं वा तन्मात्रे सदद्वैतं प्रसज्यते। अर्थान्तरत्वे सिद्धं [4]तत् सदसद्भ्यां विलक्षणम् ॥
यद्येवम्[5], अस्ति ब्रह्मेति ब्रह्मौपनिषदं मतम्। घटवत् सदसत्त्वाभ्यामनिर्वाच्यं तवाऽऽपतेत् ॥
आनन्दसत्यज्ञानादिनिर्देशैरेव वैदिकैः। ब्रह्मणोऽप्यतथाभाव[6]स्त्वयैवैवं समर्थितः ॥
सदसद्व्यतिरेकोक्तिः प्रपञ्चस्य च [7]हीयते। यत् यथा किञ्चिदुच्येत तत् सर्वस्य तथा भवेत् ॥
[8]तस्मात् अस्तीति संवित्तिर्जायमाना घटादिषु। तत्तत्पदार्थसंस्थानपारमार्थ्यावबोधिनी ॥
सजातीयविजातीयव्यवच्छेदनिबन्धनैः। [9]स्वैस्वैर्व्यवस्थितै रूपैः पदार्थानां तु या स्थितिः ॥
सा सत्ता; न स्वतन्त्राऽन्या; तत्राद्वैतकथा कथम्। न च नानाविधाकारप्रतीतिः शक्यनिह्नवा ॥

(धर्मनिषेधेऽपि सधर्मकतया सद्वितीयत्वम्)

(37) [10]न वेद्यं वित्तिधर्मस्यादिति यत् प्रागुदीरितम्। तेनापि साधितं किंचित् संविदोऽस्ति न वा त्वया ॥ अस्ति चेत् पक्षपातः ([11]बाधः) स्यात् न चेत् ते विफलः श्रमः। अतः स्वरसविस्पष्टदृष्टभेदास्तु संविदः ॥ यथास्था (रथा) दिभिर्वा (र्वा) ह्यैर्नैक्यं याति (यथाव[12](वत्) स्थायिभिर्बाह्यैर्नैक्यं यान्ति?) घटादिभिः।

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1. ब्रह्मातिरिक्तपरमार्थमिथ्यात्वसत्त्वेनैव। 2. न तु मिथ्यात्वप्रमाणमात्रं ब्रह्मप्रमाणमात्रं वा। *अत्रान्यादृशः कारिकापाठक्रमो मुद्रितग्रन्थस्थोऽशुद्धः।

3. घटोऽस्तीत्यत्र घटशब्दवाच्यमस्तिशब्दवाच्यसन्मात्रब्रह्मणोऽनन्यदन्यद्वा। आद्ये पटोऽस्तीत्यादावप्येवमिति सदेकतत्त्वसिद्धिः। 4. घट इत्येतत्। 5. समानाधिकरणास्तिपदार्थात् घटपदार्थस्य भिन्नत्वे। 6. आनन्दो ब्रह्मेत्यादैरानन्दादिभिन्नता। 7. सदसद्व्यतिरिक्तः प्रपञ्च इति प्रयोगे तद्भेदस्यैव प्रपञ्चे सिद्धेः। 8. ननु तर्हि समानाधिकरणस्थलेऽभेदस्यैव बोध्यत्वात् कथं सदद्वैतासिद्धिरित्यत्र अस्तीति न ब्रह्मोच्यते, किन्तु घटादिपरतन्त्रो धर्म इति वदन्निगमयति **तस्मादिति**। 9. स्वैरित्यादिकारिका शतदूषण्यां ६१ वादेऽन्ववादि। 10. एवं प्रत्यक्षादिप्रतीतेः विषाय कत्ववत् व्यवच्छेदकत्वस्यापि संभवात्, सत्त्वेन प्रतीतेषु सदसद्व्यतिरेकित्वायोगाच्चापोहा नामपि सदसद्व्यतिरेकित्वायोगात् सर्वथा स्वयंप्रकाशत्वादिभिस्सद्वितीयत्वमित्युक्त्वा प्रकारान्तरेणापि तदाह **नेति**। 11. पक्षपात इति श्रु. प्र. पाठः। निर्धर्मकत्वस्येवान्येषामपि धर्माणां प्रमाणसिद्धत्वे तदेकमात्रस्वीकारे **पक्षपात** इति। **पक्षबाध** इति पाठे अद्वितीयत्वसिद्धान्तभङ्ग इत्यर्थः। 12. यथावस्थितैः। **बाह्यै-**

[1]सहोपलंभनियमो न खल्वेकैकसंविदा । न चेदस्ति समामान्यं सर्वसंवेदनास्पदम् ॥

(सहोपलम्भनियमेन ग्राह्यग्राहकापलापः पूर्वपक्षिणः)

(38) [2]सहोपलंभनियमान्नान्योऽर्थः संविदो भवेत् ॥

यदेतदपराधीनस्वप्रकाशं तदेव हि । स्वयंप्रकाश (?) ताशब्दमिति वृद्धाः प्रचक्षते ॥

यस्मिन्नभासमाने हि यो नामार्थो न भासते । नासावर्थान्तरस्त (रं त ?) स्मान्मिथ्येन्दुरिव चन्द्रतः ॥ अभासमाने विज्ञाने न [3]चात्मार्थावभासनम् । इति संविद्विवर्तत्वं प्रपञ्चः स्फुटमञ्चति ॥ (तत्खण्डनम्)

(39)....मैवं (मा नामैवं ?) परिभवः ; प्रत्यक्षेण बलीयसा । संरक्ष्यमाणभेदास्ते नानुमानानुवर्तिनः ॥ तथाहीदमहं वेद्मीत्यन्योन्यानात्मना स्फुटम् । त्रयं साक्षाच्चकास्तीति सर्वेषामात्मसाक्षिकम् ॥ प्रत्यक्षप्रतिपक्षश्च नानुमानं प्रवर्तते । न हि वह्नेरनुष्णत्वं द्रव्यत्वादनुमीयते ॥ किञ्च हेतुर्विरुद्धोऽयं सहभावो द्वयोर्यतः । तवाहि नत् हि [तवापि नहि ?] (तथाहि-न हि ?) संवित्तिः स्वात्मना सह भासते ॥ 'नीलाद्युपरापेतस्वच्छचिन्मात्रसन्ततिः। स्वापादौ भासते, नैवमर्थस्संवेदनात्पृथक् ॥ तेन संवेदनं सत्यं संवेद्योऽर्थस्त्वसन्' इति । तदेतदपरामृष्टस्व वाग्बाधस्य जल्पितम् ॥ सहोपलंभनियमो येनैवं सति हीयते । [4]यस्मादृते यदाभाति भाति य (त ?) स्मादृतेऽपि तत् ॥ घटात् ऋतेऽपि निर्भातः [5]पटादिव घटः स्वयम् ॥

(इतः परः संवित्सिद्धिग्रन्थो नोपलभ्यते)

नमो नमो यामुनाय यामुनाय नमो नमः ।
नमो नमो यामुनाय यामुनाय नमो नमः ॥

॥ श्रीरस्तु ॥

रित्यनेन आन्तरसंविद्वैलक्षण्यं दर्श्यते । अत्र मीमांसाकृता निरालम्बनवाददूषणसरणिरभिप्रेता । अत एव समनन्तरमेतदसहमानस्य सहोपलम्भनियमावलम्बनेन पुनरुत्थानम् । । 'सहोपलम्भनियम' इति, 'नचेत्' इति चार्धद्वयं विनैव क्वचित्तालकोशे पाठः । अस्य च सहोपलम्भपक्षदूषणपरत्वात्, उपर्येव पूर्वपक्षप्रस्तावात् , ततःपश्चाद्यत्र क्वापि तत्खण्डनग्रन्थमध्ये निवेशः स्वरसः । नचेदित्यस्य, 'माभूदिति चेत्—तर्हि' इत्यर्थः । यद्वा सौगतैस्सामान्यापलापात् संवेदनास्पदं सर्वं ससामान्यं न चेत्, संविदः कथमप्यनुगमायोगादेकैकसंविदैव सहोपलम्भनियमो वाच्यः ; स चासंभवीति विशिष्टार्थः । अयमर्थः आ. सि. । 2. शङ्कते सहेत्याद्यर्धसप्तकेन । 'सहोपलम्भनियमात् अभेदो नीलतद्धियोः । भेदश्च भ्रान्तिविज्ञानैः दृश्य इन्दाविवाद्वये' इति बौद्धः । 3. आत्मार्थावभासनम्--ग्राहकस्यात्मनो ग्राह्याणामर्थानाञ्च भानम् । 4 यस्माद्वस्तुनः यत् ज्ञानम् । तस्मात् ज्ञानविशेषात् । तत् वस्तु । 5. निर्भात इति शत्रन्तात् पञ्चमी । घटं विनापि भासमानात् पटात् ऋते घट इव भातीत्यन्वयः ॥

एतदुपरि सर्वो ग्रन्थो नष्टः। अद्वितीयश्रुतिविमर्श-सत्त्वासत्त्ववाद-तत्त्वमसिविचारेभ्यः पश्चात्प्रवर्तितो यो विस्तरेण संविदद्वैतपूर्वपक्षः, तस्य खण्डनमेतावतापि न समाप्तम्। प्रत्यक्षानुमित्यादिरूपेण विचित्राणां संविदां प्रमातृभेदात् विषयभेदाच्च भेदं सिद्धान्तारम्भे प्रदर्श्य, तदुपरि सर्वापलापाय प्रस्तुताया अविद्यायाः स्वरूपादि प्रदूष्य, ततः संविदस्सधर्मकत्वादपि संविदद्वितीयत्वं दुर्वचमित्यारभ्य, धर्माणामपोहरूपाणां सदसद्व्यतिरेकप्रसङ्गे प्रपञ्चसदसद्व्यतिरेकमेव निरस्य, एवं संविद्धर्माणां विषयप्रपञ्चस्य च वास्तवतया सर्वापलापायोगमभिधाय, पुनर्बौद्धसरण्या संविदतिरिक्तनिरसनाय सहोपलम्भनियमप्रस्तावे तत्खण्डनमत्र क्रियते। एतत् समाप्य शिष्टं संविदद्वैतपूर्वपक्षिप्रस्तुतांशसमाधानं वक्तव्यमस्तीति॥

उपक्रमादिलुप्तांशलिप्सया त्विदमादिमा। संवित्सिद्धिर्मातृकादिक्रमाच्चान्ते परिष्कृता॥ १॥
अभिनन्दन्ति बालस्य स्खलतोपि पदक्रमम्। भ्रान्तेः पुरुषधर्मत्वात् तृप्येद्दृप्येच्च कःपुनः॥ २॥
स्वोक्तमप्युज्झ्यते स्वेन सता दुष्टं परैः किमु। गुणश्लाघिबुधप्रीत्यै गुरुभक्त्योद्यतं मया॥ ३॥
इत्थं विरचितानेकशास्त्रसाहित्यवाङ्मयः। तर्कार्णवाद्युपाख्यो यस्सोऽहं श्रीवीरराघवः॥ ४॥
प्रणीतानेकसुश्लाध्यप्रबन्धैर्गुणभूषणैः। यतीन्द्रैः प्राज्ञसच्छिष्यवृन्दस्तुतपदाम्बुजैः॥ ५॥
श्रीरङ्गलक्ष्मणाभिख्यैर्यैरस्म्यपरयामुनैः। देशिकैर्बोधिताशेषगूढार्थो यैर्दयाघनैः॥ ६॥
लब्धितोभयमीमांसावल्लभाख्यश्च संसदि। एषां षष्ट्यब्दसंपूर्तिमहसत्कारकाम्यया॥ ७॥
प्रत्नं **सिद्धित्रयं** प्रौढं भगवद्यामुनोद्गतम्। सुहृत्संप्रेरितः प्रीत्या परिष्कृत्य स्वकीयया॥ ८॥
गूढप्रकाशटिप्पण्या संयोज्याद्य समर्पये। दैवतं ये ममैतेभ्यो गुरुभ्यो रोचतामिदम्॥ ९॥
वाञ्छा परं भवति वक्तुमनुक्तमन्यैः एवं विचिन्त्य कथितञ्च परत्र दृश्यम्।
दृश्यं न यत् तदपि बाध्यमबाधितञ्च प्राज्ञो न मृष्यति परस्तु न वेत्ति किञ्चित्॥ १०॥
'यतिपतिरवधत्ते यामुनार्यस्स्वयं वा' इ(वे)त्यनघनिगमचूडासूरिसूक्तप्रकारा।
क्व तु कृतिरियमीदृक् क्वाहमज्ञोऽन्यसक्तः कथमपि गुणमन्विष्यात्र तुष्यन्तु सन्तः॥ ११॥

वेधोजिह्वाग्रवासिन्यपि भवति कला भारती यस्य, यस्य
त्वास्थानं भाति नित्यं निरवधिमहिमाचार्यजिह्वा स देवः।
सच्चित्तक्षेत्ररूढस्वकचरणयुगीभक्तिवल्लीप्रसूनैः
तत्त्वज्ञानप्रसूनैः जनमिह निखिलं वासयेद्वाजिवक्त्रः॥ १२॥

इति श्रीवात्स्य वीरराघवाचार्य विरचितम्

गूढप्रकाशाख्यम्

सिद्धित्रयटिप्पणम्।

श्रीमते रङ्गरामानुजमहादेशिकाय नमः

॥ शुभमस्तु ॥

अर्थानुवादः शतदूषणीस्थः प्रागेव सिद्धेरुपदर्शितोऽस्याः ।
शब्दानुवादाः स्वमेव दृश्या ये न्यायसिद्धाञ्जन आत्मसिद्धेः ॥
उपोद्घातं पृथग्द्रष्टुमुत्सहन्ते न वैदिकाः ।
तत्तसिद्धिमुखेऽन्तश्च तदर्थोऽतो व्यभज्यत ॥
न यत्र चिह्नं निरदेशि किञ्चिन्न टिप्पणादावपि यद् व्यचारि ।
तत्रान्यथापाठ इह प्रकल्पस्तालानुरोधादिति भावनीयम् ॥
स्वैरं न पाठोऽन्यथितो मयेह प्रदर्श्य दृष्टां स्थितिमन्यरीतिः ।
यथार्हमावेदि मनाक् अशेषं धिया च कोशैर्विमृशन्तु सन्तः ॥
यद् ब्रह्मसिद्धिः स्फुटमिष्टसिद्धिर्नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धिश्च निरस्यतेऽत्र ।
विमृश्यते तन्त्रगपञ्चिकादिग्रन्थश्च तत्तादृगिहाभिनन्द्यम् ॥

॥ शुभमस्तु ॥

अस्य सिद्धित्रयस्य निर्माता श्रीभगवद्यामुनमुनिः कवेरजाभागपरिसरप्रख्यातश्रीवीरनारायण-(काट्टुमन्नारगुडि) पुराभिजनस्य बाह्यकुदृष्टिनिरसनेन स्वमतस्थापनाय व्यायतत्त्वं शास्त्रं भगवत्तद्भक्त साक्षात्कारानुभवसंपत्तये योगरहस्यञ्च प्रणीतवतो योगिसार्वभौमस्य श्रीभगवन्नाथमुनेः पौत्रः ईश्वरमुनि-पुत्रः चोलराजास्थानपण्डितं विजित्य प्राप्तार्धराज्यः पितामहशरणादिष्टेन तच्छिष्येण श्रीपुण्डरीकाक्ष-सूरिणा स्वाशक्त्यवस्थामालोच्य स्वशिष्य श्रीराममिश्रमुखेन विबोधितविशेषार्थस्त्रिदण्डधारी परमतनिर-सनादिना परिरक्षितवेदवैदिकः स्वस्य स्थाविरे श्रीभगवद्रामानुजमनुगृह्य तन्मुखेन स्थापितपुरातनसिद्धान्तः (आङ्गलवत्सरगणनया एकादशद्वादशशतकमध्यकाले लब्धाभ्युदयः) ; येन हि विजयप्रस्थाने विशिष्य घोषिताविमौ श्लोकाविति संप्रदायः—

'न वयं कवयस्तु केवलं न वयं केवलतन्त्रपारगाः ।
अपितु प्रतिवादिवारणप्रकटाटोपविपाटनक्षमाः ॥'
'आ शैलाद्रिकन्याचरणकिसलयन्यासधन्योपकण्ठात्
आ रक्षोनीतसीतामुखकमलसमुल्लासहेतोश्च सेतोः ।
आ च प्राच्यप्रतीच्यक्षितिधरयुगलादर्कसोमावतंसात्
मीमांसाशास्त्रपुग्मश्रमविमलमना मृग्यतां मादृशोऽन्यः ॥' इति ॥

एतच्चरितं विशिष्य दिव्यसूरिचरितकाव्यादौ द्रष्टव्यम् । **एतदनुगृहीताश्च प्रबन्धाः**–श्री चतुःश्लोकी, स्तोत्ररत्नम्, आगमप्रामाण्यम्, गीतार्थसंग्रहः, पुरुषनिर्णयः, सिद्धित्रयञ्च । अत्र पुरुषनिर्णयः सर्वथैव नोपलभ्यते ; शिष्टेषु च सिद्धित्रयादन्ये ग्रन्थाः सामग्रयेण लब्धास्सम्यगेव परिष्कृत्य मुद्रितास्समुल्लसन्ति ।

श्रीभगवद्यामुनमुनये नमः

॥ श्रीरस्तु ॥ शुभमस्तु ॥ उभयवेदान्तग्रन्थमालासंपादकः ॥

द्वितीयसंस्करणमिदम्

1942 संवत्सरे मुद्रितस्यास्य पुनरीदानीं 1971 संवत्सरे उभयवेदान्तग्रन्थमालायां पुनर्मुद्रणम्।

प्रथममुद्रणे-मातृकात्वेनोपयुक्तं काश्यां मुद्रितं देवनागरलिपिपुस्तकम् ; आन्ध्रलिपिपुस्तकञ्च। (तिरुपति) श्रीवेङ्कटेशप्राच्यविद्यापुस्तकभाण्डागारस्थो ग्रन्थाक्षरतालकोशोऽप्यान्तमवैक्षि। मद्रनगरराजकीय पुस्तकभाण्डागारस्थिताश्च कोशास्तत्रतत्र यथावसरमलोकिषत॥ अत्र योजनाय समुचितटिप्पणनिर्माणेन, पाठशोधनेन, स्थितपाठार्थविमर्शनेन, विषयविभजनेन, विशेषचिन्तनेन, फक्किकाविभागेन, प्राचीन-ग्रन्थसंवादानुवादप्रदर्शनेन च यथाशक्ति प्रेक्षावतां प्रीणनाय सुबहु व्यापृतम्। फलांशे तु सन्तः प्रमाणम्। अधिकं तु सतामादरात् पुनर्मुद्रणे प्रतीक्ष्यमित्यावेदितमत्राप्यनुसंधेयम्॥

सिद्धित्रय—टिप्पण निर्दिष्टनामसूची

(गीतापुराणोपनिषद्विषयनामसूचनं तु न)

(१)

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भक्तेर्धाम विरक्तिशेवधिरयं वृत्ताधिको द्योतते मीने लब्धजनुर्वृषे गुरुवरः श्रीरङ्गरामानुजः ॥१

श्रीमद्वेदान्तरामानुजमुनिकृपया सार्वभौमीं समृद्धिं
संप्राप्तस्तद्गुरूणामपि सह यशसा नाम बिभ्रत्, दिशश्च ।
अर्थं सन्तं श्रितेभ्यः, कृतिभिरपि परित्राणमुख्याभिरत्र
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उपधीकृत्य मामित्थं प्रवृत्त गुर्वनुग्रहः । सिद्धित्रयपरिष्कारमकार्षीत् महदर्पणम् ॥ ४ ॥

अस्तु यामुनसिद्धित्रयपर्यालोचनादमुनोज्ज्वलः अनुरागोद्भवो नाथ श्रियै श्रीरङ्गलक्ष्मणः ५

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उभयवेदान्तग्रन्थमालासंपादकः

PREFACE

As there have been no good editions of Yamuna's *Siddhitrayam* except the two (the one published several years ago at Banaras in the pages of the *Pandit* and the other a Telugu edition) which are themselves now scarce and the copies crumbling as one handles them, I thought it a pious duty to bring out a critical edition of the text with a translation in English for the benefit of the reader who is desirous of studying the original, but has slender or no knowledge of Sanskrit. This idea got reinforced when I happened to notice that years before an attempt was made to translate *Siddhitrayam* and the rendering of the first few pages appeared in the *Brahmavadin* but thereafter the work was discontinued, possibly because of the difficulty of the task. Here was a challenge. A treatise of profound importance, the very basis for Sri Ramanuja's epoch-making works, must be made available to the reader anxious to study the original texts, though it be in translation. Mimamsa Kesari Sri. K. Srinivasachariar, my esteemed colleague at the Annamalai University, fell in with the idea and we decided to bring out a critical edition of the text with an English rendering. The text was compared with the manuscripts available in the library of the Theosophical Society, Adyar, the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, The Oriental Institute, Tirupati and the Manuscripts Library, Mysore. As we got beyond the first few pages, we realised the enormous difficulty in translating this terse and compendious work, rendered more difficult by the absence of any commentary thereon. But we were fortunate in receiving the whole-hearted and unstinted help from the three most eminent savants, encyclopaedic minds immersed in our sacred lore, unrivalled exponents of Visishtadvaitic thought, Sri Abhinava Desika Uttamur T. Veeraraghavacharya, Nyaya Vedantakesari Madhurantakam Sri. Viraraghavachariar, and Panditaraja D. T. Tatachariar. But for their blessings this venture would not have been crowned with success.

The text and translation appeared in instalments in the pages of the Journal of the Annamalai University. This mode of publication in a periodical helped us to take up this extremely difficult work in convenient bits in the midst of heavy professorial duties. But what was an advantage in one respect turned out to be a great disadvantage in another. For by the time the translation was completed - and it took quite some years to finish it - we could not keep track of the reprints which were to be collected and issued in book form. The prospect was indeed gloomy. It looked as if the labour of years was lost, until by a turn of luck, Sri. V. T. Rangaswami Aiyangar, the esteemed President of the Sri Visishtadvaita Pracharini Sabha, Madras, suggested to me the publication of a translation in English as a companion to his proposed re-issue of *Siddhitrayam* with a luminous

commentary by Abhinava Desika Uttamur Sri Veeraraghavachariar. The suggestion was most welcome. The opportunity was availed of for revising the translation. I prepared a fairly comprehensive introduction dealing with the life and works of Yamuna.

Sri K. Srinivasacharya and I are thankful to Sri V. T. Rangaswami Aiyangar for his munificence in undertaking to finance this publication, and to the Ubhaya Vedanta Granthamala Book Trust for initial advance of funds. Under his inspiring leadership the Visishtadvaita Pracharini Sabha has brought out several important publications to popularise Visishtadvaitic thought and religion. We are thankful to the Government of India for so generously agreeing to bear a part of the cost of this publication. We offer our grateful thanks to Professor K. R. Appalacharya for help and guidance at every stage.

Madras
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R. R.

INTRODUCTION

R. RAMANUJACHARI

Yamuna's Life:

Yamunacharya, [1] more popularly known as Alavandar, was the son of Isvara Bhatta and the grandson of the celebrated Nathamuni, the reputed thinker and sage who set Visishtadvaita Vedanta on a fresh phase of its career. He was born in 916 A. D.[2] at Viranarayanapuram (now called Kattu Mannargudi) in South Arcot District in Taminad. He was named Yamuna, presumably because he was born soon after his parents went on a pilgrimage to holy places on the banks of the Yamuna, hallowed by association with the lilas of Sri Krishna. He studied under Maha Bhashya Bhatta. It is said that, like Ramanuja, he had an uncommonly handsome figure and lovable personality and dignified carriage and deportment[3] Beauty of form was matched by the high quality of his mind. Venkatanatha refers to this *avaditamatih* (*Stotra Bhashya*). A precocious child, Yamuna mastered several branches of learning in a short time. Tradition records that he defeated in a debate arranged by the chola potentate of the time, a conceited and presumptuous court-poet, Vidvajjanakolahala (Akkialvan), who was a terror to all learned men far and near, as he exacted a heavy capitation fee from all learned folk. In recognition of this victory, Yamuna was hailed Alavandar (the man come to save or rule) by the queen, and was granted the gift of a territory by the king. Venkatanatha refers to this in his *Rahasyatrayasara, Guruparampara-sarah.*

> நீளவந்தின்று விதிவகையால் நினைவொன்றிய நாம்
> மீளவந்தின்னும் வினையுடம் பொன்றி விழுந்து உழலா
> தாளவந்தாரெனவென்று அருள் தந்து விளங்கிய சீர்
> ஆளவந்தார் அடியோம் படியோமினி அல்வழக்கே.

"We who were caught up in samsara from beginningless time have now, by good fortune, acquired a true knowledge of our nature as a spiritual being distinct from the body, consider that Alavandar (Sri Yamuna) came into the world to protect us from the danger of falling again in the mire of transmigratory cycle and we will ever be attached to the feet of the sage, Alavandar, who triumphed over his opponents and blessed us with his writings. Never more shall we read the works of heretics".

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1. Some of his other names are Yamuna Muni, Peria Mudaliar, Yamunaituraivan, and Vadimatsimhendra.
2. Dhatu year, ashada month under the asterism uttarashada.
3. Tiruvaimozhi, IV. VIII—Idu. Commentary.

To this day a locality in Gangaikondapuram goes by the name 'Alavandarmedu' vouching for the substantial correctness of the episode. The distractions of princely life kept him away from spiritual association for some years, till he was won over to the higher life, thanks to the tireless efforts of Rama Misra (Manakkalnambi), the chosen disciple of Pundarikaksha (Aravindaksha, Uyyakkondar), who was himself the foremost among the numerous disciples of Nathamuni, charged with the duty of instructing his grandson in the sacred lore. When Rama-misra initiated Yamuna into the ultimate truths and passed on to him the spiritual treasures bequeathed to him by Nathamuni, the awakening came and Yamuna realised the futility, of the life he had been leading, felt the spiritual call and became a sannyasin and settled at the holy spot of Srirangam, leading an exemplary life of saintliness and rectitude.[1] He became the accredited leader of the Visishtadvaita Vedantins and devoted all his time to the dissemination of the truths handed to him by his master and to the composing of philosophical and religious works for the benefit of posterity and in unremitting service to Bhagavan. Except for a trip to Kanchipuram to see the young Ramanuja on whose worthy shoulders he wanted the mantle of leadership to fall, and a pilgrimage to Tiruvanantapuram (Trivandrum) to worship at the famous shrine of Sri Padmanabha, Yamuna stayed at Srirangam which was in those days a great centre of Vaishnava thought and faith.

Some interest attaches to these two visits. It is said that during his visit to Kanchipuram, he saw at the temple the young Ramanuja near his teacher, Yadavaprakasa, and in the company of fellow students. Yamuna was deeply impressed with the bright, young man who was head and shoulders above the rest of the company, and he fervently prayed to the Lord that he may be pleased to make Ramanuja the worthy leader of the faith. Saying that Ramanuja may be allowed to complete his preparatory studies under Yadava, Yamuna had to hurry back on an urgent call from Srirangam. But before returning, he took care to send a copy of his *Stotra-Ratna* to Ramanuja for his edification and spiritual nourishment. Ramanuja was so captivated by the beauty and grandeur of the work that he longed to become Yamuna's pupil. This ambition was not actually fulfilled; but like Ekalavya, he became his pupil in mind.

About Yamuna's pilgrimage to Tiruvanantapuram, tradition has it that during one of the important annual temple festivals called Adhyayana

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1. Tiruvarangattamudanar in his *Ramanuja Nurrandadi*, st. 21 speaks of him with the greatest veneration as "the foremost among the saints wedded to the holy life"

(...தூய் நெறிசேர் எதிகட் கிறைவன் யமுனைத் துறைவன்...)

Utsavam, when the Alvars' Divya Prabandams are sung, the Araiyar (the Chief Chorister) while chanting the following stanza of *Tiruvoimozhi* repeated it thrice, gesticulating and, as it were, pointing to Yamuna.

> கடுவினை களையலாகும்; காமனைப் பயந்த காளை
> இடவகை கொண்டது என்பர், எழில் அணி அனந்தபுரம்;
> படம்உடை அரவில் பள்ளி பயின்றவன் பாதம் காண
> நடமினோ, நமர்கள் உள்ளீர்! நாம் உமக்கு
> அறியச் சொன்னோம். X ii 8

" Good souls ! you could have all your sins, including the most deadly ones, rooted out, if you would only follow my suggesion. Wise men have declared that the ever-youthful Lord, the very embodiment of beauty, and the creator of Manmata, has specially taken His abode in the beautiful city of Tiruvanantapuram to make Himself easily accessible to all. Speed to this holy spot to worship the blessed feet of Sri Padmanabha who reclines on Adisesha with his resplendent hood. Having tasted of this delectable experience myself, *I commend this to you,* lest you should miss it. *Speed, good soul, speed* ". Yamuna took it as a divine command that he should offer worship at a shrine so dear to Saint Satakopa. He rose at once, put Teyvavari Andan in charge of his ashram (monastery) and hurried to Tiruvanantapuram and had darsan at the sacred shrine of Sri Padmanabha.

While at Tiruvanantapuram, enjoying the unsurpassed experience of the Divine, Yamuna suddenly remembered that that was the precise date on which he had been instructed to meet Kurukaikkaval Appan from whom he had previously sought initiation into the mysteries of Yoga. What could he do, except to accuse himself for his forgetfulness? If wishes were aeroplanes, he could have rushed to that great adept in Yoga on time. His sorrow at the loss of the only opportunity was inconsolable. We are told that with this lapse, the Visishtadvaitins lost for ever the secret of Yoga.

In the last days of his life, Yamuna was keen that the mantle of spiritual leadership should fall on worthy shoulders. He could think of none but Ramanuja. As he was thinking of Ramanuja, Yamuna got, from two devotees who had come from Kanchipuram to pay their respects to the ailing master, the welcome news that Ramanuja had broken away from Yadavaprakasa and was rendering service to Lord Varadaraja. Yamuna took the news as a god-send and as an answer to his prayers that he may be allowed to have young Ramanuja as his successor; and immediately he sent his disciple, Mahapurna, to Kanchipuram, to get Ramanuja to his presence. On the side of Ramanuja, for some years past he had been anxious to become a disciple of Yamuna, whose *Stotra-Ratna* had made a tremendous impression on him. Now that he was free from any obligation to Yadavaprakasa, he got

permission from Lord Varadaraja and set out for Srirangam. He met Mahapurna on the way at Madurantakam and was delighted to learn that the master had sent for him. Both hurried to Srirangam. But when they arrived, it was too late. Yamuna had left off his mortal coils (1040 A. D.) and Ramanuja could only see the body of Yamuna lying in state. His sorrow was inconsolable. Tradition has it that Ramanuja noticed three of the five fingers of the right hand of Yamuna closed and he interpreted this phenomenon as betokening three unfulfilled wishes of the Master. After due inquiries, he learnt that the master had often referred to the need (i) to express our gratitude to Vyasa and Parasara in an appropriate form (ii) to pay a tribute of devotion to Saint Satakopa and (iii) for writing a commentary on *Vedanta Sutras* of Badarayana from the Visishtadvaita stand-point for which Yamuna and earlier acharyas had laboured so hard. When Ramanuja expressed his resolve to carry out the wishes of the master, lo ! the fingers opened !

That the period assigned to Yamuna is fairly accurate and reliable is shown by internal evidence. While refuting the doctrine of absolute identity based on the upanishadic text *ekamevadvityam Brahma*—Yamuna says in his *Samvit Siddhi* "The statement, the paramount ruler of the Chola country *now reigning* is without a second in this world" is intended to deny the existence of a ruler equal to him; it does not deny the existence of his servants, sons, consort and so on.

> Yatha cola nrpassamrad advitiyo*S* dyabhutale
> iti tat tulya nrpati nivaranaparam vacah |
> na tu tad bhrtya tat putra kalatradi nishedakam ||
>
> *Samvit Siddhi* p. 101

This passage while revealing Yamuna's penetrating intellect and knack of explaining even the most abstruse in terms of the most familiar, throws light incidentally on his age. The paramount ruler is Rajaraja, the Great, (985-1012 A.D.) the most powerful of the Chola monarchs, who was undoubtedly the paramount ruler at the time and who rightly claimed for himself the title of emperor (samrat), having conquered the Vengi Kingdom, Orissa and Ceylon and vanquished the Rashtrakutas.

It is also interesting to note that Yamuna refers in one place to Sureswara, the pupil of Sankara, and also the commentator of Sankara Bhashya, by name as "Sauresam vacah",[1] and in another place speaks of him as, *Vartikakara*[2] and quotes two verses from his *Brhadaranyakopanishad-*

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1. *Atma-Siddhi*; Page 35; vide foot note 76
2. *Atmasiddhi*, p. 27; vide footnotes 57; and 58

Bhashya-Vartika. From the references he makes to Sureswara (800 A.D.), Srivatsanka Misra and Bhaskara, it is clear that Yamuna must have flourished long after these thinkers.

Yamuna's works.—

From authoritative sources, it is learnt that Yamuna composed eight works; and they are.—*Agamapramanya, Maha Purusha Nirnaya, Atma-Siddhi, Isvara Siddhi, Samvit-Siddhi, Gitarthasamgraha, Chatussloki* and *Stotra-Ratna*. Venkatanatha's *Rahasyatrayasara* vouches for this; at the commencement of his commentary on *Gitarthasamgraha*, he says:—

Manatvam bhagavan matasya mahatah pumsastatha nirnayah
Tisrah siddhaya atma samvid akhiladisana tattvasrayah |
Gitarthasya ca samgrah: stutiyugam Srisrisa yorityamun
Yadgranthan anusandathe yatipatistam Yamuneyam numa: ll

Agamapramanya is devoted to vindicating the authoritativeness of the Pancharatra agamas. *Mahapurusha nirnaya* is designed to show that the ultimately Real is the Supreme Purusha, Sriman Narayana. The three siddhis-*Atmasiddhi, Iswarasiddhi* and *Samvit Siddhi* - establish the visishtadvaitic conception of soul, God and samvit (knowledge) after a critical examination of rival views. *Gitarthasamgraha* is a marvellous epitome of the teaching of the *Bhagavadgita* which is one of the cardinal texts for the vedantin. *Chatussloki* and *Stotra-ratna* are hymns in praise of Goddess Lakshmi and *Lakshmipati*,

Another work, *Kashmiragama pramanya*, is sometimes attributed to him. Perhaps the only evidence for this is the following statement occurring towards the close of *Agamapramanya* (page 89)

Yatha ca ekayanasakhaya apaurusheyatvam-tatha Kashmiragama pramanyeva prapancitamitineha prastuyate (....that the *ekayanasakha* is apaurusheya (not the work of any person, but self-existent) has been discussed at length in *Kashmiragama pramanya*; therefore, it is not here dilated upon). A close look at this passage will reveal that it is non-committal with regard to the author-ship of this work. All that it states is since the self-existence of ekayanasakha has been elaborately dealt with in that work it is not discussed here (i.e. in *Agamapramanya*). A comparison of this passage with a few parallel references would be interesting. i) In one place, Yamuna says "How knowledge never fails to be manifest has already been

1. *A History of Indian Philosophy* by S. N. Dasgupta Vol. III p.16 and 139; *Contribution of Yamuna* to *Visishtadvaita by* Dr. N. Narasimhachari. p. 2 and Yamuna's *Agamapramanya* Ed, and translated by Dr. A.B. Buitenan p. 4.

elaborately dealt with in the *Prathamadhikarana;* hence it is needless to refer to that view here...(Yatha cha samvitah prakasavyabhicharastatha prapanchitam prathamadhikarna iti natropakshipya pratiksheptavyam)[1] (ii) In another place, Yamuna states: "And this has clearly been proved in the *Adhikarana* and later it would be conclusively established" (sa cha adhikarana siddhah sadhayishyate cho parishtat)[2] (iii) In yet another place, Yamuna writes, "This (the impossibility of such an analysis) may be ascertained from the commencement of the siddhanta part of *bhrantyadhikarana* and from *Samvit-Siddhi* (anirupanancha bhrantyadhikarana siddhantarambe *samvit-siddau* cha anusandhatavyam)[3]. (iv) To cite one other instance "As the Yatharthakhyati has been established in the *Sastra*, it is not dealt with here" (Yatharthakhyati samarthanena cha Sastra iti na varnyate)[4]. From these analogous statements where references are not confined to his own works, it would be clear that there is no sufficient warrant for including *Kashmiragama pramanya* among his works in the face of the strong tradition that he composed only the eight works detailed above. There are reasons to believe that it was composed by one of the disciples of Nathamuni who contributed a great deal towards making the *Agamas* a live force in thought and conduct.

The chronological order of Yamuna's works.—Although the chronological position of the works of Yamuna cannot be definitely fixed, yet it could be stated with a fair measure of certainty that (i) of the three *siddhis, Samvit Siddhi* was composed first, then *Atma Siddhi* and next *Isvara Siddhi* (ii) *Agama pramanya* was composed after *Purusha nirnaya* and that (iii) *Chatussloki* preceded *Stotra Ratna.* There is internal evidence in support of the first two statements and well recognised procedure to vouch for the correctness of the third. The evidence may now be indicated. That *Samvit Siddhi* was composed before Atma Siddhi is clear from the following references it contains to *Samvit Siddhi* (a) "Already established in *Samvit Siddhi* (Samvit Siddha veva sadhitam)[5] (b) "may be ascertained from...and from 'Samvit-Siddhi' (samvitsiddhau cha anusandhatavyam). As there is the following reference to *Atma- Siddhi* in *Ishvara Siddhi* the latter must have been composed later than the former. "When discussing the nature of the soul, it has been shown that it is only after relinquishing the former body..." (purva deha parityagena dehantara prapaka karma prerita prana sahaya eva dehantaram pravisati ityupapaditam atmacintayam).[6] In *Agama pramanya,* Yamuna says: iti sarvan chaitat Purushanirnaye nipunataramupapaditam iti neha prapanchyate (All this has been well explained in great detail in Purushanirnaya and is therefore not further dilated

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1. *Atma Siddhi* pp. 59. 2. *Atma Siddhi* p. 73. 3. *Atma Siddhi* p. 75.
4. *Atma Siddhi* p. 25. 5. *Atma Siddhi*, p. 31. 6. *Iswara Siddhi*, p. 95.

upon here). This supports the view that *Purushanirnaya* preceded *Agama-pramanya*. The accepted procedure that one is to perform purushakara prapatti to Sri (Lakshmi) before prapatti to the Divine Couple favours the inference that *Catussloki* must have been composed before *Stotra-ratna*. The reason for approaching Goddess Lakshmi prior to offering oneself to Sriman Narayana is, in the words of Venkatanatha, to secure the intercession of Lakshmi, the very embodiment of mercy, on our behalf so that the Lord may not take too serious a view of our sins and shortcomings and that his anger and dissatisfaction with us may be mitigated and He may be pleased to accept our surrender (tadupa sadana trasa samanim).

If chronologically *Samvit Siddhi* is the first among the *Siddhis*, it may be asked: Why is it that *Atma Siddhi* figures first and *Samvit Siddhi* comes last in all available editions of *Siddhi traya?* A plausible reason is that although all the three have suffered from the ravages of time and vandalism, and are, in consequence, incomplete, *Atma-Siddhi* alone is a little fuller and its beginning along with the *mangala sloka* has escaped destruction, while *Samvit-Siddhi* has not only lost, like *Isvara Siddhi*, much valuable material both at the beginning and end, but also in the intervening parts.

THE SHAPING FORCES OF YAMUNA'S THOUGHT

The shaping forces of Yamuna's thought include the writings of such illustrious purvacharyas as Tanka, Dramida and Srivatsanka Misra, the *Nyaya-tattva* of his grandfather and pracharya, Nathamuni, and the compositions of the Alwars, particularly those of Nammalwar (Saint Satakopa). He has profound admiration for the ancient preceptors. Tanka's (Bhashyakara's) work he characterises as concise and pregnant with meaning (parimita gambhira bhashina)[1], and Srivatsanka Misra, he describes as the venerable Srivatsanka who set forth an ocean of rules of interpretation, elegant and thoughtful (gambhira nyayasagara bhashina Srivatsanka Misra).[2] Nathamuni's *Nyaya tattva*, a veritable treasure-house of philosophic wisdom, has furnished the guide lines for Yamuna's own epoch-making writings.[3] This is evident from his references to this work and to its *padas* (chapters) and *adhikarnas* (sections). He seems to have followed this work so closely that Venkatanatha says that '*Atma-Siddhi* is verily a condensed version of *Nyaya-tattva*' (Nyayatattva prakaranam hi *Atma Siddhi'h*:[4] It is a matter of poignant interest that this master-piece has been

1. and 2. *Atma Siddhi* p. 9
3 Uktam khalu Nathamunibhih Vedantanukulam Nyayatattivabhidhanea ! tacchi parigrhitam Yamunacharyadibhih:-Venkatanatha's *Tattvamukta Kalapa* p. 491
4. *Nyaya-siddhanjana*, Buddhipariccheda

lost. Yamuna's feelings of gratitude to Nathamuni is too deep for words. He starts and winds up his *Stotra Ratna* with fervent praise of his spiritual guru; and at the close of *Agamapramanya*, he grows ecstatic in his praise of the great supernormal spiritual gifts of Nathamuni which enabled him to have Sakshatkara (direct, immediate apprehension) of the three reals-cit, acit and Iswara. (Jiyan Nathamuni sva Yoga-mahima pratyaksha tattva trayah)[1].

Yamuna's indebtedness in Nammalvar is immeasurable and is expressed in an inimitable way in the following stanza of *Srotra-Ratna*.

Mata pita yuvatayas tanaya vibhutis
sarvam yadeva niyamena madan vayanam l
adhyasya nah kulapater vakulabhiramam
Srimat tadangri yugalam pranamami murdhna ll

Stotra-Ratna St. 5.

"I bow my head reverently before the blessed feet of Parankusa[2], the first and foremost leader of our race, adorned with *vakula* flowers : those holy feet alone have been and ever will be to me and to everyone of my race, mother, father, wives, sons and cherished wealth".[3] How Yamuna has been steeped in *Divya Prabandas*, particularly in *Tiruvoimozhi* could be seen from a study of his *Stotra Ratna*. Elsewhere it has been shown how this hymn echoes the sentiments expresed in *Tiruvoimozhi*.

It is learnt that Yamuna used to expound to his disciples the inner significance of Divya Prabandas and more especially, *Tiruvoimozhi*; and many of his original interpretations of some of the stanzas of Tiruvoimozhi have been recorded as 'Alavandar's *nirvahamkal*' in *Idu*, the most elaborate and fascinating commentary on Tiruvoimozhi.

Accounts of the life of Ramanuja record that as directed by Mahapurna, Ramanuja was studying the inner significance of Divya Prabandas from Maladhara, who had himself learnt them from Yamuna. Maladhara took great offence at Ramanuja now and then pointing out that what he

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1. *Agamapramanya*, Ed by Buitenan p. 80
2. Nammalvar, Satokopa and Maran are some of the other names of Parankusa.
3. Compare Venkatanatha's obeisance to Nammalvar in the third stanza of Prasthavapaddatih, *Padukasahasra*. Nammalvar saw the very root of the veda and hence could give us their equivalent in Tamil in his *Tiruvoimozhi*.

was saying could not have been Yamuna's own views; and in consequence he suspended instruction. When Mahapurna heard about this, he advised Maladhara to resume the discourses, stating that Ramanuja was no ordinary pupil and that his discipleship was just as formal as that of Krshna under Sandipini; and that, in any case, they were but channels, conduit pipes as it were, to pass on Yamuna's teaching to Ramanuja. The discourses were resumed, and later, when differences of opinion arose again, Maladhara realised that Ramanuja was on surer ground and that he had a clearer insight into Yamuna's mind than he himself could claim; for like Ekalavya of old, Ramanuja had uncommon guru-bhakti and was attuned to the master's mind. This episode bears testimony to the great esteem in which the visishtadvaitie acharya held the Divya Prabandas, considered as the Tamil veda, and acquired complete mastery over them.

Siddhitraya at a glance:—

SIDDHITRAYA

Atma-Siddhi, Isvara-Siddhitrayam and *Samvit-Siddhi,* usually referred to by the collective name of *Siddhitrayam* are not parts of a single work but pendent treatises designed to establish respectively the visishtadvatic conception of *atman (jiva or soul)*, Isvara (God) and *Samvit* (consciousness; knowledge), after a critical consideration of rival views. These polemical works are conceived on the model of the great *Siddhis* of the advaitic school, such as *Brahma Siddhi, Ishta-Siddhi* and *Naishkarmya Siddhi.* Some of the views set forth in these *Siddhis* of the advaita school come in for critical examination in *Siddhitraya.* In *Atmasiddhi*, some statements from *Ishtasiddhi* are cited and criticised[1].

Atma Siddhi and *Isvarasiddhi* are written in elegant prose interspersed with verse in the manner of early philosophical works like *Tantra-vartika*; and *Samvit Siddhi* is wholly in verse.

Unfortunately all these have suffered from the ravages of time and neglect and possibly from vandalism. All of them end abruptly; *Isvara Siddhi* and *Samvit Siddhi* have no beginning either, and *Samvit Siddhi* is the worst hit, because even in the body of this work there are many gaps. What we now have of *Siddhitraya* is only a fragment of the original work. Even in this truncated form, *Siddhitraya* impresses upon its reader that the author was a master-mind who expounded all the cardinal principles of visishtadvaita in a clear and distinct manner and that he set himself the highest standards of logical thinking. These three *siddhis* are of the greatest value to the student

1 *Atma Siddhi*, p. 32

of vedantic thought not only because they are the earliest available visishtavaita classics but also because they present an authentic account of this system of thought and belief, having been inspired and shaped by the rich contributions of previous acharyas including Nathamuni, transmitted to him through an unbroken tradition. They have furnished the basis and inspiration for Ramanuja's brilliant systematisation of Visishtadvaitic thought and also for post-Ramanuja dialectics.

ATMA SIDDHI

The *mangala* sloka (invocatory verse) with which *Atma Siddhi* commences is a prayer for the highest form of bhakti[1] to the Supreme Purusha; and it states in a nut-shell the visishtadvaitic conception of the Deity. Yamuna explains why he undertakes this work. All systems of thought agree that Atma-jnana is the means to transcendental felicity (*nisreyas*). Numerous sruti passages assert that knowledge of the *jivatma* and *Paramatma* is the means of liberation. But conflicting views have been held by thinkers on almost every aspect of the self, its essential nature, attributes, the means by which it is known, its duration, number, the way to the attainment of moksha and so on. Likewise, divergent views are entertained about the infinite self. In the maze of arguments and counter-arguments presented by inquirers seeking to justify their respective views of man and God, one is confused and is unable to come to the right conclusion. Hence the need of this inquiry.

At the very outset, Yamuna states in unmistakable words the *Pratijna*—the thesis which he proposes to establish,—in a superb stanza remarkable for its brevity and clarity.

Dehendriyamanah prana dhibhyo Snyo S nanyasadhanah:
nityo S vyapi pratikshetramatma bhinnah atma swatah sukhi ll

"The individual soul is a spiritual principle different from the body, senses, mind (*manas*) vital breath, (*prana*) and consciousness (*dhih*); it does not depend on anything else for its manifestation (i.e. it is self-luminous); it is eternal, subtle (*anumatra, atisukshma*), distinct in each body and is, in its essential nature, blissful"

Then Yamuna plunges into the subject, seeking serially to establish, after a reasoned consideration, every one of the items mentioned in the *pratijna*. First materialism in its different forms identifying the soul with

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1. The *bhakti* prayed for is semushi bhaktirupa (knowledge that has blossomed into bhakti) as will be evident from Ramanuja's prayer at the commencement of his Sri Bhashya.

either the body or senses or *manas* or vital breath is examined and shown to be unacceptable. Incidentally the Nyaya-Vaiseshika theory that *manas* is one of the nine ultimate *dravyas*, which with their properties and relations constitute the whole universe, is assailed. Then follows a critical review of the theory that *samvit* (consciousness) is the soul, for the reason that it is *ajada* (other than insentient). The Buddhists *(prakatah)* and the disguised Buddhists (pracchanah) sponsor the view that self-luminous consciousness alone is the soul and that it is the only reality; but that on account of *vasanas* (impressions of previous experience) or on account of beginningless ignorance *(avidya)*, it has for its object the erroneously imagined and unreal distinctions of knower and known. The Buddhist doctrine, whether it identifies the same with momentary consciousness (*kshanika vijnana*) or with a stream of consciousness, has to face insuperable difficulties. Nor docs the Advaitic theory of pure consciousness devoid of subject and object, eternal and self-luminous, fare any better. Yamuna shows that what is termed consciousness is well-known to possess the character of manifesting by its very existence some object to its substrate, namely the soul; and that terms such as *samvit, anubhuti, jnana, prakasa* and *avagati* are synonyms and are relative terms, always pointing to an agent and an object. The atman is a knower (*jnatr)* and not mere knowledge *(jnana)*. Perception, reasoning and scriptural testimony support the visishtadvaitic view of the soul; and on this view alone the possibility of ignorance afflicting the soul could be explained. The self which is knower presents itself as 'I' (*aham*).

The *pramanas* by which the self is known are next considered. The Nyaya and the Sankhya doctrines that the soul is known through inference come in for scrutiny. The fallacies lurking in their proofs for the existence of the soul are relentlessly exposed. The Nyaya arguments could, at best, prove the existence of 'some entity' as the substrate of qualities such as effort and desire; but it would be difficult to call it the 'self'. Likewise, the arguments advanced by the Sankhya are shown to fail of their purpose. Yamuna also exposes the deficiencies of the Nyaya and the Sankhya conceptions of the soul.

Then, he demonstrates the untenability of the view that the self is directly perceived. The Bhatta maintains that the self becomes aware of itself and this must only be through *manasa-pratyaksha*, since the external senses cannot cognise the self, which is subtle and formless. The Bhatta understands *aham-pratyaya(*self-consciousness) literally. The 'I' it is said, can be perceived directly. So the self, according to him, is both subject and object of knowledge. The Prabhakara objects to this and contends that the self is always subject and that it is revealed as such (*grahaka eva*), as subject only in all knowledge. In other words, it is revealed simultaneously with the

object. Whenever an object, say a pot, is known, there is, in addition, self-awareness. But the self so known is cognised as knower, not as object of knowledge. Either school of Mimamsa criticises the other; and Yamuna shows that neither position stands logical scrutiny. He says the self cannot be revealed by that for which he stands witness, any more than he who witnesses the pot can be revealed by the pot. Yamuna states that persons well versed in the vedas, having no faith in the power of reason to prove the existence of the atman, assert that this proof is furnished by the vedas alone.

Anumaniki mapyatmasiddhim asradd adhanah srautimeva tam srortriyah sankiranti. Thus it is concluded that the self is known only through *sruti* and *srutyarthapatti*. What the scriptures teach has to be properly understood; and for this unclouded reasoning is a pre-requisite.

Then Yamuna establishes that the soul is self-luminous consciousness in itself and possesses knowledge as its attribute. In its very essence (*svarupa*) the soul is consciousness; and it has consciousness as its attribute, (dharma). To distinguish consciousness which is of the nature of *dharma* or attribute from that which is the *svarupa* of the soul, it has come to be called *dharma-bhutajnana* (attributive consciousness). Attributive consciousness is eternal and natural to the soul as luminosity is to the sun. This doctrine, special to visishtadvaita vedanta, offers a satisfactory solution for many a knotty problem.

The objections, mostly from the Nyaya-Vaiseshika and Mimamsa darsanas, to the view that consciousness is eternal and natural to the self are next considered. Among other things, it is said, if knowledge were eternal there would be no distinction between one item of knowledge and another. Moreover, knowledge is known to be caused only when there is sense organ contact. Further, there must be knowledge even in deep sleep. These and other objections are suitably met. It is pointed out that if, as the opponent says, knowledge is an occasional property of the soul, it would amount to despiritualising it. After an elaborate discussion into the nature of prakasa (manifestation) Yamuna concludes that it is *anubhava duratvam* (*not* remote from experience). In this he is adopting the definition offered by Nathamuni. This conception offers an easy explanation for all facts of knowledge and shows how the past and the future could come under the purview of knowledge.

From the foregoing discussion, Yamuna concludes that the soul has consciousness for its essential nature and is aware of itself at all times; and it knows objects besides itself, with the aid of *dharma-bhuta-jnana* working through the medium of *manas* and senses. Since the perception of external objects depends on various causal conditions, it is said 'He knows', He does not know'.

Though the soul shines forth as having consciousness for its essential nature, yet, like the fish which moves about in the deep lake or the milk mingled with water, the soul does not shine forth clearly and directly. That is why the arguments advanced by teachers of old consistently with the nature of the soul and with scriptural teachings are held in esteem. But these don't satisfy fully; for they could after all provide only indirect, mediate knowledge (*paroksha jnana*). To secure immediate knowledge (*aparoksha jnana*), persons seek to get rid of the veiling obscurities and evils by the practice of yoga and to purify themselves through fire (*puta paka*) as it were by mental control allowing the *sattva* quality to predominate. Immediate knowledge arises only at the culmination of the highest stage of concentration. Thus, with the aid of scriptural testimony, inference and perception resulting from the practice of yoga, such a disciplined person cognises the soul, which is in itself self-luminuous, most clearly and explicity (*bhavana prakarsha paryante cha paroksha jnanamudayata iti sarva vadi nirvadam iti*).

Next the inquiry into the duration of the soul (*kalavaccheda pariksha*) it taken up. The Buddhist view that the soul is momentary (*kshanika*) is taken up for consideration. The rest of *Atma-siddhi* has been lost.

Yamuna refers to certain sections of *Atma-Siddhi* which are not available. i) The section called *sambandhavimarsa* where the nature of the relation of the finite soul to the infinite Self is determined is lost. ii) Again, the section where he establishes that the soul is *svatssukhi* (*blissful* in its pristine purity) is also lost. This being the last item in the pratijna (what he set out to establish) it is clear Yamuna completed the work; but a good part has been irretrievably lost.

ISVARA SIDDHI

Isvara Siddhi is devoted to a discussion of the existence and nature of the Supreme God. As stated already it is incomplete. The available text contains only a part of the *purvapaksha* relating to proofs for the existence of Isvara. Starting abruptly, it ends with equal abruptness. The prefatory statement runs as follows: "In establiing that the (activities of the world process) is under the governance of a single supreme person, the prima facie view may be stated first" This is followed by the presentation of the Mimamsa objections to a belief in an ommiscient God. The Mimamsaka recognises no creation or dissolution and thinks that the world is self-evolving, getting the impetus for change from the past karmas of souls who play their part in life's journey at the time; and therefore, he dispenses with the God-idea. The Mimamsaka argues that perception, whether of the normal (*laukika*) or of the super-normal (*alaukika* or yogic) kind, fails to furnish any evidence for

a belief in God. Nor is inference capable of establishing God's existence. Next comes the Naiyayika reply to these arguments and his proofs for God's existence. This is followed by the Mimamsaka rejoinder; which again invokes the counter-arguments of the Naiyayika and he adduces further proofs of God's existence. At this stage, the work breaks off. The portions lost include entire *siddhanta* and also part of the *purvapaksha*, at least what the Mimamsaka would possibly have said about *agama* not vouching for the existence of God. It is obvious that the Nyaya stand-point with which the available text ends does not represent Yamuna's own view, though Dr. S. N. Dasgupta is disposed to think otherwise, for reasons best known to himself. He says "Yamuna follows the method of the Nyaya and tries to prove that the world is an effect, and as such, must have been produced by an intelligent person who has a direct knowledge of the materials. He has also a direct knowledge of *dharma* (merit) and *adharma* (demerit) of men in accordance with which he creates....."[1] Having definitely stated in *Atma Siddhi* that the fimite self is known only through scripture, Yamuna would never countenance the view that the existence of the Supreme Self is matter for *anumana*.

anumaniki mapyatma siddhim asradda
dhanah srautimevatam srotryah sangirante.

Moreover, in *Agamapramanya*, Yamuna states categorically "that might be only if the proof of the existence of God is sought on the flimsy ground of inference; but, as a matter of fact, it is not so; the great Lord is indeed known only on the authority of the upanishads"

nanu ca kevala tarkabaladayam
yadi sishadhayisha-padam isvarah: |
bhavetu nama tatha sati dushanam
srutisirah pramito hi Mahesvarah || *Agamapramanya* p. 17

Further, the substance of the entire *Isvara siddhi* now extant, including the views of the Naiyayika, figures in the purvapaksha in Ramanuja's comments on the *Brahma Sutra* I. i. 3—*sastrayonitvat*. Taking the discussion beyond the *purvapaksha*, Ramanuja points out that belief in a God as the author of the universe is primarily based upon sruti or revelation. Reason, designated *yukti* or *anukulatarka* may indicate the probability of a conclusion already reached by other means, and is thus ancillary to scriptural authority. In this matter, the function of reason is purely negative, the removal of any antecedent improbability that may be felt to exist about the truth of God. By itself reasoning is powerless to prove God's existence. At best it can make

1. *A History of Indian Philosophy*, by S. N. Das Gupta Vol. III p. 153.

out a case for an intelligent being who is to be the creator of the world; it cannot establish that the creator is a single omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, all-wise and merciful God. Much less can it establish that God is at once the material and the efficient cause of the universe.

SAMVIT SIDDHI

As noticed already, *Samvit Siddhi* has suffered the greatest damage having lost large tracts at the beginning, the end and also in the intervening parts. What remains of *Samvit Siddhi*, though fragmentary, is still of considerable value to the student of vedantic thought as it discusses many a fundamental philosophical issue. In the main, the work is devoted to a critical review of the advaitic doctrines and the establishment of the visishtadvaitic theory. Incidentally some of the Sankhya, Jaina and Bauddha concepts of the Real come in for scrutiny. The topics discussed include the advaitic interpretation of certain upanishadic texts for which a privileged position is claimed by the absolutists, texts such as *sad eva saumya idam agra asit, ekame vadvitiyam Brahman, tat satyam* sa atma *tat tvam asi* Svetaketo'', the ontological status of the world; the conception of Brahman as pure, distinctionless (*nirvisesha*) quality-less (*nirdharmaka*) thought (*samvit*), the concepts of *Maya* and *avidya*; *ekajivavada*; the critique *bheda*; and so on.

Taking their stand on certain crucial upanishadic texts, the *abheda* srutis, the advaitins contend that Brahman is the only reality (*satya*) and that the *prapancha* (the world of men and things) is *mithya*. It was easy for Yamuna to establish his own thesis that Brahman is all-comprehensive and does not exclude the cosmos by showing that as against the few *abheda srutis* the bulk of the upanishadic texts (i.e. the *abheda srutis*) support belief in the *saprapancha* ideal,namely that *ciducit prapancha* is real and is rooted in Brahman. But that amounts to committing the error of concentrating on convenient sections of the upanisads and explaining away the rest. It could at best show that this is also a plausible alternative interpretation, but not vindicate its claim to greater credence. Therefore, Yamuna takes up for consideration the very *abheda srutis* which are claimed to be the bedrock of unflinching monism, and establishes with great logical acumen that they do not bear out the interpretation put on them by the Advaitins. Far from expounding alternative theories of the Real and its relation to the world, the three types of upanishadic texts-the *abheda* srutis, the *bheda srutis*, and the *ghataka srutis*-stress different aspects of the comprehensive and consistent view of the real, namely the transcendence, the unity and the immanence of God. Interpreted in the light of the context in which the statement; ''Sat existed, one only, without a second ''aditya'', the expression '*advitiya*', it would be been, does not deny the existence of everything other than *Sat* or Brahman. Whether taken as a *bahurihi* or *tat purusha* compound, it does

not convey such a negative meaning. All *pramanas*, perception, inference and sruti, vouch for the reality of the world. ''Sat existed, one only, without a second' really intends to assert, says Yamuna, that the Supreme Spirit is one without a peer. He neither has nor had nor will have an equal or a superior (*samanadhika rahita*) fit to be reckoned as a second. He cites an illustration to support this interpretation. "The paramount monarch of the chola country now reigning is without a second in the world" emphasises that he is unrivalled, there is no monarch equal to him. Surely, it does not deny the existence of his retinue, sons, consort and so on. The whole host of devas, asuras and men, the fourfaced Brahma and the cosmic egg form but an infinitesimal part of a drop from the ocean of the greatness (*mahima*) of the Supreme Purusha, the Lord of all who is untainted by *klesas* (sorrows) or *karma*, and who is the seat of the six-fold qualitiss of omniscience and the the like, and whose glories eannot even be conceived by the mind. "There is but a single sun in the sky and not two'' does not deny the existence of the rays of the sun. The world which is but an infinitesimal fraction of the entire collection of entities which constitute His possessions (*vibhuti*) and which are under His sway could scarely be called a second entity. Yamuna asks: Does anyone counting with his fingers the ocean as seven, count the waves, foam, bubbless and drops of water found therein ?

The truth of the world is not its unreality, but its having Brahman for its soul-*aita tatmyam idam sarvam tat satyam.* The world constituted of spiritual and non-spiritual entities derives its very being from the fact of its having Brahman for its soul; and it is the body (sarira) of God. It is a mode (*prakara*) of the Lord. Its unchanging and ultimate cause is *Sat* alone. Just as sparks are not different from the fire where from they take their rise, even so the effect is non-different from their cause. That the effect is substantially the same as the cause is shown by the very examples cited, namely, clay, steel, gold and so forth. The cause that brought them into actuality is also the sustaining principle. Without being nourished by Brahman's power, fire would be incapable of burning; water of wetting, and wind would be powerless to move.

The concise formula, *Tat tv m asi*, is claimed by the advaitin to be an unequivocal statement of the identity of *jiva* and Brahman. Does this text teach the absolute identity of jiva and Brahman? Of the two terms here equated *Tat* refers to the omniscienct Lord whose will is ever-realised, who is the creator of the world and who is the sea of illimitable bliss; and *tvam* to the finite soul characterised by helplessness and affected by sorrow and misery. Their qualities are wholly opposed to each other as light to darkness; they must be distinct and to equate them would amount to attributing contradictory qualities to the self-same entity. It is unhelpful to

suggest that contradictory features could be attributed to the same object on the basis of limiting conditions; for there could be no limiting conditions in the case of pure consciousness.

It won't do merely to say that the world is an appearance *(mithya)*. How the appearance appears has to be explained. The advaitin seeks to explain it thus: Brahman which is under the influence of *maya* appears as Iswara who is characterised by *satya samkalpatva* and who is the cause of the world; and the self-same Brahman under the influence of avidya, appears as the finite soul steeped in sorrow and delusion and that consequently the identity of the basic reality, *suddha caitanya*, is what is asserted in the *Tat tvam asi* text.

According to Yamuna such a doctrine bristles with difficulties. For one thing, there would be confusion between Iswara and jiva. Further the contention that Brahman is, in itself, devoid of these distinctions, but that, in association with *maya* and *avidya*, it deludes itself into believing that it is manifold and possessed of qualities is like asserting that Devadatta who is beheaded for an alleged crime remains unhurt. Besides, this interpretation of *Tat tvam asi* amounts either to saying 'A' is 'A' which is a tautology or attempting to equate what could not be identified, namely the real and the unreal.

The equation *(sama nadhikananya* is to be interpreted as *prakara* prakari identity or *sarira sariri bhava.*

Yamuna points out that the scriptures teach that Brahman and the finite self are not identical and that, in moksha, the jiva retains its ditinctness as seen in the description that "dwelling in the depths of Brahmanubhava the liberated soul experiences illimitable bliss, "If the jiva were to perish at the time the fruits of its labours are realised, Yamuna asks: For whm is this moksha? Who would endeavour to reach such a state of self-annihilation?

After exposing the weakness of the theory of a single, distinctionless, qualityless and pure consciousness, Yamuna seeks to establish that *samvit* is manifold.

Next he takes up for examination the conception of *avidya* which is a vital, and at the same time, the most vulnerable part of Advaitic philosophy. The notion of *avidya* is, according to Yamuna, a waxen doll that cannot stand before the fire of reasoning. He exposes the manifold defects of the doctrine of *avidya*. These have been succinctly expressed by Ramanuja in what has become known as sevenfold objections (*sapta vidanupapatti)* to

maya, and these have been elaborated by Venkatanatha in his great polemical work, '*Satadushani*. *Avidya* must be either a negative or a positive principle; and either alternative leads to unwelcome results. It is spoken of as *sadadvilaksana*. The reasons advanced to support this could be shown to prove quite the opposite description. *Avidya* is either consciousness or the knower or the known; and in any case, it cannot be dispelled; either *avidya* is the contradictory or the contrary of *vidya*. If the former, it cannot possibly exist any where, as the real is consciousness witht out a second; if the latter, the theory that *samvit* is without a second would have to be abandoned. *Avidya* as conceived by the advaitin can have no *asraya* (support). It can have no place in the jiva; to say so is to commit the fallacy of mutual dependence (*any on yasraya*); it could have no place in Brahman, which is omniscient. And if it were to exist in the omniscient and the eternally free Being, it can never be removed.

It is argued that the texts referring to ommiscience and other perfections have only relative validity (*vyava harika pramanya*) while those speaking of non-dualism alone have absolute validity (*tattvika pramanya*); but this is untenable, because there is no basis except dogmatic assertion for distinguishing between two sets of scriptural texts. *Avidya* should not only have an *asraya*, a basis from which to operate, but also something which it negates (*pratiyogin*). On the advaitic theory, Brahman must be both the *asraya* and the *pratiyogin*, a manifestly impossible position. To suggest that in different aspects Brahman is *asraya* and *pratiyogin* is to accept distinctions in Brahman.

Next Yamuna shows that *avidya* cannot be single. The view that *moksha* is not a state to be newly attained is then shown to be indefensible. The contention that *avidya* is an obstacle to *Brahma-jnana* does not stand the test of reason. Then *eka jiva veda* is shown to be illogical. Next, it is pointed out that the Advaitin cannot give an intelligible account of social life on the basis of the theory of phenomenal selves, each of which creates with the aid of its individual *avidyas*, objects perceptible only to itself. Then it is shown that the advaitic view that self-luminosity, unity, all-pervasivences and eternity characterise consciousness contradicts their view that *samvit* is *nirdharmaka*. To make them the very essence of Brahman is no escape. *Satyam, jnanam* and *anantam* cannot be interpreted negatively as is sought to be done.

The advaitic theory that all *pramanas* establish non-difference is to be rejected; because, everyone of them reveals its object as something specific. There is no support for the conclusion that the world is *sadasad-vilaksana*.

The advaitic argument that things are only thought, since they always go together is next shown to be faulty. It is a double-edged weapon; for,

on the same ground, one might as well draw the inference that thoughts are things. Moreover, the very assertion that thoughts and things go together implies difference. If there were no two things, there could be no talk of their going together.

A few passages from *Samvit Siddhi* not found in the available text but quoted in *Srutaprakasika* (Sudarsana suri's commentary on *Sri Bhasya*) may be cited. These have also been reproduced by Venkatanatha.

1. Yadya prakasa mana dhih kadacidavatisthate
   .....
   ghatadaviva tatrapi kalpaniyam prakasakam |

2. ghato' yamiti vijnane ghatamatram, prakasate
   na vittiriti yushmakam goshthishu nanu ghushyate

3. atita' nagate carthe katham prakatya sambhavah
   na hi dharminyasatyeva dharmah sambhavamrcchate

4. tadevapasyatam sarvasunyatvat bhibyatam satam
   gatissvayam prakasatvadrte nanyopalabhyate.

The first states the advaitic argument that *samvit* must be regarded as self-luminous; for, if it depended on 'something else' for its manifestation, that something else would require some other entity for its manifestation and so on endlessly. The second is the Advaitic criticism of the Bhatta view that when objects are cognised, objects alone are presented first and not *samvit* also; *samvit* is presented later, as when it is said 'I know this jar'. The third is the Advaitic refutation of the Bhatta view of prakatya. In the last, the Advaitin criticises the Bhatta theory of *samvit* and shows that unless it is admitted to be self-luminous, the very existence of *samvit* would be threatened.

Criticisms Answered

This summary of the discussions on the available text of *Siddhitrayam*, brief as it is, suffices to show that almost all the fundamental issues of philosophy have been considered from the stand-point of visishtadvaita vedanta and conclusions drawn after a critical review of rival doctrines. These conclusions are reinforced, and topics not discussed here dealt with in the other works of Yamuna. Together they present a comprehensive account of visishtadvaita darsana in all its aspects.— *tattva, hita and purushartha.* On the foundation thus well and truly laid Ramanuja erected a stable and splendid superstructure satisfying fully the demands of philosophy and religion.

Before indicating the extent of Yamuna's influence on Ramanuja, it is quite necessary to show that the comments made by Dr. Surendranath Dasgupta on the contributions of Yamuna are unwarranted. Otherwise the criticisms may be taken to be justified especially since Dr. S. N. Dasgupta enjoys great prestige among the exponents of Indian thought. The criticisms and the replies thereto may be prefaced by the general observation that Dr. Dasgupta seems not only to have overlooked the fact that large portions of the *Siddhis* have been lost, but also to have skipped over the available text. Besides, he has practically ignored the other works of Yamuna which corroborate, amplify and supplement what is established in Siddhitrayam. The most effective way of meeting the adverse comments is by quoting extracts from Yamuna's writings thereby revealing that Dasgupta's reading of the texts has been perfunctory.

Now for the comments.—1. "Yamuna follows the method of the Nyaya and tries to prove that the world is an effect, and as such, must have been produced by an intelligent person who had a direct knowledge of the materials. . . ."[1] The reply to this has already been furnished. It has been shown that Yamuna does not accept the Nyaya view that the existence of God is proved by arguments and that in *Agamapramanya* he has categorically stated that scriptural testimony is our only guide in this regard. (vide p. 16 ante)

2. " . . . Iswara is spoken of as fashioner of the world system in accordance with the Nyaya doctrine. From the manner in which he supports the relation of Isvara to the world, both in the *Siddhitraya* and in the

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1. A History of Indian Philosophy by Dr. Surendranath Dasgupta, vol. iii, pp. 153-4 all the criticisms on the subject are found in pages 153-4.

Agamapramanya, it is almost certain that his own attitude does not differ much from the Nyaya attitude which left the duality of the world and Isvara unresolved....." Reply.—Mistaking the view mentioned last in *Isvara-siddhi* for the *Siddhanta*, Dasgupta draws this palpably erroneous conclusion. That Yamuna does not countenance the view that God is an almighty clock-maker setting to work on material existing independently of Him has already been indicated. Again, far from accepting the dualism of Iswara and the cosmos, Yamuna maintains that the Real is a unity. The ultimately Real is the Supreme Purusha who owns the multitudinous objects and persons comprising the *prapancha* as His *vibhutis*, (property, glory) *prakaras*, (modes). The modes are real, distinct from one another and from God; they have their distinctive characteristics and there is no mixing up of their nature; and yet they are inseparably related to the Supreme and have an adjectival existence. They are related to the Supreme as body is related to the soul; they owe their very existence to, are controlled in their activities by, and exist to subserve the purposes of the Supreme. Yamuna's solution of the problem of the 'One and the many' is unique. Rejecting at once the notion of a blank unity and unrelieved pluralism he believes in a unity in diversity. The prakaras are many; the prakarin is one.

The very opening stanza of *Atma-siddhi* declares that prakrti, kala and souls (*baddhas*, *muktas* and *nityas*) always conform to the will of Sriman for whom creation, sustenance and dissolution are sport, in the interest of soul-making.

> Prakrti purusha kala vyakta mukta yadiccha
> manuvidadhati nityam nitya-siddhairanekaih |

Again, he says.—

> "Svadhina trvidha chetanachetana
> Svarupa sthitipravrtti bhedam purushaviseshamisvara....."

"The Supreme Person has under His control the diverse forms of essence, existence and activities of the threefold jivas and non-intelligent objects.....". In fact, the special contribution of visishtadvaita vedanta to the solution of the problem of the relation of God to the cosmos is the conception of *sarira-sariri-bhava*.

The section termed *sambandavimarsa* devoted to a discussion of this question is among the portions of *Atma-Siddhi* lost; but at the very outset, Yamuna has clearly expressed what is unmistakably his view.

atma paramatmano sambandhepi.....nanatve satyeva
abhedo namanvayah amsamsi bhava lakshanah samavayah;
ses a seshitva rupah, paratantra lakshanah, svasvami bhavah.
bhrtya svami lakshana iti..... *Atma Siddhi*, p. 8

"In regard to the relation of the individual soul to the Supreme Self, while accepting multiplicity of souls, the relation between God and the soul is one of non-difference; it is conceived in different ways, as an inherent relation like that between whole and part, or as the relation between the principal and the subordinate, or as the relation between owner and owned, or as that between master and servant". The last mentioned—bhrtya-svami relationship—is what Yamuna accepts. This would imply the partial truths conveyed by others; but they do not bring out, quite as well as this does, the unique features of the relation of souls to God, namely that they are eternally, inherently and inseparably related as servants to the master. Being the most natural relationship, it accounts for bliss arising from service to God. In all other cases, servitude to others is a cause of suffering. Inseparability (aprthak siddha) characterises this relationship.

In *Samvit siddhi* (p. 104). Yamuna says.—

tadda taadaatmya sambandhe sruti-pratyaksha mulake |
nirdosha S paurusheya ca srutiratyartham aadaraat ||

"Scripture and perception assert that the relation of identity (*tadatmya*) of *tat* and *tvam* is in the sense of soul-body or prakari-prakara aikya, not as *bhedaabheda*).....The scripture, self-existent (not the work of any person) and free from all defects, earnestly and repeatedly declares that the finite self and the Supreme Self are identical, non-different, in this sense."

Thus the most essential feature in the relation of the jiva to God is its being inherently and for all time a bhrtya or dasa. This idea is elaborated in *Stotra-Ratna*.

Pita tvam mata tvam dayitatanayastvam priya suhrtvamana
tvam mitram gururasi gatiscasi jagatam |
tvadiyastvadbhrtyastva parijanastvad gatirahm
prapannascaivam satyahamapi tavaivasmi hi bharah || St. 60

"Thou (alone) art my father, Thou art my mother; Thou art my beloved son; Thou art my true well-wisher; Thou art my dear friend ; Thou art my preceptor; Thou art the refuge of all the worlds; I am Thine, Thy servant, Thy attendant; Thou art my only support; I have taken refuge in Thee; under this circumstance, I am indeed a burden on Thee."

3. " Yamuna thus gives us hardly any new ideas about Isvara and this relation to the souls and the world. He does not make inquiry into the nature of the reality of the world and rests content with proving that the world appearance is not false, as the Sankarites supposed....."

This criticism has no meaning, because Yamuna (and for that matter this would apply equally to any of the exponents of vedantic thought) claims no originality for his views. He is not weaving out a system of his own, but is seeking to expound the profound truths imbedded in the upanishads. He does not claim any originality for his interpretation either; for he strictly follows the lead given by the ancient masters like Tanka, Dramida and Sri Vatsankamisra and conforms closely to well-established rules of interpretation (*nyayas*). Notwithstanding all this, none can deny the unique and original contribution that Yamuna has made to vedantic thought. A mastermind, he has assimilated the vast array of traditional views, laid bare the unerring logic that supports them, and synthesised the apparently diverse and contradictory disclosures of the real found in the Vedanta, the Pancharatra agamas and Divya Prabandams and presented them in a remarkably cogent, logical, lucid and convincing manner.

One is heartened to find that Dasgupta concedes at least that Yamuna proved the untenability of the advaitic theory of the phenomenality of the world. As for the nature of the world, it has been shown that it is a *vibhuti* (possession) of the Lord, and that it undergoes real modifications (parinama) under the guidance of the Supreme and provides the body, mind, senses and the like, (i.e. the instruments of enjoyment) the objects of enjoyment and the field whereon the jivas are to play their part.

yadanda mandantara gocharam ca yaddasottaraanyaavaranaani Yani chal
gunah pradhaanam purusham param padam
paraatparam brahma cha te vibhutayah ll *Stotra-Ratnam*, St. 17

The cosmic sphere, all that lies therein, its sheaths numbering over ten, the threefold gunas, primordial matter, the finite self, the transcendental domain of Brahman, released souls and the ever-free souls, Thy divine forms of transcendental beauty—all these constitute Thy limitless and glorious possessions over which Thy sway is absolute"

Ityadi vedavach ana tanmulaptagamairapi |
Brahmatmanatmalabho Syam prapanchaschidachinmayah ||

Samvit-Siddhi, p. 102.

"With the aid of scriptural texts such as the foregoing and smrti texts based thereon, it is learnt that the world constituted of senient and nonsentient objects derives its very being from the fact of its having Brahman for its soul"

Mama natha! yadasti yo S smyaham
Sakalam taddhi tavaiva Madhava !
... ... *Stotra Ratna*, St. 53.

"Oh Madhava! whatever I have and also whatever I am-all these are indeed thine own..." Echoing the sentiments expressed by Nammalvar in Tiruvoimozhi iv. viii-10, Yamuna says "Oh Lord! I can't endure even for a moment my body, my vital energies, the joys coveted by all, my very self and what-ever else that belongs to me, if they do not subserve Thy purposes and glorify Thee. This is the truth. Let them break into thousand pieces, if they don't serve Thee. Oh slayer of Madhu ! This is my earnest prayer."

Na deham na pranan na cha sukha maseshabhi lashtam
na chatmanam nanyatkimapi tava seshatva vibhavat l
bahirbhutam natha! kshanamapi sahe ya tu satatha
vinasam tatsatyam Madhu mathana vijnapanamidam ॥

Stotra Ratna, St. 57.

4. "He is also silent about the methods which a person should adopt for procuring his salvation and the nature and characteristics of that state". The following citations from Yamuna's works would suffice to show that he has not been silent about either the means to moksha or about its nature, but has specially mentioned *bhakti* and *prapatti* as the *sadhanas*, and has described moksha as *brahma-prapti* betokening not only freedom from the travails of samsara but also the positive experience of the bliss of the attributes of the Divine and of rendering unremitting service to the Supreme.

Hita.— (a) tad sadhanatopi.....ubhaya parikarmita svantasya aikantikatyantika bhaktiyoga labhyah. *Atma Siddhi*, *P. 9.*

"As regards the means of attaining moksha ..... the Supreme is attainable only by bhakti-yoga by one whose mind has been completely

purified by the two-fold discipline of *Karma-yoga* and *jnana yoga*". This formula has been taken over by Ramanuja and quoted in *Vedartha-samgraha*, (pp. 98-99)

(b) svadharma jnana vairagya sadhya bhaktyekagocharah l
Gitarthasamgraha, St. 1.

"The Highest Brahman, Lord Narayana, is within the range of vision of bhakti alone, brought on, fostered by the scrupulous performance of one's own duty without attachment (nishkama) and by the acquisition of a vision of the self and by the cultivation of complete detachment from worldly desires."

(c) ekantyatyanta dasyaika ratis tvat padamapnuyat |
tatpradhanamidam sastram iti. *Gitarthasamgraha, St. 32*

"He whose only joy is in rendering perfect and absolute service to the Lord at all times will attain the highest state."

(d) Na dharma nishto S smi nachatmavedi nabhaktimamstvaccharanaravinde | akincano S nanyagatissaranya tvat padamulam saranam prapadye ॥ *Stotra-Ratna, St. 22.*

"O Saviour, sure and neverfailing! I lay no claim to steadfastness in *karma yoga* nor to a vision of the self *(jnana-yoga)*; nor to fervent devotion to Thy lotus-like feet; utterly lacking in competence and having no other refuge and looking up to no other end than reaching Thee, I take refuge under Thy feet".

Venkatanatha bears testimony to the fact that "great teachers like Ramanuja, the prince among ascetics, and Yamuna have clearly demonstrated that there is no greater *hita* in all the world than surrendering the responsibility for one's spiritual uplift to Thee, Daye!"

.....

Yatl pati yamunaprabhrtayah pradayanti Daye |
jagati hitam na nastva yi bharanyasanadhikam ॥
Dayasatakam, St. 59,

PURUSHARTHA.—

(a) .....parama purusharthabhute brahma praptilakshana mokshe S pi .....tad gunanubhava janita niratisaya sukha samunmesh opanita yantika tat kinkaratva lakshana iti. *Atma Siddhi*, p. 8

"In regard to the supreme goal of human endeavour, moksha, which consists in the realisation of Brahman.....it is the unsurpassed bliss of continuous and uninterrupted service to the Lord, evoked and sustained by the rising tide of unsurpassed bliss arising from experience of the Lord's qualities, deeds and so on".

The following stanza answers the question of the ontological status of the soul in moksha.

Brahmananda hrdantastho muktatma sukhamedhate

Samvit Siddhi, p. 104.

Moksha is not a state where the soul merges in Brahman and loses its uniqueness, but one where it retains its distinctness, transcends mundane existence and experiences the infinite bliss of service to the Lord.

Yamuna's place in Visishtadvaitic thought:

The debt that Visishtadvaitism owes to Yamuna is inestimable. As Venkatanatha says, this ancient system of philosophy was set on a fresh phase of its career by Nathamuni; it was considerably developed by the works of Yamuna and was greatly strengthened (i-e. rendered proof against attack) by Ramanuja.

Nathopajnam pravrtham bahubhirupachitam yamuneyaprabandai—
stratum samyag yatindraih .....

Tattva-mukta-kalapa, Adravyasara, St 136.

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In paying reverential homage to the illustrious hierarchy of acharyas commencing from the Lord Himself, Lakshminatha, Narayana, the consort of Sri and ending with his own preceptor, Ramanuja, Kuresa (Srivatsanka Misra) refers to Sage Natha and Yamuna as occupying the central place.

Lakshminatha samarambham Natha Yamuna Madhy |
asmadacharya paryantam vande guruparamparam ||

Tanian (Laudatory verse)

Yamuna's influence on Ramanuja:—

Ramanuja has unbounded reverence for his pracharya, Yamuna, and acknowledges that he owes everything to him.

yat padambhoruha dhyana vidhvasta seshakalmashah |
vastu ta mupayato Sham yamuneyam namamyaham ||

Gitabhashya, opening verse

"I prostrate before Yamuna—that great personage by meditating on whose sacred feet, I got all my karmas completely dispelled, and became an entity (what I am)." Again in his *Vedarthasamgraha*, Ramanuja glorifies Yamuna thus:—

Param Brahmaivajnam bhramaparigatam samsarati tat
paropadhyalidam vivasamasu-bhasyaspadam iti |
srutinyayapetam jagati vatatam mohanamitam
tamo yenapastam sa hi vijayate yamunamunih ||

Vedarthasamgraha, p. 1.

"Splendidly victorious shines Yamuna, the reputed sage who dispelled the deluding darkness of ignorance in the shape of false beliefs stalking the world despite their running counter to the authority of scripture and reason-delusive beliefs such as. i) that the Supreme Brahman himself, being associated with ignorance and becoming enveloped in illusion gets implicated in samsara or ii) that He is afflicted by alien limiting adjuncts *(upadhis)* and consequently subject to karmic influence or iii) that He Himself becomes the

seat of imperfections.'' *Sri Vaikunta gadya* opens with an expression of his profound regard for Yamuna's works.

> Yamunarya sudhambhodhim avagahya yathamati |
> adaya bhaktiyogakhyam ratnam sandarsayam yaham ll

" Diving deep into the ocean of Sri Yamuna's ambrosia to the best of my understanding, I have brought therefrom the gem of bhakti-yoga and am holding it up to view for all to see clearly,''

The references made in Sri Bhashya to trayyanta nishnatas (experts in the sphere of vedanta) and to pramanika na bhahumanyate in Sri Bhashya are to be taken, says Sudarsana Suri, as referring to Yamuna.

In the Sri Bhashya, Ramanuja has fully utilised *Siddhi trayam* either quoting from it or paraphrasing it. Specially, in Jijnasadhikarana, sastrayonitvat adhikarana and utpattyasambhavat adhikarana in Sri Bhashya one meets the thought and even the very language of *Siddhi trayam*. The superb manner in which disputed passages from the upanishads are interpreted and the several aspects of vedantic thought synthesised in *Vedarthasamgraha* bears distinctive marks of the impact of the principles and procedures employed by Yamuna in *Samvit Siddhi*. *Gitarthasamgraha* has furnished the basis for Ramanuja's *Gita bhashya* . In his *Nityagrantha* which lays down the code of daily conduct for the *Sri Vaishnavite*, he has emphasised the importance of *panchakalika puja*, a vital feature of Pancharatra Agama, whose authoritativeness was established by Yamuna so effectively in the face of its detractors. Sections of *Saranagati gadya* and *Sri Ranga gadya* are modelled on Yamuna's stotras. Thus in Ramanuja's writings one finds an amplification, explication and systematisation of Yamuna's works.



Analytical Outline of the Three Siddhis

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SIDDHITRAYAM

ATMA SIDDHI

1. May I have the highest bhakti to Śrīman[1] (the Consort of Śrī or Lakṣmi), the Supreme Puruṣa who is ever pleased by souls whose sole enjoyment is in rendering service to the Divine, and to whose will Matter (prakṛti)[2], bound souls (puruṣa)[3], time, manifest material nature, released souls and innumerable eternally perfect souls always conform. (St. 1)

There are many conflicting views concerning the finite self and the Infinite Self. With a veiw to making the matter clear, a book named Atmasiddhi (the determination of the real nature of the soul) is written. (St. 2)

That the knowledge of the self is the means of attaining transcendental felicity is indeed admitted in all systems. Upaniṣadic texts such as the following, declaring that the knowledge of the finite self and of the Supreme Self is the means of liberation are found:- "On knowing the finite self and the Supreme Controller to be different, and thereby becoming the object of His grace, he attains immortality";[4] "If one should know the self"; "The knower of the self crosses over sorrow";[5] "He who knows Brahman attains the Highest"[6]. Eminent teachers hold many conflicting views concerning the finite self and the Highest Person.

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1 As the prayer is for highest form of bhakti to Sriman, it is evident that Yamunacharya considers Lord Narayana along with Lakshmi the means of salvation, even as He, in conjunction with her, is the supreme goal.

2 Visistadvaitism recognises three classes of jivas - baddha (the bound), mukta (the liberated) and nitya (the ever - perfect). Jainism accepts a similar classification.

3 Prakrti is the primordial source of the material universe In the state of pralaya (dissolution) it is known as *avyakta* (the unmanifest); in the state of *sarga* (evolution) it is called *vyakta* (the manifest).

4 Svet. Up. 1. 6.

5 Chand. Up.

6 Tait. Up.

(Conflicting views concerning the finite self.)

2. With regard to the individual self, some maintain that it is the body itself;[7] others that it is the senses; others, that it is mind (manas); others that it is vital breath (prāṇa);still others that it is pure consciousness, which is erroneously supposed to possess the quality of being a knower and which does not appear in its real state as the 'I' [8];

Others that it is different from body, senses, mind, vital-breath and consciousness and that, like ether and the like, it has a non-intelligent nature, and that it is the substratum of knowledge, pleasure, pain and other adventitious and special qualities, and that it is the object of selfconsciousness.[9]

Others again say that it is of the nature of pure consciousness itself, which appears to possess inauspicious qualities, such as love, hate, pleasure, pain etc., produced by the limiting condition of the internal organ, even as a crystal that is in itself white appears however, to possess redness and other qualities imparted to it by certain specific limiting conditions (say, an adjacent red flower); and that the luminosity of its being is neither born nor destroyed; and that it is selfluminous.[10]

Others again hold that it has the nature of knowledge and bliss. Still others that its nature is of that knowledge which, on account of its agreeableness to its possessor, acquires the name of bliss and pleasure.

(Conflicting views regarding the pramāṇas by which the finits self is established)

3. Similarly (with regard to the means of knowledge by which it is established, divergent views have been offered, such as that) it can be known through inference[11]; that (it) can be known only through scripture; that (it) can be known through mental perception[12]; that (it) is directly known only as the knower in all cognition of objects[13]; that, as it possesses the nature of knowledge, its luminosity is neither born nor destroyed and that it is self-luminous. Though possessed of this

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7 Charvaka doctrine.
8 Advaita Vedanta.
9 Nyaya-Vaiseshika.
10 Sankhya
11 Sankhya
12 Mimamsa.
13 Prabhakara school of Mimamsa

nature (i-e though self-luminous), with the aid respectively of scripture, inference, and yogic perception, it is directly perceived in its true nature as having a character different from everything other than itself, clearly, more clearly, and finally most clearly and immediately.

Similarly (with regard to its size, the rival views are that) it is infinitely big; that (it is) atomic in size; that (it is) of the same size as the body; that, though in itself devoid of magnitude, it is limited to the size of the body pervaded by it. Again, concerning the manner of its pervasion, the different theories are that it pervades only by its intelligence and that it pervades by itself.

Similarly (with regard to its duration, it has been stated that) it is momentary; that it endures as long as the bodily heat lasts; that it exists till the material world is dissolved; that it lasts till mokṣa is attained; and that it is unchanging and eternal.

Similarly (with regard to its number), it is maintained that it is one and the same in all bodies[14]; and that it is different in each body.

(Conflicting views regarding the Supreme Self)

4. So also about the Infinite Self, some do not admit at all an Isvara (God) who directly perceives all things and who is all-powerful. Some, while admitting a God, maintain that He is of the essence of pure consciousness, which is unchanging and is devoid of the distinction of knowledge, means of knowledge, knower, and the known, and of the ruler and the ruled and so on. (They hold that) on account of beginningless avidyā, he is erroneously imagined to possess knowledge of manifoldness, such as akāśa, and greatness such as sovereignty.[15]

Others, while accepting this characterisation (of the Supreme Self as being of the nature of pure consciousness), state that it is subject to limiting conditions, and that, in association with the limiting condition

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14 One variety of Ekajivavada holds that there is one jiva residing in each of the many bodies.

15 Advaita-ekajivavada and also nanajivavada where Isvara too is a reflection. cf *Pancadasi* Ch, X,

of avidyä, for the reason of its having avidyä for its essence, it is taken to possess manifold distinctions of jivas commencing from Brahmā and ending with immovable things and that, in conjunction with māyā, which is under its control and which assumes diverse wonderful changes, it acquires omniscience and other glorious qualities.[16] Similarly, others uphold the view that God possesses universal Lordship which is invariably and exclusively maintained for Him by the modification of independent pradhāna. This modification has for its cause the fact of pradhāna possessing the quality of sattva *par excellence*.[17] Others assert that, although He is free from limiting conditions, He is yet subject to modification. Others favour the view that although He does not undergo modifiications, yet, on account of being reflected by the reflecting media of the diverse internal organs which are aspects of His own māyā, this intelligent being, who is one only, acquires the forms of Viśva, Taijasa and Präjna.[18] Others hold that the Lord is that Supreme Person who has under His control the diverse forms of essence, existence and the activities of the threefold jivas and non-intelligent objects, and who is the great ocean of all auspicious qualities, such as jnana, bala, aiśvarya, vīrya, śakti, tejas,[19] and others which are natural to Him, invariable and unrivalled in excellence.

(Diversity of views regarding the manifestations of the Supreme Self)

5. Similarly, even in regard to His manifestations, some contend that He has the four forms of Viṣṇu, Siva, Brahmā and the Sun-God; others hold that His form is threefold or twofold or single, after eliminating those forms which are unacceptable to them.

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16 Nanajivavada, on the view that Isvara is the prototype, not a reflection.

17 Yoga

18 Advaita where Iswara is the prototype

19 ज्ञानमिह सर्वसाक्षात्काररूपम् cf. यो वेत्ति युगपत्सर्वं प्रत्यक्षेण सदा स्वतः । बलं नाम श्रमप्रसङ्गरहितं सर्वधारणसामर्थ्यम् । ऐश्वर्यं नाम अव्याहतेच्छं सर्वनियन्तृत्वम् । वीर्यम् = सर्वोपादानत्वे सर्वधारण सर्वनियमनेऽपि विकाररहितत्वम् । शक्तिः = स्वेतरसर्वनिर्वाहिका सर्वोपादानत्वात्मिका. यद्वा यदन्यैः अशक्यत्वादघटितमिव भाति तद्घटनसामर्थ्यरूपा । तेजः = अस्वाधीनसहकार्यनपेक्षत्वम् ; पराभिभवन सामर्थ्यं तेजः केचित्प्रचक्षत ॥

Concerning the individual manifestations (of God) doubts have been raised about their being eternal or non - eternal, elemental or non-elemental, whether they exist for their own sake or for the sake of others; and doubts too have arisen concerning their attendants, place of residence, etc.

(Conflicting views concerning how the Supreme Self is known)

6. Similarly, with regard to the means of knowledge some hold that He is known from the Vedas alone;[20] others that he is established by inference[21]; others that He is also cognised by extraordinary perception.

(Diversity of views regarding the relation of the individual soul to the Supreme Self)

Similarly, in regard to the relation of the individual soul to the Supreme Self also, some maintain that relations such as that between the ruler and the ruled are based on a knowledge of distinctions, which is caused by beginningless avidyā; and that, in truth, there is only one reality.[22] Others hold that though there is non-difference, the jiva is other than the Supreme Self. As there is oneness in point of essence and distinction on account of limiting conditions, some posit both difference and non-differene—difference in so far as it (Brahman) is associated with limiting conditions, and non-difference in respect of its essence.[23]

Even when there is diversity, there is the relation of non-difference (between God and the soul); several views concerning this relation are prevalent—that it is the relation of inherence obtaining between whole and part; that it is the relation between seṣa and seṣi or in other words, that between an independent entity and the dependent creature; that it is the relation between the owner and the owned, exemplified in master – servant relation.

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20 Vedanta
21 Nyaya-Vaiseshika
22 Advaita
23 Bhaskara

(Varying views regarding the nature of mokṣa)

8. Even in regard to the supreme goal of human endeavour, mokṣa, which consists in the realisation of Brahman, the several views maintained are—that it consists in annihilation of one's self[24]; that it is the destruction of ignorance,[25] that it is the state of aloofness resulting from the complete destruction of all the special qualities of the self[26]; that it is the state of becoming one with Brahman[27]; that it is the inflow of God's qualites[28]; that it consists in attaining similarity with Brahman[29]; that it is the fullest revelation of its (self's) intrinsic attributes of bliss and the like; that it is everlasting service to the Lord kindled by the heightened manifestation of unsurpassed bliss arising from the experience of His qualities, and so on.

(Conflicting views regarding the means to mokṣa)

9. About the means of attaining mokṣa also, some contend that it is attainable by karma-yoga and some that it is realisable by jnana-yoga; some believe that it is attainable by either of these (two) helped by the other[30]; some assert that it is rendered effective by both[31]; some hold that to him whose mind is purified by both (karma and jnana), it is realisable by bhakti which is ever-lasting and one-pointed.

Noticing the conflicting views of inquirers who have not determined anything conclusively, not knowing the strength and weakness of the proofs of the respective views, and entertaining doubts therefrom, wise men will be unable to secure mokṣa so long as the individual self and the Supreme Self are not understood in respect of their nature, the

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24 Buddhism
25 Advaita
अविद्यास्तमयो मोक्षस्सा च बन्ध उदाहृतः
26 Nyaya-Vaiseika
27 Advaita
अत्र यद्यपि कोशेषु साधर्म्यपदमस्ति, तथापि तदनुचितमिव; अवश्यवक्तव्यस्य ऐक्यलक्षण मोक्षस्याकथनप्रसङ्गात् ॥
28 cf Siva-Sankrantivada
29 cf Siva-sama-vada
30 Here one of the two is primary and the other secondary
31 Here both are of equal importance. Jnanakarma-Samuccayavada

pramaṇas by which they are established, their relation (to each other), the attainment (of mokṣa by the individual self), and also of the means thereto. For this reason, this work is begun to make these things clear.

(The special features of this treatise)

10. Having the same end in view, aphorisms (sūtras) were composed by the venerable Badarayana; and these aphorisms (Brahma Sutras) have been interpreted by the Bhāṣyakāra [31a] (Dramiḍāchārya) whose exposition is concise and profound; and they have been elaborately explained by the venerable Srivatsanka Misra who set forth an ocean of elegant and incisive and forthright rules of interpretation (nyāyas). Nevertheless, as the understanding of persons has been misled by faith in the various writings, good and bad and partly good and partly bad, of Acarya Ṭanka[31b], Bhartṛprapanca, Bhartṛmitra, Bhartṛhari, Brahmadatta,

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31a Dr. Van Buitenen in his edition of *Vedarthasangraha*, p. 24. states' ..... Yamuna, at the beginning of his *Atmasiddhi* gives a list of ancient Vedantins-Strangely enough he does not mention the *Vrtthi* by which Ramanuja set great store and which must have enjoyed great authority .....But he mentions a *bhasyakrt* who had explained Badarayana's Sutras 'briefly and profoundly'.....This bhasyakrt is always identified with Dramida, the Bhasyakara, for which .....there are no arguments. Ramanuja declares that the *Vrtthi* was an extensive one, Yamuna that the *bhasya* was a brief one Vrtthi 'gloss scholion' is mainly distinguished from a bhasya 'commentary' by its size; a long vrtthi will be very similar to a short bhasya. As Bodhayana's omission cannot be accounted for in this context-where a sub commentary by a Srivatasankra Misra another ancient Master, is mentioned-I am inclined to think that Yamuna and Ramanuja both referred to the same work by different descriptions." The logic of this identity is far from clear No. convincing reason has been advanced by Dr. Buitenen to show that there has been a mixing up of the vrtthi and the bhasya.

The absence of any mention of Bodhayana vrtthi in Yamuna's work poses no problem; it is easily explained on the simple hypothesis that the work was not available to him. This would accord well with the traditional account that Ramanuja undertook an arduons journey to Sarada Math, Kashmir, to consult this rare manuscript said to have been preserved there.

31b In the same edition of Vedarthasangraha, p. 25, Dr. Van Buitenen makes the following strange observation. "Tanka's name which has the second place in Ramanuja's list does also appear in a list of Yamuna but here he has the distinction of being mentioned the first of a series of adversaries and is put on a par with Advaitins like Bhartrhari and Sankara and Dvaitadvaitins like Bhartrprapanca and Bhaskara." Evidently, the expression *sita sita* (good, bad and partly good and partly

Sankara, Srivatsanka, [31c] Bhaskara, and others; and as persons do not know things as they are and even understand them erroneously, the undertaking of this work is but proper for a right knowledge of categories.

(Determination of the nature of the individual self)

11. The view to be defended here is that the individual self is different from the body, the senses, manas, prana and intellect; (it) does not depend on anything else (for its knowledge); (it) is eternal, subtle distinct in each body, and is in its essential nature, blissful. (St. 3)

(The purvapaksha or prima facie view that body is the soul on the evidence of perception. The case for the identity of soul and body)

12. On the strength of perception we consider the body itself to be the soul. In the cognition 'I know', the atman who is indeed the knower, shines forth as the 'I'; and the body is the object of the consciousness of 'I'; as is evident from the cognition 'I am stout', 'I am lean'; in fact, stoutness and the like relate only to the body; hence, as the 'I' is put in apposition with 'lean', 'stout', etc., it must necessarily be admitted to have the body for its object. Otherwise, all usage, popular and learned, would be meaningless. It cannot be maintained that here (in statements like 'I am stout') the 'I' denotes the body by a figure of speech (lakṣaṇa), because there is no other place where it can possibly be said to have a primary significance.

Again, it cannot be said that if the consciousness of the 'I' as knower has for its object the body which consists of several parts, the

bad) occurring in the text has escaped the notice of this eminent orientalist: else he would not have drawn such a conclusion - Yamuna's list is not made up exclusively of adversaries but it contains a few names of exponents of vedantic thouhgt some of whom have composed works which, in his opinion, are trustworthy guides ' to a Proper 'understanding of the nature' of the Real, others untrustworthy and yet others in part reliable and in part unreliable. Again the very mode of reference to Tanka as 'Acarya Tanka' clearly indicates the great esteem in which Yamuna holds this thinker.,

31c It is noteworthy that reference is here made to two thinkers with almost identlical names-a Srivatsanka Misra, and a Srivatsanka; of these the former is affiliated to the visistadvaita school and is applauded as having laid down a wealth of elegant, incisive and forth-right rules of inter-pretation; while the latter belongs to a rival school of thought.

knowledge of the body should be accompanied by a knowledge of its parts, colour, etc. But as such a knowledge of bodily parts and colour does not appear, the cognition 'I know' would reveal the presence of something other than the body. Such a necessity (of the knowledge of parts and shapes accompanying the apprehension of an object) is found to exist only in the case of perception arising from the external senses. The capacity of the mind is restricted to the manifestation of the soul's character of being the seat of internal qualities. In fact, (even in the case of external perception) there is no necessity for the apprehension of number, magnitude, etc., because though its parts are not comprehended, a triad of atoms consisting of many parts and possessing visible magnitude is admitted to be the minimum visible entity; and because air is known to be perceived by the sense of touch only as the seat of contact (and not as a whole consisting of parts). Even when something other than the body is taken to be the object of self-consciousness, there is no knowledge of its other qualities; likewise, here too (when the body is the object of self-consciousness, there is no knowledge of its parts and colours).

The purvapakṣin's criticism of the position that the body is not the self:-

13. In each of the infinitesimal atoms consciousness is not met with and if it be accepted (that each super-sensible atom possesses consciousness), there will result belief in several thousands of intelligent beings in one and the same body; and as the special quality of the effect cannot but be based on the quality of the cause, and as consciousness does not continue as long as the body lasts, consciousness cannot be a special quality of the body. These and other kinds of arguments based on reasoning are lacking in force, as they teach what is contradicted by direct perception. If it (consciousness) be denied to be a special quality, it will amount to its acceptance as a common quality of the body. Moreover, qualities such as the character of owning activities dependent on desires and of being the seat of the senses and the like, which appear in the body and not in such objects as pots, whose non-intelligent character is admitted on all hands, reveal that the body itself is the intelligent being.

It is not improper to maintain that just as the red colour, which is absent in the parts of the areca nut and betel leaf severally, emerges in the whole, on account of a particular combination of these, even so intelligence emerges in the body, only on account of a particular combination of infinitesimal atoms which give rise to it. There is no warrant for the objection that in the instance cited, from out of the infinitesimal atoms rendered red by the heat generated in the act of chewing (betel leaf and nut) in the order of binaries, etc., red colour emerges strictly only in conformity with the quality of the cause. Further, although the special quality of variegated colour is not found in white, black and other threads severally, we clearly perceive it in the cloth made out of these. How, then, can we assert that the quality of the effect is dependent on that of the cause? Again, it cannot be said that over and above the colours of the constituent parts there is no other colour known as variegated colour in the whole; for, in that case, the whole would become imperceptible. If it be said that the whole becomes visible only on account of the colours of the parts, it would follow that all effects would be deprived of their colours. That would contradict experience as also all usage. As the special quality of hardness existing in ice is not found to be dependent on the quality of the causal substance (water), the argument commits the fallacy of *anaikānta.*

Again, hardness cannot be said to be a particular from of conjunction, because it exists in two objects, while hardness exists in one, namely, ice and because people who know the nature of things have admitted hardness to be a form of contact. It may be asked how can the body which is an object of perception be regarded as the knower.

The attempt to show that the body could at once be the subject and the object of knowledge:-

What is the contradiction involved in this? The incompatibility lies precisely here-in regard to one act, it is not possible for one and the same substance to be at once the object and the agent of action. If this were so, even on the other view (that something other than the body is the self), how can the self (the perceived) appear as the 'I' (the

perceiver) ? If it be replied that it is due to a difference of aspect, then it is equally applicable to the doctrine that the body is the self. Besides an object (of knowledge, and, for that matter, of any activity) is that which shares the fruit of actions which are found in intimate association with something other than itself; but the body experiences the results of knowledge found intimately associated with itself and hence does not possess the character of being an object. Hence there is no room for the objection (How can the body be both the subject and object?).

Summing up of dehatmavada position with reasons:-

Therefore, the followers of Bṛhaspati hold that the body itself is the soul. To that effect their sutra runs—intelligence emerges from the elements of earth, water, fire and air just as the intoxicating quality springs from herbs etc.,

THE REFUTATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE IDENTITY OF BODY AND SOUL

16. The body cannot be the soul, because (the doctrine of the identity of the body with the soul is) contradicated by perception. One and the same substance cannot appear as 'this' and 'I' to an identical person. (St. 4)

Just as the inward (objective) knowledge of 'I' involved in the conciousness 'I know' exhibits its object to be distinct from pots and the like it reveals its object to be distinct from the body which is the object of consciousness 'this'. Just as the cognition 'This is a pot' (marks off its object as distinct from the object of the consciousness of 'I',) even so the outward knowledge 'this' having the body for its object, distinguishes its object as different from the object of self-consciousness. Otherwise, there will be no basis for the distinction between 'myself' and 'others'. It cannot be urged that one and the same thing may, from different aspects, appear in this manner (as 'I' and 'this') because Devadatta wielding a stick does not understand himself as 'This person possesses a stick' (but only as 'I wield a stick').

Aham pratyaya (the cognition 'I' or self consciousness) does not involve knowledge of bodily organs; hence the self is distinct from the body :-

Moreover, to a person who has controlled the activities of his external senses and attained mental concentration and known the self as the 'I', the knowledge of organs such as hands, legs and belly does not arise. And if the body which is big and possesses parts were taken to be the object of self-consciousness, a knowledge of the organs must necessarily accompany it. It is impossible for the body which is big and which owns parts to be known when none of its parts is cognised. The instance of the *tryanuka* (triad of atoms) which was cited as disproving the general proposition (that whenever the whole is perceived its parts also should be perceived) does not really disprove it, for there is no warrant for accepting the existence of infinitesimal atoms over and above the triads which are devoid of parts and which are perceivable (in sun's rays proceeding) through the hole of the window. (Even granting the existence of infinitesimal atoms) this general proposition is not falsified, because it applies only to perceptible parts. Again, it cannot be contended that this rule obtains only in the case of the complex whole cognised by external organs, as there is no warrant (for the same). Besides, in comprehending a whole composed of parts the internal organ, in itself, does not operate. As for the case of air, it is known as the seat of touch only, because it has no colour, etc.; besides, even here, as in the case of the pot which is being touched, there is knowledge of such diverse parts; hence, no conflict with the general rule on this score.

Even cognitions like 'I am stout' establish a self distinct from the body–

The contention that from statements such as 'I am stout', 'I am lean', the self is found to have the body for its object deserves examination. Even there, self-consciousness has for its object some entity which is only inside the body; and like the knowledge of the body gained through visual perception, it does not relate to the body only which has the characteristics of stoutness, youthfulness and the like. Hence the apprehension of difference and the reference 'This is my body', as in the case of the expression 'This is my house'. This usage ('This is my body') being based on directly perceived difference, it is not proper to urge that it has to be interpreted figuratively like the expression 'This is my self',

'This is the body of the doll'. As the word 'my' denotes the self and as the two words (my and self in the statement 'This is my self') have an identical meaning and as there is no dispute concerning this, a figurative interpretation is proper. But it is not so here (in the statement 'This is my body) Because a conscious entity distinct from the body is established by perception, the word 'I' (in the proposition 'I am stout)' denotes by a figure of speech, the body which is related to the self.

Identity of body with soul illusory–

With regard to external objects, as there is knowledge of mutually exclusive colours, size, number and configuration, diversity is explicit; but, in the case of the soul, as there is no knowledge of such divergent qualities, to the ignorant there arises the illusion of the body being non-different from the soul. Again, the self has his activities determined by his desires; for, he wills, remembers and infers only at the instance of his desires; the body too has its activities, such as lying down, sitting and standing, determined by his desires; hence arises the illusion of non-difference as in the case of the shell and silver.

Yogic perception vouches for the separatness of soul and body.

Thinking minds, however, perceive the entity known as 'I' which has to be recognised as knower and which is devoid of parts to be really distinct from the body which appears as 'this' and which is stout and consists of parts.

Arguments in support of the view that body and soul are distinct entities-

As the knowledge of bodily parts is absent in the consciousness 'I know' either it does not have for its object the body or has for its object something other than the body. Wherever there is absence of apprehension of bodily parts, the body is not the object of knowledge, but something else; as in the case of the consciousness 'This is is a pot'. The knowledge which has the body for its object is, however, different (that is, there is not absence of knowledge of parts of the body), as in the instance of knowledge of the body accepted by both of us. Again

the body cannot be the object of self-consciousness, because it is known to be 'this' or because it is grasped by external senses, as in the case o the pot and the like.

The Sankhya arguments against the claim that perception establishes identity of body and soul:-

Moreover, how can he who has known his self to exist for the sake of nothing other than himself, and known other objects to exist for his sake, take this body which exists for the sake of others, for the reason of its being a collection of parts, to be the self? We directly perceive that the entire collection of internal and external objects of experience, such as sound and pleasure, exist for the sake of the self; while the self, the enjoyer, does not exist for the sake of others; but is the one object for whose glory and service everything else exists. Being a collection, the body cannot but exist for the sake of others; and all aggregates such as bed, seat and chariot are indeed found to exist for the sake of others It cannot be argued that as all collections are known to be for the sake of the body and the like which are themselves collections, the self also should be an aggregate; for, if it were so, the self too would have to exist for the sake of others; but it has already been stated that the self is directly perceived to exist not far the sake of others. On account of the non-perception of the collective nature of the self-a nature which is capable of being perceived--the belief that the soul is an aggregate stands condemned. If the self exists for the sake of another collection, the latter must also exist for the sake of some other collection and that for another and so on *ad infinitum.* But where an end is possible, an unending chain is undesirable. Moreover, when a collection exists for the sake of something else, it is not because that other itself is a collection. It is only in virtue of his nature as enjoyer the self becomes that other for whose sake all collections exist. For him who attempts to base his reference on all the qualities of the illustrative example, even though they may be unserviceable to the general rule, all inference would be impossible.

Refutation of the Carvaka criticism of arguments that the body and soul are different :-

Even though the distinction between the two (the body and self) may not be explicit, consciousness cannot be a quality of the body, as it cannot exist in it and as being quite unlike its other qualities. As all the special qualities existing in the effect are dependent on those of the causal substance, how can consciousness exist in the body without depending on the quality of its cause?

The illustration that intoxicating quality arises from the mixture of non-intoxicants not apposite :-

Bṛhaspati's teaching—that earth, water. fire and air are the realities and that from these consciousness arises just as the intoxicating quality emerges from herbs, etc.—is untenable. As power is not a special quality, it may be so (that is, need not be dependent on the quality of the causal substance). In all substances the quality known as causal power concerning the effect, cognisable from their respective effects, is a common quality, but consciousness is not so, because it is admitted to belong to the body only and because it is a special quality, as it, while remaining an effect, is cognised by one form of perception. It is not wrong to maintain that, on the basis of their own quality, form out of infinitesimal atoms, which are not effects and which acquire the intoxicating quality from the mingling of different substances, intoxicating quality arises in their effects.

Example of redness produced by chewing not apposite :-

The redness caused by betels, etc., is, likewise, produced by causes which possess the red colour generated by the mixing of different substances, after their parts have lost their cohesion (in the act of chewing); hence the red colour perceived in each of their parts too. Consciousness is not found in the parts of the body individually, nor have they been said to possess it. If that were admitted, as it would follow that in one and the same body there must be many thinking beings, it is impossible to say which is primary and which is secondary; besides, all refer-

ence to recognition would be impossible. Just as in respect of what has been seen by Devadatta, there cannot be recognition on the part of Yajnadatta, here also (what has been perceived by one part of the body cannot be recognised by another).

The illustration of parti-coloured cloth unhelpful to the Carvaka :-

The statement made before, namely, that the variegated colour found in the cloth is not dependent on the quality of the cause, is erroneous. The quality of variegated colour is nothing but that of being many coloured; and this (variegated colour) is produced by threads of different colours; hence there is nothing objectionable here. Though variegated colour does not exist in each of the threads severally, it is certainly noticed in the threads which combine and are known as threads of variegated colours. The capacity to produce cloth belongs to threads only in their togetherness; thus the variegated colour exists even in the cause of cloth; hence there is nowhere any violation (of the rule that the qualities of the effect are dependent on those of the causes). It cannot be maintained that the whole (the cloth) becomes invisible inasmuch as it does not possess any one specific colour, for, it may become perceptible by the very fact of its possessing inherently colour along with bigness. Let variegated colour be taken to be one specific colour. Even then it is found to be produced by the different colours existing in the causes. It cannot be asserted that it is only the consciousness resident in the parts that produces the particular consciousness in the body, which is composed of those parts, for, consciousness in general cannot exist in the parts. Therefore, consciousness is not a quality of the body. On the same count, the belief that pleasure and other qualities belong to the body stands condemned.

Being distinct from the other qualities of the body consciousness is not an attribute of the body :-

Besides, as consciousness, pleasure, etc., vanish from the body, like the smell of flower and sandal, even when the body continnes to be strong and in the absence of counteracting qualities, they cannot

be the qualities of the body. Colour and other special qualities of the the body, however, do not leave it in the same manner.

The qualities of the body are perceptible to the individual as well as to others and are also to be grasped by external senses; but not so consciousness, etc. Therefore, they cannot be the qualities of the body.

Additional reasons in support of the view that the body is not the soul.

Further, the body is not the soul, since like a pot, it has a beginning, exists for the sake of others, possesses a particular configuration and has colour, etc., and is an element. Again, because the body has holes and is not the possessor of the body and is a body, consciousness cannot be its quality, as in the case of the dead body. These and other logical proofs lead us to reject the view that consciousness is a quality of the body.

(Argument based on Negative concomitance indefensible)

Thus the matter having been disposed of in this manner with the aid of the aforesaid reasons which point to the major term on the strength of positive concomitance, purely negative concomitance, such as the quality of being the seat of the senses, will be powerless to establish the major term.

(The view that the senses are the soul)

17. Then let the senses themselves be (considered as) the soul. They are not referred to as 'this'. Otherwise, (if they were known as 'this') they, like the body, may be excluded from that which is the object of self-conciousness. Unlike the body, the senses possess neither visible colour and other qualities nor big size. If they did, and if self-consciousness presented the senses as its objects, knowledge of their colour, parts, etc. may be expected to arise, as in the case of the knowledge of the body. Knowledge which is the result of their activity, like

the results of bathing, study, etc., must, properly speaking, belong only to the senses That is why Satyatapas speaks of 'the seeing eye.' [35]

The refutation of this view

18. The theory that the senses are the soul is untenable, as none of its forms stands scrutiny. To explain it further—Do the senses possess knowledge individually or collectively? If individually, what is perceived by one sense cannot be recognised by another. But such a recognition, viz., 'what I saw I touch' does exist. That is why the senses, even collectively, cannot be said to possess knowledge. No object is either perceived or recognised by all the five senses together. Again, (if this view were correct) even when one sense-organ perishes death must ensue. Besides, if knowledge belonged to the senses, with the decay of each of the different senses, remembrance of their respective objects could not take place. Moreover, knowledge, though the outcome of the activity of the senses, need not inhere in them. For sin and the like, though resulting from the activity of weapons, etc., inhere in something other (than weapons). Bearing in mind the fact that if he did not speak the truth, the person who interrogated would

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35. See Varaha Purana, Ch. 91, verses 1-26. One day when Satyatapas was engaged in meditation, a boar which was chased by a huntsman took refuge in the vicinity of the sage's hermitage. Presently the huntsman rushed in and inquired of the sage if he saw a boar near by and said that if the animal could not be traced, he himself, his children and his dependents would have to die of starvation. The sage found himself in a dilemma—if he furnished the information regarding the animal's hiding place, he would be guilty of the heinous sin of betraying one who had taken refuge; if he withheld the information, he would be responsible for the death of the hunter and his dependents. After a moment's reflection, Satyatapas replied, 'Animals are endowed with eyes to see and tongue to speak. The eye that sees has no tongue to report on what it perceives; the tongue that speaks has no eye to see. Wherefore do you ask me?' Struck by the ingenuity of his speech, the bnar and its pursuer appeared to the sage in their true form as Visnu and Indra respectively and blessed him.

meet with death, and that (if he spoke the truth), it would be extreme cruelty to abandon one who had taken refuge, Satyatapas spoke like that.[36]

(The doctrine that manas is the soul)

19. In that case, let manas (mind) be the soul. On that view, it is argued the aforesaid difficulties would be got over. Indeed, manas has been known to be the controller of all the senses and has been so declared. Besides, recognition by a different sense becomes appropriate, since manas is the one entity that is the seat of both perception and recognition. Even when the respective senses perish, recognition is still possible, since manas is eternal.

(The refutation of this doctrine)

20. This theory (that manas is the soul) too is erroneous, because manas is an instrument like the eye, etc. Manas has indeed been conceived as the instrument of all knowledge concerning the outer and the inner world. From the fact that even when the different external senses are in contact with their respective objects, they are not apprehended simultaneously, we learn that there exists some other instrument besides the senses, and that, on account of the absence of its help, all objects do not appear but some one (object) alone is cognised.[38] Likewise, knowledge of pleasure, etc, as in the case of knowledge of colour and so on requires an instrument, because it is either a form of activity or of knowledge. How can manas, which is thus known to be an instrument of knowledge, be the subject of knowledge? To be a subject is really to be independent. Independence consists either in the capacity to secure, in accordance with one's own desires,

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36. Vide note 35.

37. Prajnayate is found in the Telugu edition, but is wrongly omitted in the Benares edition. The presence of the word ca implies that there must be another verb besides pratijnayate; and it can only be prajnayate.

38. ***Nyaya Sutra***, I. i —16 Yugapat jnananutpattir manaso lingam.

the means appropriate to the realisation of certain ends, or in the activity brought on by other qualities inherent in oneself. To be an instrument is to be the best means to an end, which is invariably associated with dependence on others, which, in its turn, consists in possessing activity that is subject to the control of others. How can we find in the self-same manas the association of these two mutually conflicating qualities?

Moreover, if it is maintained that manas, which is an agent, acquires, the character of an agent in remembering and other (activities) with the aid of another instrument, then the dispute concerns only the name. He alone is called the soul who perceives colour etc., with (external senses such as) eyes etc., and (who experiences) pleasure, etc., with the aid of the internal organ If the name 'manas' be attributed to that let it be done by all means. It does not affect us in the least. But it would go against linguistic usage. No more need be said in disproof of this theory.

(*Refutation of the Naiyayika proof for the existence of manas*) :–

What, it may be asked, is meant by manas? It has already been described as an internal entity which is the instrument of knowledge. What is the proof of its existence? The fact that knowledge of all objects does not arise simultaneously (it may be said) has already been shown to prove the existence of manas. True, it has been so pointed out; but, how does it establish that it is a distinct entity? Even after postulating it, you must perforce admit some other reason to account for the absence of the simultaneous remembrance of all things. Impressions born of the experience of different objects exist simultaneously in the remembering person. Still, all those objects are not remembered, but only some one of them is recalled at a time a given. The order in which the causes that are responsible for stimulating impres ions appear cannot be said to account for this (the non-appearance of all remembrance at once). If that were so, to a person whose impressions can be aroused solely by concentration, all remembrance should appear simultaneously. But, even in the case of a person who, with the desire to remember all he has ex-

perienced, withdraws his manas from all things and meditates in general, all things previously experienced do not become the object of remembrance. Should it be supposed that the order in which remembrances appear is due either to unseen forces (adṛṣṭa) inasmuch as all remembrance is either auspicious or inauspicious, or to the fact of the soul being of the nature of knowledge, then, the absence of the simultaneous appearance of all knowledge, even when the outer senses are in contact with their respective objects, would be rendered possible for the same reason ; hence no need to posit a different substance.

(Refutation of the argument that manas is the non-inherent cause of pleasure, pain and the like) :-

Again, pleasure and the like which are adventitious, which inhere in the soul and which have external objects and unseen forces for their efficient cause, must have a non-inherent cause and that is the conjunction of soul and manas. To believe that this argument establishes the existence of an entity known as manas is erroneous; for, the knowledge, which is produced by contact with agreeable and disagreeable objects and which originates prior to pleasure, pain and the like, and which inheres in the soul, may itself be the non-inherent cause. This (knowledge), in its turn, has for its non-inherent cause the conjunction of the organs, which are (themselves) in contact with objects, with the soul-a conjunction which inheres in the soul. The activity of the organ which is the cause of this (conjunction) has for its non-inhentent cause the conjunction of the soul with the organs--a conjunction which is dependent on the effort and unseen forces inherent in the soul. This effort, again, (has for its non-inherent cause) the knowledge of the necessity for action existing at the preceding moment. The unseen force (has for its non-inherent cause) the effort itself. Thus, even the argument that knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire and other special qualities of the soul require a non-inherent cause does not justify the positing of a different entity.

Untenability of the view that atma gunas such as pleasure arise only in conjunction with some substance other than itself and that it is manas :-

From the fact that the colour of the atoms of earth (prthivi) originates from the non-inherent cause, viz., conjunction with fire, it may be said that the non-inherent cause of the special quality of an eternal substance is only the conjunction with another substance; but this argument too is superficial. Wherefrom is it learnt that colour and other qualities of earth particles originate from conjunction with fire? If the answer is:- it is so perceived in the resultant substance, then, inasmuch as pleasure and the like arise after the knowledge of the realisation of agreeable and disagreeable (objects), what is it that is not perceived here? Indeed, there will be occasion to infer other causes only when the perceived causes are found to be defective. And here, there is no defect. Therefore, it is well to accept the following formula that among the factors well known to be causes, that is the inherent cause wherein lies the inherence of the effect; that is the non-inherent cause which is closely associated therewith; and the rest, the efficient cause. It is not proper to posit the conjunction of a different substance which is gratuitous and not well-known and to consider it the non-inherent cause. Such an admission with regard to colour and like the residing in atoms is due to non-apprehension of other causes and to (the logical need for) conformity with perceived things. But the contrary has already been proved here.

(Even if conjunction with such a substance were necessary, it does not follow that it must be with manas) :-

Even if this were so, that conjunction with another substance, which may be inferred on the strength of invariable concomitance, being known to inhere in objects that can be touched and are elemental, the argument culminates in the cojunction with the well-known body, etc.,; hence, a ninth substance (manas) need not be posited.

Again, if indeed, manas were elemental, it must be one among (the bhutas or primal elements) earth and the like; but this is contradicted by other arguments proving it to be otherwise. They are:- Manas cannot be constituted out of the earth, because like the tongue,

it is an organ instrumental in experiencing taste; it cannot be related to water, because like the nose, it is an organ instrumental in experiencing smell; similarly, being instrumental in experiencing what is not the object of the respective organs, it is possible to assert that it is not made of fire and the like; hence the non-elemental character of manas. This argument is inappropriate; for it would establish the opposite (conclusion) viz., that it is a distinctive substance (element). The character of being an organ instrumental in experiencing taste, proves that manas is composed of water (rasa), even as it establishes that manas is unrelated to earth. Similarly, the other reasons also prove the character of its being related to their respective elements, even as they reveal that it is not the other elements.

Further, that organ which grasps a particular quality among sound, touch, colour, taste and smell – that alone is constituted out of the element possessing that quality. Granting, indeed, that this is so, as it is also known that organ alone (i.e., that organ which grasps only a particular quality) is not constituted of other elements than its own, by merely showing that (you) cannot establish the negative result which you intend to convey (viz., that manas is non-elemental).[39]

Moreover, being the common instrument apprehending sound and other qualities, manas, like the body, may as well be a single substance made up the five elements, or it may be two-fold, three-fold and so on being made up of different elements.[40] For instance, it is said in scriptures, 'Gentle sir! manas is indeed food.'[41] It may be argued that this scriptural passage does not seek to teach the fact of manas having its source in food, but, like statements such as 'Prana is water'[42] it only seeks to assert the fact of its (manas) owning activities dependent on it

39. The sense-organ which grasps only one quality may be said to be made of that particular element alone which possessess that quality. But this affords no basis for the inference that manas is non-elemental; for, manas apprehends all the qualities.

40. The variant reading is ekadvitradimayam.

41. *Chand. Up* VI. 5.

42. *Chand Up.* VI. 5.

(food). That is why manas continues to exist even in the state of realisation. Indeed, in the eighth chapter of the same Upaniṣad this fact has been stated thus: 'Perceiving with the aid of manas the object of his desires, (he) rejoices'; 'To this person, the manas is the celestial eye.'[43] Similarly, in the Mahopaniṣad it is said of the Supreme Deity that 'He mediates on another object of desire with the aid of manas'.[44] In the puranas too, it is said, 'He creates the world with the aid of manas only.'[45]

Manas is no other than buddhi :-

To the foregoing, it is replied—True, it is so. It was only said that rather than assume a different substance we may as well accept this position. But, in reality it is neither elemental nor the ninth substance.

In that event, what does the word 'manas' refer to? It refers only to the intellect (buddhi). That is why the person of (great) intellect is termed manasvi. The differences of states of mind are readily perceived in this way : 'My mind is perturbed' ; 'My mind is tranquil.' To conclude, our ancestors' description of manas as an instrument is calculated to bring out the differences of states, just as intellect and egoity (though ultimately one, serve to indicate differences of states.)

Manas is not the soul:-

The reply is whether, manas is elemental or whether it is a different substance; in either of these two cases, intelligence cannot be attributed to it.[46] Hence, there is no use investigating into the nature of a substance, when no statement regarding that has been advanced.

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43 *Chand. Up.* VIII

44. *Mahopaniṣad* I.

45. *Viṣṇu Purana*, V. 11, 15.

46. Is manas an aspect of buddhi ? Or, is it a different substance altogether ? Yamunacharya leaves this question open, and thinks that, in any event, manas cannot be an intelligent entity.

The theory that Prāṇa is the soul.

21. Then, let vital breath (prāṇa) be (called) the soul. If that were so, the apprehension of the body, which is associated with it (prāṇa), as one which is connected with the soul, and the apprehension of the body, where there is absence of prāṇa, as one which is not associated with the soul will both be appropriate. Departing from the body, going to other worlds, and wandering in other bodies would be even more appropriate in-as-much as it is prāṇa's nature to move. Otherwise (i.e, if prāṇa isnot the soul) scriptural passages referring to departing, going and coming would have to be given a secondary significance, because movement cannot reasonably belong to that which is infinitely big and to that which is big but devoid of contact.

Refutation of this theory

22. This (theory) too is not correct. Intelligence cannot belong to prāṇa, because, like external air, it is only air, and because in the state of deep sleep even when the soul is devoid of activity, prāṇa possessess activity. Indeed, it is only on account of its activity that even in the case of the person who is asleep, transformation of substances that have been eaten and drunk into the sevenfold tissues of the body (dhātus) [47], inhalation and exhalation take place. Prāna is, indeed, the air which is mixed up with a little fire, water and food, and which resides in the viscera. This (air) too, being exhaled into and out of the throat, mouth and nostrils, and being sensed, like pots and others similar to it, by the organ of touch, clearly shines forth as the non-soul.

Further, the doctrine that prāna is the soul, being refuted in the same manner in which intelligence has been negatived of the body,

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47. Dhātu (from the root dha, 'to hold') is that which supports or sustains the body. It is usual to mention seven dhatus or tissues of the body—chyle (rasa), blood (rakta), flesh (māmsa), fat (medas), bone (asti); marrow (majja); semen (sukra). Sometimes hair (kesa), skin (tvac), and muscle and tendons (snāyu) are added to the list. See Tait, Ar. X 54.

does not call for separate disproof. Because the soul is not all-pervasive, even though it is devoid of contact, departing, going and other (activities) conforming to the direction of effort and unseen forces, may appropriately belong to the soul, as (they belong) to manas; hence, the passages declaring these activities as belonging to the soul are not to be taken as carrying a secondary significance. As this will be taken up again in inquiring into the size (of the soul), let this suffice (for the present).

The Theory that Consciousness is the soul

23- Then, let consciousness itself be (taken as) the soul, because it is not non-intelligent. The quality of non-soul is found in pots and the like to be concomitant with the quality of being non-intelligent. The quality of being non-intelligent, which is foreign to consciousness excludes its concomitant (the quality of being non-soul) from consciousness. The quality of being non-intelligent belongs to consciousness, because consciousness shines merely by its own being. Indeed, while it exists, consciousness, unlike jars and the like, does not remain without shining; if it fails to shine, it may be acknowledged that its shining is dependent upon something other than itself.

The Bhāṭṭa view that Consciousness is insentient.

Perhaps you may hold the following view: Even when consciousness has arisen, it is the object only which shines forth. When we have the knowledge 'This is blue'[48] we are not at the same time, conscious also of a consciousness, which is not blue and which is different from what may be pointed to by the word 'this'. Hence, by the very existence of consciousness the object is illumined as in the case of the sense-relation(where the object is brought to light, though the relation itself is not manifested). Immediately after, by noticing therein (in the object) a peculiar illumination,[49] which is adventitious, consciousness is inferred.

48. In older philosophical works, more especially in Buddhistic writings, it was usual to take nila as an illustration for an object. In later works, ghata does duty for nila.

49. According to the Bhāṭṭa School of Mīmāmsā, when cognition of an object arises, the latter is affected in a particular way; it becomes illumined, manifested or

There is no such thing as jnātatā; hence consciousness is self-luminous:-

This view is untenable, because, unlike colour and other qualities, that illumination, which is an attribute of things and which is something different from consciousness, is not apprehended even by keen observers. As all worldly experience and usage is explicable solely in terms of consciousness,which is admitted by both of us, it is not proper to posit that (illumination).

If the knowledge of objects be admitted to be devoid of the manifestation of knowledge and knower, sometimes the following experience must occur; 'This is a pot; it is not known whether I know it or not.' But it does not occur like this.

In respect of the apprehension of objects, past and future, if there is no speech and no action, the manifestation of such objects cannot be proved by inference. And the manifestation of consciousness which is based on the manifestation of objects would be even more impossible. If there are no speech and action, the manifestation of objects is not cstablished by inference, because it appears to have been known prior to them (speech and action).[50] To explain—Being prompted by somebody, it is only after concentrating (the mind) and recollecting that a person replies, 'Now it is remembered by me.' It cannot be maintained that the aforesaid speech itself is the cause of this recollec-

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made known (prakāśa-viśiṣṭa). It is from this illumination or manifestedness (prākaṭya or jnātatā) that we infer that knowledge has previously arisen. Thus it is held, that consciousness is not perceived, but is inferred from its result. For a refutation of this view see Vedanta Desika's *Tattvamuktākalāpa*, page 394. See also *Sarvārthasiddhi*.

50. Against the view that cognition is inferred from its result, namely, jnātatā, it is urged that, in respect of objects past and future, as we cannot perceive the prākaṭya, we cannot infer the knowledge of such objects. To this it may be replied that though the jnātatā of past and future objects is not perceived, it may be inferred from the speech and action concerning them and that from the jnātatā thus inferred, knowledge of those objects can be easily inferred. This reply is unsatisfactory, because if speech and action do not exist, jnātatā cannot be inferred, and much less can consciousness of objects, which is based thereon, be inferred ; if they exist, they are not found to prove jnātatā, for the objects appear to have been known previously.

tion, because it is a pre-condition of this (speech), and because of reciprocal dependence. Which shameless fellow will maintain that the knowledge of an object is inferred from statements concerning itself?

Additional argument to show that consciousness is self- luminous:—

Further, the statements and different properties found in that through whose connection these arise in another object are dependent upon the existence of the former itself and not upon its connection. For instance, the reference to existence arising in the case of earth and the like, on account of association with existence, does not arise in the case of existence itself through the connection with (another existence); the visibility found in earth and the like, by virtue of connection with colour, does not arise in the case of colour itself through the connection with (another) colour. Thus statements, such as, it 'shines forth', and qualities, such as, knowability found in pots and the like, arise from connection with consciousness; and these (statements and qualities) found in consciousness are not dependent on the connection with consciousuess, but are dependent on its own being. Hence, consciousness itself (should be considered as) the soul, as it is self-luminous.

The contention that consciousness is itself the soul, as there is economy of thought.

Further, whoever admits a knower apart from knowledge admits also consciousness. Indeed, if consciousness were non-existent, the reference to the knower would not be appropriate. If this is so, as it is admitted by both parties, let that (consciousness) itself be the knower. What is the use of that other entity which has been assumed ?

The contention that the cognition 'I know' will not prove the existence of a soul distinct from knowledge.

It may be urged that from the statement 'I know' it is evident that the soul appears to be distinct from, and to be the seat of, consciousness. True, but as it is determinate (savikalpaka) percep-

tion, it cannot be admitted as a valid perception. [51] Proceeding on the assumption that the knowledge of distinctions is real, that being which is of the nature of luminosity and which is referred to as 'I,' cannot be taken to be a separate entity, because of the invariable association of awareness (of knowledge and knower) to which no exception has been noticed, and because the entity which is admitted by you to be distinct from consciousness cannot be said either to possess the quality of luminosity or not to possess it. For, if the former, it cannot shine forth, as that will go against its nature; if the latter, it will amount to consciousness itself.

The contention that, like the knower, the known also is unreal.

Even in the matter of setting aside differences among percived things, the very same mode (of reasoning) will apply. Therefore, the avowed Buddhists as well as the disguised Buddhists (declare) that the self-luminous consciousness alone truly exists and that it alone is the soul, and that this consciousness, on account of the capacity of the immediately preceding cognition known as vāsanā (impressions of previous experience), and on account of beginningless ignorance (avidyā), has for its object the erroneously imagined and unreal distinctions of knower and the known. For instance, the avowed (Buddhists) say -"Although consciousness, in its nature, is devoid of distinctions, yet on account of erroneous knowledge, it appears as possessing the distinction of object-consciousness and sub-

51. According to the Buddhists, indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) perception merely apprehends the specific individuality of its object (svalakṣaṇa) and does not grasp its qualifications. This is passive reception of sense impressions. But the sense material thus received is invariably subject to a process of mental elaboration. The forms of thought (vikalpa), which are of five kinds—generality (jāti), quality (guṇa), action (karma), name (nāma), and substance (dravya)—are superimposed on the svalakṣaṇa, so that every object perceived has to appear through those forms. We cannot help perceiving an object otherwise than as belonging to a class, bearing a name, as characterised by an attribute and as related to another substance. This is determinate (savikalpaka) perception. As it makes considerable additions to the material presented by sense, it may be said to distort the real. Hence, the Buddhists think that, strictly speaking, it is not perceptual in character. cf. kalpanāpoda mabhrāntam pratyakṣam nirvikalpakam vikalpo vastu nirbhā sādasamvādādupaplavah.

ject-consciousness.[52] The disguised Buddhists, for instance, say—The spotless] reality cannot be the cause of the world, because (then the world would have no cessation. Hence, māyā alone is the originator of the distinctions of the knower and the known.

The refutation of the Buddhist doctrine that consciousness is the soul

24. The reply (to this view) is:— Consciousness manifests itself as perishing every moment and as being different in regard to every object. If that (consciousness) were the soul, how could a person recognise on the subsequent day what he perceived the previous day, as, 'I saw this'? This cannot be met with the aid of different objectless consciousnesses alone, for the statement that knowledge is characterised by objectlessness has for its meaning what is contradicted by every form of knowledge, such as perception and the like. If the middle term (which in this argument is no other than consciousness) possesses an object, there being no distinction between this consciousness and all other consciousnesses, they would also be similar (*i.e.*, possess objects); if it (the middle term) be objectless, then, as there is no mlddle-term, the conclusion cannot be established. As the doctrine that consciousness is objectless has been cendemned at length both in the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmamsa sections,[53] and as the yathārthakhyāti has been established in Śastra,[54] it is not dealt with here.

Impossibility of explaining recognition even on the admission that the self is a stream of consciousness:-

That is why even on the Buddhist's admission that consciousness is a stream, the justification of recognition fares no better. If a stream

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52. Quoted in Mādhava's *Sarvadarsana Sangraha*, in the chapter on Bauddha Darsana.

53. *Mimāmsa Sūtra*, I. i. 5; *Sābara Bhāṣya*, pp. 28-30, Ānandāsrama Series; *Slokavārtika*, Nirālambana section, pp. 24-90, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series; *Vedanta Sutras*, II. ii. 27.

54. Nathamuni's *Nyāyatattva* is the Sastra here referred to. The opening stanza of that work refers to itself as a sāstra—

Yo vetti yugapat sarvam pratyaksena sadā svataḥ
tam pranamya harim sāstram nyāyatattvam pracakṣmahe.

of consciousness which is different from (momentary) consciousness and which endures and which remembers is admitted, it will amount to giving up his own (Buddist's) position and accepting another's; if it is not admitted, recognition becomes inexplicable. Indeed, in regard to what is experienced by one person, regcognition cannot arise in another. It cannot be maintained that the illusion of recognition arises in the knower on account of the non-apprehension of difference due to close similarity, as in the case of the flame and the like. Indeed, there (in the case of the flame), to one and the same individual who perceives the earlier and the later entities and who, on account of their possessing similar shapes, fails to notice their differences, the illusion is but natural. But here, in as much as the several consciousnesses are described in Buddhism as being ignorant of any information about one another, and as perishing without a remainder, neither the character of being the seat nor that of being the object of the illusion of identity can arise in these (consciousnesses); because, even if there be great similarity, one person cannot regard what has been performed by another as having been executed by himself. Hence, an intelligent entity, who is the seat of the stream of consciousnesses that appears and perishes, and who exists at the time of recognition, must be admitted.

To obviate this difficulty the veiled Buddhist contends that consciousness is unborn, changeless and devoid of distinctions

Here one may point out that consciousness is not non - eternal, for, its antecedent non-existence is not ascertainable. Its being unascertainable follows from the fact of consciousness being self-established. Indeed, in the case of what is self-established, antecedent non-existence and the like cannot be demonstrated either by itself or by another. That which manifests, by itself, its own non-existence must do so either by being existent or non-existent. If it (consciousness) exists, as there will be no non-existence, how can it establish (its antecedent non-existence)? On the other alternative (if consciousness is non-existent), by reason of its very non-existence, it is even less capable of establishing (its antecedent non-existence). Hence, it (antecedent non-existence of

consciousness) is not established by consciousness itself. Nor is it proved by another, for, consciousness cannot be the object of anything else. If it were the object of consciousness. it would, like the pot, etc., cease to be consciousness. Therefore, (that is, as the antecedent non-existence of consciousness is not established either by itself or by another), consciousness has no origin. And, as it has no origination, other positive changes have also to be denied.[55] For, they are concomitant therewith (origination). That is why plurality of consciousnesses is also to be denied. The absence of the pervader (vyāpaka), namely, the character of having an origination, involves also the denial of what is pervaded by it (vyāpya), namely, plurality. For, what is unborn cannot possess differentiations. Moreover, because differentia, mutual non-existence and the like are objects of consciousness, like colour and other qualities, they cannot be attributes of consciousness. Therefore, nothing that is an object of consciousness can be its attribute.[56] Therefore, consciousness alone, which is devoid of all kinds of differences and which is attributeless and which has luminosity alone for its sole essence, and which is unchanging and eternal, is both the finite and the infinite self. It has, for instance, been said 'that consciousness which is unborn, un-knowable and which is the nature of the Infinite Self ... .' Their technical jargon (has it) that (consciouness) alone is the ultimate purport of the Vedánta texts. The Vārtikakāra[57] for instance says that scriptural testimony teaches that consciousness alone,, which is supposed to be the result of those means of knowledge that have external things for their objects (*i. e.*,perception, inference, etc.), is the gist of upaniṣadic texts. If something other than this (consciousness) were postulated (to be the object of perception, and other pramāṇās), there would result the non-authoritativeness of the Vedanta

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55. Bhāvavikāra may also be taken to mean changes of positive entities. See *Śrutaprakāśikā*, 181-2.

56. The reading in the Benares and Telugu editions is anumeyaḥ.

57. Sureśvara (A.D. 800) is the Vrātikakāra here referred to His chief works are the *Naiṣkarmya Siddhi* and *Bṛhadaranyakopaniṣad-Bhāṣya-Vārtika*. The latter work has been commented on by Anandagiri in his *Śāstraprakāśika* and by Anandapūrna in his *Nyāyakalpa-latikā*.

texts; and hence something other than consciousness ought not to be postulated.[58]

Refutation of the Advaitic view :-

Those who have understood (the true nature of) the self (assert) that this doctrine does not conform either to worldly experience or to the Vedas,

This is opposed to experience :-

To explain further-what is termed consciousness is well-known to possess the character of manifesting by its very existence some object to its own substrate (i,e. the substrate of knowledge), to have the words jnāna, avagathi, anubūthi as its synonyms, to have an object and to be the quality of the knowing self. It is, indeed, in this manner that the experience 'I know this' occurs to all beings individually. As in the case of pleasure, pain and the like, the origination, existence and destruction of consciousness manifest themselves directly.

The existence of consciousness in the states of deep sleep, drunkenness and swoon cannot be accepted, as it is negatived by effectual non-perception. If in those states also consciousness were to exist, then, at the time of waking, it should be remembered; but (as a matter of fact) it is not remembered. That is why the person who wakes up realises, on reflection, 'For so long a time I was not conscious of anything.' Though there is no general rule to the effect that there should be remembrance of all the things experienced and though there is absence of

58. This translation of these two verses (159th and 160th) from the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-Vārtika is based on Anandagiri's commentary. According to him the first verse means that granting that pratyakṣa and other pramāṇās have external things for their objects, still their result, viz., consciousness, is the gist of the vedantic texts. The second verse states that the pramāṇas cannot have external things as their objects, for, otherwise the vedantic texts would lose their authoritativeness, inasmuch as they would be powerless to establish differenceless Brahman. Hence, the pramāṇas cannot have for their object anything other than vedantic teaching, namely, consciousness. See Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya vārtika, Anandasrama Series, p. 51

death and other powerful causes responsible for the obliteration of traces of previous experience, the uniform non-remembrance establishes only the non-existence of experience (during states of deep sleep, etc.).

Nor may it be said that even though there is manifestation of consciousness, non-origination of its remembrance may be due either to the absence of delimiting objects or to the extinction of the object of self-consciousness. For, the absence of one thing and the non-apprehension of that (thing) cannot possibly be the obstacles in the way of the result which is caused by the manifestation of some other object. Even if there be the manifestation of these three (consciousness, objects and self-consciousness) the manifestation of each of these is the cause of the remembrance of its respective object. Again, the object referred to by 'I,' which secures permanency on the strength of recollection, cannot be said to meet with death in deep sleep and other similar states. That is why on waking there is the judgment 'All the while I slept well'.

Moreover, something known as consciousness (samvid) which is devoid of objects and substrate cannot exist, as there is absolute non-apprehension (of the same). Those who have understood the true import of words maintain that the words samvid, anubhūti, jnāna, prakāśa and the like are relative terms.[59] Indeed, neither in common speech nor in scripture do we meet with the usage of roots, such as jānāti without being associated with an agent or an object,

It cannot be maintained that consciousness does not grasp its own prior non-existence :-

It was maintained that from consciousness its antecedent non-existence cannot be proved, because when what is self-established exists, at the same time its antecedent non-existence cannot exist, being opposed to it. But this contention is superficial. For, there is no rule to the effect that only such objects as exist at the time of consciousness are proved by it; (were it so) the past and the future would become unknowable.

59. A relative term depends for its meaning on its relation to some other name.

If it is contended that when the antecedent non-existence of consciousness is established, it must be contemporaneous with consciousness (we ask) has it been perceived like this anywhere? If it is so (perceived), as the antecedent non-existence of consciousness is established thereby, the negation of antecedent non-existence (of consciousness) is not proved. The statement that the antecedent non-existence (of anything) is contemporaneous with that thing is a mad man's declaration. Indeed, this quality, namely, that of bringing to light objects that are contemporaneous with itself is the nature of perceptual knowledge arising from the senses. But this is not the nature of all forms of knowledge nor of all means of knowledge.

For the same reason, the following (contention) also stands condemned. If the means of knowledge is real on its own right, inasmuch as it is self-luminous, it must exist at all times; therefore, its object too must exist at all times; for, the means of knowledge is always associated with the bject of knowledge. For, the association of means of knowledge with objects of knowledge does not consist in the invariable relation of the objects of knowledge with the means of knowledge at the time of its existence; but it consists in the negation of the unreality of that particular form of things in which the latter have been apprehended as existing in a certain place, time, etc. That is why the statement that memory has no external object, because even when external objects have perished memory is noticed, becomes a prattle.

The contention that there are no pramanas to establish antecedent non-existence is refuted :-

It may, however, be said that the antecedent non-existence and the like of consciousness are not ascertained by perception, because it is not something present at the time of perception; and that it cannot be established by other means of knowledge, since there are no signs (linga) and the like. If this were so, the character of being self-established would not prove the absence of antecedent non-existence; indeed, it has now to be maintained that there are no means of proving it. But it has already been said that it is impossible to hold that there are no means of

proving it, for non-existence is established by effectual non-perception itself.

Consciousness is not eternal

Moreover, perceptual knowledge establishes existence of its object at the time of its own existence, and not the existence (of the object) at all times. Hence, it has to be stated that consciousness manifests itself only as being limited by time, taking the form 'I exist only at this moment, not at other times.' Otherwise (if knowledge were not limited by time, its object too, namely) the pot and the like would be eternal. Similarly, inference and other kinds of knowledge (must be limited by time; otherwise, they would reveal their objects also to be eternal). And it has already been said that a pure consciousness, which is devoid of the distinctions of perception and inference, and which is objectless and supportless cannot exist

This contention that consciousness cannot be proved by anything other than consiousness is disproved :-

The contention that the antecedent non-existence of consciousness cannot be proved by anything other than consciousness on the ground that consciousness cannot be the object of anything else is indefensible; for (one's own) previous knowledge is made the object of present cognition, as in the judgment 'At one time I knew'. Besides, the consciousness of other persons is inferred from reasons (linga) such as, the invariable rejection and acceptance respectively of disagreeable objects. And, if it is not admitted that the consciousness of others is inferred, there would result the impossibility of all scriptural and worldly usage, in as much as it would be impossible to grasp the meanings of words.[60] Further, approaching the guru and the like would

60. The meanings of words may be understood from vyavahāra. Thus, for example, a youngster notices the pupil fetching a cow when his master utters the words 'Fetch the cow', and immediately concludes that the action of fetching the cow was the result of the pupil grasping the desire of the master when he uttered the words 'fetch the cow.' At that time, he takes the words in one mass as conyeying one complex whole of meaning. Which word in that whole stands for the animal, and which signifies the action is not apprehended then. Later, when the teacher says 'fetch the

be impossible, for there could be no apprehension that he is possessed of knowledge.

The contention that if consciousness becomes the object of another consciousness, it would cease to be consiousness is met :

The belief that if consiousness is the object of anything else, it would cease to be consciousness is untenable. The character of being consciousness consists in the quality of manifesting itself solely by means of its own existence to its substrate; or in the quality of being the means of manifesting (by its own existence) its object (to its substrate).[61] These two characteristics (of consiousness, namely that of manifesting itself and its object to its substrate), which are established by one's own experience, do not fall away even when consiousness becomes the object of another consciousness. How then can it be maintained that consciousness ceases to be consciousness (when it becomes the object of another consciousness) ? Pots and the like, on the other hand, do not possess the quality of being consiousness, simply because they do not possess the aforesaid characteristics and not because they are objects of experience.

Further, (even on your view) that consiousness does not possess the character of being the object of another consciousness, the same difficulty, namely, that it will cease to be consciousness, does exist as in the case of the sky-flower, (which is not an object of cognition; and which is not a cognition).

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horse', a different animal is brought. Again, when he says 'tie up the cow', a different action follows. By observing varied actions resulting from the different utterances, the youngster understands that the word 'cow' denotes an animal of a certain description, that the word 'horse' an animal of another kind, the word 'bring' denotes the action of bringing, and so on:

61. In commenting upon these definitions, Sudarśanācārya observes that it consciousness is defined as that which manifests itself, this definition would also apply to pots and the like, for, they too manifest themselves. To exclude them. the qualification 'to its own substrate' is added; the pot manifests itself, not to its substrate, the ground on which it stands, but to the knowing person. Again, the further qualification 'solely by means of its own existence' is added in order to exclude certain attributes of the self, such as, atomic size, eternity and so on, which are manifested to their substrate, not by themselves, but by an act of knowledge. The Śrī Bhāṣya would add

The quality of being consciousness cannot be attributed to the self, for it possesses the character of being the seat of consciousness. Nor can it be said that it (the self) is not the object of consciousness; for, though it is self-luminous like consciousness, it is admitted to be capable of being known by oneself and others. The objection that, if the self is knowable, it would cease to be self would, as stated before, equally apply even to the view that it is not knowable.

If it is contended that it is only the non-existence of the sky-flower (rather than the fact that it is not the object of experience) that is responsible for the sky-flower not being soul or consiousness, then let it be held that even in the case of pots and the like, it is only their character of not being the seat of consciousness and of their not being opposed to ignorance[62] that is responsible for their being non-soul and non-con-

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yet another qualification 'at the present time' with a view to excluding past states of consciousness. Even without this addition, past states of consciousness stand excluded since every past experience is revealed not by its own existence, but by another act of knowing. But this qualification serves to emphasise the fact that any state of consciousness can manifest itself by its own existence only at the time it exists, and that a past state of consciousness can be apprehended by another state—a fact denied by the opponent. 'At the present time' denotes 'the time when the relation of consciousness to its object exists'. Since a state of consciousness cannot manifest itself, solely by its own sake, to any person other than its own substrate, the words 'to its own substrate become necessary. This definition is acceptable only to those who maintain the svayamprakāśatva theory; hence, a second, which will be acceptable to all is offered. The qualifications 'to its own substrate', 'by its own existence' and 'at the present time have to be supplied in this definition also. 'Means of manifesting' would apply also to the potter's stick, wheels and other instruments; and hence the qualification 'to its own substrate'. The knowledge arising from one sense organ can not be the means for the manifestation of an object revealed by another sense; visual perception, for example does not manifest that which is the object of auditory perception. Hence the need for the words 'its own object' The qualification 'by its own existeace' serves to exclude the sense organs, which are instrumental in revealing objects, not by their own being, but in so far as they give rise to knowledge As in the case of the first definition, here also the expressions 'at the present time' and 'its own substrate' are intended to exclude respectively past states of consciousness and the experience of others.

62. It is not necessary that if external objects, such as pots, exist at all they ought to be known. Hence, they are not considered to be opposed to ignorance (ajñānavirodhi. Knowledge, however, is opposed to ignoranee (ajñānavirodhi) because when it exists it must necessarily shine forth.

sciousness. Should it be contended that if consciousness is the object of consciousness the two qualities (namely, the quality of not being the seat of consciousnesss and of not being opposed to ignorance) must belong to it, (we reply) that even on the view that consciousness is not the object of consciousness, it would likewise possess those two qualities, (as in the case of the sky-flower). No further need to expose how ridiculous these devious and flimsy arguments are.

The assertion that if consciousness is without an origin, it could have no changes is refuted:-

Again, the assertion that as consciousness has no origin, other modifications of it are negatived is fallacious; for, (the implied general proposition, namely, that whatever has no origin has none of the other changes, is falsified by the contradictory instance of antecedent non-existence, because,) although antecedent non- existence has no origin, it is found to have an end. Even if the qualification 'positive entity' be added, the falsity (of the general proposition as modified viz., All positive entities having origin have none of the other changes) will be proved by the ignorance (avidyā) which is admitted by you. For, this ignorance even though it has no origin, is subject to manifold changes and terminates through the rise of knowledge. If it is said that its modifications are unreal (we ask) do you admit changes which are ultimately real and believe in any entity having an origin and still being ultimately real? It is only if these are admitted, the qualification 'ultimately real' can be fruitfully applied either to the major or to the middle term. If these are admitted, then your case has, indeed, been ably defended by one skilled in logic!

The contention that if consciousness is unborn, it cannot have differentiations is refuted:-

The statement that what is unborn cannot possess differentiations is not correct; for, the distinction of the self, which is assuredly unborn, from the body, senses and the like has already been established; and because ignorance, which is admitted to be beginningless, has necessarily

to be taken as being distinct from the self.[63] If ti is said that this differentiation is phenomenal, (we ask) have you observed any-where real distinction to be invariably concomitant with origination?[64] It will be shown presently that the distinctions existing between various kinds of knowledge and objects of knowledge, which are established by uncontradicted experience, are ultimately real.[65]

The contention that consciousness of qualitylessi stands self-refuted:-

The contention that consciousness does not possess the attributes which are objects of knowledge, and that the attributes which are known do not belong to consciousness as its qualities is proved to be fallacious by the qualities of self-luminosity, eternity and the like, which are established by scriptural testimony, inference and other means of knowledge to exist in consciousness, and which are acknowledged by yourself.[66] It cannot be pointed out that these attributes are in reality only pure consciousness; for, even though it (consiousness) is admited to exist, conflicting views with regard to these attributes are noticed. It is only after admitting the existence of consciousness that disputants maintain its inferability, momentariness, and the like. Besides, consciousness and these attributes are in their essential nature distinct, Indeed, consciousness is that which, solely by means of its own existence,

63. All systems of Indian thought, with the exception of the Cārvāka darsana' accept the distinction of the self from the body, senses and so on; and the opponent admits, in addition, the distinction of the self from avidyā. Hence, he cannot deny vijātiyadheda.

64. In order to prove that consciousness admits of no real distinctions, because it has no origin, the negative concomitance (vyatirekavyāpti) - whatever has real distinctions must have an origin—must be cited. But as the opponent does not admit real distinctions, he cannot point to any instance of this negative generalisation. Hence, his argument commits the fallacy of vyāpyatvāsiddhi. Moreover, if the distinction of avidyā from the self is not real, it follows that ignorance itself may become the self.

65. The distinction between objects of knowledge necessarily points to distinction between kinds of knowledge This shows that sajātiyabheda is real.

66. The admission that consciousness possesses the attributes of self-luminosity, eternity and the like implies that consciousness admits of internal differences (svagatabheda).

manifests some object to its own substrate. But self-luminousness consists in shining forth or being manifest solely by means of its own existence to the soul. It has already been established in *Samvit-siddhi*[67] that 'shining forth,' which is implied therein, is a quality common to all sentient and insentient things alike. If you were to (confuse this 'shining forth' with prākaṭya and) say that it is not admitted by Vedāntins, (we point out that) the expression 'shining forth' refers to the quality of being fit to be an object of reference Eternity, again is the quality of existing at all times. Unity is limitation by the number 'one'.

It is not proper to suggest that as these attributes (self-luminosity, eternity and unity) constitute the negation of non-intelligence, of spatial and temporal limitations and of plurality respectively, the aforesaid difficulties are got over. For, even if they are of this nature, as they will still be the attributes of consciousness, you cannot meet the charge of anaikānta (straying reason). The denial of non-intelligence, non-eternity, plurality and the like would be empty statement signifying nothing if the several qualities opposed to these were not present in consciousness. Ignorance (avidyā), which is knowable, is found in the self; and this is a position admitted by you. (Hence. it cannot be maintained that the attributes which are known do not belong to consciousness as its qualities).

Further, after suggesting the relation of consciousness to something with the aid of the genitive case-ending found in the word asyāḥ (occurring in the stātement nāsyā meyo dharmaḥ) to assert the attributelessnes of consciousness will, like the attribution of the quality of being a barren woman to one's mother, convey the opposite meaning. If consciousness is admitted to be manifest, it will follow that it possesses attributes; otherwise, (if it is not admitted to be manifest) it amounts to positing an absolute non-entity like the horns of a hare. If it is said that manifestation itself is consciousness, (we ask) 'Oh, Ye! tell us whose manifestation it is. If the reply is that it is not the manifestation

67. The expression 'samvitsiddhāveva sādhitam' indicates that *Samvitsiddhi*, was composed before *Atmasiddhi*.

of anything, then, it cannot be manifestation at all, for, manifestation, like the quality of being a son, always refers to some entity and belongs to somebody. If it is said that it (manifestation) belongs to the self, (we ask) what is the meaning of the genitive case - ending?[68] Hence, to maintain that a consciousness, which has been described as above and which has a character similar to that of sky-lotus, is the ultimate end of the Vedānta will only lead to the destruction of the Vedas themselves.[69]

Even on the view of the veiled Buddhists, recognition would be inexplicable:

Further, even if consciousness were eternal, the impossibility of recognition would still persist; for, recognition which takes the form—'I experienced this at one time'—indicates that there is a conscious subject existing at earlier and subsequent times. But, in your view, consciousness is mere consciousness. With regard to itself, consciousness cannot be its own subject and its own object.

It cannot be maintained that jnātṛtva is superposed on consciousness:

Should it be argued that, even though consciousness is ultimately only consciousness, but falsely appears as an experiencing subject, just as the shell appears as silver, and that (this consciousness itself cannot be said to be illusory, for) without a real basis no illusion can arise, this argument is unsound. On this view, the conscious 'I' would shine forth as equivalent to consciousness, taking the form 'consciousness is I,'[70] even as silver, the yellow colour, the quality of being existent in the mirror,

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68. Pānini's Ṣaṣṭhī śeṣe-declares that the genitive case - ending invariably refers to some relation or other. The expression 'soul's manifestation' (ātmanaḥ siddhih) must, therefore, indicate that there is some relation between soul and the quality of manifestation. Hence, it cannot be maintained that the soul is attributeless.

69. There is a pun on the word vedānta.

70. When a piece of shell is mistaken for silver, the illusion takes the form 'This is silver,' and not 'shell is silver'; for, so long as the specific qualities of an object are known, no illusion with regard to it can arise. Likewise, when consciousness erroneously appears as the 'I,' the illusion must take the form 'This is I' and not 'consciousness is I', Hence, it may be asked: How can it be asserted that the illusion concerning consciousness would take the form 'consciousness is I'? Our reply is

duality and the like appear falsely as being the form of the lustrous object presented before us, the conch, the face, the moon and the like. This consciousnesss which always presents itself as something distinct (from the conscious subject) is marked as taking the form 'I am conscious' and as being the distinguishing attribute of the altogether separate entity known as 'I', just as the stick is found to be the attribute of Devadatta; when the judgment 'Devadatta holds a stick' does not have for its object the stick only, how can it be asserted that (in the analogous case) this consciousness of 'I', which reveals the entity called 'I' as owning consciousness, has for its object consciousness only, which is, in fact, a mere attribute.

Refutation of the view that jnātṛtva is the result of superimposition:

How (we ask) did you arrive at the conclusion that the character of of being a knower is an illegitimately transferred quality (adhyasta)? If it is replied that this like the sta emnt 'I am stout', presents itself only to him who erroneously identifies the self with the body, (and as such, the character of being a knower, like stoutness, is superimposed on the self, we rejoin that) since the consciousness too, which you regard as the self, presents itself only to that person who has that (confusion of the self with the body), this consciousness also must likewise be a superimposition. If it be said that, since consciousness continues even after the dawn of true knowledge of reality, it cannot be illusory, (we ask) 'Sir, does the self really cease to be a knower after the acquisition of true knowledge?'[71] Oh! if that were so, it would be far better not to be a knower of the real than to be a knower of the real; for, at least in the state of illusion, he would perceive, many a happy thing.

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that in the case of shell-silver it is not the shell aspect of the presented object, but some other aspect that causes the illusion. But in the case of consciousness, as the opponent describes it to be attributeless, it cannot be said that some aspect other than that of being consciousness leads to the illusion. Hence, it has to be admitted that even when its specific aspect of being consciousness is known consciousness gives rise to the illusion of 'I' and takes the form 'consciousness is I.' See *Sruta Prakāsikā*,

71. Scriptural passages describing the state of release definitely declare that the released soul continues to be a knower. Hence, it cannot be maintained that with the rise of true knowledge the quality of being a knower vanishes.

The contention that jnātṛtva resides in ahamkāra:

You may maintain that to be a knower is to be an agent in the act of knowing, to be liable to change,[72] to be non-intelligent, and to reside in the knot of the ahamkāra,[73] and that the self is the enjoyer of the fruits of the knowing process, a non-agent, a changeless entity, the witness (sākṣin)[74] and pure luminosity; and that the character of being an agent and the like cannot be the attributes of the self; for, like colour and other qualities, they are knowable and that if the quality of being an agent belongs to the self, even though the latter is an object of the consciousness of 'I', it will be impossible to avoid the unwelcome conclusion that the quality of being non-soul, of existing for the sake of others, of being non-intelligent and the like would belong to the self even as they belong to the body; and that the distinction of the knower, who is the object of the consciousness of 'I', and who enjoys the result of the activity of the body, from the body, which is well known to be the agent in all secular and sacred duties, is noticed; and that similarly here also it is reasonable to admit that the witnessing inward self is distinct from the knower denoted by the term 'I'.

This is opposed to everyday experience.

This argument (of yours) is illogical, for, apart from the inward self which shines forth as the knower in the judgment 'I know', no other

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72. Knowledge is an activity and it has a beginning and an end; hence, the quality of being an agent in the act of knowing must have a beginning and end, that is, must be subject to change.

73. Ahamkāra is spoken of as a knot (granthi) either because it is the root cause of the tangled mass of illusions or because it binds the jīva closely to the manifold illusions which are, in fact, its own handiwork.

74. According to the Advaitins the ultimate reality, Brahman, which is one, undifferenced, eternal and self-luminous consciousness (caitanya), is particularised by the antaḥkarana in two ways. When Brahman is determined by antaḥkarṇa as a qualifying attribute (viśeṣana) it is called the jīva; when it is determined by antaḥkaraṇa as a limiting adjunct only (upādhi), it is called the sākṣin. The antaḥkaraṇa is inseparably bound up with jīva, but is separable from the sākṣin. The sākṣin performs the office of manifesting the odjects known as well as the knowing subject. Since all diversity takes its roots in ajñāna, the sākṣin which illumines objects of experience and the experiencer, is spoken of as the 'witness of ajñāna.'

self which is pure luminosity only and which is termed 'witness' is apprehended. The character of inwardness as attributed to the self (pratyaktva) consists precisely in the quality of being 'I' found in that entity which by virtue of its being the seat of knowledge, is marked off from the body, senses, mind, vital breath and consciousness, and which, contrary to the procedure of outward objects, proceeds, as it were, and shines for its own sake.[75] The character of being a witness as attributed to the same (self) consists in being a direct knower (an eye-witness). Indeed, one who is not knower is not spoken of as witness. Since all objects that are manifested reveal themselves to the knower who shines forth as 'I', the experience—'I know', 'It presents itself to me'—is shared by every self.

Indefensibility of the position that pratyaktva belongs to ahamkāra:

The quality of being a knower cannot belong to that modification o unmanifest prakṛti (avyakta) which goes by the name of egoity (ahamkāra), nor to that known as intellect (buddhi); for as in the case of the body, the quality of not being an intelligent entity, the character of liability to change, insentience, the quality of existing for the sake of others and other similar reasons make it impossible (for the quality of jnātṛtva to belong to either egoity or intellect.)

The untenability of the view that ahamkāra appears as knower either on account of reflection or contact with consciousness.

Nor can it be said that the quality of being a knower may well belong to egoity or intellect on account of the reflection of intelligence; for, what is not open to visual perception is not observed to have reflection. Besides, on your view, the quality of being a knower does not really belong to consciousness. If jnātṛtva really belongs to consciousness, on account of conjunction with consciousness, this quality may appear in another substance (say in egoity or intellect) or be apprehended therein, even as heat appears in the iron-ball on account contact with fire.

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75. Outward objects present themselves for the sake of the knowing subject, and not for their own sake. The self, on the contrary, shines for its own sake. Svasmai bhāsamānatvam pratyaktvam. Parasmai bhāsamānatvam parāktvam.

The contention that ahamkara appears as knower, because it manifests consciuosness as residing in itself:-

Yon may perhaps maintain the following view: "In manifesting the self which is none other than pure consciousness, the egoity (ahamkara), although of non-intelligent nature, manifests the self as residing within itself; for it is the nature of manifesing entities to reveal the objects that are being manifested as residing in themselves, just as a mirror, a sheet of water, particular instances of a class (say, the short, the hornless cows) and the like reveal the face, the sun, cowness, etc. as dwelling in themselves respectively. The erroneous view that finds expression in the judgment 'I know' is the result of that (i.e., the ahamkara being a manifesting entity reveals consciousness as residing within itself; in other words, ahamkara appears as the possessor of knowledge. That is why in states of deep sleep and release, there is manifestation of the self in its true nature of pure consciousness only without the revelation of the 'I'. That is also the reason why the quality of being non-soul has to be predicated of the 'I'. Suresvara's statement runs to the effect—'If the quality of being 'I' belongs to the self, it must persist in states of deep sleep and release; for the reason that it does not persist, it must be taken to belong to something else '.[76]" This (argument) lacks coherence.

The refutation of the preceding view:—

To say that the ahamkara which is essentially insentient manifests the self-luminious soul is as illogical as to assert that a spent coal manifests the sun. In fact, the manifestation of all objects is known to depend on consciousness, which is not insentient and which you consider to be the soul. The assertion—that the non-intelligent ahamkāra, which itself depends for its revelation on consciousness, reveals such a consciousness, which manifests all subjects without an exception and which has as its essential nature a luminosity that knows neither birth nor extinction, nor any other modification-will be ridicu ed by those who have understood the real nature of the soul.

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76. *Naiṣkarmya Siddhi*. Bombay Sanskṛt and Prākrit Series. No. 38. Ch. II Stanza 32. p. 70.

Further, the relation of being the manifesting and the manifested entity cannot obtain between ahamkāra and consciousness, for they are opposite in nature.[77] If the self is admitted to be capable of being manifested, it would imply that, like the pot, it would cease to be consciousness. Do not say that the surface of the hand, which is itself manifested by the sun's rays, is seen to manifest those rays themselves; for, the surface of the hand is responsible only for the accumulation of thos rays.[78] The sun beams thus accumulated are distinctly perceived; hencee, they are in reality not manifested by the hand at all.

None of the three alternative ways in which ahamkara could be said to manifest consciousness is tenable:-

Again (we ask) what is the nature of this 'manifestation', which is said to be effected by the ahmkāra in respect of the self which is essentially consciousness? It cannot be said to be the origination of consciousness; for in as much as it is self-dependent, it must be admitted not to depend for its existenee on anything other than itself. Nor can it be said to be the illuminaiion concerning consciousness, since it is not cabable of being apprehended (by another consciousness). Indeed if it is cabable of being experienced (by another consciousness), it would imply that it, like pots, etc.. would cease to consciousness,

None of these possible modes of the third alternative is tenable:-

For the same reason (i. e, that consciousness is not the object of another consciousness), manifestation cannot be said to be the assistance rendered to the instruments of knowledge (concerning consciousness). This assitance may be (of three kinds) — (*i*) It is either such as results from the removal of those obstacles to the rise of knowledge which reside in the object to be known, like the service rendered to the

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77. Consciousness and ahamkāra have opposite natures. The former has the character of manifesting all objects without an exception; while the latter, being distinct from consciousness, depends for its manifestarion on consciousness. H nce, it is impossible for ahamkāra to manifest consciousness.

78. This analogy is unsound, because, unlike the sun's rays, consciousness is not spread out and cannot be said to be collected by ahamkāra.

eye by light through the dispelling of darkness. (*ii*) Or, it is the help arising from being the means of contact between objects known and the sense-organs, like the help rendered by the particular instance, mirror, etc., to the eye and the like, which reveal respectively general qualities, one's own face, etc. (*iii*) Or, it is the help which accrues from the removal of the impurities residing in the knower, like the service rendered by (virtues such as) tranquillity, restraint and so on to the śāstras, which are the means of the true knowledge concerning the infinite and the finite self.

(It cannot be the first kind, for) there is nothing resident in consciousness which impedes the orgination of knowledge (of consciousness) and which could be removed by ahamkāra. (You cannot reply that ajñāna dwells in consciousness and is dispelled by ahamkāra, for) inasmuch as ignorance would have the same abode and the same object as knowledge, it is impossible to locate it in the witness which you have admitted, and which is devoid of the two qualities (of being the seat of knowledge and its object). Indeed, pots and the like, which are devoid of the possibility of knowledge, are never spoken of as possessing ignorance. Similarly, for the reason that the quality of being the knower never belongs to pure consciousness, it can never possess ignorance. Even if it is so (i. e., even if consciousness possess ignorance), it is not admitted that ignorance is removable by ahamkāra, since ignorance can be put an end to only by knowledge, and since it has been so admitted. Besides, knowledge terminates the ignorance which concerns its own objeet only.[79] As the quality of being the object of knowledge has not been attributed to consciousness which is regarded as the self, the ignorance residing therein can never be destroyed by anyone at any time. (The ignorance which you speak of as existing in consciousness may be either defined as the antecedent non - existence of knowledge or considered as indefinable). Ignorance, which is of the nature of

79. When knowledge arises it dispels only that ignorance which centres round the object known. For example, when the shell is known as shell, this apprehension terminates the illusory cognition of that object which existed till then. If knowledge is said to put an end to all ignorance. it would have to be admitted that knowledge of the true nature of the shell dispels every form of illusion. See *Sruta Prakāśikā*

the antecedent non—existence of knowledge, cannot be regarded as an obstacle to the rise of knowledge.[80] That the following statements—Ignorance is positive in nature; (it is) indefinable; (it is) the material cause of the world; and so on—are merely incoherent prattle will be shown in the section dealing with the relation (of finite souls to the infinite self). Hence, it cannot be said that the manifestation of consciousness is effected by the ahamkāra whose essential nature is removal of defects in the objects known.

(It cannot be the second, for) as consciousness is beyond the reach of the senses (the assistance rendered to the means of knowledge by ahamkāra) cannot consist in being responsible for the contact (of the objects known with the senses). (Nor can it be the third, for) as the entity known as 'I' is (in your view) the knower, it cannot be cleansed of its impurities by itself.

It cannot be maintained that the manifesting entity should manifest the object as residing within itself.

Nor can it be said that it is the nature of the manifesting entity to reveal the manifested objects as residing within itself; because such a nature is not observed in the lamp and the like (which manifest things without exhibiting them as residing in themselves); and because, knowledge, the means thereof and whatever is auxiliary to them have the nature of promoting the manifestation of things as they really are. That knowledge, the means thereof and whatever is auxiliary to them have the aforesaid nature follows from the doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge (svataḥprāmāṇyā)[81]; and if this is not admitted, there would ensue lack of certainty in anything.

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80. The antecedent non- existence of an object cannot be regarded as an obstacle to the origination of that object.

81. On the question of the validity and invalidity of knowledge four views have been held. According to the Sāṅkhyas the validity and invalidity of knowledge are both inherent in it. The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika takes the opposite position and contends that both the validity and invalidity of knowledge depend on external factors. On this view, knowledge, in itself, is neither true nor false; it is rendered valid or invalid by outside factors. The Buddhists take invalidity to be intrinsic

(With regard to the analogy of the particular instance, vyakti. cited by you), such a manifestation (of the universal as residing in the particular instances) is due to the fact that the universal is only the character met with in the instances, and not the fact of those instances being the manifesting entities, as it has already been shown (that the case of the lamp flame) falsifies the view (that all manifesting entities reveal objects as taking their abode in themselves). (As for the analogy of the mirror, etc.) mirror and similar objects are only responsibile for the mistake, namely the reflecting of the ocular rays, and are not manifesting agents of faces and other objects.[82] The real manifesting agents however, are only light and the like. Although light is the real manifesting agent the false impression (of the face appearing within the mirror) is the outcome of the mistake of the deflection (of the ocular rays). But here, the capacity to produce a similar mistake (in the self-luminous consciousness) does not belong to the entity known as 'I'. If it is so, (it. e. if that capacity belongs to the 'I'), then perception and other forms of knowledge would lose their validity; and hence, nothing would be true. Therefore, what constitutes the inward self is not pure consciousness, but the entity 'I', which reveals itself as a knower.

Refutation of the contention of Suresvara that in deep sleep there is no consciousness of 'I'.

As regards your contention that in deep sleep and release the self manifests itself only as mere consciousness and does not appear as 'I', the belief that in deep sleep such a condition of consciousness prevails (i. e., consciousness shining forth without an object or a substrate) has

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to knowledge, and validity extrinsic. The Mīmāsakas and Vedāntins, while admitting the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika view in regard to invalidity of knowledge, maintain that validity is inherent in knowledge.

82. The general proposition 'all manifesting entities reveal their objects as residing within themselves' was sought to be established on the strength of instances such as mirror, etc. In refuting this view, it was first pointed out that there are instances against this generalisation. Now it is shown that even the instnces cited by the opponent do not prove his case. The mirror, for example, is responsible only for reflecting the ocular rays, and not for manifesting the face. The real manifesting agents are light and the like.

already been refuted. Since even in deep sleep the self does present itself up to the time of waking only in the form of the 'I', (the manifestatin of the 'I' cannot be said to be absent in that state)[83]. If it is said that on account of the absence of consciousness of external objects, and prevalence of darkness (tamas) in deep sleep, the 'I' does not present itself clearly and distinctly, (we reply that) it must be admitted that even the consciousness posited by you does not, likewise, present itself clearly aud distinctly in that state. No one who has risen from deep sleep is found to recall the experience which occurred to him during sleep, namely, 'I am not I (ahamkāra.; nor am I anything else (the knower or the known); but I am only pure consciousness and I stand as the witness of ignorance.'

If you were to say that from the reflection 'For so long a time I knew nothing at all' such a position (namely, that in deep sleep there is presentation of pure consciousness only) is made out, (we ask) how (is it made out)? (If your reply is that) this follows from the expression 'nothing at all' (occurring in the aforesaid reflection, we rejoin) in that case, the manifestation of consciousness also would have to be denied.

Analysis of your statement establishes just the opposite of what you intend to prove.

While in the judgment, 'I knew nothing at all,' the word 'I' denotes clearly the self which is manifested in deep sleep and the words 'knew nothing at all' negative (all) knowledge on the part of that 'I', the fool who manitains (that the self - same judgment establishes) that in deep sleep there is manifestation of pure consciousness along with the absence of the presentation of 'I' does not know its contradiction to experience. It has already been said that there can be no knowledge without an object and without a substrate.

The reflection "I was not even aware of my self" does not mean the absence of 'I' but something else:—

You may ask : Do we not, on waking, get the knowledge 'I who slept, was not even conscious of my self'? (Does it not indicate that

83. Ekarūpeṇa also suggests that presentation of the self as 'I' is common to everybody.

in sleep there is absence of the manifestation of 'I')?. True , (we reply): that knowledge (namely, the reflection 'I was not even conscious of myself') after indicating by the word 'myself' the self, which, in the waking state, is understood as being characterised by caste, stage in life, etc., shows that the 'I', which shines forth in sleep, which is not clearly experienced, and which manifests itself for its own sake, is not known in such a manner (i. e. as characterised by caste, stage in life, etc.); but it does not show that the 'I' whose essential nature is to be the knower, is itself not apprehended. Indeed, our reflection is to the effect: 'I did not even know myself as having slept in a particular place and as possessing certain characteristics.'

The statement in question undoubtedly points to the existence of the 'I' and its manifestation.

Moreover, your position indeed is this, namely, that in deep sleep the self exists as the witness of ignorance. And it has already been said that to be a witness is to be a direct knower. This witness too is nothing but the 'I' which is apprehended in the judgment 'I know'; how then, could this 'I' not be apprehended in the state of sleep? That which Illumines itself for its own sake appears only as the 'I'; hence, it follows that the self, which shines forth even in sleep and other similar states, appears only as the 'I'.

The 'I' (ahamartha) persists in the state of release:-

To maintain that the 'I' does not persist in the state of liberation is unsound; for, it amounts to asserting, as is done in Buddhism, but in a somewhat different way, that release consists only in the annihilation of the self. The 'I' is not a mere attribute of the self; if it were an attribute, it may be said that even after its destruction the self exists in its true being; as it persists on the dissolution of ignorance. In fact, the true being of the self is nothing but the 'I'; and knowledge appears to the self as an attribute of the latter as is evident from the judgment 'knowledge has arisen in me'. (It has been shown that even granting your position that the self exists as a witness of ignorance in deep sleep it does not follow that the 'I' disappears in that state.) There is no

need to argue the point, when something other than the witnessing consciousness (sākṣicaitanya) is the self.

On the stength of the sacred text relating to liberation and endeavour of souls for securing mokṣa the existence of 'I' (ahamartha) is proved.

Moreover, he who considers himself to be afflicted by the miseries of worldly existence, whether in truth or in error, and thinks 'I am suffering pain', and in whom the desire for release has arisen, making him reflect: 'How may I become tranquil and blissful, setting aside this entire collection of miseries?', he alone enters upon the means for realisation. If (on the other hand) he were to realise 'I should be no more if I practised the means (for the attainment of release)', he would run away at the very mention of the topic of release. As a consequence of this, since there can be none possessing the requisite qualifications (to enter upon the study of the scriptures), the entire upaniṣadic texts and all the śāstras relating to liberation would lose their validity.[84]

If you were to say that mere luminosity which is indicated by the word 'I' would persist in the state of release, (we ask) 'Of what use is it?' For, no sensible person would exert himself under the influence of the idea 'Though I shall perish, there will remain some luminosity;[85]

Refutation of the view that the "I" is an objective element (i.e. it is jaḍa)

For the same reason, even the contention-that in self-consciousness (which expresses itself in the judgment 'I know') that element which is not referred to by the word 'this' (i. e. the non-objective element, pratyagartha), which has consciousness for its sole essence, and which is luminosity, is the self ; and that in the same self-consciousness what

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84. The validity of scriptures consists in their generating true knowledge in the mind of the aspirant. If there were no qualified pupils to study them they would lose their validity

85. Cf. Sri Bhāṣya.

Nirastākhiladuḥkhoham anantānadabhāk svarāt |
Bhaveyamiti mokṣārthī śrvaṇādau pravartate ||
Ahamarthavināśaścet mokṣa ityadhyavasyati |
Apasarpedasu mokṣakathāprastāvagandhataḥ ||
Mayi naṣṭepi mattonyā kācit jñaptiravasthitā |
Iti tatprāptaye yatnaḥ kasyāpi na bhaviṣyati ||

has to be considered as objective element (yuṣmadartha, parāgartha), for the reason that it depends for its manifestation on consciousness, is the 'I' referred to in the judgment 'I know'—stands condemned.[86] It is also contradicted by direct perception, (for the judgment 'I know' implies that knowledge is an attribute and that the 'I' is its possessor, and that knowledge is an objective element (parāk), while the 'I' is a non-objective element, (pratyak).

The statement that the intelligent entity refered to in the judgment 'I know' is an objective element (parāk) is as self-contradictory in its meaning as the assertion 'My mother is a barren woman'. Nor can it be said that this intelligent entity depends on something else for its manifestaion (and is hence parāk, i. e., non-soul, for, being of the nature of consciousness, it is self-luminous.

Since luminosity, by the very fact of its being luminosity, must necessarily pertain to something or other, as in the case of the luminosity of the pot, etc., mere luminosity cannot be the soul. Therefore, that entity alone which shines forth as the knower and termed 'I' is the self.

Even in the state of release, the self shines to itself as 'I'

This self, even in the state of release, shines to itself only as the 'I', for it shines for its own sake. (There is the general principle that) whatever shines for its own sake is found to shine only as the 'I'; for example, the self which is subject to the round of births and deaths is admitted by both the contending parties to shine in such a manner. Whatever does not appear as 'I' does not shine for its own sake; as pots and the like. The released soul does appear for its own sake. Therefore, it appears as the 'I' and in no other way.

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86. Two arguments of the opponent are here referred to. The first seeks to prove that consciousness is the soul, for the reason that it is a non-objective element; that it is non-objective is inferable from its being self-luminous; its self-luminous nature follows from its being consciousness. The second tries to establish that the entity 'I' is not the self, because it is an objective element. That the 'I' is an objective element is shown by its dependence on consciousness for its manifestation. Its dependence on consciousness for its manifestaion is inferred from its being distinct from consciousness.

The consciousness of 'I' is natural and not due to occasional factors.-

It cannot be said that if the released self appears in such a manner (i. e., as the 'I') it would imply that it is involved in ignorance and samsāra; for, this would contradict the nature of being a released soul; moreover, the consciousness of 'I' does not have for its cause the quality of being subject to ignorance and samsāra. Since even persons like Vāmadeva, who have had their ignorance destroyed in its entirety by means of the direct realisation of Brahman as the self of all, are found to have the consciousness of 'I', the latter cannot, in fact, have ignorance for its cause. The scriptures say - 'Seeing this, the sage Vāmadeva understood: I was Manu and the Sun.'[87] 'I alone exist and shall exist.'[88] From the following passages and others like them it is clear that a similar reference to Himself as 'I' is noticed even in the case of the Highest Person, who is not afflicted even in the least by ignorance and other evils in any manner and at any time. (The following scriptural passages are found) 'Let *me* enter these three divinities (i. e., fire, water and food);[89] 'May I become manifested and be born';[90] 'He thought: May I create the worlds'' '[91] (It is said in the Gītā) 'Since I transcend the destructible (kṣara) and am also superior even to the Indestructible (akṣara), I am proclaimed in the world and in the Veda as the Highest Person';[92] 'I am he who lifts them ...';[93] 'I am the giver of the seed, the father';[94] ' I know the things past,';[95] and so on.

'Ahamkara' which refers to the body and which is a product of matter is the result of delusion and has to be dispelled—

(It may be asked) 'If the 'I' really constituted the self, how could the Highest Lord have included ahamkāra among the elements that go to make up the material embodiment of the self (kṣetra), and how could he have classed it among the evils to be rejected?[96] (Our reply

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87. *Bṛh. Up.* I. iv. 10.
88. *Atha. Up.* I. i.
89. *Chānd. Up.* VI. iii. 2.
90. *Chānd. Up.* VI. ii. 3.
91. *Ait. Up.* I. i.
92. *Bh. Gītā.* XV. 18.
93. *Bh. Gītā.* XII. 7.
94. *Bh. Gītā.* XIV. 4.
95. *Bh. Gītā.* XII. 26.
96. *Bh. Gītā.* XVI, 18.

is) the teaching of the Highest Lord found in the verse (of the Gītā XV. 5) commencing with the words 'The great elements, the ahamkāra ..." to the effect that ahamkāra is to be included among th objects that constitute the material embodiment of the self (kṣetra) really refers only to that modification of unmanifest prakṛti by whose instrumentality the body, which distinct from the real self denoted by the word 'I', is erroneously taken to be 'I'. And this ahamkāra, which is responsible for our slighting persons who are worthy of respect, and which is termed conceit, is often referred to by śāstras as meriting rejection.

It is only where the self appears as 'I' - 'I am deva' - I am man - the possibility of ajnana airses-

Therefore, it is proper to conclude that the consciousness of 'I', which has nothing to contradict it, has really the self for its object; and that, on the other hand, the consciousness of 'I' which arises in regard to the body that is not the soul, is ignorance. (In agreement with this) it has been said by (Parāśara) the grandson of Vasiṣṭha: 'O thou! the giver of delight to thy family! Hear from me the essential nature of ignorance; it is the consjderation of the not-self as the self.'[97] (Our position squares well with Parāśara's definition of ignorance; but yours does not; for,) the illusory apprehension of the body as pure consciousness occurs to no one. Even to you, who maintain that pure consciousness alone is self, the consideration of the non-soul as the self will be possible, if there is the illusory apprehension of the body as pure consciousness. As is proved by perception (the judgment 'I know' establishes knowledge to be an attribute and the 'I' to be its possessor), and as it results from the application of the aforesaid reasons (such as, if pure consciousness alone persisted and the 'I' disappeared in the state of release, no one would strive for realisation), and as scriptural texts (declare that even released souls refer to themselves as 'I'), and as there is the possibility of ignorance (only on our position), it follows that the self which is the knower presents itself as the 'I'.

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97. *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*. VI. vii. 10.

The unsoundness of the argument that consciousness itself is the soul as it is insentient

With regard to (your) assertion that consciousness itself is the self because it (consciousness) is not non-intelligent, it has to be pointed out (that you must explain) what you understand by 'not non-intelligence'. If it is replied that a non-intelligent entity is that which may (at times) fail to manifest itself, even though it be existent, and that an intelligent entity is that which has an opposite nature, namely, an existence invariably associated with manifestation (we point out that) since pleasure and the like are not considered to be soul even though they are not non-intelligent your reason is fallacious. Indeed, when pleasure, pain, desire and the like exist at all they never fail to present themselves. (If an intelligent entity is defined as) that which depends for its manifestation on its own existenee, (we point out that) since the lamp and the like are not taken to be the soul even though they depend for their manifestation on their own existence, your reason is fallacious. Besides, as a manifestation different from consciousness is not admitted (by you) your hetu (reason), namely, intelligence occurring in the argument that consciousness itself is the soul, because it is intelligent) becomes unestablished (i. e. commits the fallacy of svarūpāsiddha); it also contradicts your theory (that consciousness is attributeless). If it is your view that pleasure and the like, although invariably associated with manifestation, are bound to be non-intelligent, for the reason that, like the pot, they manifest themselves for the sake of others, and are in consequence, to be considered as not-soul, (we ask in reply,) Do you mean then to suggest that knowledge too manifests itself for the sake of something other than itself, namely, the knower, the 'I' ? The judgment 'I know' establishes this, even as the judgment 'I am having pleasure' (proves that pleasure presents itself for the sake of the 'I'). Therefore, the quality of being not non-intelligent (ajaḍatva), taken in the sense of the quality of manifesting for one's own sake, does not exist (asiddha) in consciousness (which is the minor term or pakṣa in your argument). Hence, it is only the entity known as 'I', which is not non-intelligent, and which manifests itself for its own sake by its own existence that constitutes the self. The luminosity

of consciousness itself is dependent on its connection with the self. That is why knowledge, as in the case of pleasure, pain and the like, manifests itself to that intelligent person who is its own substrate, and not to anybody else. The self, on the contrary, does not present itself for its own sake by depending on its connection with some other soul or some other entity. This will be explained presently.

The argument that on account of the invariable concomitance of the knowledge of 'I' and consciousness they are identical is unsound—

You cannot maintain that the invariable association of the manifestation of 'I' with consciousness prevents us from taking the 'I' to be a distinct entity; for, on the same count, it might as well follow that consciousness itself cannot be taken to be a distinct entity. Since it (consciousness) invariably manifests itself along with the 'I', it would follow that consciousness also is not an entity different from 'I' and that it is unreal.

Moreover, since in each item of knowledge we meet with the absence of the invariable association of the manifestation of 'I', the invariable manifestation of 'I' with any particular item of knowledge does not exist.

Besides, there is neither an object (viṣaya) apart (from its knowledge) nor pure knowledge divested of āny relation to all particular objects; if either existed, then the invariable concomitance of the manifestation of knower with knowledge could be posited.[98] And even if the property common to all knowledge (jñānasāmānya) is existent, it

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98. Having pointed out that the sahopalambhaniyama itself is impossible for the reason that there is the presentation of the 'I' even in the absence of any particular item of knowledge, Yāmunācārya proceeds to establish the defective nature of the illustrative example, which the opponent must cite in his argument, namely, wherever there is invariable apprehension of two things together there must be non-difference between them, as in the case of knowledge and its object. In order to prove that knowledge and its viṣaya are non-different, the object by itself and the knowledge by itself must be taken and shown to be invariably concomitant. But, in truth, neither exists apart from the other. Hence, the illustrative example is subject to the charge of being unproven.

is not considered to be a positive entity by the Buddhists.[99] We shall show that even in the absence of all (knowledge due to mental) modifications, the soul exists as a self-luminous entity. From the assertion that the two (i. e., knowledge and knower) are one, there arises a contradiction in the opponent's own statement; for, the word *saha* (with) is used only when two entities enter on an identical course of action, as in the instance 'with the pupil, the preceptor comes'. Further, after referring to the two (i. e. blue and its awareness) by the expression *nīla-taddhiyoḥ* to assert (their) identity by the word *abhedaḥ* (non-difference)[100] is like stating that one's mother is a barren woman.

Besides, in view of the fact that qualities such as non-intelligence and the like are denied to consciousness, and in view of the fact that the knowledge of the soul in bondage is invariably apprehended along with the all-embracing knowledge of the omniscient being (sarvajña) (your hetu) is liable to be charged with *anekānta doṣa*.[101] If, in their case (i. e., between the knowledge of the soul in bondage and that of the sarvajña), non - difference is admitted, the quality of non - intelligence and that of having a form and the like would have to

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99. The Buddhists cannot hope to escape the difficulty by saying that between viṣayatva (the property of being an object of knowledge) and jñānatva (the property common to all knowledge) there is invariable concomitance, for they do not consider sāmānya (universal) to be a positive entity. Its admission, they say, leads to all sorts of absurdities. The universal is, at best, a working fiction, a useful device in thinking. When certain things are regarded as similar, it is not in virtue of their possessing some common features, but because of their distinction from the rest. The perception of a cow, for example, does not indicate that cowness, as a positive quality, exists in that creature; it only signifies that it is different from all non-cows *(apoha)* See *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*.

100. The reference here is to the Buddhistic dictum—sahopalambhaniyamādabhedo nilataddhiyoḥ.

101. By drawing attention to the fact that the hetu (sahopalambhaniyama) is present even in cases where the sādhya (non-difference) is not known to exist, Yāmunārya exposes the fallacy (i. e. *anekānta*) vitiating the argument of the opponent. The latter may try to meet this by admitting that even in those cases the sādhya is really present. In reply to this, Yāmunā says in the next sentence that this admission leads to absurdities.

be ascribed to consciousness, and the quality of being a bound soul would have to be attributed to the Buddha.

Even the contention that since one and the same consciousness presents the invariable concomitance of knower known and knowledge they are identical is refuted—

As shown before, even the contention of their (knowledge and knower) being invariably the objects (viṣaya) of one and the same knowledge stands condemned.[102] Besides, here the non - existence o the hetu in cases where the sādhya is known to be absent (vipakṣa) cannot be established; for there may be the invariable presentation of knowledge, the known and the knower in one and the same knowledge, and still there may not be non-difference between them.[103] What is the inconsistency here? Do (objects of knowledge, such as) blue and the like depend for their apprehension and consideration on knowledge either because they are not self-luminous or because of their non-difference (from knowledge)? As, in this manner, it becomes a matter for doubt, it is impossible to determine that there is this non-difference. And this generalisation (that everything depends for its manifestation on consciousness) obtains only in the case of objects known and not in that of knowledge or the knower.

Besides, the conflict (of this theory) with perceptual experience is obvious; for, in every knowledge, the distinction of the knower from knowledge is apprehended. (At this stage the opponent may object and say that the distinction of knower from knowledge cannot be perceived, since the counter-correlative (i. e., knowledge) is not perceived; and that

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102. To obviate the contradiction invoived in sahopalambhaniyama to which attention of the opponent was drawn, he shifts his ground and employs a different hetu, namely, *niyamena ekajnānasiddhatvam*.

103. The opponent argues that knowledge and the knower must be identical; for they are invariably apprehended together in one and the same knowledge. Against the possible objection they may be so apprehended and still may not be identical, he must adduce the indirect proof (*tarka*) that if they were not identical, they could not be apprehended together in the self-same knowledge. It is shown here that he is unable to do so.

even if it is admitted to be perceptible on the strength of the doctrine of svayamprakāśatva, it does not help, since it is not visible. To this we reply) in the matter of the perception of difference there is no necessity for the counter - correlative (*pratiyogi*) to be either perceptible or visible; for when the direct perception of difference is possible with the aid of the mere thought of the counter - correlative, a particular variety of this knowledge is not required, in as much as it is not responsible (for the perception of difference). (We may go a step further and say that) even when the counter-correlative is not apprehended, things are directly perceived as being distinct in themselves; [104] and this will be testified to by everybody from his own experience.

The contention that knower and known are one on ground of invariable concomitance even as different flames are considered one on account of similarity–

(The opponent may ask) since, by trampling on the head of the perception of difference which is alive, (we) notice the universal concomitance between the invariable manifestation (of two things) together and their non-difference, how can the sublation of non-difference be effected by perception of difference ? If it could be effected, even the inference regarding the difference of the flames (at sucessive moments would be stultified by the recognition of their identity. (The reply is that) the fool (of an opponent) is ignorant of the distinction (between these two cases.). Indeed in the case of the flame, the perceptual

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104. The apprehension of the generic property (jāti) of a thing, say a pot, is nothing more than the apprehension of the distinction from other things, i.e., non-pots; and it prevents erroneous identifications. In fact, difference (bheda) is nothing more than generie property (jāti). To grasp the generic property in itself it is unnecessary that the counter-correlative (pratiyogi) should have been perceived But the generic property, in its aspect of eliminating erroneous identifications is known as bheda (difference), and is, certainly, found to pre-suppose knowledge of the pratiyogi. See *Sri Bhāsya*. Ananda Press edn. p. 29 ; see also verses 13–14 of *Adravyasara* in *Tattvamuktākalāpa* and *Sarvārthasiddhi* 'yadā punaḥ adhyāsa nivartakatvarūpadharmāntaravaiśiṣṭyena vyavahriyante, tadā bhedā itī ucyante | tena tesamevā dharmāṇām vastusvarūpeṇa vyavahriamāṇādmine pratiyogisāpekṣatvam | adhyāsanivartakatvarūpadharmāntaravaiśiṣṭyena vyavahriyamāṇānām pratiyogisāpekṣatvam iti |

knowledge, which arises when there is continuity of the defects in the settled causes (of knowledge) in capable of sublating the inference which is based upon defectless perception. To make the point clear—it is found that, on account of close similarity between the different flames that are extinguished and lighted immediately after and which exist in the parts of one and the same which the remembrance "This is, certainly, that flame which I saw before" occurs to one who has not noticed their difference.

The example of different terms appearing as identrcal is not helpful-

Therefore, even in other cases (where the flames are not extinguished and kindled afresh), as there is the occurrence of a series of the complete set of causal factors, which have no counter-acting circumstances, and as there is the separation of parts (of the causal conditions) it is to be concluded that such a knowledge (of identity) has for its object closely similar and incessantly flowing flame-series. Similarly, as the cognition of diversity in regard to one and the same thing is found in the case of seeing the moon double and the like as being occasioned by the swerving from the normal mode of the working of the sense-organ,[105] and as having its object

105. Either through pressure of the finger upon the eye or on account of some defect in the visual mechanism, the rays of the organ of sight (nāyanaraśmi) split and travel in two directions, there by creating, for all practical purposes, two mutually independent apparatuses of vision. One apparatus apprehends the moon in her proper place, without, however, apprehending her unity; the other, which moves some what obliquely, apprehends, at first, a place close by the moon, and sudsequently the moon herself, without, however, noticing the intervening space separating this place and the moon. These two perceptions-one manifesting the moon in her proper place, and other in a place close by-arise in such quick succession that the perceiver fails to notice the order of their occurrence, and thereby omits to note their varying natures. Thus, the double apparatus causes two apprehensions; and as the apprehensions differ, there is also difference in the character of the object apprehended. The mistake here lies in the failure to notice the fact that the duality found in the places is unrelated to the moon. Hence, the perception of two moons. The Prābhākara account, which is closely similar to this, would, however, say that the double apparatus yields a duality of apprehensions, but it fails to grasp that the duality present in the apprehensions is unrelated to the moon. Compare: 'netravṛttiḥ vittigatadvitvam candrañca agṛhītabhedam gṛhṇātīti Prābhākarāh | yathā

contradicted by the simultaneously arising defectless cognitions of many persons, this (perception of diversity) is not capable of setting aside the inference of identity in those cases. But here, the knowledge which immediately apprehends the distinction of the knower, knowledge and the known is not of such a nature; hence, here it certainly does prevent the very possibility of the birth of the inference of identity.

But, here it is not proper to say that identity is inferable on the mere basis of the invariable manifestation of two things together;[106] for we know of no obstacle preventing the existence of this hetu (*probans*) in cases where the sādhya (that which is to be proved) is absent It may as well be that this invariable apprehension is due to objects depending for their manifestation on consciousness. Since the reference to the deviation from the normal mode of working of the senses serves no purpose for the reason that (knowledge and knower) are not cognised by the senses, (you cannot point out that the perception of difference, like the perception of two moons, is due to the deviation from the normal mode of working of the senses). As the existence of a sublating cognition is denied by effectual non-perception, (the perception of difference cannot be declared to be false).

Moreover, consciousness is well-known to be the manifestation of objects;[107] and that it is self-luminous is beyond dispute; hence, such an invariable manifestation of knowledge and the known is unavoidable.

Samvitsiddhau Prādhākarama'opanyāse "netravṛttir dvidhābhūtā dve tu aṛtī vitanvatī | dvitvam candrañca yugapat nirbhāsayati tatra nah" | iti deśagatadvitvam candrañca agṛhītabhedam gṛhṇāiiti tatotra vaiṣamyam | *Srutaprakāsikā*. The verse quoted from *Samvitsiddhi* is not found in the printed books and manuscripts examined so far.

105. Upalabdhisāhityaniyaniyama and sahopalambhaniyama are identical. The fallacy of anekānta vitiating this hetu was first exposed. Here it is shown that the inability to cite indirect proof applies to this, as it does to the other hetu, namely, niyamena ekajñānasiddhatvam.

*The Benares edition .eads *vitti;* the vrriant reading found in the Telugu edition and in some manuscripts has been preferred.

107. See note 104.

The contention that distinction (of objects from one another) can be established without the aid of consciousness is not likely to be put forward by any one who is not mad. Let this violent shaking of the doctrine which is opposed to experience suffice.

Refutation of the contention that there is no object that does not manifest itself–

Since the notion that the manifestation of objects, such as, blue and the like, which, in their nature, are not self-luminous, (is effected by consciousness) is vouched for by experience, it requires no other proof. The self, on the contrary, is essentially self-luminous. On this count alone, the self cannot be knowledge, as the former is self-dependent. It has already been stated that knowledge is dependent (on the self), that it is occasional, that it exists only so long as the causes, such as, the eontaet of the senses with their objects, persist, and that its nature is to pertain to some object or other. The self, on the contrary, is independent, and is the knowing subject; it shines as the 'I' in every self.

Even when it is of this nature, if the self is termed knowledge, on the ground that it does not depend for its manifestation on something other than itself, you are welcome to say so. Even when it is so (described), surely, this knowledge is the possessor of knowledge, and not such a pure consciousness (as is held by you).

Scriptural support for the existence of a soul distinct from consciousness:

Indeed, for that very reason, the *Chandogas* (those who chant the Sāma-veda) declare "He who has the awareness of 'let me smell this' he is the self.'[108] Similarly, after the question "what is the soul?" has been raised, *Vājasaneyins* offer the same definition (of the soul, namely ',He who is in the midst of the senses and vital breath, who has knowledge for his essence and who is the light inside the heart, he is the person.'"[109] It is only in the manner indicated already that the true nature of the soul has been here described as follows—,,He who is

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108. *Chānd., Up. VII. xii.4.* 109. *Bṛh. Up. IV. iii. 7.*

experienced by everybody, who is filled with knowledge concerning diverse objects, who resides among the senses and breath as their director, who is the inward light in the region of the heart, and who shines for his own sake as the 'I,' is the puruṣa." The followers of Atharva veda say "Truly, this entity, the seer, hearer, smeller, taster, thinker (māntr), knower (boddhṛ), doer (kartā), he who has knowledge for his essence, is the puruṣa." [110] Similarly, the following and other passages are found :--- "Lo ! whereby would one understand the understander?"[111] "The seer sees neither death nor sickness, nor the evil in the world" [112] ; "He (the highest light to which the jīva reaches up) is the Supreme Person." "The jīva experiences him in diverse ways . . . not thinking of the body cast behind in the midst of his kin" ; [113] "Even so. the sixteen parts (kalās) of the experiencer (jīva), which depend (for their existence, nature and continuance) on the Highest Person, on reaching Him, become incapable of entangling Him in pleasure, pain, etc." [114] "Different from that made of mind is another inner soul consisting of knowledge." [115]

Even while defining Brahman, in the text-- 'Brahman is satya, jñāna .....' the word jñāna does not refer to mere knowledge, but to the possessor of it; for, if it referred to the former, according to the sūtra-liti [116]-- it would follow that the first syllable must have the principal accent. But this word, jñāna has its principal accent on the last syllable. The word jñāna being so accented will be appropriate only if it has, at its termination, the suffix *ac*, which conveys the same meaning as the suffix *matup*. Otherwise, it would not be (appropriate). We shall explain this very clearly while treating of the Supreme Self. The Aitareya Upaniṣad also, after describing Brahman in the words 'prajñāna is Brahman', refers to the Lord as the possessor of supreme intelligence by the expression 'he (Vāmadeva), by means of this Self possessed of intelligence.' [117] Therefore, it is clear that this soul is truly the knower.

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110. *Praśna. Up. IV.*
111. *Bṛh. Up. II. iv. 14.*
112. *Chānd. Up. VII. xxvi. 2*
113. *Chānd. Up. VIII. xii 3*
114. *Praśna. Up. V*
115. *Tait. Up. II. 4*
116. *Aṣṭādhyāyi. VI. i 193*
117. *Ait. Up. Part V.*

THE PRAMANA BY WHICH THE EXISTENCE OF THE JIVA IS ESTABLISHED

(*a*) The Nyāya view that the soul is established through inference—

25. What is the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) by which this individul self, which is distinct from the body and the like, and which is intelligent, is established ? Akṣapāda, who is master of the science of logic, thinks that it is inference. What he says is— ' Desire, hate, pleasure, pain and knowledge are the reasons pointing to the existence of the soul. ' [118] Has invariable concomitance between these and the soul, like that between smoke and fire (dhūmadhvaja), been observed anywhere ? Indeed, if so, as the knowledge of the self is obtained thence itself, what is the need for inference ? (The opponent replies) no invariable concomitance may have been observed in particular (between qualities such as desire, etc., and the soul) ; but, in general (i.e., between qualities and their substrate), it may be noticed. To make the point clear... Desire and other qualities, like sound and so on, are inferred to be dependent upon something, for the reason of their being effects, non-eternal (entites) attributes, and so on. That which is the substrate of these (qualities) is the self. That desire and the like are qualities is inferred by elimination. Being non-eternal, they cannot be either generality (*sāmānya*), or particularity (*viśeṣa*), or inherence (*samavāya*), or non-existence (abhāva). As they are inherent in all-pervasive substances, they cannot be either substance (*dravya*) or action (*karma*). That they are specific qualities (*viśeṣaguṇa*) is established by the fact that at all times, like colour and other qualities, they, while being non-eternal, are grasped by one of our senses.

After proving in general terms that consciousness, being a guṇa, must have a substrate, it is shown by a process of elimination that it must be a specific entity, namely ātmā :—

The reasons concomitant in affirmation and negation (*anvayavyatirekiṇo hetavaḥ*), which, in this manner, indicate only (the need of) some substrate (for desire, etc.), are narrowed down in their scope in such a

118. Icchādveṣaprayatnasukhajñānānyātmano liṅgāni *Nyāya-Sutra, I i 10*

way as to refer to the soul by the reasons which are conconmitat in negation only *(kevalayvatirekisādhanaiḥ)* and which disprove the view that they are qualities of substances other than the soul. That this is so is evident from the following :—Desire and the like are not the qualities of the primal elements (mahābhūtas), because they are perceived only by oneself, or because they are not to be grasped by the outer senses. The qualities belonging to the primal elements, such as colour and the like, are perceivable by oneself and others and are perceived by the outer senses; but desire and the like are not so (perceivable) ; hence, they are not the qualities of primal elements. Again, space (dik), time and mind (manas) do not have specific qualities; and their attributes are not open to perception ; hence, desire and the like are not their qualities. Reasons, such as the following---since they are not dependent on the causal substances; since they do not exist as long as the body lasts--(reasons) which were cited before, and which refute the view that they are specific qualities of the body, are to be brought forward and applied here also. Therefore, desire and the like are not the qualities of the body ; for, while there is evidence contradicting the view that they are the qualities of the body, they are qualities. Whatever does not possess the sādhya does not have the aforesaid sādhana either, as in the case of colour. Desires and the like, however, possess the aforesaid hetu, and hence, they possess the sādhya.

Or, the thesis to be proved (instead of being 'Desire and the like are not the qualities of the body') may be the following--Desire and the like are qualities of some substance other than the body, which is the point under dispute.[119] The aforesaid hetu and illustrative example may be cited (in the case of this thesis also). Positive concomitance too may be shown in a somewhat general way. That which is a quality, when there is evidence contradicting the view that it is the quality of a given entity, is the attribute of something other than that given entity, just as sound is the quality of something other than earth and the like. In this way, just as ether (ākāśa) is proved (to be the substrate of sound), the self is established (to be the substrate of desire and the like.)

119. The point in dispute is not the existence of the body, but its possessing desires etc., as attributes.

Refutation of the Nyāya view

26. Some consider that this (view) is not correct. To elucidate this point :—with the aid of reasons concomitant in affirmation and negation *(anvayavyatirekī)* it was only made known that there must be some support (for desire and other qualities), which might be either the body or some other substance. By this reasoning alone the soul is not established (to be that substrate).

Argument from pure negative concomitance fares no better :—

The reason concomitant in negation alone (*kevalavyatirekī*) does not even possess the quality of being a correct reason ; for, as in the fallacy called *asādhāraṇa*, there is absence of the probans in instances where the sādhya is surely met with (sapakṣa).[120] The objection that on this admission, even the reason concomitant in affirmation alone cannot be considered as correct : for, as in the fallacy known as *sādhāraṇa*, there is the failure to show the absence of the reason in the counter-example (vipakṣa) [121]---(this objection) does not stand. Since, even in the absence of suspected limiting conditions (upādhis), such as space, time and the like, the co-presence (of the hetu and the sādhya) is

120. In the argument, 'sound is eternal, because it is sound' the hetu is vitiated by the fallacy of *asādhāraṇa* ; for, it is not present in any sapakṣa (i.e., similar examples where the sādhya is present) even as it is not present in the vipakṣa. Similarly, in cases where reasons concomitant in negation alone (*kevalavyatirekī*) are employed, there being no sapakṣa, it is impossible to show the presence of the hetu in sapakṣas. Hence, *kevalavyatirekī* is considered fallacious. It is defective for another reason also. In order to show that wherever the sādhya is absent the hetu is also absent the sādhya must first have been understood previously ; but it is not met with anywhere. Hence, the Vedāntins dismiss *kevalavyatirkī* as being faulty. Cf. 'sādhyābhāvo vipakṣe kathamiva viditaḥ tasya sādhyāprasiddheh' *Tattvamuktākalāpa, Buddhisara*, versa 53. See also *Nyāya-Parīśuddhi* (Memorial edition, pp. 66-75) and *Dīdhiti*. The *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* rejects *kevalānvayī* also, on the score that the *kevalānvayī* requires a sādhya which is present everywhere and such a sādhya is inadmissible on the theory that Brahman is nirguṇa.

121. The opponent says—In the argument 'the mountain has fire, because it is knowable', the hetu is defective (*sādhāraṇa*), because it is not absent in the vipakṣa. Simllarly, in arguments employing reasons concomitant in affirmation alone (*kevalānvayī*), there being no vipakṣa, the absence of the hetu in the vipakṣa cannot be cited. Hence, *kevalānvayī* also is a defective process of reasoning.

found, it is definitely ascertained that the hetu has the character of being connected with the sādhya. From the mere observation of the absence of the sādhya when there is the absence of the hetu, it is not possible to ascertain that the hetu has the character of being connected with the sādhya. As the non-existence of the sādhya is met with in innumerable places, it is impossible even to take note of them all exhaustively. If even in a single place the hetu were to be present in some manner, the universality of the connection cannot be maintained. Besides, it is a matter for doubt whether the non-existence of the sādhya is due to the absence of the hetu or to some other cause. Even the thesis (that desire and the like) are the qualities of some entity other than earth and the like may be charged with having an unproven attribute (*aprasiddha-viśeṣaṇa*), for that other entity has not been proved.

(b) The Sāṅkhya View

The Sankhya mode of proof stands discredited for the same reasons :-

27. By the same reasoning, even the various reasons (such as collocations exist for the sake of others) are to be understood as having been set aside.

The Sankhya proofs for the existence of soul.

Let us analyse them in the order of their presentation. "Since collocations exist for the sake of something other than themselves, since (in this other) there is the absence of the three guṇas and the like, since there must be control (of these collocations), since there must be an experiencer, and since there is activity for securing aloofness (from prakṛti), the soul exists." [122] This means--Being collocations, the body, the senses and so on, like a bed, a seat, a house, etc., exist for the sake of something other than themselves. The character of being a collocation attributed to the body and the primal elements is vouched for by perception. That the same character (of being a collocation) belongs to unmanifest prakṛti (avyakta), mahat, ahamkāra and the senses, as to the body and elements, is to be inferred from the fact that the former are of the nature of pleasure, misery and delusion.

122. *Sānkhya-Kārikā*. verse 17.

(A possible objection is that) when the senses are admitted to be derived from ahaṁkāra and when the meaning of what is accepted as the sādhya, namely, the quality of existing for the sake of another is the quality of existing for the sake of another which is itself not a collocation, the respective reasons for the above only prove the opposite, and hence, they are subject to the fallacy of *ubhaya-viśeṣaviruddha*.[123] (The Sāṅkhya replies) this objection cannot be raised. Since the presence or the absence of the senses is dependent respectively upon the presence or the absence of ahamkāra, since there is support of scriptural passage such as, "The senses are considered to proceed from ahamkāra."[124] since there is contact of qualities, viz., brigthtness and ligthtness[125] (with the senses), the fact that the senses have for their source that variety of ahamkāra where-in the sattva quality predominates and which is known as *vaikārika* is well supported by evidence ; hence, it would be improper to deny this fact. Even so, the belief that the self is not a collocation is unshakables, for the reason that (1) if the soul were itself a collcatio[n] as it would have to exist for the sake of another collocation, there would result an unending series, and, as a consequence, many things for which evidence is lacking would have to be assumed ; (2) the quality of being a collcation is not responsible for an entity being a śeṣi (i. e. one for whose sake others exist) ; and (3) inference itself would lose its validity, if also the qualities found in the illustrative examples are taken into consideration.[126] When the refutation of the statements-that the senses do not proceed from ahamkāra ; and that the body, senses and the like exist for

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123. It is interesting to note that this identical argument has been cited as an example of *ubhayaviseṣaviruddha (i. e.* Dharmadharmyubhaya viśēṣaviruddha*)*, by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in his *Śloka-Vārttika* Anumānapariccheda. sl. 105-7. The six varieties of *viruddha*-Dharmasvarūpabādha, Dharmaviśeṣabādha, Dharmisvarupabādha, Dharmiviśeṣabādha, Dharmadharmyubhayasvarupabādha and Dharmadharmyubhayaviśeṣabādha—have, in later times, been reduced to one, since all of them, in the last resort, only prove the opposite of what is intended to be proved.

124. *Viṣnu Purāṇa*. I. ii.41.

125. Sattvām laghu prakśakamiṣṭam *Sṇkhyā-Karikā*. verse 13.

126. Cf. yadi vivakṣitārthavyatirekeṇa anumānasya avivakṣitamapi viṣayaḥ, nanvetasyām kalpanāyām sarvānumānam vyāhanyeta. *Nyāya-Vārtika* (Chowkamba edn. pp. 344–45). See also *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭikā* (Benares edn. p. 600).

the sake of other collocations--is effected on the strength of some evidence, it will not necessarily follow that even the facts of their being a collocation and of their existing for the sake of others, which are uncontradicted, should stand condemned. Thus, it is evident that the soul, which is itself not a collocation, is free from the three guṇas (sattva, rajas and tamas) which are associated with the quality of existing for the sake of another--a quality which never fails to be present whenever the character of being a collocation exists.

Being of th nature of pleasure, pain and misery, the body and the like are controlled by some other entity, even as the chariot and other objects by the charioteer and the like. Further, pleasure and pain, which are respectively known as agreeable and disagreeable experiences, point to a person who is pleased or displeased, even as the servant and the foe (imply a person who is ministered unto or one who is hated). Since the body, etc., are perceptible, like pots and similar objects, they must have a perceiver [127] distinct from themselves. As shown before, the absence of the three guṇas from the soul, who is (thus known to be) a controller, a knower of agreeable and disagreeable things and a perceiver, is definitely ascertainable.

Similarly, as all things commencing from the body and ending with unmanifest matter (avyakta) are of the nature of the three guṇas, the state of release, which is essentially the annihilation of all miseries, is impossible of attainment by them; but, since the śāstras and wise men endeavour to attain (release), there must be a soul (puruṣa) that is distinct from the body, that is not a collocation, and that is untouched by the three guṇas.

Refutation of the Sāṅkhya Arguments

28. Even here, although with the aid of reasons, such as that collocations exist for the sake of others, the existence of some other entity

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127. In interpreting bhoktṛbhāvāt, some have understood bhoktā as enjoyer, and some, as perceiver. Both the interpretations have been mentioned here. See *Sāṅkhya-tattva-kaumudi*, Kārikā, 17.

(than the body), who is a controller and perceiver is established, yet, (with their aid) the qualities of not being a collocation and of not possessing the three guṇas, which are admitted by you, cannot be determined as belonging to it. To explain—The positing of a series of collocations, made on the strength of the observation that a collocations always exists only for another collocation, like the positing of a series of causes having no beginning, made for the reason that something is an effect, is not wrong.

It cannot be said that (the quality of being a collocation) is not responsible (for anything being a śeṣi, an independent being for whose sake others exist); for, in respect of any collocation, the soul, which is not a collocation, which is unattached, which is bereft of all modifications and which is mere consciousness itself, which is unchanging and for which no service is rendered by anything else, cannot be that other for whose sake the collocation exists. That which is served or produced by another becomes the śeṣi in respect of that other. That which serves or produces anything exists for the sake of the latter.[128] But, since the puruṣa admitted by the Sānkhyas is not so (served or produced by a collocation), how can he be regarded as being that other in respect of the collocation? What is more, how can the collocation be treated as existing for his sake? If it be said that though the puruṣa is not really rendered any service, he imagines himself as being served, (we reply) by all means let him imagine like that; how does it help to establish that he is being served? For the reason that children imagine ether to possess the dirt found in a region, the character of being dirty will not belong to it.

The impossibility of a conscious and changeless entity being the victim of illusions :-

Further, to whom such an illusion occurs and how must be investigated. It cannot occur to the power of consciousness; for, the illusion, which is a mode of change and which is the root cause of a hundred ills, cannot arise in the exceedingly pure consciousness, as it is devoid of al

128. Cf. *Jaimini-Sutra*. III. i. 1—śeṣaḥ parārthatavāt .

modifications. The internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa) too, for which buddhi is another technical expression, cannot experience the illusion ; for, like the body, it is non-intelligent.

If it be urged that, though it is non-intelligent, the internal organ, being transparent, receives the reflection of consciousness and becomes a conscious subject, as it were, (we reply) not so ; for, reflection and its reception cannot properly belong (respectively) to consciousness and buddhi, which are alike formless. If it be contended that to be a reflection is to be like it, (we ask) what is meant by ' being like ' (consciousness) ? If the reply is that it consists in having a nature similar to that of consciousness, (we rejoin) if, indeed, that were so, when buddhi attains similarity with consciousness which is free from all modifications, it too becomes devoid of all modifications ; and hence, it would be impossible to account for the contact of modifications, such as, illusion, pleasure and pain, which are met with in every soul.

If it be said that buddhi has a nature similar to that of consciousness only in so far as it possesses consciousness, (we reply) not so ; for, on your view, the soul is, in fact, consciousness itself and not a conscious entity ; the venerable Patañjali, for instance, asks 'If consciousness alone is the soul, what is it that is referred to here, and by what?'

If it be urged that ' being like ' (consciousness) means 'being like not-non-intelligent , (we reply that) it has already been shown that not being not-intelligent is nothing more than the quality of being a knower and that the explanation of ' being like ' (a conscious entity) is sought to be made in terms of itself ;[129] and hence, this (interpretation of ' being like ') is pointless.

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129. ''Being like a reflection of consciousness, it becomes a conscious entity as it were'' was the reply to the question ''How can the antaḥkaraṇa, which is non-intelligent, be a conscious entity and experience illusions?'' ''Being like a reflection of consciousness'' when explained, finally amounts to 'being like a conscious entity.' Thus, the answer reduces itself to a tautalogous proposition ''Being like a conscious entity, it becomes a conscious entity, as it were.'

Further, how (we ask) can he who maintains that the existence of buddhi is dependent upon the nearness of consciousness posit its being not-non-intelligent ? And, when this particular quality, known as the character of being a knower-a quality associated with some object or other-does not exist in either consciousness or buddhi, which are considered to be the orginal and the basis of reflection, it cannot occur in the reflection. This reflection theory has already been refuted while discarding the view of the heretics in disguise.

The refutation of the argument that the vṛttis of the antaḥkarana are superposed on the puruṣa.

It may be said that, though the puruṣa (self) is changeless, the antaḥkaraṇa itself, which possesses wonderful and diverse activities, such as *pramāṇa* and *viparyaya*[130] produced by the power belonging to the nearness of the puruṣa, exhibits its activities and different objects to the puruṣa; and thereby, he comes to be called witness (sākṣī), enjoyer (bhoktā); just as the gathering of generals possessing extremely great valour exhibits to the master its activities, such as entering the enemy's camp and causing consternation therein, and, as a consequence, he comes to be termed a monarch, a man of valour and a conqueror.

But, this view is unsound. In fact, it is only for the sake of the seer that the visible object is found to exist; and for the Sānkhyas or for their followers, the heretics in disguise, who alike maintain that consciousness alone is the soul, the quality of being the seer is not real. And, the quality of being a śeṣi (one for whose sake others exist) cannot be brought about by the fictitiously imagined quality of being the seer. Besides, it has already been said that even this fictitious imagination cannot arise. (As for the analogy), the king, who commands his generals, in

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130. *Pramāna, viparyaya, vikalpa, nidrā* and *smṛti* are the five vṛttis of the antahkarana. For an account of these see Yoga-*Sutras* I.5-11.

*The word *parākramiyah* has been formed in accordance with Pānini's sutra 'vinmatorluk' (v. iii 65). Compare the stems srajiyas, tvaciyas. Atiśayena parakramavat parākramiyaḥ (one possessing) extremely great valour).

All printed books and manuscripts read pratibalavilolanādivṛtti; bus pratibalavilolanādivṛttim is obviously a better reading.

a general or in a specific manner, in those activities, and who acquires the fruits resulting therefrom, such as, sovereignty, and who engages in activities such as purchasing, receiving and inheriting,[131] which are responsible for the relation of being owner and property, is not an analogue to the soul, which is inactive, and which is rendered no service by anybody; hence this view is valueless.

The different arguments seeking to prove that the soul is distinct from the body and the like are well-known to be stultified (*atītakālatā*),[132] in as much as their subject-matter is shattered by perceptual knowledge, such as, 'I am stout,' 'I go,'; for this reason, those well-versed in the vedas, having no faith even in the view that the proof of the soul is afforded by inference, assert that this proof is furnished by the vedas alone.

The existence of the soul established by sruti and srutyarthāpatti.

In fact, scriptural passages, such as the following, directly reveal the distinctness of the soul from the body and the like. " The soul (ātmā) is not this ; it is not that. "[133] " The bodiless, the scatheless, the sinewless, the pure (śuddha), unpierced by sins (apāpaviddha) " ; [134] "Some go into a womb for assuming bodily form; others become immovable objects " ; [135] "He is never born, nor does he die " ; " Indeed, only this (body) which is devoid of life dies "[136] ; " Verily, there is no freedom from pleasure and pain so long as he is embodied ; when he is bodiless, pleasure and pain do not touch him."[137] Even the injunctions prescribing means for realising heavenly bliss and

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131. Perhaps, in preference to birth (janana) mention may be made of conquest (jaya), since, in the case of kṣatriyas, conquest is regarded as a special title to ownership, cf. svāmī rikthakravasamvibhāga parigrahādhigameṣu | brāhmaṇasya adhikam labdham | kṣatriyasya vijitam | nirviṣṭam vaiśyasūdrayoḥ. *Gautama Dharmasūtra*. X. 38-41.

132. The fallacy of *atītakālatā or kālātyayāpadesa* has, in later Nyāya terminology, come to be called *bādha*.

133. *Bṛh. Up.*
134. *Isa. Up. 8.*
135. *Kāṭha. Up.* V. 7.
136. *Chānd. Up.* VI. xi. 3.
137. *Chānd. Up.* VIII xii. 1.

the like, which are to accrue after bodily death, lead to the positing of an eternal, conscious entity, that is distinct from the body, and so on ; hence, the individual soul has for its means of proof the scripture and the presumptive testimony connected therewith (*śrutyarthāpatti*).

(c) The Mimamsā view :—

The existence of the jiva deduced from sense perception

29. (One may ask) why should this heavy load be placed on the head of the vedas, whose sole aim is to teach the means for realising the good and avoiding the evil ? Indeed, we know the soul with the aid of the testimony of perception itself, which is the basis of all pramāṇas, such as, inference and scripture. From cognitions such as, 'This is my body,' ' I know this,' it is evident that this seer shines forth in direct perception as being distinct from the body also, just as he is distinct from objects known, such as, the pot.

Refutation of this view

30. (We reply) do not say so; for that is perceptual knowledge which arises from the contact of the senses with objects ; [138] and from their contact with the inward soul, which is devoid of colour and other qualities, and which is exceedingly subtle, unlike their contact with outward objects, the senses are incapable of originating knowledge (concerning the soul). It has been so declared in the vedas : " The self-existent (svayambhūḥ) made the senses proceed outward (and thus troubled them). " [139] All objects revealed by the senses will invariably be accompanied by the quality of non-intelligence ; therefore the knowledge born of the senses is incapable of touching the soul.

The Bhāṭṭa view :–

The existence of the soul established through perception by manas

31. It may be said, " Let the external senses not come into contact with the soul and present it, since they are elemental (bhautika;) but the manas, being non-elemental, may enter into contact with the

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138. indriārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam ..pratyakṣam. *Nyāya-Sūtras*, I. *i. 4.*
139. *Kaṭha*. Up. IV.I.

soul and present it. (Against this, we reply) it is not so ; for, if that too be a sense-organ, it must inevitably be elemental. It has been so declared in the vedas : ' Gentle sir ! the manas is, indeed, made of food (anna) " [140] ; when dealing with manas it has been fully explained.

It may be urged : " Certainly, there is a cognition of 'I'— a cognition which is direct awareness. And this (cognition) cannot but be what has arisen from the senses. The claim of manas in regard to (the manifestation of) pleasure and the like, even though they do not fall within the scope of the external senses, is well established. Hence, it is but proper that the cognition of 'I ' should have this for its cause. This can be expressed syllogistically. The soul, like pleasure and so on, is to be grasped by mental perception; for, while it is not capable of being grasped by the external senses, it is still an object of perception.

Refutation of this view

32. (Our reply is) it is not so ; for, from the case of (samvedana) jñāna, (where the sādhya is absent while the hetu is present), it is found that this argument commits the fallacy of *vyabhicāra* (To escape this fallacy), you cannot point out that jñāna is not open to perception ; for without depending on anything else, it manifests itself as 'I know ; and it has already been stated that if it were not an object of perception, it would, in fact, cease to be knowledge.

Untenability of the suggestion that jnāna is the object of mental perception :—

It cannot be contended that, since it is an object of mental perception, jñāna too is fit to rank among similar examples (sapakṣa) ; for this contention will not stand scrutiny. (If that is your view), you must point out whether even the knowledge concerning the knowledge of an object is produced exactly at the time when, by virtue of a certain conjunction between soul and manas, the knowledge of an object takes birth, and whether (it is produced) by the selfsame contact, or whether it is produced at a different time and by a different contact. (Regarding the first alternative), the origination of the two (i. e. knowledge of an

140. *Chānd. Up.* VI.v.4.

object and knolwledge concerning the knowledge of that object) at the same time is impossible. If that were so, the birth of a collection of limitless items of knowledge, each of which has the other for its respective object, would have to take place at the same time. But it does not take place. If it takes place simultaneously, the distinction made between being an object of knowledge and owning the object (viṣayaviṣayitvaniyama*h*) would become baseless. (Regarding the second alternative), if it (knowledge concerning knowlege) is made known by a knowledge arising at a different time, it would cease to be an object of perception; for, as knowlegde is momentary, the earlier knowlege will not last till the rise of the knowledge which reveals it. If it lasts, all cognitions would have to exist at all times. If it be urged that it is incompatible with its effect (i.e. if it perishes as soon as its effect springs up), (we reply that) as its effect namely the mental inpression arises inmediately after, it will not exist at a different time (i. e. at a time when the revealing consciousness arises). Hence jnāna cannot be an object of mental perception. And it cannot be said that it is obvious that the argument commits the fallacy of *vyabhicāra*. Besides, as the quality of being grasped by the senses is invariably concomitant with the quality of being non-soul, your argument commits the fallacy of *viruddha* also (i.e. is guilty of employing adverse probans). Further the illustrative example cited in the argument is defective in not possessing the sādhya; for, pleasure and pain are not admitted to be objects of perception.

Enquiry into the nature of sukha, duhkha etc:-

And it is not so admitted, because pleasure and pain are nothing more than the flourishing or the decaying state of the senses. Indeed, whne the senses are not perceptible, their flourishing or decaying state will not be the object of preception.

In the case of pleasure and pain, as in that of the senses, or again, in that of the different states of mind (manas) on the view of those who maintain that manas is inferable, the false impression that they are directly perceived is due to the power of long continued experience.[141]

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141. With continued practice one infers the existence of pleasure, pain the states of mind and the like so effortlessly and quickly and without noticing the

The section dealing with pleasure and pain (*sukhaduhkhādhikaraṇa*)[142] or the discussion of the description of the soul (vide p. 8) as being in its essential nature blissful (svatassukhi) found in this work itself[143] ought to be explained to those who, following the Buddhistic doctrine, believe that pleasure and pain are included in the category of knowledge, for the reason that they are produced by causes which are non-different from knowledge, and to those who, by accepting the system of Kaṇabhakṣa (the exponent of the Vaiśeṣika system) believe that they are the special qualities of the soul (and not the flourishing and the decaying states of the senses).[144]

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several steps of the argument, that one comes to think that he directly perceives them.

142. *Sukhaduhkhādhikaraṇa* is the sixth section of the first pāda of Nāthamuni's *Nyāyatattva-śāstra*, a work which is not extant now. Yāmuna refers to a few other adhikaraṇas of this śāstra. In fact, his *Atmasiddhi* may be regarded as a brief exposition of *Nyāyatattva*. Compare *Nyāyasiddhānjāna*, Buddhipariccheda "Nyāyatattva-prakaraṇam hi Ātmasiddih"

143. This discussion over svatassukhi is included among the portions of *Atmasidhi lost*.

144. Those who identify pleasure and pain with the flourishing or the decaying states of the senses mean by 'senses' the internal sense (manas) and not the outer senses; for, pleasure and pain are nothing more than the tranqûil and the disturbed states of manas. cf. "tathā ca antahkaranaprasādāvasāydāyoreva sukhatvaduhkhatva-vyapadeśadarśanāt tatprasādāvasādāveva sukhaduhkarūpāvityarthah." Rangarāmānuja ṭikā on *Nyāyasiddhānjana, Buddhipariccheda*.

Though this view is defended here and elsewhere in *Atmasiddhi*, it cannot be considered to be his final view, for, later on, he says that all reference to certainty, doubt, pleasure, pain and the like has for its object either same particular form of contact of knowledge with its object or knowledge possessing that contact. cf. *Nyāyasiddhānjana, Buddhipariccheda* ". . . sukhaduhkheca nātmadharmau ityāditu vaibhavena matāntareṇa vā abhihitam anyathā kathameva upasamhārārambhe brūyāt 'tadevam ātmasvabhāvabhūtasya caitanyasya viṣayasamśleṣaviśaeṣagocara eva niścaya-śamśayādi vyavahārabhedah tadviśeṣabhāji caitanyevā." Rāmānuja says, in *Vedārthasamgraha*, 'that knowledge, which is in contact with a particular object, and which is considered the cause of pleasure or pain, is really plesasure or pain itself and not its cause. Besides knowledge, nothing else which could be called pleasure or pain is noticed.' 'yena viṣayaviseṣeṇa viśeṣitam jñānam sukhasya janakamityabhimatam tadviṣayajñānameva sukham tadatireki padārthāntaram nopalabhyate'

*The reading tatcalanam found in the Chowkamba and Telugu editions is manifestly wrong; it has been altered into cetaścalanam. If, however, the original

Being, in fact, only different states of consciousness, desire, aversion and the like must be perceptible, even as consciousness is; hence, with these as illustrative examples, you cannot advance your argument. Desire is consciousness which is directed towards objects with a view to obtaining pleasure. The same (consciousness,) when directed towards objects, with a view to obtaining the opposite of pleasure, is aversion. Sorrow is mental agitation caused by conciousness of past pains. Fear is mental excitement produced by the awareness of pains to come. Since these (i.e.. terms namely, desire, aversion, sorrow and fear) and others like them may be understood even from treatises dealing with definitions, it is needless to discuss them (here) at length.

It has already been shown that, as it involves a contradiction, one and the same self which is partless, cannot possess, in respect of itself, the quality of being at once the preceiver and the perceived. If the distinction of parts (within the self) be admitted, to establish the same, (for each of these parts) other parts would have to be admitted; similarly, for these latter, other parts, and so on *ad infinitum*. Besides, the quality of being a collocation would have to be attributed to the soul.

The Bhātta view again:—

(Here is yet another attempt to show that the self is open to mental perception). A consciousness, like the following : ' I perceive the pot ' posited to exist on the strength of scriptural references to the awareness of the perceiver, [145] by those whose intellect has been blinded by excessive faith in their own system, must be said to exist on some occasions (at least) ; for (often) only the several objects which are near the senses are apprehended (and not the self). Such a consciousness pertains to the self is established by mental perception, and which is associated with a knowledge, whose existence is inferred from the quality

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reading must stand. the sentence "bhūtaduḥkhajñānena taccalanam śokaḥ" must come after and not preede the sentence "āgāmitajjñānena cetaścalanam bhayam."

Niramkusasya is a variant reading. In the context, it makes no sense.

145. cf. tadātmānamevāvet aham Brahmāsmi, Bṛh. up. I. iv. 10.

found in the object (known)—a quality which is occasional, which is related to the soul, such as, *prākaṭya and prakāśa* [146]

The Prābhākara reply thereto:—

To this it is replied—"It is indeed, surprising that the confusion, namely, that in respect of their own experience the self does not notice any difference at the time objects are apprehended should occur to eminent investigators. It has already been stated (vide p. 27) that the following experience—"This object is really such and such; we do not know whether it is known or not; not do we know whether it appears to me or to others" does—not exist at any time, and that when there is no appehension of knowledge and the knower, such an experience would also have to occur. If there is no appehension of the knower the special feature observed everywhere in what is perceived by us rather than in what is perceived by others, cannot be appropriately explained. If the consciousness 'I perceive the pot' has for its object a knowledge which is inferred, then, the experience would only take the form 'I knew' and not 'I know'; for, when there is the observation of the special feature (*prākaṭya*) produced in the object by knowledge, and when its (i. e., of *prākaṭya*) invariable concomitance with knowledge is brought to mind, and when the inference originates, the knowledge which is sought to be inferred must have already disappeared. The impossibility of inferring knowledge has already been pointed out. Besides, the view that the soul is open to mental perception is refuted by the very fact that knowledge (which is said to be inferred) is grasped by the self as belonging to itself. If it be said that knowledge is inferred without any reference to the self, then, between what is known by oneself and what is apprehended by others there would have to be no distinction.[147]

146. Briefly stated, this view maintains that on some occasions, at least, we get a consciousness like 'I perceive the pot'; it involves three factors—the 'I', knowledge and the pot. Of these, the second is inferred from the illumination (*prākaṭya*) found in the object known; and the third is directly perceived by the outer senses. Regarding the 'I', as it is beyond the reach of the external senses, and as it has already been shown that it is not open to inference, it must, by a process of elimination, be concluded that it is open to mental perception.

147. Every one of the statements made by the opponent is refuted. First, it is shown that the knowledge of 'I' as perceiver cannot be occasional, and that,

The Bhāṭṭa rejoinder:-

How. it may be asked, could the indistinguishability of what is known by oneself from what is known by others be said to result when there is non-apprehension of the knower? Indeed, the distinction of what is known by oneself from what is known by others is not dependent on the apprehension of the knower. Their distinction can be rendered intelligible by the fact that the knowledge of objects takes birth as being inherent in oneself or as being inherent in others. This demarcation, too, in the birth of the several items of knowledge of objects which belong to oneself and to others is explainable on the basis of the distinction of the means namely the causes of knowledge such as, the contact of the senses, belonging to oneself or others, with objects. It cannot be said that the manifestation of the self too deserves to be included among the causes of knowledge; for in the manner of the senses and the like, it (i.e., the self) may act as the cause (of knowledge) without itself being manifest. It is not right to maintain that the manifestation of the object is itself the manifestation of the self. Indeed, the manifestation of one object cannot be the manifestation of another; for, otherwise, an unwarranted extension of this principle would become possible. Further, at the time objects are presented, even knowledge itself, one on which the very distinction of the respective shapes of objects depends, is altogether hidden from view, even as the senses and the like (remain hidden). (When that is so) where is the possibility for the manifestation of its substrate, the self.?[148] Even the contention of some that the threefold manifestation occurs everywhere

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in fact, all cognitions of objects involve, in addition, the apprehension of the self and knowledge. Next, it is pointed out that knowledge cannot be inferred with the aid of *prākaṭya*. Lastly, the attention of the opponent is drawn to an inconsistency in his argument. He must admit that when knowledge is inferred, it is necessarily inferred as related to the self. Hence, in the very act of inferring knowledge, the self also is apprehended; and it is futile to talk of the self being open to mental perception.

148. When objects are known, knowledge which is responsible for bringing to light the respective shapes of objects is not itself revealed; just as when things are perceived, the senses which are the instruments of perception are themselves not cognised. While knowledge itself remains unmanifested, there is absolutely no room for the presentation of its substrate, the self.

taking the form 'I know this' does not fit in with experience; and is forthwith refuted.

The Prābhākara position clarified while refuting the Bhāṭṭa view:-

If that be so[149], let it be granted that the self is manifested as the knower at the time every object is apprehended. The self-luminosity of knowledge has necessarily to be admitted, because the refutation of the view that knowledge depends for its manifestation on some means other than itself has been effected, in every possible manner; and because when knowledge does exist, it is never noticed to be unmanifest. How knowldge never fails to be manifest has been elaborately dealt with in the *Prathamādhikaraṇa*[150] Hence, it is needless here to refer to the view (that knowledge depends upon something else for its manifestation) and refute the same. For the reason that during states, such as sleep, even though collections of objects of knowledge exist, there is non-apprehension of the same, it has to be admitted that the capacity to reveal the same belongs to knowledge. Therefore, it is but proper to admit that the manifestation of the self also is effected by knowledge itself, which has definitely been proved to possess the quality of revealing other objects.

The Prābhākārā view that in deep slecp and mokṣa there is no self-consciousness.

(If it be said that the self need not depend on knowledge for its manifestation, for the reason that even in the absence of the latter, the self shines forth, it is thus replied to). The view that even when know-

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149. If the consciousness of the self as the perceiver in every cognition of objects is not necessary for accounting for the distinction between objects known by oneself and those known by others, at any rate, on the ground that knowledge which is self-luminous has the quality of revealing everything, it should be admitted that, when it reveals objects, it manifests the self also.

150. Tee elaborate treatment of the nature of jñāna set forth in Prathamādhikaraṇa of Nāthamuni's *Nyāya-tattvā-śāstra* is, unfortunately, not available But there are some extracts from this work in Vedānta Deśika's *Nyāyasidhāñjana*. cf. 'Nyāyatattvetu Prathamādhikaraṇe lakṣaṇāntarāṇi bahūni dūṣayitvā "atyantavegitātyanta saṅkṣmyam nirbharatā thatā svasatākāla bhāvyāptiḥ jñāne lakṣma catuṣtayam " iti svoktalakṣaṇopasamhārah kṛtah' Buddhipariccheda, p, 249.

ledge of objects is absent in deep sleep the self is revealed may be rendered intelligible by arguments, but (it) does not satisfy the mind of those who think and act in the light of experience. Again, to the released soul knowledge cannot arise, as its causes do not prevail (in that state). If it be contended that the knowledge which obtains in the state of release is eternal, being independent of causal conditions, then, there must be perpetual release ; and those scriptural passages (which teach the existence of jñāna in this state) must be considered to be *arthavādas*.[151]

There is no possibility of the occurrence of any cause which could account for the birth of knowledge concerning himself and others to the released soul, who is devoid of all senses, body and contact with impressions of knowledge and actions. And it is not right to maintain that, as the mind (maṇas) is an eternal organ, through its conjunction itself knowledge is caused in that state; for, although, like ether, mind is, in its essential nature, eternal, it being the originator of jñāna by acting as an organ is dependent on its association with merit and demerit.[152] Being associated with merit and demerit, manas acts as the means of knowledge; for although it is an eternal sense organ the mind like the mechanism of hearing, acts as an instrument of knowledge.

Nor is the view tenable—namely, that contact with manas, which is assisted by the merit resulting from concentration, is itself the instrument of knowledge; for, it contradicts scriptural passages whish declare that all good and bad deeds perish" ; for example : " the deeds of this person (i. e., the released soul) perish " ; [153] "Then he who knows (Brahman), shaking off good and evil deeds, leaving the spotless..",[154]

151. Arthavādas are those scriptural pasaage which do not directly convey positive or negative injunctions, but which, by extolling prescribed or censuring forbidden acts, aim at infusing in the mind of the listener a keen desire to engage in his sacred duties at the earliest opportunity.

152. Even through the organ of hearing is nothing but ether (*ākāśa*) it is only the ether which is limited by the winding walls of the auditory apparatus (*karṇaśaṣkulī*) that can function as a sense-organ and possess the capacity to appreciate sounds. In the same way, though manas is eternal, it can act as the originator of knowledge not always, but only when associated with merit and demerit.

153. *Muṇḍa up.* II. ii. 8

154. *Muṇḍa. up.* III. i. 3

If final release were the result of good deeds there would be a further return (to the state of bondage). Besides in view of the following scriptual passages (it is evident that release does not result from deeds) "The uncreated (Puruṣa) cannot be attained by what is created (i. e. deeds).[155] "Hence, just as here the world won by good deeds perishes." [156]

Nor can it be contended that in the state of release, the self, by its very existence, acts as the cause of knowledge concerning itself; for, that would involve the rejection of what is well-established and the positing of something unproved. If the very existence of the soul were itself the cause of knowledge, knowledge also would, like the existence of the soul, persist therein at all times; and as a consequence, the stream of births and deaths would not arise at all; hence, there would be no distinction between the states of bondage and release. It is not helpful to suggest that as knowledge is obstructed by the body, sense and other impediments, it comes to be absent in the state of bondage. Indeed that, must be the obstructing factor which prevents the origin of the effect, even when the entire set of causal conditions is present So far it has not been proved that the self is the entire cause of jñāna. While the body and senses are well-established to be the cause of knowledge, for the reason that the latter is found to arise only to those possessing them, to speak of the very body and senses as constituting an impediment to to jñāna is a mad man's assertion. Therefore, jñāna must be said to be absent in the state of release; and the scriptural passages speaking of the existence of jñāna, pleasure and the like as prevailing in that state must be taken as being auxiliary to the injunction prescribing knowledge of the self, [157] and interpreted in accordance with *gauṇī vṛttī*.[158] Therefore, since there is invariable presentation of the self at the very time when the knowledge of objects arises, it must be concluded that, in the manner indicated already, the self presents itself as the knower in all knowledge of objects.

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155. *Muṇḍa. up.* 1. ii. 12. 156. *Chānd. up.* VIII i 6.

157. cf. ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ mantavyaḥ nididdhyāsitavyah. Bṛh up. VI. iv. 6.

158. In the proposition 'Devadatta is a lion', the term 'lion' cannot, obviously, be understood in a literal sense. The judgment only signifies that Devadatta

Refutation of the Prabhākara view and proof that the soul is self luminous

Those who have understood the (true import of the) Vedānta do not countenance this view either, as it is the prattle of that form of narrow mind which results from ignorance of the true nature of the self. Indeed, the knowledge of objects is no other than the presentation of objects ; and with its aid neither the self, nor its knowledge is capable of being presented ; for, neither of these is the object of the cognition of objects (*viśayajñāna*). That which is not the object of a given consciousness cannot be presented by that consciousness, just as taste could not be revealed by the consciousness of colour. Knowledge and knower are not the object of viṣayajñāna; hence, they too are not manifested by it.

The Prabhakara contention that jnāna is not self-luminous

(The opponent may say) the quality, namely, that of being manifested by knowledge concerning itself is the character of objects known; (and ask) how can the character of objects known be thrust on knowledge and knower, when knowledge is only knowledge and the knower is only the knower? It has already been shown that they are not open to mental perception; and the impossibility of inferring them has also been proved. (It may be asked) If so, how is knowledge manifested? (The opponent's reply is) it does not depend on anything else; because consciousness is self-luminous.

(The reply to the above is:) it is not so; for, consciousness too cannot shine forth by its own aid, since, like objects, it is revealed for some one other than itself. How can self-consciousness, which, on your

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possesses a strength, ferocity, cruelty and the like which are similar to the corresponding qualities of the lion. This interpretation of the word *lion* is in accordance with what is known as *gauṇī vṛtti*. *Gauṇī vṛtti* has been defined by Khaṇḍadeva in his famous *Bhaṭṭadipikā* and *Kaustubha* thus : 'Svaśakyasamavetavattā gauṇvṛttih—samavetavatvañca kvacit āropitatvasambandhena kvacit svasamāna jātiyaḥ guṇavattāsambandhenah iti bheda.' Jaimini's *Pūrvā-Mīmāmsā-Sūtra*, I. iv 23 mentions six varieties of gauṇī vṛtti : 'tatsiddhi jāti sārūpya praśaṁsā bhūma liṅgasamavāya iti guṇāśrayāh"

view is self-luminous, shine forth to some one person only and not to all? It may be argued that because of its inherence in that particular self, (it shines forth to that self only). In other words, that consciousness which is inherent in a given self can manifest itself only to that self and not to others; for, it is not inherent in the latter. If so, (we reply) it amounts to admitting that the manifestation of consciousness is dependent upon the relation of consciousness to the self; for, the presence or absence of this manifestation is dependent respectively upon the presence or absence of this relation.

If it be said that while consciousness is, in its essential nature, self-luminous, it still stands in need of this relation for being associated with the different correlates (*pratiyogin*) and not for its own manifestation: (we ask) how did you arrive at this conclusion? If at any time consciousness, like the soul, presents itself without depending upon the correlatives, then, we may come to this conclusion ' but such a presentation is not met with. The very existence of consciousness, like that of the quality of being son or conjunction, presupposes a substrate and a correlative; hence, there is no room for thinking of the manifestation of knowledge apart from these.

If it be maintained that the manifestation of jñāna is dependent upon its very being, for the reason that, as long as it exists, it never fails to present itself; (we ask) when it exists is its relation with the self absent? Further, if this were so, even pleasure, pain and the like would, on your view, be self-dependent: for when they exist, they never fail to be manifested.

If it is your intention to say that the quality of being self-luminous has been admitted to belong only to consciousness, which is accepted by all disputants as being the means for the manifestation of all things other than itself; and if you were to ask where is the need for positing self-luminous entities, when with the aid of such a consciousness alone, the manifestation of all other objects, internal and external, becomes intelligible, (we may as well reply;) Let the self alone which is admitted on all hands to be the witness (sakṣin) of all objects and their cognitions

be considered self-luminous : (and ask you in turn) where is the need for several entities of that description ?

Even if prāṇa is self-luminous, the soul does not depend on prāṇa for its apprehension

Moreover, the view that the revelation of what stands witness to a given entity is effected by that given entity itself is not supported by everyday experience. The soul is, indeed, found to be the witness of the knowledge of objects, even as it is the witness of objects. Let all items of knowledge concerning objects be admitted to be self-established; even then, with their aid, the soul cannot be directly apprehended: for, it is their witness. Indeed, the self cannot be revealed by that for which he stands witness: just as he who witnesses the pot cannot be revealed by the pot. As the conscious eniity is the witness of all object-cognition it cannot be directly revealed by them.

The soul is self-luminous

All objects possess a manifestation concerning themselves, a manifestation which is not dependent on something similar to them or on something manifested by themselves. Hence, the soul owns a manifestation concerning itself—a manifestation which is not dependent (upon something similar to it or on anything reavealed by itself). No object is found to depend for its manifestation on some other entity which is similar to itself, or on something which is manifested by that object itself. In fact, the pot does not require for its manifestation some other pot; but it stands in need of light and so on. Likewise, light also, when it shines forth, does not require some other light; nor does it need pot and the like, which depend for their manifestation on light itself; but it stands in need of the sense-organ, an entity which is dissimilar to it. Similarly. sense-organ also does not require (for its manifestation) light and the like, or the pot, which alike depend on the sense-organ for their manifestation; but it requires consciousness, which is an altogether different type of entity. Similarly, consciousness, in its turn, does not depend (for its manifestation) on some other consciousness: nor on the sense-organ and the like, whose manifestation is dependent on itself: but it requires the self-dependent soul, which is its

substrate and which is a different type of entity. In the same manner the self, in its turn, does not require for its direct presentation some other self nor does it require consciousness, sense-organs, and the like; whose presentation is dependent upon it. That is why the presentation of the essential nature of the self is not dependent upon anything other than itself.

The proof that the soul has consciousness as its eternal and essentia nature

To the soul which has been shown to have consciousness as its essential nature consciousness must indeed be an invariable attribute. On account of its conjunction with manifold objects, consciousness comes to be such and such a knowledge (e.g. knowledge of the pot, knowledge of the cow and so on). Just as the rays of the sun, by virtue of their contact with several different objects, come to be treated as different illuminations, such as the illumination of the pot, the illumination of the cloth and so on: even so, consciousness which is an attribute of the soul, on account of its contact with diverse objects, acquires different names and comes to be spoken of as being distinct, such as the cognition of the pot, the cognition of the cloth, and so on. And these (different cognitions) are merely the several states of consciousness. As they are, thus, the different attributes of the self, which is a conscious entity, they become perceptible to the self; even as, on the view of those who maintain that consciousness is an occasional attribute of the self* the delimitation of knowledge by the different objects is perceptible to the self.

The pūrvapakṣa that consciousness is non-eternal and that there are no grounds to prove that it is eternal

Those who know the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika darśanas and the Neo-Mīmāmsakas who follow their doctrines declare that consciousness is

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* The reading *asādhāranasajātiyānthāntarāpekṣah* found in the mss. and printed copies makes no sense Hence the following emendation *svasādhyasādhyasādhārānajātiyārthāntarāpekṣah has been suggested.*
tattadvittitvam is the reading found in some manuscripts. It is preferable to *tattaccittatvam* found in the Cowkamba and Telugu editions

an occasional quality of the soul: because consciousness depends (for its presence or absence) on the presence or absence of such factors, as the contact of the senses with the objects : and because experiences, such as, 'I know,' 'I knew', are known to be limited by time: and because the distinction between the sleeping person and the person awake and that between the soul in bondage and the soul released, would disappear, if the soul were regarded as the substrate of consciousness even in states such as sleep and *turīya*[159]. Further, in respect of consciousness which is eternal and which is inherent in the soul, all distinctions based on each object known become unintelligible. Indeed, then (i. e. if conciousness is eternal), as it possesses the nature of manifesting (objects), either all objects would shine forth in one and the same knowledge or none at all there being no distinguishing feature favouring one object rather than another.) When it is admitted to have a different character (i. e, when it is occasional), the distinction of knowledge (into, knowledge of the pot or knowledge of the cloth) based on this principle, namely, that knowlebge which arises from the sense organ or probans or something similar coming into contact with a particular object. pertains to that only becomes reasonable.

The opponent calling in question the siddhāntin's position.—

It may be contended that consciousness itself, through the medium of the senses and the like, becomes coloured by different objects, and (thereby) comes to be distinguished into such and such a knowledge pertaining to such and such an object: and that as the process of being coloured is accidental, the dependence on the senses, the limitation by time into the past, present, etc., and the distinction of states, such as, sleep and the like become intelligible. This (contention) is erroneous. When one object is near, another (which is not near by) cannot be

159. The psychology of the Upanisads mentions four states of the soul—*jāgrat* (waking), *svapna* (dreaming), *suṣupti* (deep sleep) and *turīya*. During the waking state, manas and the outer senses are active. In the dream state, the outer senses are in abeyance, but manas continues to function. In deep sleep, even manas is quiescent. *Turīya* is a transcendental state not to be grasped by the experience of the ordinary man. While it resembles sleep in so far as there is complete withdrawal of normal consciousness, and the absence of desires, it differs from it in so far as in this state the self reveals itself fully

coloured (by it) . If it be said that consciousness itself proceeding outward gets so close a contact (with the object as to be coloured (by it), (the reply is :—) not so: for, in the case of a formless object, such as ether proceeding outward, entering and the like are impossible. How can consciousness, which is an attribute, depart from the substance wherein it inheres and proceed elsewhere? Nor does the object enter into (consciousness) for the object is perceived by everybody as being located in the place outside. Besides, in the case ef (formless) entities, such as generality, the same difficulty (i. e. impossibility of proceeding outward or coming in) holds good.

Refutation of the view that the ātmā (dharmin) and consciousness (dharma) are one:—

It may be said that the inward entity, like the luminous substance, exists in two forms, viz., in a dense, and in a sparse form : of these the entity in the dense form is the self : and it has the words *pratyak, cetana, kṣetrajña* and the like as its synonyms; but the entity in the sparse form, referred to by the terms *caitanya, jnāna* and the like, is called, by courtesy, a quality for the reason that it is dependent on the pratyagartha (the inward entity in the dense form) ; even as the luminous entity in the dense form is termed flame, fire and the like ; while the same entity in its sparse form is referred to as *prabhā* (radiance) and *jyotih* light) ; proceeding outward and coming into contact would be appropriate in the case of consciousness, as in that of light (*āloka*) : for, consciousness is only the sparse region of the self.

But this view is untenable : for, qualities, such as, those of existing in a dense and in a sparse form cannot be attributed to the self, which is without parts, and without forms and which has no contact (with anything else). We could admit the self to exist in such a manner if we were prepared to admit the following set of qualities, viz., the character of possessing parts, of having forms, of being non-eternal, and of having relations, as belonging to the self. But it is unreasonable to make such an admission : for it would result in reducing the self to a non-intelligent entity. This peculiar theory of the self, which stands

condemned for the very reason of its imitating the Ārhata (Jaina) doctrine, need not detain us any further.

Refutation of the view that consciousness is all-pervasive

It may be contended that the self, is, in its entirety, related to consciousness, which is capable of illuminating all objects and in all ways ; that it is all-pervasive; and that although it is of this nature, all objects do not present themselves to it, since there is the obstruction proceeding from the quality of darkness (*tamas*) : and that when, with the aid of the sense-organs, wherein the sattva quality predominates, this darkness (tamas) is dispelled in accordance with their different capacities, the respective objects shine forth : and that thus, without there being any proceeding outward or coming in on the part of consciousness and objects, all reference to knowledge as pertaining to particular objects becomes intelligible.

Even if this were so, the senses and probans (*hetu*), like jnāna, could not be considered the cause of knowledge, for, they are responsible only for helping objects to be illumined (by removing the enveloping tamas), and not for originating knowledge (It is no escape to say that) the illumination of objects is itself knowledge ; since (in that case) the objects also for the reason of their being illumined would have to be considered the knower.

Even on the view advanced by some that the conjunction of consciousness, which is a quality of the self, with the object is spoken of as knowledge, the same difficulty (the unwelcome result, viz., that the object would have to be considered as the knower) persists, since conjunction exists in both (the self and the object) ; and, in addition, there is contradiction with experience, since the presence or absence of knowledge is experienced to inhere in the self only (and not in the object), as is evident from the experience 'I know this now,' 'I do not know this now.'

Do not say that, just as in the case of the sun which is unchanging and which possesses hosts of rays which are responsible for manifesting objects, it is the sun, and not the object, that is considered to be

the manifester and called like that, (here also, the reference to the self, and not the object, as the possessor of knowledge becomes intelligible). For, in the case of the sun, since the rays are substances, contraction and expansion, contact with objects and separation therefrom, are possible ; and hence the consideration (of the sun rather than the object) as the manifester is quite intelligible. Consciousness, on the other hand, is a quality : hence, in this case, there is no adequate basis for the consideration of the self rather than the object as the knower.

Untenability of the view that the soul has a two-fold knowledge, (i) eternal and (ii) non eternal

It may be said that the knowledge belonging to the self is twofold —one relating to itself, the other to everything else; and of these, the former is without a beginning and an end, is dependent on the very existence of the self and persists at all times; while the latter, whose very existence is dependent on several occasional factors, such as, the senses which are in contact with the various objects, originates and perishes as the knowledge of such and such an object—a knowledge whose presence or absence is based respectively on the presence or absence of the casual factors. And it is on this basis that even the distinction of states into those of sleeping, waking and the like would be rendered intelligible. To this it is said in reply that we may accept this if we notice any proof for the assertion that knowledge exists in the self eternally.

The illustration of the remembrance that there was no elephant at the tank—bund in the morning cited to prove the existence of consciousness in deep sleep is unhelpful :

(One may ask : Does not the following argument prove that consciousness is an eternal and not an occasional property of the soul ?) It is admitted on all hands that in the state of waking the consciousness of self always exists ; but its existence in states of sleep and the like is inferred, for the non-existence of knowledge of objects in those states is remembered on subsequent occasions. Whenever the non-existence of a thing is remembered as having existed at a given time, there must necessarily have existed at that time a knowledge of its locus, as in the case

of the non-existence of the elephant remembered at noon-day as having prevailed in the morning on the bank of a tank or thereabouts witnessed then. That which is known as the locus of the non-existence obtaining at a given time involves knowledge concerning itself at that time; for instance, the bank of the tank or thereabouts perceived in the morning.[160] The self is remembered as the locus of the non-existence of the consciousness of objects--a non-existence which prevailed in the states of deep sleep and the like; hence, at that time (also) it must have possessed knowledge concerning itself.

The reply is 'not so'. For, in the light of instances such as, the hill, tank and the like which were not noticed in the morning by a person, and which are known to be the substrate of his non-existence as is evident from his experience 'In was not present there in the morning, it is clear that your reason is liable to be charged with *anekānta doṣa*, For the cognition of non-existence two conditions would suffice, namely, (i) at the time of the cognition of non-existence, there must be knowledge of its locus—a locus which exists simultaneously with the non-existence which is sought to be apprehended, and (ii) the absence of the knowledge of the pratiyogin (counter-correlative)—which, had it existed, must surely have been grasped as having existed at that time. Here, even without there being any self-consciousness at the time of sleep, those two conditions may possibly exist; for, at the time of waking, there is the knowledge of the locus (i.e., the self), as is evident from remembrance; and in the waking state, there is no remembrance of the experience existing at the time of sleep also—an experience, wnich is as clear and dis-

160. It is well-known that in the walking statae consciousness always exists. If it could be shown that it exists in sleep and other kindred states also, it would follow that consciousness is an eternal quality of the soul. For this purpose, the following analogy is employed. Jnst as when a person remembers at noon-day that there was no elephant at the tank in the morning, he must have noticed in the morning the tank which s the locus of the non-existence of the elephant. Even so when a person remembers on walking that he had no cognitinn of objects at the time of sleep, he must necessarily have krown. in the state of sleep, the self which is the locus of the non-existence of the cognition of objects. Thus, it is to be concluded that even in the states of sleep, swoon and the like, there is consciousness In other words, consciousness is an eternal property of the soul.

tinct as waking experience and which is capable of being remembered (if only it existed).[161]

Nor is the remembrance on waking "I slept well" helpful in proving that there is self-awareness in deep sleep:–

It cannot be said that experiences, such as 'I slept well,' prove the presence of the cognition of 'I' in the state of sleep; for, experiences such as 'I slept well' (found in the waking state) are based on the consideration of the then existing brightness and briskness of the body and senses; and are not remembrances (of what took place in sleep); even as knowledge of caste, dress, configuration and the like is not remembrance. (It cannot be maintained that caste and the like are not experienced, while the 'I,' is experienced). They too are certainly experienced thus : " I, belonging to this caste, slept here so long, in such and such a dress, in such and such a form."[162]

Moreover, even if the cognition 'I slept well' were admitted to be a recollection, the remembrance of 'I' pertains only to the self which is known at the time of sleep to be in association with the *vṛtti*, known as *nidrā*—a *vṛtti* based on the quality of *tamas* (darkness) which makes for the absence of other *vṛttis*, like *pramāṇa* and *viparyaya*—even as it is known in the waking state to be in association with some vṛtti or other; it does not pertain to either the self which manifests itself (*svaprakāśa*) or to that which shines forth with the aid of a knowledge which is its innate quality; as there is no warrant (for stating that it refers to either of these). The revered Patañjali thinks that *nidrā* (sleep) also, like

161. The foregoing analogy is shown to be unsound. To be able to say at noon-day that there was no elephant in the morning at the tank, a person need not have noticed the tank in the morning. It is enough if he has a knowledge of the tank at noon-day, and if there is no knowledge of the elephant, which, if it had existed, would surely have been known. Similarly, in order to state that there was no consciousness during sleep, it is enough if the person has a knowledge of the self at the time of waking, and if there is the absence of the cognition of objects.

162. Even those who think that the self is cognised in deep sleep admit that its caste, dress and the like are not cognised then, but are apprehended from a consideration of the state of the person on waking. Similarly, it could be said that the cogni-

pramāṇa, viparyaya and so on, is a form of *vṛtti*.[163] Hesays, "*Nidrā* (sleep) is the *vṛtti* which has for its object tamas, which is the cause of the non-existence of other *vṛttis*, (like waking and dreaming.")[164]

The contention that the self depends on jnāṇa for its manifestation and that jnāna is non-eternal:-

The same may be expressed in syllogistic form.--The knowledge of the self—the matter under dispute--is dependent upon the cognition of objects, because it is knowledge of the self, like the knowledge of self found in one who is awake.[165] Knowledge is an occasional quality; for it is a specific quality of the self, like pleasure and so on. It cannot be maintained that pleasure, pain and like are not the qualities of the self; for, while they are not known to have any other basis, they shine forth as residing in the same substrate wherein self-consciousness resides: as knowledge and the like (which are not known to have any other substrate than the self and which are known to dwell in the self (e.g., we may say 'I am happy').

The proof that dharmabhūtajnāna is eternal:-

Those who have understood the true nature of the soul declare that consciousness is an innate quality of the soul; for, it is a quality dependent on the soul itself; just as illumination is an innate quality of light. Apart from being the substrate of consciousness, the self has no other form. That which is devoid of consciousness cannot be the soul, as in the case of the pot and the like. It cannot be said that the soul,

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tion 'I slept soundly' does not point to a knowledge existing at the time of sleep, but is based on a consideration of the condition of the body, senses, etc., at the time of waking.

163. *Vyāsa Bhāṣya on Yoga-Sūtra* I. 10 and Vācaspati Miśra's ṭīkā thereon deal with the question whether *nidrā* must rank as a *vṛtti* alongside of *pramāṇa and viparyaya*

164. Pātañjala *Yoga-Sūtra* I. 10. The translation of this sūtra is based on Vācaspati Miśra's ṭīkā See also Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa's *Yoga-Sūtra-Vṛtti*.

165. Just as the consciousness of the self found in waking is dependent upon the cognition of subjects, even so, in sleep also the conciousness of self must depend on the cognition of objects. But as there is no knowledge of objects then, there cannot be consciousness of the self.

becomes a soul by virtue of its capacity to know; for, (if that were so) in the state of release, it would have to perish. For in the systems of Kaṇāda and Gautama release consists in the total annihilation of all special qualities of the soul, such as, intelligence, pleasure and pain. There is no warrant to declare that a substance, which altogether fails to produce its effect, possesses the capacity of producing it. Effects, such as, knowledge of pleasure and pain, which are found to be associated with one connected with a body, will lead to the conclusion that the potency to produce them resides only in the self thus qualified; even as smoke will only point to the fact that the capacity to produce it resides in the fire associated with wet fuel; or as paddy-sprout leads to the inference that the capacity to produce it resides only in the rice associated with the husk Further, when it is possible to differentiate the soul from the non-soul with the aid of the presence of consciousness alone, it is unnecessary to posit the potency to know.

Though jnāna is eternal it has atma for its support:—

It is not right to maintain that consciousness itself is the self; because the nature of cousciousness is to depend upon a substrate and a correlative, while the self has an opposite character ; and because the self, the knower, unlike consciousness, shines forth directly : and because on the strength of every-day experience, reasoning (*tarka*) and scriptural testimony, it has already been shown at great length that the quality of being the self belongs only to that entity which is endowed with knowledge.

Refutation of the view that the conjunction of consciousness with object is prana:—

Even on the doctrine that consciousness itself becomes the soul, owing to the extraneous superimposition of the quality of knowledge on its accidental relation with objects, it is unreasonable to contend that consciousness itself (which possesses the relation) may (as a consequence of this illegitimate transference) be justifiably treated as the knower. For in as much as the relation dwells in both the relata, the object too would have to be regarded as knower.

It is not right to suggest that, though the relation is found in both the relata, the quality of being the knower is definitely attributed to only one specified member of the relata (i e. consciousness), just as in the case of the relation of cause and effect (where, while the causal relation resides in both, only one specified member of the relata is taken to be the cause, and the other to be the effect). For there (i. e. in the case of cause and effect) the relation is the form of invariable mutual dependence of the producer and the produced.

In respect of the self the analogy of the relation of cause and effect does not hold:—

If it be said that here also the same mutual dependence prevails, we reply not so. For (in the present case) there is no occasion for mutual dependence. Why (we ask) does the object stand in need of consciousness? And why, again, does consciousness require the object?

If you were to reply, (that this dependence is) for the purpose of *siddhi*, we ask) what is meant by *siddhi*? It cannot denote origination; for origination is well-known to depend on other causes. Indeed, pots and the like have for their causes other well-known factors, which are complete in themselves, such as, clay, staff, the rotation of the wheel, etc ; (hence) they do not require for their origination consciousness also. (If it be said that the so-called factors are in reality only consciousness, and hence, objects such as, pots and the like, really depend on consciousness itself, it may be replied that) the doctrine that things are nothing but thoughts (*vijñāna*) has already been refuted. To maintain that the soul which is eternal depends upon objects for its origination would indeed be ridiculous.

If you were to say that *siddhi* denotes manifestation, (we ask) Well sir! do you then contend that because it depends upon objects for its manifestation, the soul, though self-luminous, possesses a manifestation which is dependent on objects? Your understanding of the nature of the soul would indeed be praiseworthy !'

(Nor could the object depend on consciousness for its manifestation ; for) it has already been shown that manifestation cannot be a quality different from consciousness and residing in objects.

Even if it were a quality different from consciousness, it cannot be said to be dependent on consciousness alone : for (in that event) there would be the manifestation of all objects at all times. Indeed, all the causal factors being present at all times, the effect could not rise on some occasions only, (i. e., since consciousness which is the cause of manifestation is eternal, the manifestation cannot be occasional). If the specific quality (known as manifestation) were treated as an occasional property, then it would amount to (your) admitting consciousness itself under a different name. Thus, the conclusion is inevitable that the soul is the possessor of consciousness and not mere consciousness.

The contention that since dharmabhûta jnāna is dependent on occasional factors it cannot be eternal:-

(The objector may ask) since khowledge, which has been admitted to account for the manifestation of different objects at different times, is occasional and is of the nature of a process or activity, how can it be treated as an essential quality of the self ? To make the matter clear:— When results, such as, reaching a certain destination, reside in some ebjects (e. g., the places reached), they are peculiar to others (e. g. Devadatta) who are responsible for these (results) in so far as these are effects ; such results are found to be produced by activities, like proceeding and so on, which are occasional, peculiar and inherent in those to whom the said results are peculiar. Hence, it is but right to infer that the manifestation of objects which resemble these (i. e. reaching the destination and the like) is produced by an activity, which is similar to the activities mentioned before and which is inherent in that person to whom the manifestation is peculiar.

The reply to the foregoing;—

It is not so ; for in view of the fact that the ownership of land and the like is acquired on account of the mere absence of heirs [166] and

166. It is likely that *abhāvaprāpta*.....is a haplo graphical error for *nābhibhāvaprāpta*.....As the expression *nābhibhāva* is used in the Dharma śāstras in the sense

not in virtue of any activity (on the part of the owner), and in view of the fact that the ownership of paddy and other grains grown in the field —an ownership which is peculiar to the person to whom the field belongs—is not acquired through any activity, (the aforesaid *hetu*) may be said to be vitiated by *anekānta doṣā*. In order to escape this fallacy it may be suggested that) the owner of the land is not the cause of his ownership inasmuch as he is devoid of activity ; [167] (but this suggestion) is rendered fallacious by instances, such as activity and time (which, though devoid of activity, are still considered to be causal factors). The statement that when they (i. e. time, activity and the like) exist, the effects follow (and hence they are considered to be causal factors is equally applicable to the case of ownership. [168] If it be said that the activity which is responsible for ownership is, indeed, the activity involved in being alive, (we ask) "My dear sir, as this activity is responsible in common with this for taking care of the crops and the like also, how can you maintain that ownership is brought on by a peculiar activity on the part of the owner?"

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of relationship, the text as emended, would mean 'on account of the mere fact of a person being a near kinsman.'

167. To prove that consciousness is an occasional property of the soul, the opponent advances the following argument:—Any result which, while remaining in one object, is peculiar to another causal substance, must be produced by an activity which is occasional, peculiar and inherent in that causal substance. Manifestation while remaining in pots and the like, is peculiar to the knower (e. g. Devadatta) ; therefore it must be caused by an activity which is occasional, peculiar and inherent in the knower. As this activity goes by the name of knowledge, it follows that knowledge is an occasional quality of the knower.

The *anekānta doṣa* vitiating this argument is exposed by citing the case of ownership, where the *hetu* is present, while the *sādhya* is absent. Though ownership is peculiar to the causal substance, namely the owner, it need not be produced by any activity on his part.

The opponent may try to escape the fallacy by suggesting that in the instance cited the *hetu* is absent together with *sādhya*. In other words, he may say that as the owner is not a causal factor at all, ownership cannot be taken to reside in a causal substance.

168. In other words, when the owner exists, his ownership does follow. Hence, though devoid of activity, the owner is certainly a causal factor in respect of his ownership.

Further, even if being alive were admitted to be a peculiar quality, it might as well be the activity responsible for the manifestation of objects also. Where is the point in positing something unproved ? If it be said that although there is life no object is (sometimes) manifested (and hence life is not responsible for this manifestation of objects, we ask you in reply) 'Does the aforesaid ownership follow whenever life exists ? ' [169] If it be said that the existence of grains, such as, paddy, is also required, (we reply) that here also (i. e. in the case of the manifestation of objects) contact with the senses and the like is required. Thus, in either case the difficulty that may be raised and the explanation offered are similar. Therefore, only this much (can be said) :— the aforesaid quality which is peculiar to a given person has for its cause a special attribute belonging to the peron ; and (in conformity with this principle) the fact that the special attribute responsible for the manifestation of object is consciousness, which belongs to the self even as light belongs to the sun, is acceptable to us.

Refutation of the view that as cognitions are limited by time they are non-eternal

It is not right to say that, like the act of going, knowledge may be inferred to be occasional, for the reason that there arise cognitions— such as, 'I knew', 'I know',—which, on account of the fact that they are dependent on several causes, are found to be limited by time. For the instance of the sun's light renders this argument liable to be charged with *ānekānta doṣa*. Indeed, here also, there are the cognitions 'The sun illumines this place,' 'The sun illuminated it' and 'The sun will illumine it.'[170]

If it be suggested that even though the light of the sun is its essential quality, the cognition limited by time may be justified on the ground

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169. A person may live and still have no ownership, if the thing owned is either lost or given away to another.

170. Thus even though light is an essential property of the sun, it appears limited by time. Even so, consciousness, though an essential property of the self, may still be limited by time.

that its contact with the regions to be illumined is occasional, it may be replied that here also the various objects cognised, which acquire the capacity (to limit knowledge) from their contact with the senses, limit the quality of knowledge which is an essential property of the self; and it is for this reason that the following become intelligible:— the dependence on the senses and the like, cognitions limited by time into the past, the future and the present and all referencss to the same.

Activities of consciousness altogether of a different nature from activities such as going and cooking:--

(The opponent may ask) how can it be determined that in this case the distinction of knowledge (implied in the cognitions-- 'I knew,' 'I know' and 'I will know'), like the distinction of the light of the sun or that of the precious stone, is dependent upon limiting conditions, and that, unlike the distinction between the activity of going and cooking, it is not based on the essential nature (of knowledge itself) ? (We reply the soul is certainly perceived as having that nature (i. e. as having consciousness for its essential quality). Indeed unlike the clod of earth, the soul is never found to be a non-sentient nature. That which is perceived as having a certain quality necessarily possesses it as its essential nature, even as air, which is perceived to possess the quality of (*sparśa*) touch, (owns it as its essential quality). That which does not possess a certain quality as its essential nature may also be perceived in itself, bereft of that quality, just as persons like Devadatta are perceived even without the activities of proceeding and the like, (which do not form part of their essential nature).

The illustration of the body not apposite:—

If it be said that consciousness is like the body (in being invariably manifested, though only an accidental possession), (we reply) not so. for (what is said with regard to the body) itself stands in need of proof. In other words, you may contend that just as the conscious entity shines forth as being invariably associated with the body, even though the latter is not its essential nature, it always shines forth along with conciousness also (even though the latter is not its essential property).

(Our reply is) it is not so: For what is said of the analogous instance requires proof. Indeed, the conscious entity does not shine forth only as being associated with the body; for to adepts in yoga whose minds are concentrated and whose external senses have become quiescent the conscious entity clearly shines forth as the 'I,' without there being any thought of the body. I have already stated that the cognition 'I know' devoid of the apprehension of the complexion and configuration of the body must have something other than the body for its object. Further when the bodies become differentiated into several classes, such as. devas and men, in accordance with past deeds. and when they appear and disappear, it is not possible to maintain that a given body, unlike the manas, forms part of the essential nature (of the soul). Although there is continuity of the subtle body (*liṅgaśarīra*), the charge of *vyabicāra* cannot be levelled against the argument, as it is not perceived.[171]

Should it be said that if consciousness is an essential attribute of the soul, it should be manifested in the state of sleep and swoon, (we reply) 'not so'; for none of the possible interpretations of this statement will stand scrutiny. To make the matter clear :—When this unwelcome position is said to result, do you mean by *prakāśa*, (1) the quality which is commonly present in all objects and which is generated by jñāna and which has for its synonyms terms *prakāṭya* and the like, or (2) knowledge itself, or (3) the proximity of knowledge ? On the first alternative, there is no room for this unwelcome position at all, because no such quality (known as *prākaṭyā*) exists. The non-existence

171. The gross body may appear and disappear and thus may not accompany the soul at all times; but the subtle body, at any rate, being continuous, may accompany the soul at all times and may thus be said to nullify the statement that the soul does not always shine forth along with the body To this the reply is that as the *liṅgaśarīra* is not open to perception, it cannot be stated that the soul shines invariably along with the *liṅgaśarīra*

*The Benares and Telugu editions read *tadviprakarṣam* ; and the Telugu edition refers in a foot-note to a variant reading *tadaviprakarṣam*. In fact the reading suggested—*tadaviprakarṣam*—is correct.

*From the context it is clear that *vyāhāra* is preferable to the variant reading. *vyavahāra*.

of *prākaṭya* has already been clearly indicated while establishing the self-luminosity of consciousness. And even if it were to exist, its non-origination might as well result from the obstructing factor, namely, *tamas* (darkness). On the other two alternatives, as what has been said is acceptable to me, no defect in my contention has been brought to light. Indeed when the puruṣa possesses consciousness as his essential nature, his possessing knowledge even in the state of sleep is acceptable to us ; hence, to suggest this as a defect in our contention is no charge at all.

In deep sleep, here are no activities of consciousness (dharma bhūta - jnāna)

If you were to contend that, in case consciousness of oneself were admitted in states of sleep and the like, there would result the prevalenc of everyday activities in these states as in that of waking, (we reply) 'not so'. For the soul is not the object (*viṣaya*) of any activity. What is the nature of the activity in regard to the souf (which you think, would result) ? Indeed, the soul is incapable ol being lifted or cast away or treated with indifference. If it is suggested that there would have to prevail discussion concerning the soul, (we ask) "Dear Sir, is the object of indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) knowledge or that of the knowledge of children, dumb persons and others like them ever discussed (by them) ?" If it is argued that the non-origination of discussion in regard to these cases is due to the absence of auxiliary causes, such as the efficient condition of the senses, the desire for discussion and the like, (our reply is) as this type of explanation is equally applicable to the other case also, you are addressing your query to the person who cannot be questioned. [172]

The experiences of the soul in deep sleep need not all be remembered:—

If you were to say that remembrance would have to occur, (we reply) 'not so' ; for the states of sleep, and swoon are not forms of expe-

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172. Compare-Yaścobhayossamo doṣaḥ Parihāropi vā samah | Naikaḥ paryanuyoktavyaḥ Tādrgarthavicāraṇe ||

When an identical difficulty is encountered by both the rival disputants and when it could be met by either in the same way, it is not open to one of them to level that difficulty as a charge against the other.

rience (*vṛtti*). To explain:– Should it be stated that knowledge of the self exists in the state of swoon or the like, there would have to occur at a subsequent time remembrance (of the self) taking the form 'I experienced it thus,' as in the case of knowledge of other objects, (the reply is) 'not so.' For swoon and the like are not experiences (*vṛtti*). Indeed, swoon and sleep, unlike the acts of seeing and touching, are not particular modifications (*vṛttis*) of the intellect. If they were such modifications, they would give rise to impressions (*samskāras*) which are responsible for remembrance. But, really, swoon and sleep are nothing but the very existence of the soul in its essential nature of jñāna, devoid of modifications (*vṛtti*), when the senses have been withdrawn from their activities on account of the quality of darkness (*tamas*) which is in the ascendant.

It cannot be said that, for the very reason of its having jñāna as its nature, the soul can itself generate the impressions; for, as the soul would then possess incessantly accumulating impressions (*samskāras*) release would for ever become impossible. When an experience has served its purpose by leaving behind impressions appropriate to itself, remembrance arises in accordance with its root cause, (namely, the samskāras); and it is stimulated by factors, such as, experience of similar objects or of associated things. But here no origination or obstruction of consciousness of the self can ever exist; for consciousness of the self is dependent on the existence of the soul which is eternal. That there is no other cause responsible for the same will presently be shown. Thus, at the very time when an experience continues to exist, how can its remembrance take birth?

(It may be pointed out that the cognition 'I who existed yesterday am the selfsame individual even to-day' clearly indicates that there is remembrance of the self; to this it is replied—). Even the awareness—'I who existed yesterday am the selfsame individual even to-day'—which is mixed up with remembrance must be said to be concerned with the self limited by time, and not with the self in its pure nature. In sleep and other similar states, the consciousness of the self is indistinct and is also indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*); (only) with the aid of knowledge which is

clear and distinct and which is determinate (*savikalpaka*) is the basis of remembrance (i. e. the *samskāra*) produced; when that is so, how could it be said that remembrance would result? Since, having no knowledge of the self and having a knowledge of the self which lacks clearness and distinctness are similar, there arises the false belief that (in sleep) there is no knowledge of the self, even as there is no knowledge of the effort involved in maintaining the body (while such an effort does exist).

Refutation of the contention that if dharmabhutajnana is eternal, it would do away with the distinction between bound and released souls:—

It cannot be maintained that if (in sleep) the self exists in its essential nature as an unchanging consciousness alone, there would be no difference between this state and that of release. For in the one case (*i. e.*, in sleep) impressions (*vāsanās*) born of *kleśas* [173] as well as the obscuration of the gunas exist, while in the other (i. e. in release), they are totally annihilated. (If it be stated that, at least, between sleep and *asamprajñāta samādhi* (super-conscious samādhi) there would have to be no difference, it may be replied that) even the soul existing in the state ef super-conscious samādhi that has acquired complete detachment (*vairāgya*), [174] that possesses the most intense samskāras conducive to restraint, and that has discharged its duties and is about to enter upon the state of final release, must be distinguished from the self existing during sleep.

Refutation of the view that nidra is a mode of action accounting for the experience of pleasure or pain on waking:-

If sleep is not a form of *vṛtti*, how (it may be asked) can remembrances, such as, 'I slept soundly,' arise to the person who is awake? Indeed, remembrances having for their object what has not been experien-

173. All the manuscripts and printed editions read *samprajñātasamādhāvapi*. But judging from the context, *asamprajñātasamādhāvapi* appears to be the proper reading. It is reasonable to suppose that a reference to the state of release is followed up by a doubt concerning a state which is the nearest approximation to it.

174. Compare *Yoga-Sūtra* II. 3. Avidyāsmitārāgadvesābhiniveśāḥ klesāh.,
* *Gāḍham mūḍham* is a variant reading.

ced before never arise. Certainly, remembrances, such as, 'I slept well,' 'My mind is perturbed,' 'My limbs feel light' have for their cause the impressions (*bhāvanas*) produced by experiences relating to the quality of tamas which is associated with the sattva quality and which is preponderant. When there is an excess of tamas and rajas, there arise cognitions–such as 'I slept uneasily,' My mind is whirling,' 'My mind is unsteady'. When tamas is wholly preponderant having overpowered sattva and rajas, there arise the following recollections— 'I have slept wholly oblivious of everything'. 'The limbs of my body feel heavy.' 'My mind is as it were, robbed away,' 'And it is, as it were, covered over'.

(We reply) all this is true enough : but your question has already been answered thus :—Assuredly, these cognitions do not have impressions (*vāsanās*) for their source; but are based on the consideration of the then-existing specific states of the body, senses and the mind (manas); and these cognitions are the result of inference. Indeed, such cognitions take the following form:— 'On account of the fact that my mind is tranquil, and that the organs are light consequent on the proper assimilation of food, 'I slept well'; (hence, they must be inferential). (Even if they are remembrance), the remembrance may become intelligible, for the reason that it is based on the thought of several desirable and undesirable objects---a thought which exists at the moment (of sleep) and which lacks clearness and distinctness, on account of the varying degrees to which the senses have been withdrawn during sleep; hence, *nidrā* need not be a separate *vṛtti*.

The conclusion that nidra is no vrtti will not contradict the yoga-sutra:-

(You may ask) how, then, could the sūtra of the great sage have come in at all?--"Nidrā (sleep) is the *vṛtti*, which is the cause of the non-existence of other vṛttis."[175] (The reply is) as the context aims at stating what has to be suppressed, its intention is not to describe the nature of the *vṛttis*, as in the case *viparyaya* (which, though not a vṛtti, is yet mentioned as that which has to be suppressed). Indeed, a false knowledge which is not based on the object which it reveals

175. Vide p. 95.

cannot be met with; for all knowledge is invariably associated with an objective reality.[176] And this fact has clearly been proved in the *adhikaraṇa*: [177] and later it will be established again. As sleep (*nidrā*) is a hindrance to the soul (*cit*) which is to attain release, it is mentioned as something that deserves to be suppressed

Granting nidra is a vṛtti, from that reason itself it follows that consciousness is an essential nature of the self.

Let it be granted that sleep (*nidrā*) is a *vṛtti* having for its object the most highly developed tamas, and tnat it is responsible for the absence of other *vṛttis* mentioned already; such as, *pramāṇa*;[178] let it also be granted that the congnitions arising to the person awake are remembrances. Even then, the fact does remain that the soul possesses consciousness as its essential nature, for the reason that it owns a knowledge which always continues to be.*

(The opponent may say that) the continuity of knowledge may as well be explained in terms of the persistence of the causes of knowledge, (and ask) how can it be asserted that knowledge is an essential property of the soul, on the strength of the continuity of knowledge? (The reply is:--this assertion is made) on the strength of the reason that without knowledge which exists in the very nature of the soul, tamas which prevails in the states of sleep and the like will not be manifest to the soul; for there is no causal factor that could manifest it. (It might be said that though knowledge is absent, tamas may be manifested with

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176. Compare *Yoga-Sútra* I. 8, 'Viparyayo mithyājīāna natadrūpapratiṣṭham.'

177. Evidently the reference is to an adhikarana in Nāthamuni's *Nyāyatattva Sāstra*. As the author is generally in the habit of mentioning the name of the adhikaraṇa to which he refers, in all probabillity, he would have mentioned the name here also. But unfortuntely, it has been lost. cf pp. 79,85 and 112.

* The Telugu and Benares editions read *tathā satyanadarata*. The former refers in a footnote to a variant reading *tathā na satyanavarata*. The emendation we suggest is *tathā satyapyanavarta*.

178. Vide note No. 163.

the aid of the senses or manas or the samskāras; but this is untenable) For in sleep all the senses together with the mind (manas) are quiescent. And the power to produce any knowledge other than remembrances does not belong to the impressions (samskāras). (Nor can it be said that tamas may reveal itself; for tamas is not self-luminous; since it would then have to be invariably manifested to the soul (in the waking state also), when it grasps objects other than tamas. For the reason that knowledge is established to be the means for the manifestation of all things, it must be admitted, whether you like it or not, that predominant tamas or any other quality residing in the soul becomes manifest (with the aid of this knowledge alone), which, being patent and having in its turn no instrument (for its own manifestation), forms an essential feature of the soul

The self-luminous soul-the substrate of prāṇa – is eternal–

Besides, (to put the same syllogistically)--The soul possesses an eternal illumination: for it is a knower. The possession of non-eternal illumination, which is invariably concomitant with what pervades (*vyāpaka*)--the quality of being other than a knower--cannot find a place for itself in the soul which possesses the quality of being a knower —a quality opposed to the *vyāpaka* (i. e. the quality of being other than a knower) [179]

The Soul being the substrate of prāṇa, is svayamprakāśa-

The possession of illumination as an innate property is attributed to the soul, because it is a knower. The possession of an illumination which is dependent upon something other than itself is invariably associated with the quality of being other than a knower.

Determination of the significance of the term 'prakāśa' and of the nature of its relation to the soul:–

What is meant by this illumination (*prakāśa*) which is said to be eternal and innate to the soul? And what exactly is the nature of its

179. The syllogism may be stated thus – Nothing possessing non-eternal illumination is a knower. The soul is a knower. Therefore, the soul does not possess non-eternal illumination. Cf. *Ved. Sū.* II. iii. *31*. Pumstvādivattvasya satobhivyaktiyogāt.

relation to the soul? If illumination means knowledge itself and if the relation is that of being the container and the contained (*āśrayāśrayitvam*), then (with regard to the aforesaid syllogism) in order to cite the invariable concomitance of the absence of the *sādhya* with the absence of the *hetu*, pots and the like must be cited as illustrative examples in the following way:--Whatever possesses a non-eternal illumination or an illumination depending upon something else is other than a knower; like pots, etc. Then, as the negation of something specific presumes the affirming of something else belonging to the same general category, it would result in the admission that occasional knowledge resides in pots and the like.

The contention that the self is the object of knowledge and not svayamprakāśa—

In order to obviate this difficulty if it be said that the relation (in question) is no other than that of being the object apprehended and being the subject apprehending (*viṣayaviṣayibhāva*), then, the soul would have to be the object of an eternal consciousness. And since the quality of being an object of consciousness is invariably concomitant with that of being dependent upon some specific causal factors, consciousness cannot be an innate property of the soul.

If it be said that this universal concomitance is met with only in the case of insentient objects, the reply is 'not so' ; for even when some other soul is cognised, this dependence on certain causal factors is noticed. It cannot be said that this general law, namely, that all objects of consciousness depend on specific causal factors, applies only to cases other than oneself; for even in regard to oneself, when it becomes the object of inferential knowledge, knowledge born of scripture, and yogic perception, this dependence upon causal factors is noticed.

Further, in respect of one and the same entity the character of being the object and that of being the subject (or agent) of the self-same activity are contradictory ; just as in the case of a needle, with regard to its point, the qualities of being the piercer and the pierced are

contradictory. It is not in respect of itself, but in respect of its features—such as, eternity, extreme subtlety, capacity to penetrate all things, the possesion of consciousness as its essential nature—that the soul (*pratyagartha*) comes to be the object of knowledge obtained through inference or through instruction. Since the illumination described as being innate in the soul is admitted to flow from its very being, the contradiction cannot be reconciled. On the view that the self may be admitted to be at once the knower and the known in virtue of its different aspects, the self, like the examples relied upon, such as, *śabda* (the word), cannot be said to be self-established.[180]

The contention that atma is the seat of prakāśa inferred from prākaṭya-

As a third alternative, you might hold that illumination is not knowledge, but a quality which is dependent upon knowledge and which is found alike in all objects, sentient or non-sentient-a quality by whose aid all understanding and reference, namely, 'It is illumined', arise in regard to all objects; and that the relation of this illumination to all objects, without varying from instance to instance, is just that of being the container and the contained; and that, on the strength of the aforesaid reasons themselves, it follows that such a quality is eternal and essential to the soul.

Refutation of that view:—

But this view has already been refuted. There is no prakāśa distinct from knowledge. The object about which it could be said 'It is

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* 180. (*i*) The reading in the text is *pakṣasyeva śabdādeḥ*; but the correct reading should be *sapakṣasyeva śabdādeḥ*. This argument presupposes a syllogism in which *śabda, dīpa*, etc., are relied upon as illustrative examples (*sapakṣa*). The syllogism may be set forth as follows:—ātmā svaviṣayaḥ; svaprakāśatvāt, śabdavat dīpavat ca. It may also be added that the Vaiyākaranas hold that a word (*śabda*) illuminates itself while illumining its sense and that there is no verbal cognition (*śābdabodha*) which does not involve a verbal configuration. Compare Bhartṛhari—na sosti pratyayo loke yaśśabdānugamādrte.

(ii) *Vipakṣasyeva śabdādeh* is the reading suggested by some. Ātmā is the *pakṣa* in this argument; pots and the like constitnte the *vipakṣa* (i.e. examples where the sādhya, namely self-luminosity, is absent), Sabda also must be classed among counter examples. If this reading is accepted the translation of the latter part of the sentence would have to be modified as follows:— ... ... the self, like the counter examples, such as śabda, cannot be said to be self-established.'

manifested' is that concerning which there is the knowledge capable of rendering it fit for thought and discussion. Since there arises knowledge conducive to discussion concerning the object known, the knower and knowledge itself, it is but right that the reference 'It is manifested' should apply in an identical way to all these three.

If the illumination were to be admitted as a separate entity (i.e. if it is distinct from knowledge), and if the soul has this *prakāśa* for its innate quality, where, again, is the need for attributing consciousness to the soul? It cannot be said that consciousness is nothing but *prakāśa;* for even objects, such as pots and like, would become conscious entities, inasmuch as they possess *prakāśa.* If it is said that (consciousness and *prakāśa* are different and that) *prakāśa* is that which is manifested to the soul when there is possession of knowledge, what about knowledge *(samvit)*? Indeed, *samvit* is itself consciousness; and it is not possessed of knowledge.

If it be said that this quality (i.e. *prakāśa*), dependent upon the relation in question, may belong to knowledge, (it may be asked) what exactly is the nature of the relation which acts as the basis of prakāśa? It cannot be that of being the container and the contained; for, then, pots and the like would have to be deprived of *prākatya.* Nor can it be the relation of being the apprehending subject and the object apprehended, for the precise nature of this relation defies analysis. The impossibility of such an analysis may be ascertained from that part of the *Bhrāntyadhikarana*[181] (of *Nyāyatattva*) where the statement of the conclusion (*siddhānta*) commences and from *Samvit siddhi.* Moreover, (if the quality of being the apprehending subject (*viṣayitva*) was the cause of prakāśa, since this quality does not exist in the soul and in non-sentient objects like pots, it (prakāśa) would have to be denied to the soul as well as to non-sentient objects.

The view that *siddhi* is nothing but being the seat of *prakāśa*) which is dependent upon jñāna, and that it is with the aid of that *siddhi*

181. While discussing the nature of error, *Sarvārthasiddhi* (Buddhisara) refers to this *adhikarana.* See the *Tattvamuktākalāpa, Sarvārthasiddhi* p. 404.

that knowledge is inferred to exist has already been refuted. (The defect of mutual dependence—*anyonyāṣraya*—involved in that view can by no means be got over by the suggestion that consciousness is itself self-luminous; and is not inferred with the aid of *prakāśa*).

Nyāya refution of the Prābhākara and Bhātta views and the contention that relation of jnana and its viṣaya is through sense contact.

Even to the person who contends that consciousness is self-luminous it would be impossible to get over the diversity in regard to the manner in which objects become fit for discussion.

Again, how knowledge, which is inherent in the soul, could generate in the object, which is unrelated to it, a *prākāśā* or discussion is a matter for consideration. Do not say that it is generated by the proximity of the causes of knowledge, such as the senses and reasons (*liṅga*). Indeed, that which has already come to exist does not produce its effect by depending upon its own efficient cause. Activities pertaining to the pot—such as, fetching water—cannot be treated as having for their bases or superintendent (*adhisthāna*) what is identical with the potter and the like. Further, when the efficient cause perishes, there is no destruction of the effect; but here, when factors—such as, the contact of the senses—perish, knowledge of colour and the like disappears. Therefore, it has to be said that consciousness proceeding outward along with the senses gets into contact with different objects,[182] just as the organ of touch comes into contact with hands and the like. If that were so, since the knowledge of the respective objects is dependent upon this contact, it is but right that such knowledge should be dependent upon the existence of this contact. Otherwise, why should the knowledge which has already arisen vanish when the contact of the senses with objects falls away ?

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182. Compare Śri *Bhāṣya* on *Ved Sū II. ii. 27*-nābhāvā upalabdheḥ—sambandhaśca samyogalakṣaṇaḥ. see also the *Tattvamu ktākalāpa* p. 652. Dravyam prāg buddhiruktā paramiha viṣayaissaṅgamādirnirūpyah samyogam Bhāṣyakārāh prathamamakathayan nyāyatattvānusārāt.

The Nyāya argument that with the disappearance of jnāna, prākatya disappears is untenable because with the disapparance of the efficient cause, the effect need not disappear.

The same difficulty confronts also the person who admits *prakaṣā* as a quality which resides in objects and which is produced by jñāna. For knowledge is the efficient cause of prakāśa. Then, why (it may be asked) should the *prakāṣa* of the objects disappear at the disappearance of knowledgs ? And why should it exist only so long as knowledge lasts?

That the disappearance of the nimitta kāraṇa need not necessarily lead to the disappearance of the effect is illustrated with the instance of twoness and the like.

It is no good trying to meet the difficulty by citing the analogy of number (*saṅkhyā*) and the like.[183] For with the disappearance of the enumerative cognition (*apekṣābuddhi*) there does not result the disappearance of numbers. Like number 1 (unity), the other numbers, namely, 2, 3 and so on, for the very reason that they are numbers, exist as long as objects last. That everywhere the number which is based on a single entity and which resides individually in objects, eternal or noneternal, (i.e. the number 1, unity) lasts as long as the (particular) support lasts is admitted by all disputants. While the generaliiy, namely, numberness, exiists therein, why should not the numbers commencing from 2 and ending in infinity, and residing in multitudinous objects, be similar (to number 1 in lasting as long as the support lasts) ?

An objection may be taken to this argument:—Since number 1 is not a number at all, for the reason that it is not something distinct from the *svarūpa* (i. e. the object wherein it is said to dwell);[184] the example cited in the foregoing argument is defective in being devoid of the *hetu*.

183. The analogy may be expressed thus:—When the enumerative cognition (*apekṣābuddhi*) which is the efficient cause of numbers 2, 3 and so on disappears these numbers vanish; in the same way, when knowledge which is the efficient cause of *prakāṣa* ceases to be, *prakāṣa* also falls away.

184. This objection is met by Vedāna Daśika in the *Tattvamuktākalāpā* (Adravyasara thus—'aikyam svābhedamāhuh katicana na bhidāstyekameveti dṛṣṭēḥ

(The reply is) not so. Unity (No. 1) is certainly a number; for it persists equally in other objects (besides the one with whose very being it is sought to be identified.) If No. 1 were identical with the very being of the pot or anything else, then, unity cannot be common to all objects, as is suggested in the expressions. *one* pot, *one* cloth and so on. Indeed, there is no equation of the being of the pot (*ghaṭasvarupa*) with that of the cloth to the effect 'The pot is cloth'; but that equation of No. 1 with the pot (as is evident in the expression 'one pot') exists. Being contradictory to other nembers, unity, like No. 2, must necessarily be a number. In fact, there is no knowledge equating unity with number 2 in the form 'Unity is No. 2 .

Untenability of the argument that numbers commencing from 2 do not last as long as objeets last

It may be contended that, like contact (*samyoga*), the numbers commencing from 2 do not last as long as the objects exist, because while they exist in many objects, they are qualities. But such a contention is liable to be charged with *anekānta doṣa* in the light of the instance of 'diversity.' For as long as the pot and the cloth exist, diversity will never vanish.[185] It cannot be said that diversity is nothing but duality. (Therefore, it is not possible to get over the fallacy of *anekānta* by suggesting that, after all, diversity and duality are indentical). For (if they were identical) in respect of any three objects there would be the absence of diversity. Nor can it be said that diversity is merely the absence of unity. (Hence, the suggestion that diversity is merely a negative quality would not help to remove the fallacy.) For (in that case) diversity would have to be attributed to even absolute unreality (*tuccha*).

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bhedādṛṣṭyaikyamohaḥ taditi ca vacanam tattra tatrābhyupetam anyetvetat svasattvam viduritarasamuccityavasthānuvṛttam tatpakṣepi svarūpādadhikamidamiha dvittvamohadisiddheh. pp. 634-5.

185. How the argument comes to be vitiated by *anekānta doṣa* is here explained. In the instance of diversity, even though the *sādhya* is absent, the *hetu* is still met with.

Cognition of duality and the like is not constant, since it depends on desire to enumerate.

Even though the numbers commencing from 2 exist, being dependent upon enumerative cognition (*apekṣābuddhi*), their non-apprehension is due to the non-apprehension of the correlative (*pratiyogin*) and the cessation of the desire to know. Therefore, it is only on the admission that consciousness proceeds by way of the senses and establishes contact with objects that the dependence of *prakāśā on* the presence of this contact could be rendered intelligible.

Consciousness illumines objects through contact with them by means of sense contact.

Indeed, on your view, consciousness is the entity which manifests the object. All manifesting entities, such as, the light issuing from the lamp are found to manifest objects only by getting into contact with the objects to be illumined. Therefore, it is right to admit that consciousness also is of such a nature (i.e. it manifests objects only by getting into contact with them.)

If it be objected that a formless object like ether cannot be endowed with activity (in other words, if it is said that consciousness, being formless, cannot enter on the activity of proceeding and getting into contact), (it may be asked) what exactly is meant by 'from' when it is said that the substance wherein it is absent is devoid of activity?

Jnāna is of limited nature.

If the reply is that it is a technical term standing for that which, while being a substance occupies a limited area, (we say) the attribution of such a form to consciousness is acceptable to us. In fact, consciousness is not an all-pervasive substance. If it were so (i. e. all-pervasive), there would be the manifestation of all things simultaneously. But, on the view that it pervades a limited area, when it is in contact with one sense-organ and directed to the object falling within the range of that sense, it does not (at the same time) permeate another sense-organ. That is why different kinds of sensory knowledge do not originate simul-

taneously. Consciousness moves with exceeding quickness:[186] for its rapid permeation of different senses (one after another) is perceived as if it were simulataneous. Therefore, it is to be concluded that the character of possessing a form, in the sense described above, belongs to consciousness.

Fallacious to consider what is devoid of touch asūmtari (unlimited)

If it is urged that form (*mūrti*) is the quality of possessing touch, and that consciousness, being devoid of such a form, cannot possess any activity, (the reply is) this argument is liable to be charged with *anekānta doṣa,* in view of the instance of sound (*śabda*). For the sound emanating from the conch, the mouth and the like, though devoid of touch, proceeds, like a missile, with extreme rapidity to places far dis ant from its source by piercing through space. The fact that manas, though devoid of touch, is endowed with activity is admitted both by the Naiyāyikas who have understood the categories (*padārthas*) and by the Mīmāmsakas who have inquired into the import of propositions.

Objects, past and future, could come into contact with consciousness as what ep existed or what is yet to be—

How (it may be asked) can objects, past and future, which are nonexistent, come into contact with consciousness? (We ask you in turn) how do they become the objects (*viṣaya*) of knowledge? The same explanations that you offer with regard to these[187]—such as (their becoming the object of knowledge means just this :) their becoming mani-

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186. Compare the definition of jñāna :— 'atyantavegitātyanata saukṣmyam nirbaratātathā tathā. . . .'—given ni Prathamādhikarana of *Nyāyatāttva* and quoted in the *Nyāyasiddhāñjana,* Buddhipariccheda. Vide *infra* p. 95 and note 150.

187 Vedānta Deśika quotes these passages and discusses them in the *Nyāyasiddhāñjana*. Rangarāmānujaswāmi also comments on them. They identify the first (i. e , the view that objects, past and future, become the object of jñāna) as the view of the Naiyāyikas, and the second (i. e. the view that these objects possess prākatya) as that of the Bhāṭṭas. See Buddhipariccheda, p. 266.

fested,' or their possession of qualities like number—may apply here also.[188]

Moreover, since such obects may even be said to exist at this very moment as 'things that have perished' and 'things that are yet to be,' what is the difficulty in stating that consciousness comes into contact with them in the light of their having such a type of existence.[189] Just as the eye comes into contact with the Dhruva and Śimśumàra[190] maṅḍalas existing in vastly remote regions even so, in regard to entities existingat vastly remote periods of time, consciousness comes into contact with qualities, such as Svayambhu existing at the beginning and end counter to kalpa (world epoch). Hence, there is nothing that could run to everyday experience.[191]

Further, for the reason that they are manifested by consciousness, things past and future, like knowledge and the knower, cannot be considered to be beyond the reach of knowledge.

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188 The illustration (*dṛṣṭānta*) of number may be elaborared thus:—When one says There were four mangoes, three of them have been lost,' the No 3 is associated with non-existent objects.

189. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāmsakas, according to whom *vyakti* and *jāti* are diffent and non-different (bhedābheda), maintain that objects, past and future, exist even now in the form of jāti and that they may well be said to possess prākaṭya Similarly, it may be said that such objects have an existence of some sort. Once that is admitted, it is easy to show that consciousness may come into contact with them. See *Nyāyasiddhāñjana*, Buddhipariccheda p. 267. Compare : 'atītānāgatam svarūpatosti adhvabhedāt dharmāṇām.' *Yoga-Sūtra* IV. 12 and Vācaspati Miśra's commentary thereon and also the Vyāsa Bhāṣya.

190. The Hindu tradition has it that the Lord Nārāyaṇa, in the from of the celestial body, Śimaśumārā (also called Śiśumāra), controls all the heavenly bodies. and that he acts as their support from his abode in the heart of Śimśumāra and that many of th devas dwell in the several organs of Śimśumāra, (e. g. Agni, Mahendra, Kāṣyapa and Dhruva shine forth, without ever setting, from the tail region of Śiśumāra), and that whoever sees this celestial body gets rid of his demerits (*pāpa*) See the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, Amśa II, ch. 9 and 12 and the *Bhāgavata purāṇa* V Skanda

191. In all probability, the proper reading is *nālikām* rather than *nālokām*. On either reading, the meaning is substantially the same.

The non-apprehension of intervening spacc explained.

Moreover, (against the possible objection that if consciousness can get into contact with objects far removed from us by vast stretches of space and time, it must be in contact with those of intervening space and time, it may be replied that) as consciousness moves with extreme rapidity, the false impression arises that there is no awareness of (objects existing in) the intervening space and time; just as the false belief arises, namely, that there is no apprehension of the contact (of the point of light) with different points in space or its separation therefrom —a contact and separation which proceeds in a definite sequence and which resides in the circle traced by the fire-brand (*alātacakra*).

Besides, consciousness, proceeding outward having come into association with that form of the different senses, reasons (*hetu*) and impressions (*samskāras*) which is invariably related to their respective objects, gets into contact with those objects only which are respectively related to these (i.e., the senses, etc.); just as the significatory potency of words, such as the cow is related only to the universal aspect (of things), even though on hearing a word, like the cow, an object constituted of universal and particular features presents itself in a single cognition; or just as the vedic injunction deals only with that aspect of the *bhāvanā* which is unknown, having neglected the part already known[191a] Therefore, here it is legitimate to maintain that consciousness proceeds through the senses towards their respective objects. To this effect the Adorable Kṛṣṇa says, "It (the manas) forcibly drags consciousnesss along, even as the wind drives the boat on water."[192] And Manu says, "From among the several senses even if one sense organ were to proceed out-ward, thereupon the person's knowledge also would move outward, even as water would flow from the hole found in the leather bag."[193]

191a. For example, the injunction, 'dadhnā juhoti', aims at specifying the kind of oblation to be offered at the Agnihotra, rather than at emphasising the need for performing that homa, the necessity for the latter having been already learnt from the other vidhi, 'agnihotram juhoti'.

192. *Bh. Gitā*, II 67.

193. Manusmṛ II 99.

The objection that consciousness as a quality cannot leave its substrate and proceed elsewhere answered

The objection raised—namely, how can consciousness, which is a quality, proceed elsewhere, leaving its substrate?—is hardly reasonable; for it has not been maintained that it leaves its substrate. Consciousness proceeds hither and thither by way of the senses without ever leaving the self. That its reunion (with the self) would become impossible were it to lose contact there with has been set forth in the (*Nyāya-tattva*) Śāstra.

(It could even be shown that qualities may leave their substrate and proceed elsewhere; for) qualities, such as, sound, odour, the rays of the sun and the lustre of the gem are found to be endowed with movement and to leave their substrate. Indeed, sound (*śabda*) is exceedingly subtle and elemental, and has the quality of proceeding long distances.

The Prābhākara view of śabda refuted–

A possible objection is the following - *śabda* (sound) is all-pervasive, like ether; but, with the aid of *dhvani* (vibration) which helps to reveal it, it appears as if it dwells in a particular place, and as if it moves about. And it may be put in syllogistic form thus-*śabda* is all-pervasive; for, like the magnitude of ether, sound, while residing in one substance, is the quality of ether. (We reply) 'not so'; because *śabda* is not a quality of ether. It really belongs to the air in motion (*vāyu*); for, like touch (*sparśa*) which pertains to the air in motion (*vāyu*), *śabda* invariably originates along with *vāyu*. Any quality which invariably originates along with a given substance must necessarily be considered to be a quality of that substance alone; even as colour and the like, which invariably originate along with a substance are treated as its qualities. And sound invariably originates along with *vayu*, in as much as both invariably originate together from the contact of the drumstick with the drum or from the separation of the parts of the bamboo caused by its splitting.

Besides, *śabda* does originate; for, like smell, it is grasped by the senses and is also a quality. Moreover, it is created by human activity;

for, like conjunction and so on, it is apprehended only after such activity has taken place. Nor can it be fancied that human effort and the like are merely aids to the manifestation of sound; for that would go against the principle of economy (of thought). Indeed, rather than assuming that they are the cause of the manifestation of sound, to postulate that they are the causes of sound itself is to have the advantage of economy (of thought). Whatever serves as a manifester reveals simultaneously everything which resides in one place and is graspable by a single sense organ; for example, the lamp manifests everything existing at an identical place, namely, the number, size, etc., and vessels, like the water-pot. In as much as the air in motion produced by the conjuction and disjunction of the plate and the like is not of such a nature, it cannot be a factor for manifesting sound.

He who maintains that sound is eternal cannot give a reason for certain sounds being manifested while other sounds are not; because sound dwells in partless ether and is the object of the auditory sense. It has already been pointed out that when the locality (in which objects are apprehended) is one and when the apprehending organ is single, the mantifester also must be unitary. Since in the present case the manifester is not unitary, the *vāyu* originating from human effort must be the cause (and not the manifester) of sound. That is why a multiplicity of sounds has to be admitted, each act of pronunciation producing a distinct sound. Because what is once produced cannot be created again, and because there is diversity in the complete sets of causal factors, the multiplicity of sounds arising from different acts of pronunciation must be admitted. Besides, how can qualities which are known to exist simultaneously in sounds (*varṇa*), such as *ga*—qualities, such as that of possessing the principal accent and the secondary accent, and that of being long and short–fail to differentiate their substrates? (It cannot be urged that the recognition, namely, 'This is the self-same sound which was met with before' points to the identity of the sound and also to its eternity: for) even this recognition is based on the similarity arising from the source being identical and not on the identity of the sounds themselves; even as the recognition of the flame (as self–identical is based on the similarity of the flame–series, and not on identity). The reasons which prove sound to be diverse have already been adduced.

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The Prābhākara view that object is manifested without the relation of consciousness

The following objection may now be raised:-(The upshot of the discussion is) *prakāśa* is either the conjunction of consciousness (with the object) or some peculiar property resulting from this (conjunction). But in regard to the manifestation of consciousness neither of these alternatives holds; for relation always pre-supposes difference in the relata. Therefore, consciousness cannot enter into relation with consciousness. This conjunction with consciousness cannot occur to the soul either ; for the latter is the substrate of the quality, namely, consciousness. In fact, the relation between the attribute and its substrate is not the relation of *samyoga* (conjunction); but really, it is *samavāya* (inherence); for it is of the nature of the relation existing between inseparable entities. *Samyoga* (conjunction), on the contrary, is either the coming into relation of two objects well-known to be disparate, a relation dependent upon activity, or the closely contiguous existence of the aforesaid objects, which do not stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect.

(In order to obviate this difficulty), if *prakāśa* is taken either as one of these relations, namely, conjunction or inherence of consciousness with objects or any one of the other possible relations of consciousness to objects, then the defects of (such a definition) being too narrow (*avyāpti*) or too broad (*ativyāpti*) may be cited, according to the circumstance of each case, in respect of the knower, knowledge, the known, the body and the senses.

The admission of prakāśa as a separate entity, having been effectively discredited by non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) does not call forth any other adverse comment. Therefore, it is but proper to admit the following—that entity concerning which there arises knowledge capable of initiating a thought and discussion of it may be spoken of as being manifested.

As the tendency to initiate thought and discussion regarding all these three (i. e., knowledge, the knower and the known) is an essential

feature of consciousness, the diversity in the manner in which the cause (i.e., consciousness) operates (in these three cases) cannot be raised as an objection. It cannot be asked why such and such a nature belongs to such and such an object.

If so (i.e., if the tendency to initiate thought and discussion regarding all the three is an essential quality of knowledge, the difficulty raised on p. 104, namely, How can knowledge which is inherent in the soul generate in the object, which is unrelated to it, a *prakāśa* or discussion?) may be sought to be overcome by the suggestion that knowledge may, with the aid of various operating causes (such as the senses), be responsible for *vyavahāra* concerning the object, even though the latter be devoid of any relation (to consciousness), whether it be conjunction (*samyoga*) or inherence (*samavāya*).

The Prābhākarā view refuted

(To this it is replied) it has already been shown (vide p. 104) that an entity does not enter on its own activities by depending on its efficient cause. If the term *prakāṣa* were to signify knowledge conducive to thought and discussion (*vyavahārānuguṇa samvedana*), then, the diversity in the significance (*pravṛttinimittabheda*) suggested by this term cannot be got over. If the expression *vyavahāranuguṇa samvedana* is taken as a *bahuvrihi* compound (i.e., if it denotes that which possesses knowledge conducive to *vyavahāra*), prakāśa would have to be denied to consciousness; for there is no knowledge (which this knowledge may be said to possess). If the expression is taken as a *karmadhāraya* compound (i.e., if it denotes 'the character of being knowledge conducive to vyavahāra), prakāśa would have to be denied to the knower and the known: for they do not possess the character of being knowledge. And the character of being conducive to the starting of an action is to be ascertained from the action itself; but, prior to an action there is) the knowledge (*prakāśa*) that the object concerning which there is activity is already cognised and that there is discussion concerning the same.

The true significance of prakāśa

If so, what is the significance of the term *prakāṣate* (shines forth)? Indeed, we do not know of a *prakāśa* which exists in common in the knower, the known and knowledge, and which has the same form in all

these three, and about which no objection could be raised. (To this) it is replied.—evidently, you are not acquainted with the *Prathamādhikaraṇa* of *Nyāyatattva*. While pointing out therein that remembrance arises only in the event of there being experience, it has been clearly stated by the author (Nāthamuni) that *prakāśa* means not being remote (*adūratvam* i. e., nearness) from experience, a nearness which is the cause of *smṛti* (remembrance).[194] It amounts to this, namely, that prakāśa means not being remote (*adūra*) from experience.

The objections to the concept of adūratva answered

(The objector may ask :) What is meant by *adūra* ? Does it mean 'different from' or 'opposed to' or 'the absence of' that which is remote? Again, is *adūratva* (not being remote) a qualification (*viṣēṣaṇa*) or an *upalakṣaṇa*.?[195] If it is a qualification (*viśēṣaṇa*) in each of the three alternatives alike, consciousness or prakāśa will invariably be preceded by the awareness of not being remote from experience. But, as a matter of fact, it is not so. If it is an *upalakṣaṇa* what other nature prakāśa possesses besides this *upalakṣaṇa* must be pointed out. But it has been said that this nature is not apprehended. (To this) it is replied, 'Enough of this misplaced excitement.'

Let *anubhavādūra* mean either 'different from that which is remote from experience' or 'opposed to that which is remote from experience'. And to be manifest is to be different from that which is remote from experience or to be opposed to that which is remote from experience.[196] Why has all this prattle been indulged in ?

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194. The qualification 'the causes of smṛti' is purposely included in this definition of prakāśa. Otherwise, all objects which are presented to experience would have to possess prakāśa. In actual fact, that is not the case. Though several objects are within the focus of attention, all of them cannot be said to be manifested; for, clearly, we are not interested in them all. Hence, only those objects which fall within the range of experience leading to remembrance can be said to possess prakāśa. Compare 'pathi gacchataḥ kāṣṭhaloṣṭādijñānotpattyā kāṣṭhaloṣṭādiṣu satopi anubhavādūratvasya prakāśapadārthatvābhāvāt smṛtinimittamityuktam.'

195. Upalakṣaṇa is a characteristic which reveals certain aspects of a thing already known to possess other aspects.

196. This verse is quoted in *Nyāyasiddhāñjana*. In his ṭīkā on *Nyāyasiddhāñjana*, Rangarāmānuja interprets prakāśatvam as prakāśamānatvam. Our translation is based on this interpretation. He also suggests the emendation 'prakāśotra.'

Like external illumination, even the cognition 'It is manifested' is no other than the awareness of the nature of knowledge and of the object connected thereto—a nature opposed to that of being remote from consciousness. There also the thought and reference 'It shines', arising in respect of the rays of light and the regions of space wherein they pervade, are based on the quality of not being remote from light. Just as, in the one case, the dispelling of darkness is due to the quality of not being remote from light, here also the dispelling of ignorance is due to the quality of not being remote from consciousness. That is why at a subsequent time recollection of the object known as also of the knowledge itself arises. There being no room for the question as to the precise nature of the relation of consciousness (i.e., whether it is *samavāya* or *samyoga*), it follows that the question raised is one that ought not to have been asked at all.

Deciding on the nature of the knowledge relation as samyoga

Besides, ***samyoga*** is merely close contiguity, which, in its turn, is synonymous with *nairantarya* (not being separated by intervening space). And it is only this *samyoga*, which obtains between inseparable (*ayuta-siddha*) objects of which one is self-dependent and the other dependent, that is referred to by the technical term *samavāya* in the system of the Vaiśeṣikas : hence, the question whether the relation of consciousness with objects is *samyoga* or *samavāya*, proceeding as it does on the assumption that *samavāya* is a separate entity, does not arise. In the section dealing with relation (*sambandavimarśa*),[197] we will presently show how inherence (*samavāyā*) could be brought under conjunction (*samyoga*).

Or, *prakāṣa* may be understood in a different sense as denoting the capacity to initiate thought and discussion—a capacity dependent upon

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It must be understood that the definition of prakāśa set forth is this stanza applies only to the prakāśa residing in objects perceived by the senses, and not to that found in objects inferred or to that residing in knowledge itself.

197. The section dealing with the relation of the finite soul to the Infinite Self is included in the portions of *Atmasiddhi* lost. Already, on an earlier occasion, reference has been made to this section. Vide p. 49.

the quality of not being remote from consciousness. Even when its causal conditions are present in their entirety. either on account of the presence of obstructing factors, or on account of the absence of the capacity for being manifested, *prakāśa* does not arise in the other qualities of the soul (besides its consciousness), such as being all-pervasive and being unattached, and in the body, senses and the like; just as the colour, taste and the like of the water of the Jamna, which is in contact with the eye, are not manifested. Hence, for the reasons mentioned above, the self has consciousness for its structure and consciousness for its nature. The self cognises the rest with the aid of the senses.

The examples of sukha etc. deduced by the purvapaksin not apposite.

Even the charge levelled against us, namely, that consciousness, being a special quality of the soul, must, on the analogy of pleasure (*sukha*) and the like, be an occasional quality proceeds from complete ignorance of the true nature of qualities. For the qualities which are dependent upon the very being of anything will last as long as their substrate lasts ; but the knowledge of pleasure and pain is not dependent in this manner upon the very being of the self. It has already been shown how consciousness is responsible for the self being what it is.[193] Pleasure and pain, on the contrary, are not the qualities of the self; [199] for they have been shown to be no other than the flourishing or decaying state of the senses (vide p 78). This point will be further elaborated when establishing that the soul is in its essential nature blissful, a fact signified in) the last word[200] i. e., *svatassuki,* occurring in the

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198. This text has been quoted by Vedānta Deśika in his *Nyāyasiddhāñjana*. Rangarāmānuja interprets it thus—jñānamatmatve upādhiḥ prayojakamityarthah. Tataśca yāvatprayojyam prayojakāvasthānāvaśyambhāvāt bodhasya svābhāvikatvādi siddhyati iti bhāvaḥ''. See *Nyāyasiddhāñjāna*, Buddhipariccheda p. 238.

199. Surely, this is not his final view on the matter; for in a subsequent passage he declares that certainty, doubt, pleasure and pain are forms of knowledge and consequently, qualities of the self. Here, either he defends a view other than his own or shown off his competency to prove any position (*vaibhavavāda*). See note *144* on p. *79*.

200. See note *143* on p. *79*.

stanza commencing with *dehendriya mana prāṇa*). Hence, the defect of not possessing the *sādhana* (means of inference) vitiates the illustrative example.

Desire and aversion also[201] are the different states of manas and are not the direct qualities of the self. Indeed, it is learnt from the scripture: "Desire, will, doubt, faith, steadfastness, lack of steadfastness, contempt, conjecture (*dhīḥ*), fear—all this is truly manas".[202] This fact has also been stated in the Gītā in the verse commencing with the words, "Desire, aversion, pleasure, pain."[203].

Definition of śarīra (body) according to the siddhāntin

As the expression *cetanādhṛtiḥ* (occurring in this stanza) is one word, it is the definition of *kṣetra* (body). The body is, in fact, the collection (of the primal elements) which is supported by consciousness.[204] It amounts to stating that the body is what enters on its activities only with the aid of consciousness appropriate thereto. That is why descriptions such as the following are found in the *Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa*—"..... for whom the earth is body...for whom the water is

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201. When pleasure and pain are shown to be defective as illustrative examples, one may cite desire and aversion instead. Here it is shown that these fare no better, for they too are equally liable to be charged with the defect of not possessing the sādhya.

202. *Bṛh. I* v. 3 and *Maitri up. VI 30.*

203. How, it may be asked, does this verse from the Gitā declaring that desire and aversion constitute the *kṣetra* bear testimony to the view that they are the qualities of manas ? Possibly the author thinks that once this verse excludes the possibility of their being the qualities of the self, it could be shown, on the strength of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text, 'etat sarvam mana eva,' that they belong to manas.

204 Analysing the expression *cetanādhṛtih* into *cetanayā dhṛtih*, Yāmunācārya arrives at the meaning 'a collection supported by consciousness.' But in the *Gita Bhāṣya*, Rāmānuja splits it into *cetanasya ādhṛtih* and interprets it to mean 'a collocation which has sprung up as the seat of the soul (who enjoys pleasure and pain and who seeks worldly experience or liberation therefrom)'. On either interpretation, *cetanādhṛtih* denotes only the body.

body...for whom the soul is body..."[205] Such descriptions are met with in the *purānas* also,—"All these constitute His body"[206].

The significance of dhīḥ' occurring in the sruti texts cited above.

(The upaniṣadic passage quoted above reckons *dhīḥ*, which is obviously a quality of the soul, as one among the properties not belonging to the soul. Hence, the objector asks) what is meant by *dhīḥ* (in that text)? (The reply is) it means conjecture *(utprekṣa)*, and does not have knowledge for its significance. For in the same upaniṣad it has been declared that knowledge is an essential quality of the soul. Indeed, the scriptural texts assert.—"There is no cessation of the knowing of a knower (because of his imperishabillity)";[207] "There can be not cessation of the seeing of a seer, because of his imperishability."[208] This scriptural text, which establishes that there can be no destruction of knowledge for the very reason that the knower is imperishable indicates hat knowledge is dependent upon the very being of the knower.

It is not right to contend that (in the text in question) the seer (*draṣṭā*) is taken as a qualification of seeing (*dṛṣṭi*), i.e., it is not right to interpret the text thus—'There can be no destruction of seeing which is no other than the seer'); because, in that event, there would be impropriety in the use of the masculine gender, and because the *hetu* would come to be identical with the *sādhya* (i.e., there would be no *hetu* worth the name).[209]

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205. *Bṛh. up.* III, vii.

206. *Vṭṣṇu Purāṇa*, I, 22, 86.

yāni mūrtānyamūrtāni yānyatrānyatra vā kvacit |
santi vai vastujātāni tāni sarvāṇi tadvapuḥ. ||

207. *Bṛh. up.* IV, iii, 30.

208. *Bṛh. up. IV*, iii, 23.

209. Two difficulties stand in the way of taking *draṣṭā* as a qualification of *dṛṣti*– (i) If *draṣṭā* were to qualify *dṛṣṭi*, both the words must be in the same gender; but *draṣṭā* is masculine, while *dṛṣṭi* is feminine. (ii) Again, on this interpretaion, the text would mean—'There can be no destruction of seeing whieh is no other than the seer because it does not perish.' Clearly, it is vitiated by *petitio principii*.

Even if the term *dṛṣṭi* aims at revealing the very essence of the soul, the charge of there being no *hetu* is unanswerable.[210] Moreover, it would amount to the abandoning of your position. It is but right to adduce as *hetu* the proposition that the soul is eternal—a proposition established by several incontrovertible arguments and supported by the śāstras. When an object exists, whatever depends upon the very being of that object cannot but exist; even as yellowness of light cannot but exist when gold or the lamp exists. Therefore, this is the true meaning (of the text under consideration)—at no time, whether in the state of worldly existence or that of release is there cessation of knowledge, which is an essential feature of the soul, and which, as a result of its diverse forms of relation with different objects, external and internal, acquires different names, such as seeing, smelling, tasting, speaking, hearing, reflecting, touching and conceiving, and which shines of its own accord. (The scriptures declare): "Just as a lump of salt, without any distinction of parts, whether they be not-inner or (they be) not-outer,[211] is filled right through with the same taste, even so this soul, right through, without any distinction of parts, is constituted of knowledge (*praj ñānaghana*); ".. by his own luminosity, by his own light";[212] "O King", said he, "this ātman is self-luminous"[213] The Chandogas say that even in the state of release "The seer sees neither death nor sickness, nor the evil in the world. Verily, the seer perceives all."[214]; "The jīva enjoys not thinking of the body cast behind in the midst of his kin"[215]; "He who, with the aid of manas, the celestial eye, experiences all enjoyments and feels joyous"[216]. And other texts like the following—

210. If the term *dṛṣṭi*, whose gender does not vary in accordance with that of the object which it qualifies (*niyataliṅga*), is taken as an adjective qualifying *draṣṭā*, the grammatical difficulty may be got over; but the fallacy of *petitio principii* still remains.

211. *Bṛh up.* VII, v, 13. This text enumerates the parts of the lump of salt in this negative fashion for two reasons :—(1) If the positive mode of expression viz., inner and outer parts, were used, parts in the middle region would be left out. The negative expressions secure exhaustion. (2) Again, as the soul is *niravayava*, (partless), the analogy of the lump of salt would be in order only if it uses the negative expressions.

212. *Bṛh. up.* VI, iii, 9.

213. *Bṛh. up.* VI, iii, 6.

214. *Chānd. up.* VII xxvi, 2.

215. *Chānd. up.* VIII, xii 3.

216. *Chānd. up.* VIII, xii, 5.

"The puruṣa does know things, but he fails to know what he ought to understand"—which declare that even in the state when all the senses are destroyed knowledge belongs to the soul strongly affirm that knowledge belongs to the soul. Statements like the following are found in the purāṇas also—"The soul is constituted of bliss and jñāna and is undefiled."[217] Passages such as the following are found in the itihāsas—"It (the soul), is the light of all lights." The revered Śaunaka says, "Just as the lustre of the gem is not created by cleansing it of its impurities, even so knowledge (which is the very essence of the soul) is not created by the shedding of imperfections. Again, water or space is not created by the digging of a well. Only that which has all along existed is rendered manifest. How can the non-existent ever come into being ? Likewise, qualities, such as jñāna, are not created but only manifested by the destruction of evil qualities (*heyaguṇa*); for, in truth, they are the eternal qualities of the soul".[218] For this very reason the Sūtrakāra says, "That is why (the individual soul is) a knower".[219]

References to origination of knowledge, its loss, doubt, certainty and the like explained.

The usage of the different expressions, doubt (*saṁśaya*) and certainty (*niścaya*) and the like[220] has reference either to the different relations of objects to consciousness, which has thus been shown to be the essence of the soul, or to the consciousness that has entered into those relations.[221] Indeed, certainty is the close conjunction of consciousness with a single object. Loose conjunction of the same with several

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217. *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa*, VI, vii, 22.

218. *Viṣṇudharmottara* 104. 55-57. Compare *Vedānta-sūtra*—sampadyāvirbhāvassvena śabdāt. IV. iv. 1.

219. *Vedānta-sūtra* II iii 19.

220. 'And the like' includes pleasure and pain.

221. One does not usually speak of objects with consciousness as being either doubtful or certain. On the contrary, it is knowledge that is described as being either doubtful or certain. Hence the second alternative. See Rāṅgarāmānuja's ṭīkā on *Nyāyasiddhāñana*, p. 274.

objects simultaneously constitutes doubt.[222] The conjunction following from impression of previous knowledge (*jñānavāsanā*) constitutes recollection (*smṛti*); and so on with the rest. It has already been stated that what is called knowledge is the conjunction of the object with consciousness which is an attribute of the soul.

It cannot be said that since conjunction exists in both (the object and consciousness), the object also would have to be considered the knower. For conjunction with the object is not met with in the object itself. Indeed, the object is in conjunction with consciousness, as with external light. Although illumination is only relation with light, the source of light alone, such as the sun, rather than the pot and the like is considered to be the manifester. If it be suggested that in as much as light is dependent upon the sun, the latter alone is considered the possessor of this quality (light) and that the manifestation of other objects is due to the conjunction with this quality, (we reply) if that be so, in the present case also, the description 'He knows' legitimately applies only to the self who gets into contact wtth objects through the aid of consciousness, in as much as the latter is his quality. From all this it has to be concluded that the soul has certainly consciousness for its essential nature, and is aware of itself at all times ; and that in regard to other objects (besides itself), owing to various causal conditions, it has to be said 'He knows', 'He does not know'.

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* Dṛḍhasamyogah samśayah is the reading found in all manuscripts nnd printed books. The correct reading is adṛḍha samyogah. See *Nyāya Pariśuddhi*, Memorial Edition, page 30.

222. When we are in doubt as to whether the distant object is a post or a person, consciousness is in conjunction with two objects—the post and the person. As two mutually contradictory presentations cannot be given simultaneously in a single cognition, some maintain that in the state of doubt there are really two cognitions ; and that these arise in such a quick succession that they appear to be almost simultaneous. On this view, the conjunction of consciousness with the object is *adṛḍha* (unsteady). Even on the view that in the state of doubt there is but a single cognition presenting two objects simultaneously, the conjunction of consciousness with the objects may be characterised as *adṛḍha*. Here *adṛdhasamyoga* will mean 'conjunction involving mutual contradiction'. See *Nyāya-Pariśuddhi*, Memorial edition, p. 30.

Though the soul is selfluminous, there is need of scripture to make its nature clearly known.

Although the soul shines forth as having consciousness for its essential nature, yet, like the fish which moves about in the deep lake or the milk mingled with water, the soul does not shine forth clearly and distinctly. That is why the several arguments which have been advanced by the teachers of old, and which are consistent with the reasons employed for demonstrating the true nature of the soul, and the scriptural texts are held in esteem. Not deriving any satisfaction from these, (for, after all, they could only lead to *parokṣa jñāna*), persons who have got rid of the veiling obscurities and evils by the practice of *yama* (restraint) *niyama* (discipline) and other means of yoga[223] endeavour to secure immediate knowledge (*aparokṣa jñāna*) of the distinctness of the self from everything other than itself—a knowlege which arises from (1) the removal of impurities, such as, tamas and rajas, by the process of purification by fire (*puṭapāka*), in other words, by the practice of mental control, and (ii) the predominance of the sattva quality. Since the fact that this immediate knowledge arises at the culmination of the, highest stage of concentration is not called in question by any of the rival disputants, no attempt is here made to establish it. Thus, with the aid of scriptural testimony, inference and perception resulting from the practice of yoga, the soul which is in itself self-luminous, is manifested more clearly and explicitly.

INQUIRY INTO THE DURATION OF THE SOUL

The soul is eternal.

Pūrvapakṣa : *The Buddhistic view that the soul is momentary.*

33. Henceforth, the inquiry into the duration of the soul may be taken up. Maintaining that momentariness follows from the very fact

223. Yama (restraint), niyama (discipline), āsana (posture), prāṇāyāma (control of breath), pratyāhāra (withdrawal of senses from their objects), dhāraṇā (concentration), dhyāna (meditation), and samādhi (realisation), constitute the eightfold (*aṣṭānga*) yoga. Of these, the first, namely, yama signifies non-injury (ahimsā), truth-speaking (satya), abstinence from stealing (asteya), brahmacarya and giving up of possesions (aparigraha). Niyama denotes the cultivation of virtues, such as, purity (šauca), contentment (saṁtoṣa), fortitude (tapas), study (svādhyāya) and devotion to God (Īśvara-praṇidhāna). See *Yoga-sūtra* II, 28-32.

of existence, and holding (also) that the root cause of all miseries is only the belief that the soul is eternal. the followers of the Buddhistic doctrines assert that the soul is momentary ; and their argument is as follows :—Whatever exists is momentary; the soul exists; (and, therefore, it is momentary.) Should it be asked how momentariness follows form the mere fact of existence, (it may be replied) 'because existence cannot be attributed to what is not momentary'. Since it is impossible to attribute existence to what cannot lead to fruitful activity, not even that of being the object of the comprehension of the Omniscient Being, the existence of objects is no other than the quality of leading to fruitful activity. And this (fruitful activity) is invariably associated only with momentariness: since it cannot be met with in that which is not momentary: for herein its invariable associates, namely, action all at once and action in a successive series. are absent.

How could these, viz . action all at once and action in a successive series, be regarded as being associated with fruitful activity ? How, again, could they be said to be absent from what is not momentary ? (It is replied) 'Well, listen (to what follows)': Objects may be said to bring about fruitful activity in one of two ways, either all at once or in succession and there is no other possibility. In the case of these two (alternatives). as in that of being and not-being, if one is absent, the other is bound to exist; hence in the matter of objects generating fruitful activity, there could be no third possibility; therefore, fruitful activity is invariably associated with action, successive or non-successive. And activity taking place all at once. and action that is successive cannot be met with in what is not momentary .....

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Note :

All the manuscripts of Atma siddhi examined are incomplete and end here. Evidently the rest of the work has been irretrievably lost.

ISVARA SIDDHI

In order to establish the truth that the universe runs its course under the control of some one person, let us, at the very outset, state the *prima facie* view on the matter.

THE MĪMĀMSAKA VIEW

In regard to this question, the Mīmāmsakas say :—A person endowed with the capacity to perceive all things directly cannot be posited: for such a person is beyond the reach of all the pramāṇas that could possibly help to prove his existence; (besides) there are several conclusive means of proof running counter to belief in such a person To make the matter clear—(It may be asked) is it perception or some other pramāṇa that proves his existence ? (If the reply is : perception, there is the further question) is it ordinary perception (*laukika-pratyakṣa*) or super-normal perception (*yaugika pratyakṣa*)?

Laukikapratyakṣa cannot prove the existence of God

The objects of ordinary perception being specific for each of the senses and being limited (to the *here* and *now*), it cannot serve to prove the existence of the supreme soul; for, with its aid, all objects (without an exception), knowledge concerning them, and so on, cannot be apprehended, The instrument of knowledge which could reval a person endowed with the capacity to perceive everything must necessarily have for its object (1) all things, notwithstanding their distance, their time of existence and nature, and notwithstanding the factors obstructing their apprehension, (2) knowledge concerning all these, and (3) the capacity to have this knowledge. When it is impossible even to think of such an illimitable greatness ever becoming the object of ordinary preception, which operates as a rule (according to the specific capacities of the different senses) in certain objects which are capable of coming into contact with the senses at the time, how could we imagine ordinary perception to be the effective means of proving the existence of a person (endowed with such greatness)?

Nor could yoga pratyakṣa prove the existence of God.

Nor could the perception of the yogin be a means of proving his existence. For, if it is a mode of perception, it too can only reveal present objects. Were it to comprehend objects, past and future, it would, like intuitive insight (*pratibhā*), scarcely be perception. Besides, (there arises the question) is the knowledge of the yogin born of the senses or not? Even on the view that it is sensory knowledge, there crops up the further question, is that knowledge born of the outer senses or of the internal sense? It cannot originate from the outer senses: for it is well-known that the outer senses, provided with the auxiliary causes, namely, contact with the objects appropriate thereto, give rise to knowledge concerning those object. That is why there is no possibility of knowledge concerning all things, (e. g.) silver, bygone objects, and whatever is screened from view arising from the senses, such as, the tongue. With objects, such as silver, that do not exist at the moment, there can be no contact: for contact presupposes two bases, and in the absence of either basis, there is no possibility of contact. Therefore, contact with objects is required (for perception arising from the outer senses). When the auxiliary cause is absent, how would the senses be capable of directly apprehending objects, such as by-gone things?

This may be expressed in syllogistic form :—That which produces a certain effect, when in association with a given auxiliary cause, cannot produce it in the absence of that auxiliary cause; for example, the seed which produces the sprout, when in association with the soil and moisture, does not produce the same in the absence of soil and the like The external senses, in association with the auxiliary cause, namely contact with objects, lead to knowledge. Therefore, in conformity with this principle, the outer senses do not also lead to knowledge of the past object or the future one. It has, therefore, to be concluded that the knowledge generated by the external senses cannot override the rule herein mentioned with regard to objects (that they should be present at the time, unclouded and appropriate to the senses).

Nor can it (i.e., the knowledge of the yogin) originate from the internal sense. For it is only in the domain of pleasure and other

internal states that the mind holds complete sway. If even in regard to knowledge of external objects the manas were admitted to be the unfettered and unaided instrument, then, the outer senses would become superfluous. It would follow therefrom that none could be either blind or deaf.

To express it in syllogistic form :—Without seeking the assistance of the outer organs manas, whose precise mode of apprehending external objects is under dispute, cannot enter upon the province of external perception ; for in regard to this field the activity of manas is dependent upon the outer senses. That whose activity in a certain sphere is dependent upon a given entity cannot act in that sphere independent of that given entity ; for example, the eye, whose proper functioning is dependent upon light, does not operate in its province, (viz., that of colour) in darkness.

Impossible even for the senses that have acquired supernormal powers through drugs, charms, austerities and yogic concentration to establish the existence of God

It is impossible for the senses even occasionally to transcend the limitations which are known to prevail with regard to the object by virtue of the merit acquired through the efficacy of the drugs administered by perfected souls, of *mantras* (charms), austerities (*tapas*) and yogic concentration. For these (i.e., drugs, etc.) have for their result only the manifestation of the capacity inherent in the different senses; and this capacity is well-defined (for each of them). Though the ear may have acquired excellent powers through a hundred drugs properly administered, yet it is incapable of apprehending such diverse qualities as colour and taste.

To put the matter in syllogistic form:—The excellence of the skill belonging to the senses, external and internal, concerning which there is dispute, does not transcend its limits or bounds ; for it is sensory excellence like the one perceived by us. Hence, sensory knowledge cannot make known bygone things and the like.

Yogic concentration even of the end stage incapable of proving God.

Though the knowledge that arises at the culmination of the highest stages of concentration shines forth clearly and distinctly, whether it sets forth something additional to what is revealed in previous experience or embraces nothing more than that, such a knowledge has to whirl in the eddy of the one or the other of the two streams of remembrance (*smṛti*) and illusion (*vibhrama*), and has no chance whatever of reaching the shore of validity (*prāmāṇya*). There is much less chance of trying to enchance its validity by stating that, it is perceptual knowledge. If it were a perception, how could it transcend the well-known limitations with regard to objects ? *If it were to transcend these, how could it still* be perceptual in character ? Hence, perception cannot be a valid means of proof in regard to the person endowed with superhuman power of experiencing all things.

No pramāṇa other than perception is competent either to prove the existence of God.

It cannot be any other pramāṇa either. (If it be) is that other pramāṇa infernce or scripture (*āgama*)? If it is inference, is that *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa* or *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* ? (It cannot be *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa*; for) concerning the existence of God, who is beyond the reach of all the means of proof, no inference can arise ; since the birth of the latter is dependent upon the assurance of universal concomitance (*avinābhāva*) between the hetu and the sādhya, which, in its turn, presupposes the direct perception of what is proved. Indeed, those who are ignorant of fire would be incapable of understanding smoke as a universal concomitant of fire. Nor is a mark of inference (*liṅga*) of the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* variety available in inferring the existence of a person who is competent to create all things and to perceive them directly.

THE NYĀYA ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

The world, concerning which the question is raised:—Is it, or is it not, due to divine creation?—is subservient to a single intelligent entity; for, like the body of one who is free from disease, it is constituted of non-sentient matter. Further, as the world is an effect, the ability

to create all things and perceive them directly must be inferred to belong to its author.

Indeed, all effects such as pots, water-jars and houses are found to be created by intelligent beings who know the material and the auxiliary causes and also know for whom and for what purpose they are intended[1]. The objects under discussion, such as the earth, the mountain and the wide ocean, are effects; hence it has to be concluded that they, too, have for their cause an intelligent entity.

It cannot be contended that their being effects is itself unestablishd for this is well established on the strength of reasons such as the arrangement of the parts. All objects, commencing from wholes which are not themselves the parts of other wholes (*antyāvayavi*) and ending with the diads (*dvvaṇukas*), are known to be constituted by the peculiar combinations of diverse parts which decrease (in number) in accordance with the scale of wholes; hence it follows that ultimately four different kinds of infinitesimal atoms are the material causes of the world. As for the auxiliary cause (*upakaraṇa*), it must be the unseen powers (*adṛṣṭa*) in the shape of merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*) existing in all individual souls (*kṣetrajña*) for the initial movement (*parispanda*) of the infinitesimal atoms has for its non-inherent cause (*asamavāyikāraṇa*) their conjunction with the manifold souls associated with unseen powers in the form of merit and demerit (*adṛṣṭa*) which are appropriate to this movement. As regards the purpose (of creation), it is the limitless and manifold forms of help rendered to the jīvas, a help which is in the shape of diverse, fruitful activities performed by them. The self-same jīvas who derive this help are the very persons for whom (*sampradāna*) the universe is intended. For the reason that these jīvas are incapable of perceiving the merits and demerits even though they are inherent in themselves, why should it not be inferred with the aid of a mark of inference (*liṇga*) of the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* variety that there is a Supreme Person, who as understood from the *Adhikaraṇa-siddhānta*, is different from these finite souls, who is competent to create all the worlds, who is endowed with a knowledge

1. Compare Pāṇinis sūtra-karmaṇā yamabhipraiti sa sampradānam. I. iv. 32.

of all things, which is of the most excellent kind and which is natural to him, and who is endowed with lordship and power of unsurpassed excellence.

THE MĪMĀMSAKA CRITICISM OF THE NAIYĀYIKA VIEW

The Mīmāmsakas ridicule this line of thought as being the outcome of arguments which are unsustainable and which are framed by the imagination of one who is ignorant of the methods of inference. To make the matter clear—What is the precise significance of the statement that the body, the world and the like are subservient to a single conscious entity? If it is said that it signifies dependence upon that entity, (it may be asked) what is it that is dependent upon him? Is it their origin or continuance or activity? On the first two alternatives, the illustrative example cited would be defective in not possessing the *sādhya*. Indeed, the body is not dependent for its origin and continuance upon a single intelligent entity. All persons who share in the enjoyment of the pleasures and pains dependent upon a given body must also, equally with the person who owns it, be responsible for its origin and continuance; since they are endowed with unseen powers (*adṛṣṭa*) appropriate to that enjoyment.

The continuance of a complex whole like that of the body, which is in the form of the inherence of the whole in its parts, requires no intelligent being apart from the peculiar inter-relation of the parts themselves. Continuance, understood in the sense of breathing, which stands in need of an intelligent person, is not met with in the earth and the like, which are offered as the *pakṣa* (minor term) in your argument; hence we fail to discern a uniform type of continuance existing in common in both the minor term (*pakṣa*) and the illustrative example (*sapakṣa*).

Should it be said that 'dependence' means having an activity subject to the control of a single intelligent entity, then, in consideration of instances like huge boulders or trees or cars which could be moved only with the strenuous effort put forth by several strong persons, the

argument is liable to be charged with the fallacy of *vyabhicāra*. Again, when the conclusion (namely, that the world presupposes an intelligent cause) follows from the very fact of the cosmos being constituted of (matter), the addition of the qualification 'endowed with a knowledge of the material cause and so on' is superfluous.

The argument proves what is already proven

If the aegument were to establish only dependence upon a conscious entity, then, the arugument is liable to be charged with the defect of proving what is already well-established ; for this world has been created by our own past deeds (*karma*) as something fit for enjoyment by conscious beings, experiencers (*bhoktā*). It is proper to admit that the agency for the creation of the world belongs only to the conscious beings posited by both the rival disputants, for this hypothesis has the merit of economy of thought (*lāghava*).

It is impossible to deny agency to finite souls, on the score that they are not acquainted with the material cause and the like. For all intelligent beings are quite competent to perceive directly the material causes, namely, the elements like earth, and the auxiliary causes such as sacrifice (*yajña*) and gift (*dāna*).

Direct perception of the infinitesimal atoms which are the ultimate building materials is not required for agency ; because earth and other elements possessing at all times, as at the present moment, partial growth and decay which take place occasionally and gradually, do not secure at any time total annihilation or creation.

(It is futile to contend that as *yāga* and *dāna* become the causes of creation only through the mystic power (*apūrva*) which they generate and as this power is imperceptible to the jiva, he cannot be the agent; for) the mystic potency of activities which is referred to by terms, such as '*apūrva*', may not be perceptible ; but, surely, the act itself possessing this power is open to perception. In fact, the potter and other agents engaged in producing objects, such as jars, do not enter upon their

respective activities only after having directly perceived the potency to produce the effect residing in their material and auxiliary causes, such as, the lump of clay and the wheel. However, in producing objects that are desired, the utilisation of their respective material causes would be impossible to those who are altogether ignorant of their potency. But here, the manifold potencies of activities are learnt through scriptures Therefore, let it be held that finite souls severally are the agents in creating everything in the world with the aid of their own deeds.

The Mimamsaka objection that since the earth, the ocean etc cannot be made, they cannot be said to have a cause.

Moreover, only that which it is possible to make, and whose material cause can possibly be known, is found everywhere to have a conscious being for its agent. For the reason that the earth, the mountain and the mighty ocean do not possess this nature (i e , it is impossible to make them, and their material cause cannot to known), it is difficult to imagine how they can be regarded as the respective effects of different causes. It is even more difficult to conceive how their material and auxiliary causes could become the objects of direct perception. Only an effect like the jar or the water-pot, which is known to be dependent upon an intelligent entity acquainted with material and other causes, is capable of leading to the inference that an effect must have for its cause a sentient being possessing a knowledge of that kind (i.e., knowledge of *upādāna, upakaraṇa* and the like.)

Your argument would only establish the reverse of what you seek to prove i.e. it would not prove an omniscient Lord but only a finite individual.

Further, in as much as an effect like the jar is known to be produced by a person who is different from God and who possesses limited powers and knowledge and who is endowed with a personality, and who has desires which are unfulfilled, the reason (*hetu*) cited by you, establishing as it does a knower answering to this description, is liable to be charged with *viruddha doṣa*. For it establishes the very reverse of ommiscience and lordship over the universe which is sought

to be proved as belonging to the person who is suggested to be the cause of the world.

(The Mīmāmsaka continues :)—There is no room for the objection that if this were so there would be an end to all reasoning. For, if the thing proved (*liṇgin*) is open to any *pramāṇa* other than that on which it is at the moment based, this other *pramāṇa* itself would dispel the contradictory features suggesting themselves on the strength of the mark of inference (*liṇga*). In the present case, however, when a person who transcends the reach of all other *pramāṇas* and who is competent to create all things is desired to be proved, the reason (*hetu*) will, in addition to proving him, establish also all those features which possess invariable concomitance ascertained on the strength of positive and negative evidence.

The possibility of proving the precisely opposite conclusion i. e. that the world is not created.

The activities of a person in his senses are always invariably characterised by thought of personal gain or love to others. Since, in the case of God, none of these exists, the creation of the world cannot justifiably be ascribed to him. As all his desires are already fulfilled, he does not create the world for his own sake. Since at the time of dissolution (*pralaya*) the jīvas are destitute of senses, body and other means of enjoyment, no sorrow could be experienced by them; as a consequence, creation cannot be the result of the mercy evoked by the perception of persons afflicted by sorrow ; hence, with the absence of the *vyāpaka* (the invariably concomitant), namely, personal gain and mercy, there must be the absence of the *vyāpya* (that which is inherent), namely, the activity of a sensible person. He who creates the universe out of mercy must have created it in such a fashion that pleasure alone is present in the universe. If it were suggested that he pays due regard to the past deeds of jīvas, his independence would be lost.

The argument that the nimitta karana need not know the upadāna karana and hence one who is not omniscient could be cause.

Besides, there is no rule to the effect that agency belongs only to that person who directly perceives the material cause and the like ; for

in respect of activities, such as knowing, agency belongs to the soul even though the latter is ignorant of the auxiliary causes.

The Mimamsaka concludes his argument

Hence, in as much as the *hetu*, namely, 'being an effect' is liable (for the considerations mentioned just now) to be charged with the defects of being unestablished (*asiddha*), adverse (*viruddha* and *anekānta* (straying), it is impossible that the universe should have for its cause a person like the one suggested by you.

This may be expressed in syllogistic form thus:—(1) Phenomena, such as, the earth and the mountain, are not effects, for the reason that, like ether, they are thoroughly unlike what are well-known to be effects, or for the reason that here, unlike the case of jars, the knowledge of material and auxiliary causes is impossible to secure. (2) The infinitesimal atoms are imperceptible; for, unlike jars and the like, they are exceedingly subtle substances. (3) The period under discussion (i.e., *pralaya*) is not characterised by the absence of the world: for it is also a period like the present one. (4) The body, the world and the like do not have God for their agent; for, like the jar, they are effects (5) God is not an agent, because he has no purpose in creating the world, or because, like the released soul, he is not possessed of a body.

THE NAIYĀYIKA REPLY TO THE MĪMĀMSAKA CONTENTION

To these arguments of the Mīmāmsaka the Naiyāyika replies:— The character of being an effect cannot be denied to earth (*kṣ*[illegible]) and other substances; because, like the jar etc., they are endowed with parts, or with activities while they are yet big in magnitude, or with forms while they are big in magnitude, or with wider and narrower generality (*sāmānya-viśeṣa*) while they are open to external perception and because of other reasons like this. We know of no distinct feature associated exclusively with a particular configuration of parts, about which it could be said 'This mode of configuration alone is an effect, and none else is.'

Meeting the charge that there is no vyāpti

The contention that that alone can be said to be created which it is possible to produce and whose material and auxiliary causes can possibly be known may be true enough: but the capacity to do and the power to know can only be inferred from activity and knowledge. And since these have been shown to exist in respect of the earth (*kṣiti*) and the like, on the strength of the reasons adduced already, it is clear that there is no special feature that could mark off the body, the world and the like from well-known effects, such as, the temple tower and the wall. No restriction to the effect 'The scope of activity is only this much' is noticed to limit activity to certain objects alone: and if such a restriction exists, we may assert that this cosmos is impossible of production. If it is proved to be an effect, it necessarily follows that there is a person who is competent to perceive directly its material and other causes, and to control and direct the same.

The nature of adhiṭṣhāna defined.

As in the case of the control of his own body and (senses) by the jīva, here also (i.e., in regard to the cosmos) control (*adhiṣṭhāna*) consists merely in the proximity (to the cosmos) of a God possessed of a will conducive to its activity. With regard to substances (*dravya*) this proximity takes the form of conjunction (*samyoga*) ; and in regard to their qualities, it is inherence (*samavāya*) in that wherein there is conjunction (*samyukta*).

Coming to activity (*pravṛtti*), that of infinitesimal atoms is merely change of place (*parispanda*). With regard to merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*), their activity is simply their coming into association with appropriate place (*deṣa*) and times (*kāla*) and other auxiliary causes helpful to the starting of the fruits of deeds.

It is wrong to maintain that the fruits of activities result from merit and demerit themselves;* for these and all other things not controlled

*In the printed books and manuscripts this sentence reads thus, without the negative particle, 'tābhyām dharmādharmābhyām phalam.' But from the context it is clear that the text should be 'na ca tābhyām...'

by an intelligent entity cannot effect anything by themselves; since they are devoid of sentience. Though provided with auxiliary causes, such as place and time, the axe not controlled by a carpenter, an intelligent being, is indeed incapable of making objects like the sacrificial post (*yūpa*). For the reason that instances such as seed-sprout are already included in the *pakṣa* (minor term), the suggestion that in view of the case of seed-sprout (where the non-sentient seed, not controlled by any intelligent agent, produces the sprout by its own effort) the foregoing argument commits the fallacy of *vyabhicāra* is the outcome of the ignorance (of the methods of inference) found in persons who are merely versed in the vedas. On the same count, the attempt to level the charge of *vyabhicāra* by citing the instance of pleasure[2] and the like stands condemned.

The jiva cannot be nimitta kāraṇa of the world

It is not right to attribute control to finite souls themselves simply because they are accepted by both the rival disputants; for the jīva's incapacity to perceive what is subtle and what is screened from view is well-established. (Rather than admitting a separate entity, God, would it not be better to attribute this capacity to perceive the subtle and the hidden to finite souls themselves ? The answer is in the negative) for what is posited must everywhere be in conformity with, and not contradictory to, what is known. It is not well-established that the incapacity to perceive the subtle and the veiled belongs to God, as it belongs to the jīvas; because by means of other pramāṇas the capacity to perceive them is proved to belong to him. The person whose existence is proved on the strength of the argument already advanced is surely ascertained to possess in his essential nature the capacity to perceive all things and to direct them; for 'being an effect' is invariably concomitant wtih 'dependence upon a competent agent.'

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2. Since pleasure and other affective states, which are devoid of consciousness, produce, even in the absence of any control from an intelligent person, their appropriate bodily responses, such as smiling, flow of tears and several organic and visceral changes, it may be urged that the argument is vitiated by *vyabhicāra doṣa*.

The untenabiitly of the contention that the argument only estabishes attributes opposed to omniscience etc.

The objection raised already (vide p. 142), namely that, as the *hetu* points only to limited capacity and fragmentary knowledge and to the absence of lordship, it establishes only the reverse of the qualities intended to be proved, is highly superficial: for, clearly, the *hetu* in question does not lead to the inferring of limited powers and the like.[3] In fact, for its own production any object that is being produced does not require on the part of its agent either the incapacity to effect other things or ignorance concerning them: for, in as much as it would only lead to the inference that there is a person competent to make it, the absence of the capacity to produce other things does not follow therefrom.[4] When the production of an effect may well take place solely with the aid of knowledge and power concerning the same, it is quite unnecessary to consider what is wholly unrelated to it and what has nothing to do with it, namely the absence (of knowledge and power) concerning other effects, as being responsible for its production.

Further, it has to be carefully ascertained whether what is said to be invariably concomitant (*vyāpaka*), namely, 'ignorance of other things and incapacity to effect them,' concerns all things other than the effect in question or certain things only. It cannot be ignorance pertaining to all things; for we know of no such ignorance. Indeed, the potter is not ignorant of everything excepting the pot. If it be urged that the ignorance pertains to certain things only, even this suggestion fares no better; for, so long as the object of ignorance is left unspecified, the argument is liable to be charged with *vyabhicāra doṣa* in view of the fact that even in the absence of ignorance concerning any given object, agency is still possible. No one object has been specified in order to be able to assert "Only that person who is ignorant of such and such an object is fit to become an agent."

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3. The reading found in all books is '... asāmarthyam jñānam...' but it ought to be '...asāmarthyamajñānam...'

4. All books examined read 'kevelavyatirekāsiddheḥ.' Perhaps a better reading would be 'kevalam vyatirekāsiddheḥ.'

There is no need to contend that the agent should only be a person endowed with a body ; for this contention is liable to be charged with *anekānta doṣa* in view of the very fact of the activity of assuming a body. Indeed, the soul does not take up a body while being already associated with a body; for, then it would be impossible for the yogin to take up several bodies simultaneously. When discussing the nature of the soul it has been shown that it is only after relinquishing the former body the soul enters upon another solely with the assistance of vital breath (*prāṇa*) which is induced to activity by past deeds which procure a fresh body.

What is needed for creation is controlling activity and not the body.

Moreover. the body which is the object of the controlling activity on the part of the self, the controller of the body, cannot intelligibly be included in the very body of the definition of the controller; for one and the same thing being at once the agent and the object in the self-same activity involves a contradiction. If it be maintained that control, which is simply the possession of an effort conducive to the activity of the body, is known to belong only to him who is in conjunction with the body which is sought to be controlled, it has to be replied: 'let it be admitted that the controller should be related to the object controlled, since the control of a given object is impossible to him who is unrelated to it.' (It may be asked) How is it determined that this relation need not be the bodily relation ? (The reply is) "It is for this reason, namely, that other objects also, such as the measuring rod, are controlled by one who is merely related to them.. Therefore, apart from what is required for the controlling activity, namely, mere relation to the object controlled, no other relation like the relation to the body, need be countenanced. And it has already been pointed out that relationship to material and auxiliary causes of the cosmos exists in God.

Activity can be initiated without the instrumentality of the body i. e. mere samkalpa suffices

It may be objected that the causing of any particular form of activity in things other than the body is done only with the aid of the body; for

it is found that the power in the staff, wheel and the like belongs to the potter and other agents only in virtue of factors, such as contact with the hand. This objection too is untenable; for the extraction and the scattering of the poison that has entered one's body is observed to be effected by another person by the mere exercise of his will.

When the body is absent how, it may be asked, could the will to cause movements in other things arise ? (The reply is) Then is it contended that it is the body that wills ? If that is so, in its absence there will be no will. Should it be urged that the body (does not itself will, but) is the instrument (*karaṇa*) in the act of willing, it may be replied "not so"; for the mind (*manas*) is the instrument of willing.

Has God, then, a manas ? (The answer is) "Quite so". If it be said that in that event, certain common features, such as the possession of a body, merit and demerit and the absence of sovereignty, would have to be attributed to God, the reply is "not so." For this objection is set aside on the very strength of the fact of the world having a competent agent, a fact inferred with the aid of the *hetu* that it is an effect. Moreover, since even when the body perishes contact with manas has been admitted, in as much as it is an eternal organ of sense, the argument is vitiated by *anekānta doṣa*. In fact, only that much which is relevant to the inductive relation and which is in conformity with what is perceived is admitted Since a person whose body occupies a limited area, whose knowledge is limited and whose action is subject to merit and demerit, is incapable of creation the world composed of the primal elements and what is constituted of these, and possessed of a structure inconceivable even by our minds and an extent which is boundless, it has to be concluded that there is an agent who is endowed with illimitable knowledge, sovereignty, and power and who, without requiring the body, is capable of creating all the worlds with the sole aid of his will.

No need to entertain any doubt on the ground that in the case in point many of the characteristics differ from those found in the illustrative example.

If it be said that in instances such as the jar no invariable relation between the character of being an effect and an agent of this descrip-

tion is observed, (we ask in reply) is the relation of smoke with fire of a description which exists on the dense hill side, which is never experienced before, which is huge in volume and fed by an enormous quantity of fuel, ever noticed in the kitchen? If it were so, on the perception of a particular kind of smoke it could be inferred that on the hill-top there is fire of that description. If it be said that when a certain kind of smoke is found in a given place (to be concomitant with a particular kind of fire) that kind of smoke will be capable of leading to inference of that kind of fire in that locality alone, and that a fire of a different description, even when it is not noticed in the illustrative example could still be inferred with the aid of the inductive relation of smoke in general with fire in general, in consideration of the inductive relation of the pakṣa wherein it resides (in this argument it is the hill), (we ask) how is it that when we maintain the same position it fails to appeal to your mind? Here also the character of being an effect, which is known in examples, such as the pot, to have an invariable concomitance with dependence upon a competent agent, when noticed in the case of earth and the like, points to an intelligent agent, who is capable of producing them and is hitherto unknown. Just as by ignoring the place where fire is found, the time of its existence, the fuel by which it is fed, the size, and other characteristics of fire, the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire alone which is responsible for its very existence is established; even so by eliminating the special characteristics of the agent, such as, the absence of lordship *(anīśvaratva)*, the possession of fragmentary knowledge, the characteristics of fire, the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire alone which is responsible for its very existence is established; even so by eliminating the special characteristics of the agent, such as, the absence of lordship (*anīśvaratva*), the possession of fragmentary knowledge, the character of owning a body, of being subject to merit and demerit, and of being human, universal concomitance of an effect with an intelligent agent merely, who is competent to make it, is ascertained. Hence, there is no special feature marking off these two cases.

Adducing special illustrations to strengthen the conclusion that the divine creator is vastly different from the human agent.

(Difficulties arise when it is insisted that all the special features found in the illustrative example should be found in all the cases coming under that vyāpti. For example) :—When an object, which is in conjunction with an all-pervasive substance and which possesses movement, is known without exception to be everywhere associated with the possession of touch, how can the mind[5] whose conjunction with the soul is inferred from consciousness, pleasure and other special qualities of an eternal substance, be devoid of touch (*sparśa*) ? When what is composed of wind and what possesses visible magnitude is found to be invariably concomitant with the character of being the object of the sensation of touch and is also found to have a particular abode, how can the opposite character be met with in the sense of touch?[6]

When either the colour (*rūpa*) or the contact (*sparṣa*) of fiery objects must invariably be explicit, how could it be admitted that these two are never explicit in the eye, which is inferred to be fiery, for the reason that it is the instrument for cognising colour ?

If it be said that it is so admitted (i. e, that the eye is devoid of explicit *rūpa* or *sparśa*) for the reason that the belief in the special qualities (i.e., explicit *rūpa* or *sparṣa*) appropriate to the respective

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5. The Naiyāyika raises this objection against the Prābhākara school, and not against the Bhāṭṭa school, of Mîmāmsā ; for the former believes that manas is atomic, while the latter maintains that manas, like the *ātman*, is all-pervasive (*vibhu*). And on the Naiyāyika view that there cannot be any *samyoga* between two *vibhudravyas*, manas cannot be in conjunction with the soul.

6. Some entities constituted of vāyu, such as prāṇa, viyāna, udāna and samāna, dwell only in particular regions of the body. For example, prāna is said to dwell in the heart (*hṛdi*); and samāna, in the navel (*nābhi*). And the air outside is cognisable by the sense of touch. The sense organ for touch, however, has the entire body for its adhiṣṭhāna and not merely a particular region thereof. Nor is it the object of the sense of touch.

cases is contradicted by effectual non-apprehension (*yogyānupalabdhi*), even though the character of being fiery is attributed to these (i.e., the eye and so forth) whose existence is inferred from a knowledge of their activity, and for the reason that on this admission (namely, that the special features found in the illustrative examples should be inferred to exist in other cases as well), there would be an end to all inference; (it may be replied) well, if that be so even in the case under discussion it may be admitted that these qualities do not belong to the creator of the world, because the special qualities of the potter, which in your opinion would have to be attributed to the creator of the earth and the like, are likewise contradicted by non-apprehension and because snch an admission would mean an end to all inductive generalisation. Thus, the two cases are in every respect similar, except your prejudice.

Other arguments to establish the existence of Isvara

In fact the following arguments are met with (1) The infinitesimal atoms and so forth, the precise manner of whose activity is under dispure, act under the direction of an intelligent person; for they are non-sentient and whatever is a non-sentient object, acts in this way: for example, the ball and other non-sentient objects. (2) All activities, internal and external, concerning which there is difference of opinion, presuppose the perception of their material and auxiliary causes; because, like the activities of the examples cited in the previous argument they are effects. (3) The infinitesimal atom is perceptible;[7] because, like the jar, it is an object of knowledge and is an entity. (4) The world is dependent upon the will of a person; for, like our own body, it is devoid of consciousness. (5) All intelligent persons act only under the control of a single intelligent entity (i. e., God): for by standing in need of contact with their bodies they enter upon their activities, like

7 In the Chaukamba and Telugu editions the following variant reading for the text commencing after the word योग्यानुपलब्धिबाधितत्वात् and ending with तद्वदेव is suggested:-

the sense of touch and so forth. (6) The world, which is the object of all this dispute, points to a single Supreme Person; because, like a country ruled over by a supreme monarch, the world consists of sentient and nonsentient entities.

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The text of Īśvara-Siddhi available is only this much.

तदस्युपगमेऽनेकनियमदर्शनविघातप्रसङ्गाच्च पक्षधर्मताबललभ्यार्थविशेषावबोधकानेकश्रुत्यादिमानबाध प्रसङ्गाच्च समर्थकर्तृपूर्वत्वेन घटादिषु विदितसम्बन्धनियतं कार्यत्वं क्षित्यादिषु दृश्यमानं स्वोत्पादकमदृष्टपूर्वमेव बुद्धि मत्कर्तारमद्वितीयं पुरुषधौरेयं साधयतीत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम्। तरतमभावापन्नवैचित्र्यवत्तत्तत्कार्येषु कार्यत्वमेव तत्तदनु गुणं कर्तारमनुमापयति चेत्, महीमहींधरादिरूपजगद्यतकार्यत्वमपि तदनुगुणं कर्तारमनुमापयतीति कैमुत्यसिद्धेऽर्थे ऽयर्थोऽयं निरीश्वरमीमांसकस्यात्र दुरभिनिवेशः। दृश्यन्ते ह्यस्मिन्नर्थे अन्ये च हेतवः (1) त्रैकालिकं कृत्स्नं जगत् तदनुगुणशक्त्यादिगुणगणवदायत्तस्थितिलयकं, अचिन्त्यविविधविचित्ररचनत्वात्, अतिकुशलैकायत्तस्थित्यादिकतया प्रमितचित्रप्रतिमादवत्। (2) विभूतिपदाभिधेयं कृत्स्नं एकाधेयविधेयशेषभावं, तच्छरीरत्वात्, मच्छरीरवत्।

Except for the two new arguments which this passage sets forth at its end, it contains no substantial change. These arguments are:-

(1) The world existing at all times, the past, the present and the future possesses a continuance and a destruction which are subject to a person endowed with a group of qualities, such as power appropriate thereto; because it has manifold wonderful shapes inconceivable even by the mind; for example, pictures and dolls which are well—known to have their continuance and so forth subject to a very competent person. (2) All things denoted by the expression *vibhúti* possess the characters of being supported by (*ādheyatva*), being controlled by (*vidheyatva*), and existing for the sake of (*śeṣātva*) a person; for, in the manner of one's own body, they constitute his body.

Enquiry into the significance of the text "Brahman exists, one only without a second'.

It is contended that the upaniṣadic text "Brahman (exists) one only, without a second" denies the existence of everything other than Brahman. Against this contention we argue as follows:—In what light is the compound word *advitīya* to be understood? Is it a *tatpuruṣa* or a *bahuvrihi* compound?

'Advitiya' cannot be taken as a tatpuruṣa compound

If it is the former, the significance of the latter part of the compound word must be considered as primary. Does the latter part declare that Brahman is 'different from' or 'similar to' or 'opposed to' *dvitīya* (the second)? In none of these alternatives does the text deny the existence of something other than Brahman. A second entity is clearly established if the word *advitīya* signifies 'different from' or 'similar to.' If it means 'opposed to the second', then Brahman must be either a first or a third entity; for what stands opposed to the second is 'the first' or 'the third.' Therefore, hosts of objects, three and more, along with the single entity untouched by duality (i.e., all objects with the exception of the second) do assuredly exist uncontradicted.

Since the term 'the second' (*dvitīya*) has the implicit designation (*upalakṣaṇa*) of also the third, the fourth and so forth, it may be urged that the negative particle denies everything other than Brahman (and not merely the second). But the reply is "Not so." The denial of a second entity should not be inferred from this expression; it only asserts that Brahman is something 'different from' or 'opposed to' or 'similar to the second.'[1]

1. Tadanya-tadviruddha-tadabhāveṣu naṅ.

If it is said that Brahman may be described as that which has no trace of duality, then words such as *satya* which define Brahman would turn out to be erroneous definitions (for they imply substance-attribute relation). If the expression *advitīya* were to denote merely the absence of a second, Brahman would be self-existent, and, as such, the negative particle could not be associated with the term Brahman.

'Being without a second' cannot be a qualification of Brahman. Were it a qualification, it would (as already shown) follow that Brahman is either the first or the third entity.

Nor can it be taken as a bahuvrihi compound

Even if the word is taken as a *bahuvrihi* compound, it would follow that all objects exist. All objects of the three worlds, which, in relation to Brahman, could be spoken of as the first, the third, fourth and so on, would exist safely without any danger of ever being contradicted: for all that is denied is merely the possession of a second.

Moreover, if the word is taken as a *bahuvrihi* compouud the significance of the negative found in the compound cannot be said to be associated with anything else; for it is only in the event of there being a true relation (of Brahman) with something else that the genitive case implied in the compound (*that for which* there is no second) would be appropriate. (It is only if the phrase 'not having a second' could be attributed to something, that *advitiya* could be taken as a *bahuvrihi* compound).

The phrase 'The absence of a second' does not mean Brahman itself nor an attribute thereof. For it is essentially negative, while Brahman is really not negative. Nor could it be an attribute of Brahman; (for according to the opponent, Brahman is devoid of qualities). Thus the existence of the world is not contradicted by scriptural texts speaking of reality as non-dual. The existence of the world is established by the sources of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) relevant thereto. Their verdict is further confirmed by scriptural testimony.

The significance of the expression Advitiya (the view of the visiṣṭadvaitin.)

The real significance of the text—"Reality exists one only and without a second (*advitīya*)"—may now be explained. The person who is considered *advitīya* is one who neither has, nor had, nor will have an equal or a superior capable of being counted as a second. How could the world be referred to as a second when it is but a small fraction of the entire collection of entities which constitute His possessions and which are under His sway (*vibhava*) ? The statement "The paramount ruler of the Cola country now reigning is without a second in this world"—is intended to deny the existence of a ruler equal to him. It does not deny the existence of his servants, sons, consort and so on. Similarly, the whole host of *devas*, *asuras* and men, the four-faced Brahmā and the cosmic egg form but a small part of a drop from the ocean of the greatness (*mahimā*) of the possessions (*vibhūti*) of Lord Viṣṇu who is the Lord of all, who is touched neither by sorrows (*klēśas*) nor by merits, demerits (*karma*) or (*vipāka*)[2] and so forth, and who is the seat of the sixfold qualities of knowledge (*jñāna*) and the like, and whose greatness cannot even be conceived by the mind. Which person, who counts with his fingers the oceans as seven, is capable of counting the waves, foam, bubbles and drops of water found therein ?

Just as the presence of the rays of the sun is not contradicted by the statement—"There is but a single sun in the sky, and not two"—and just as when objects are counted the number (*saṁkhyā*), which is different therefrom is not counted, in the same way in which the objects are counted, even so when Brahman is declared to be without a second, the existence of His possessions is not denied. Texts such as—"All beings constitute but a quarter of Him, three-fourths remaining immortal in heaven"[3]—declare that the entire cosmos is but a mode of Brahman.

Other śruti texts in support of the siddhantin's view

Śruti and smṛti texts, such as the following, purport to show that the world is a mode (*prakāra*) of Brahman. "His possessions are

2. Yoga Sūtra, 1, 24.

3. Puruṣa-Sūkta.

so immense. He is greater than these".[4] "That wherein he does not cognise anything other than Brahman is the highest of all (*Bhūmā*)";[5] "He is sure to be afflicted with fear who sees anything as different from Brahman (i. e., anything as not belonging to Brahman)";[6] "He before whom the cosmic egg and the entire universe pale into insignificance, just as an atom does before Mount Meru."

The world consisting of objects which are liable to modification and which are either moveable or immoveable exists for purposes of speech. The unchanging and ultimate cause of all these is *sat* alone. Just as sparks are not different from fire wherefrom they take their rise, even so the effect is not different from its cause. That the effect is not different from its cause is shown by numerous illustrations, such as clay, iron, seed and so forth. Without being nourished by Brahman's power, fire would not be capable of burning even a blade of grass; water would not be capable of drowning; and the wind would be unable to move. "By an understanding of the one Supreme Being, all become known."

With the aid of scriptural texts such as the foregoing and smṛti texts based thereon, it is learnt that the world constituted of sentient and non-sentient objects derives its very being from the fact of its having Brahman for its soul. The possessions of Brahman are not contradicted by these passages.

Refutation of the view that the world is illusory:

Should it be contended that their existence is denied, then it would follow that all activities, sacred and secular, nay even the knowledge of Brahman would cease to be; because everything (other than Brahman) would be illusory. I have already refuted the contention that although objects are in fact illusory, perceptual experience and the

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4. Puruṣa-Sūkta
5. *Chānd* Up., VII. 24. 1.
6. *Tait. Up.*, II. 7.

like are not contradicted, in so far as objects are said to possess phenomenal reality (*vyāvahārika satyatva*). Thus, it follows that, since the world is the possession of Brahman, its existence is not contradicted by the knowledge afforded by the upaniṣads, namely, that Brahman is without a second.

The objector might ask: If the world exists, how could negative judgments (such as 'There is no jar") arise? We ask him in reply "If the world were non-existent, how could affirmative judgments (like "There is a jar") arise?.

The untenability of the view that the world is at once sat and asat.

(Should it be said that since both negative and affirmative cognitions do arise, the world is at once *sat* and *asat*, it is replied that) *sat* and *asat* cannot characterise the self-same entity; for they are contradictory qualities

When contradictory qualities are attributed to the self-same entity on the strength of contradictory cognitions of 'existence' and 'non existence', there is no certainty as to which of them is true. For this reason, the Jains declare that existence and non-existence could be attributed to the world.

Since the cognition of non-existence presupposes awareness of existence, the Sānkhyas maintain that the world is a always characterised by existence.

In order to get over the contradiction presented by the mutually opposed qualities arising from the cognition of existence and non-existence, some thinkers, rejecting both the features of reality and unreality, assert that the world cannot be defined either as *sat* or as *asat* (*sadasadanirvacanīya*.)

Finding that in regard to different times and places, both existence and non-existence could characterise jars and other objects, yet others believe that both existence and non-existence may characterise the world on the basis of certain well-defined spatial and temporal differences.

When doubt is engendered as a result of the keen controversy that rages between these rival theorists, a decision in regard to this matter is arrived at by us in accordance with the Mīmāmsaka theory.

'If a person were to cognise the jar as being at once existent and non-existent, then only could the contradictory features of *satva* and *asatva* be attributed to the jar simultaneously. Since our cognitions take the following from—"This exists here at this moment" or "It is not here at present"—as a consequence of differences of space, time and states, it has to be inferred that, on the basis of such distinctions of space, time and states, *satva* and *asatva* could be attributed simultaneously to the jar. Hence, it may be concluded that reality and unreality may both be attributed to the jar and the like on the basis of differences of space, time and so forth. This doctrine need not now be considered, as it has already been refuted.

Relation with space and time is intelligible only in the case of *sat* (i.e. The *asat* could not be in contact with space and time). How, then, could it be maintained that the unreal acquires reality with the aid of its relation with space and time ? For relation (*sambandha*) is what is found in two relata. Thus the real (*sat*) always possesses the feature of reality. It is impossible for causal factors, however powerful, to create the quality of existence in what is essentially unreal. Hence the universe which has a beginning and end must be included in the category of reality. It has already been said that what does not exist at the beginning and in the end must also be non-existent in the middle. Therefore, from the certain fact of its existence now, let it be admitted that the world exists at all times.

Since unreality can never be created, it always belongs to the unreal, as in the case of the sky-flower. There is no distinction between what is absolutely non-existent and what does not exist at an antecedent time in so far as the aspect of non-existence is concerned, (i. e., differences of space, time and state could neither make the unreal real; nor could they make the real unreal).

Inquiry into the significance of the text tat tvam asi.

(The opponent may ask.—) When in the sixth chapter of the *Chandogya Upaniṣad*, taking the instance of Śvetaketu, it is declared "Tat tvam asi," how could the words 'tat' and 'tvam' be assigned their primary meanings ? The finite soul which is afflicted by helplessness, misery and sorrow is referred to by the term tvam. The omniscient Being, who has a will that is ever-realised and who is the sea of illimitable bliss, is the significance of the word 'tat.' How could these two, which are opposed to each other even as light is opposed to darkness, be equated ?

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When the qualities found in the object referred to by the term 'tat' and those belonging to the entity denoted by the term 'tvam' (are wholly opposed to one another?) .....the view that the terms 'tat' and 'tvam' refer to an identical entity has been completely rejected. Whether characteristics such as ignorance and omniscience, suffering and enjoyment be taken as attributes (*viśeṣaṇas*) or as secondary marks (*upalakṣaṇas*) of the conscious entity, in any case, the meanings of the terms *tat* and *tvam* must be different ; since, otherwise, contradictory features would have to be attributed to an identical object.

Nor is it reasonable to argue that here, as in the judgment "This is that cow", part of the primary meaning of the two terms is left out so that the terms *tat* and *tvam* signify only pure consciousness; for since to the self-luminous object two contradictory features could be attributed on the basis of limiting conditions such as time and place, the statement "This is that cow" is quite legitimate; whereas in the case of self-luminous consciousness there is none of the limiting conditions like time or place to justify the attribution of opposite qualities.

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Moreover, since in respect of self-luminous consciousness which is wholly without distinctions of any kind, there is nothing to generate the illusion of difference, which is the root cause of misery, the *śāstras*

suggesting that none of its alternatives (i.e. *bheda* being the very essence of the object or different therefrom) is tenable.

Further, since non-difference is what dispels the difference of its two substrates and since difference constitutes one objeet not being another, you yourself admit the essence of objects (*vastu-svarūpa*) as being, distinct from *bhedābheda*. talk of the various alternatives as untenable and are thus vanquished by the inconsistency involved in your own position. All attempts to refute distinction by needless discussions, such as—Is it distinct or non-distinct ? Is it related to the very essence of objects or not?—are falsified by perception and experience and are thus mere waste of lungs. The cognition "blue" is the same as the awareness "lotus"; for we directly get the apprehension "this is a blue lotus". When conjunction (*samyoga*) is the object of perception it is erroneous to raise unnecessary questions such as "Does it relate distinct objects?" even so when scripture and perception assert the relation of identity (*tādātmya*) of *tat* and *tvam*, such meaningless questions relating to it are knocked down by scripture in the shape of a stick (*daṇḍa*). The scripture which is self-existent (not the work of any person) and which is free from all defects earnestly and repeatedly declares that the finite self and the supreme self are identical in this sense.

(That the finite self and Brahman are not absolutely identical, as the opponent believes, and that even in mokṣa the jiva retains its distinctness is shown by the following description:) Dwelling in the depths of *Brahmānubhava*, the released soul experiences illimitable joy.

Since the enjoyer perishes at the time the fruit of his labours is realised, mokṣa would hardly be sought by man. If pure consciousness alone is left over, we ask: For whom is mokṣa?

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The view that consciousness is the cause of the world is untenable.

Moreover, which consciousness is it that has assumed the form of the world? It could not be the knowledge of the jar; for even in its absence the world is perceived. It is not proper to urge that before this

knowledge arises and after it perishes in mokṣa the world does not exist; for this is contradicted by perception. Nor could it be the knowledge of something else; for, after that knowledge perishes, other objects are perceived.

The purvapakṣin trying to justify the above contention with examples–

The opponent may say that consciousness is one and indivisible, that there is no apprehension of consciousness within knowledge, for objects such as jars are distinct, while consciousness is not, since it is always present. (We may ask) In view of the fact that when the cloth is cognised, jar does not shine forth, how could it be said that knowledge is always present? The opponent may reply that it is only the jar that is not manifest but that knowledge clearly shines forth. To objection that consciousness does not shine forth as something distinct from jar, the opponent asks what is the precise significance of expression "something distinct from the jar"? (He goes on to add). it denotes consciousness. it does shine forth; and if it signifies something else, such an entity is not said to shine. (He continues) moreover consciousness which, in its essential nature, is without a form and which is self-luminous is falsely taken to be manifold for no other reason except the multiplicity of objects known. Distinctions are neither objects themselves nor their attributes; nor are they open to perception and inference. The belief in the multiplicity of objects known, such as the jar, is illusory. Hence, (the opponent asks) how could knowledge become manifold on the basis of phenomenal entities like the jar? And much less could that distinction in knowledge be considered real.

The contention that consciousness is eternal:–

(He goes on to add) Further, self-luminous consciousness has no antecedent non-existence(*prāgabhāva*)(i.e., consciousness is without a beginning and is eternal); (for should the antecedent non-existence of consciousness exist, it must be apprehended by consciousness itself or by some other means; but) the antecedent non-existence of consciousness is not apprehended with the aid of consciousness itself or something else. The

first alternative leads to a self-contradictory position; for when consciousness is, its own non-existence cannot be. When consciousness does not exist, a congnition for which it is itself responsible—cannot arise[7]. The second alternative, namely, that the antecedent non-existence of consciousness is proved through some other source fares no better, for, consciousness is not the object of anything else. (i.e. Any pramāṇa that is to prove the non-existence of consciousness must first cognize consciousness before it could speak of its non-existence. But consciousness is self-luminous and not the object of anything else.)

The contention that consciosuness is devoid of attributes.

Besides, since distinction and so forth are knowable, like colour, they cannot be the attributes of consciousness. Hence, conseiousness is without a second. It is self-luminous. Therefore, those who know Brahman maintain that the foregoing questions regarding the various alternatives, based as they are on the belief that consciousness is manifold, are all the pranks of ignorance.

Detailed examinatiom of the advaitc position—consciousness is manifold.

To this we reply "Well ! all this dogmatic teaching may carry conviction with (bltnd) believers; we are lacking in such faith and search for logical reasons to convince us. Like pleasure and pain, all items of knowledge concerning various objects and obtained by different persons are directly apprehended as being distinct from one another.[8] Distinction is not denied to conjunction (*śamyoga*). desire (*icchā*) and so forth whose distinction is revealed by the relata. Nor is it admitted that they are not open to perception.[9]

Consciousness cannot be eternal, all—pervasive and unitary

"If consciousness is admitted to be eternal and all-pervasive, then all objects should shine forth at all times or none at all. It would not be

7. Vide *Ātma-siddhi p. 35.*

8. This and the succeeding stanza have been clearly elucidated in *Śrutaprakāśikā*, Jijñāsādhikaraṇa p. 89 (Nirnayasagara Press Edition.)

appropriate to seek to explain why certain objects alone shine and not others on the basis of the proximity or otherwise of objects known; for like ether *(ākāśa)*, consciousness is admitted to be all-pervasive. Nor could this be explained on the basis of the differences in the causes of knowledge; for knowledge is eternal and has, consequently, no cause. Nor yet could it be explained on the basis of the diversity of knowledge itself; for you advocate the theory that knowledge is single. It would then follow that knowledge of sound and the like would have to arise even in the case of the deaf and the blind. Besides there would be no room for the distinction of teacher and pupil."

Untenability of the contention that there is nothing apart from consciousness.

The opponent may object and say, "On our theory there is no 'all objects' distinct from consciousness. Hence, there is no propriety in your dogmatic charge that all objects should always be revealed".

To this we reply, "Well, tell me whether they appear but are not different from consciousness. If the former, your explanation of worldly and sacred knowledge is attractive indeed.[9] Since, on your theory. neither words nor their meanings shine forth, (it would be impossible to understand the world and much less the teaching of the scripture). If the latter. your view that consciousness is single would be in jeopardy; for, if the world with its manifold forms is consciousness itself. then consciousness too must be equated with the world and would thus come to be manifold.[10]

The contention that avidya is the cause of the world and that it is difficult to define it as different and as non-different

The opponent may say that since the world is the handiwork of avidyā (which cannot be described as being distinct or nondistinct), there is difficulty in deciding whether it is distinct or nondistinct from consciousness. But this is untenable: for *avidyā* is like a waxen jewel which is in contact with the fire of reasoning. To explain the matter

9. Compare *Śatadūṣaṇi*, Samvidadvaitabhaṅgavāda (33)
10. Compare *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, 8.

fully—.If *avidyā* is said to be merely the absence of knowledge (i.e., if it is a negative principle) its nature would be indefinable (*nirupākhya-svabhāva*), it cannot be responsible for anything (i.e. for creating the world.)

What is the significance of the negative particle in avidya?

(If *avidyā* is something distinct from *vidyā* (i.e. if it is a positive entity) it would be ludicrous to hold that it is indescribable. (Your) statement that *avidā* cannot be described as being distinct or non-distinct from *vidyā*, but that it is really an entity different from *vidyā* is indeed a fine piece of reasoning! If you were to urge that even this character of its being distinct from *vidyā* is illusory, we reply that, if so, *avidyā* itself would in truth be *vidyā*. And we may ask: when consciousness is pure and is not insentient, while *avidyā* is the reverse, why is avidyā not considered to be distinct from vidyā ?

What is the term vidyā occurring in avidyā ?

Is *vidyā*, whose negation is said to be *avidyā*, consciousness itself or the known or the knower ? If it is either the known or the knower, *avidyā* cannot be removed by either of these; for *avidyā* (ignorance) cannot be dispelled by anything other then knowledge. If *vidyā* is knowledge itself, *avidyā* could not possibly exist, since knowledge is eternal.

Further, if *avīdyā* is the opposite (contradictory) of *vidyā* ignorance cannot exist anywhere; for the entire world is pervaded by *vidyā* which is without a second. If *avidyā* is said to be a negative principle, or something other than *vidyā* or something opposed to it, then (you have to abandon the theory that consciousness (*samvit*) is without a second.

Āsrāyanupapatti–avidyā cannot dwell in jiva.

Moreover, for whom is this *avidyā*? (You may reply that it is) for the *jīva*. (We ask) who is a jīva? If you were to say the jiva is that to whom avidyā is ascribed, (we reply that) this leads to irreconcilable mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*); for there could be no *avidyā* in the

absence of the *jīva*, and there could be no *jīva* without av*idy*ā. It could not be said that this is similar to the relation of seed and sprout; for it is impossible to ascribe origination to the *jīva*.

Nor is Brahman the substrate of av*idy*ā.

If av*idy*ā is said to relate to Brahman, (we ask) how could the omniscient Being be subject to delusion? The character of being afflicted by the delusion that the body is itself the self—a delusion born of av*idy*ā—cannot be attributed to Brahman whom the scripture declares to be omniscient and whose omniscience is said therein to constitute his essential nature.[11]

Should it be urged that, since it implies apprehension of diversity omniscience must be considered illusory, (we ask the opponent): For the same reason, why should we not treat omniscience, like *śabdāntara*, and so forth, as being other than unreal? Just as *śabdāntara*, *abhyāsa*, *sankhyā*[12] and so on, which imply apprehension of difference and which mark off one *śāstra* from another and are considered real, why should not omniscience be treated likewise (i.e., as real)?[13]

If ignorance were to exist in the omniscient and the eternally free being, even as darkness exists in light, then ignorance could never be removed therefrom by anything whatsoever.

If it be said that the texts referring to omniscience and other qualities have only validity (vyāv*ahārikaprāmāṇya)*, while those speaking of non-dualism alone have absolute (tāttvi*ka-prāmāṇ*ya) we reply that for such a distinction there is no other basis excepting your own dogmaiic assertion.

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11. Compare *Śatadūṣaṇi* xāda 19. The alternative which conceives avidyā as *samsargābhāva* is here criticised.

12. Vide Pūrvā-mīmāṁsā. II. ii sections 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, II. iii. 11.

13. cf. Śrutaprakāśikā, Jijnyāsādhikaraṇa—"śāstrabhedahḥ karmabhedo vā." The Prābhākara view is that the second chapter deals with *Śāstrabheda;* while the Bhātta theory is that it is devoted to a discussion of *Karmabheda*.

(If *avidyā* is treated as the mutual non-existence of *jñāna* (knowledge) it will have *vidyā* for its *pratiyogin* (that which is denied) and Brahman for its *āśraya* (support); and since *jñāna* (knowledge, *samvit*) is identified with Brahman itself, your position really amounts to this, that Brahman is at once the *āśraya* and the *pratiyogin* of *avidyā*. Against such a position we ask:) How can Brahman which is through and through of the same nature and which is the Highest Reality possess the two mutually opposed qualities of being the *āśraya* (basis) and the *pratiyogin* (what is denied) of *avidyā*?[14] If the opponent were to reply that, in its aspect as the jīva (*pratyak*), Brahman is the basis of *avidyā*, and that in its essential nature it is the *pratiyogin*. (we ask) whence these two aspects? To the possible answer that this distinction of aspects is the result of avidyā, we reply that, since *avidyā*, in its turn, depends on this distinction, your position is once again liable to be charged with the defect of mutual dependence (i.e. the fallacy of mutual dependence vitiates both the alternatives viz., that avidyā relates to the jīva and that it relates to Brahman).

There is no escape from anyonyāśraya dūṣaṇa by stating that avidyā is an avastu (unreality).

Should the opponent contend that his position really escapes the defect of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*) in as much as *avidyā* is an unreality (*avastu*) we ask: Then in which entity (*vastu*) do you notice *anyonyāśraya*) to be a vitiating factor? (i.e. one who rejects everything other than Brahman as illusory cannot cite an object (*vastu*) where this defect is met with). The character of being a *vastu* is not responsible for the charge of *anyonyāśraya* being levelled; but when a thing is said to depend for its very existence on its own product, this defect arises. Therefore. it is no proper reply to urge that since *avidyā* is an unreality your position is not open to the charge of *anyonyāśraya*.

Avidya cannot be avastu (unreal)

Moreover, if avidyā is wholly unreal (avastu). we ask: How then does it come to be responsible for worldly activities (vyavahāra)? Wholly

14. cf. *Śatadūṣaṇī vāda* 19. Here the view that treats avidyā as anyonyābhāva (mutual non-existence of knowledge) is critically considered.

fictitious entities like the sky-flower are never noticed to serve the ends of practical life (*arthakriyākāri*). And your very statement that avidyā is a fiction hardly establishes that it is fictitious. If the opponent were to argue that reality is denied to avidyā by the negative particle found in the compound word 'a-*vastu*', we reply that the negation is negated when single, uncompounded words (vyasta) like 'jar' and 'cloth' are used to refer to the world which is the handiwork of avidyā. Therefore, the opponent must not think of saying that avidyā is neither real nor unreal and that, while distinctions are unreal, they appear to be real on the strength of avidyā.

Is avidyā *single or manifold? Is the bound soul which is its snbstrate unitary or manifold* ?

State wehther the avidyā posited by you as generating and explaining the world-process is single or manifold. State also whether its substrate, viz., the soul in bondage is only one or many.

Avidyā cannot be single :

If avidyā is *single*, this unitary ignorance, having already been expelled by the realisation of Brahman attained by Śuka, your effort, to secure final release (*mokṣa*) would indeed be wholly unnecessary.

The contention that Śuka and others attained mukti is not true.

It may be argued (by you as follows—) "In reality there never existed persons such as Vāmadeva and Śuka; it is only if they existed, it could be argued that avidyā, having already been dispelled by their realising Brahman, does not exist at present. Distinctions such as "released souls" and "south in bondage" are projected by my ignorance; for they are perceived, like the world of multiplicity cognised in my dreams. The scriptural text, asserting that final release was attained by them (i.e., Vāmadeva and others) as a result of the realisation of Brahman, is as invalid as dream utterances concerning *mukti*".

Refutation of the above contention

We may meet this line of argument thus—How is another person who contends that the world is projected by his avidyā refuted by you ? The self-same reason which you advance to prove that the universe is projected by your avidyā is also open to him like *sarvajna*siddhi (i e. even as the claim that the Buddha is omniscient can also be made on behalf of Kapila).

As your doctrine is thus torn by mutually oontradictory assertions, you seem to argue not because you have a case, but because you must be saying something. Just as the statements relating to their (i.e., Vāmadeva and others) release are no better than dream utterances, your propositions also (viz. that the world is a creation of your avidyā and that you must, therefore, endeavour to get rid of it) must share the same fate. Hence, your effort to secure *mokṣa* must indeed be futile. Again, if you could maintain that the scriptural passage mentions that, as a result of *Brahma-jñāna*, mukti was attained by Vāmadeva and others even when it was not attained, we might equally well say that your statement also speaks falsely of mukti as realisable in the future, when, in fact, it is not to be realised. The very examples you adduced, namely, utterances found in dreams, could be cited in support of the opposite contention.

(Perhaps your reply is—) "Such a position, viz. that *mukti* is not something to be realised in future is not unaccepatble to me, because the self is eternally free from bondage and because freedom is ever existent." Against this it may be urged that since, on this view, all efforts to secure *Brahma*-vidyā are wholly superfluous, your position amounts to invoking in ceremonies just those devils which are intended to be exorcised by them.

The contention that *mokṣa* is *an eternally existent state ; it has only to be rendered manifest through dhyana etc.*

The opponent may contend that, although *mokṣa* is an eternal state, it is obscured by ignorance and appears, on that account, to be nonexistent; and (he may add) that the fruit of knowledge is the mani-

festation of mokṣa (which has so far remained concealed). The presence of gold on the hand being forgotten, it is searched for; and after realising that it has all the while been on his hand, a person rests content. Even so, it is because of the failure to realise the true nature of the self which is ever free, that bondage is caused to the *saṃsārin*, and the nature of the self is manifested by knowledge of Brahman.

The unintelligibility of the notion of abhivyakti (manifestation.)

Our reply to this is—Tell me what is meant by manifestation (*abhivyakti*) which is said to result from the knowledge of Brahman Is it consciousness which is the very essence of self-luminous intelligence? Or is it the knowledge "I am Brahman" ? It cannot be the first: for consciousness which constitutes the very essence of Brahman, being eternal, cannot be the result of Brahma-vidyā. Nor could it be said that "manifestation" is merely the knowledge "I am Brahman"; for on your theory, such a knowledge is itself *Brahma-vidyā*. And how, we ask, could it be treated as the result of the latter ?

Moreover, on your view, this knowledge arises from upaniṣadic texts such as 'That thou art' (tat tvam asi). And, on the principle that whatever has a beginning must have an end, the fear (that *mokṣa*, may be lost at any time) may afflict even the released soul.

Avidya cannot be an obstacle to Brahma-jnāna.

Besides, the wise have defined *pratibandhaka* (obstacle) as that which prevents the appearance of the effect even in the presence of all the causal factors necesssary therefor. In the present case, what was it that was ready to emerge through the operation of its causal factors but failed to appear being prevented by the obstacle of ignorance (avidyā)? It cannot be *mukti*; for it is ever-existent. Nor could it be the knowledge "I am Brahman"; for, in the case of souls in bondage, the full complement of causes necessary for the birth of the apprehension "I am Brahman" not being present, how could it be said that this knowledge is counteracted by *avidyā* ? As a matter of fact, this

knowledge does not arise at present, not because it is prevented by counter-acting forces, but because of the absence of causal factors. Hence your position is beside the point.

Refutation of the view that there is only a single soul.

Further the belief that there is only a single soul (in the universe) is really unacceptable:[15] for, on your view, ignorance (*avidyā*), association therewith and the character of being *jīva* are only illusory (i.e., when the very notion of *jīva* is deemed illusory, its being single must be equally so).

The suggestion that the *jīva* is one, since it appears to be so, is contradicted by experience: for souls bound to *samsāra* do appear to us to be innumerable. The activities in which bound souls are engaged till the cessation of the cycle of births and deaths are not later shown to be false and are thoroughly unlike dream experiences. The unity of the self sought to be established by reasoning could be disproved by reasoning itself.

Other souls which possess conflicting thoughts and activities and whose existence is inferred from their diverse behaviour cannot be argued away any more than each person could explain away his own existence. The fire whose existence is inferred is certainly different from observed instances of fire. Similarly where is the difficulty in considering that the souls whose existence is inferred from the behaviour of others are distinct from the self of which each person is directly aware? If it is not conceded that the presence of other selves is inferred from their behaviour, all activities, sacred and secular, would cease.

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It is futile to contend that the distinction of consciousness into 'knower' and 'known' is due to manifold limiting conditions. For (if that were so), the distinction between the various parts of the body

15. cf. *Satadūṣaṇī*, vāda 61.

such as the head and hands must lead to a belief in a plurality of selves within the selfsame body. Besides, if there be only one soul (in the universe), it must experience what is happening in all places, just as the injury to the head, hands or feet is felt by the organism.

(On the basis of the observed fact that the soul does not remember its own experiences in former lives, the opponent may assert that it is unnecessary for the self to know what is happening elsewhere. To this we reply that) the self does remember its experiences which took place in the remote past (in former lives) because of factors, such as death, torment in hell and birth-pangs. But as regards what takes place simultaneously (there being no remembrance), the substrates of these experiences cannot be mixed up. How then could the delusion that there is only one soul arise ?

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The untenability of the view that there is a plurality of jivas each having its own avidyā.

It cannot be maintained that social activities can be explained on the basis of a plurality of souls each of which creates, with the aid of its individual avidyā, objects perceptible only to itself. How could *jīvas*, who are severally confined within their own dream creations and who are totally ignorant of the activities of others, carry on worldly activity which is possible only to a group of persons interacting with one another ?

Being endowed with qualities like self-luminosity and unity, consciousness cannot be said to be without a second (advitiya.)

Self-luminosity, unity, all-pervasiveness and eternity posited by you as the characteristics of consciousness really contradict your thesis that consciousness is without a second (*advitiya*). It is idle to argue that these are not the characteristics of consciousness, but that they

constitute its very being; these features of consciousness namely, self-luminosity, unity and the like are distinct from one another; besides, while the existence of consciousness is accepted on all hands, keen controversy rages regarding its nature (or characteristics). It cannot be urged that these are illusory and, hence, do not contradict the theory of non-dualism. For these qualities are learnt from upaniṣadic texts which aim at revealing the true nature of reality.

If, as you say, bliss, self-luminosity, eternity, greatness and the like are really the essence of Brahman (and not its qualities), let this position be clarified by you. (You must say that) terms such as 'bliss' either stand exactly for what the word Brahman signifies or that what are signified by them belong to him (i.e., they are its attributes) ; or they alone go by the name of Brahman.

(None of these alternatives is tenable; for) on the first alternative, there would be no need to employ these different expressions in daily life and in scriptures (the term Brahman being quite sufficient). Besides, as already pointed out, while Brahman is posited as the cause of the world, rival philosophers dispute its nature; hence, they (i.e., Brahman, bliss and so forth) must be distinct. The second alternative is scarcely better; for with these for its qualities, Brahman would certainly come to be regarded as having distinctions. On the third alternative, since each of these (i.e., bliss and the like) is itself Brahman, there would be a plurality of Brahmans. To obviate this difficulty, it might be said that all these together constitute Brahman even as a collection of trees constitutes a forest. (But even this would fare no better, because, on your theory, Brahman is a partless whole of reality.)

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(It is unreasonable to argue that these descriptions really teach a partless whole of meaning (*akhandārtha*), just as the statement "The sun is resplendent and luminous" denotes a single, partless reality).

For the luminosity and splendour existing in the sun are really different; and you cannot cite anywhere an instance in support of your contention that a partless whole of meaning is conveyed by the text.[16]

The untenability of the contention that these are not qualities but refer to the absence of certain features–

It may be urged that, since the terms *jñāna*, *ānanda* and the like merely refer to the absence of non-intelligence, suffering and so forth, and thereby denote only a unitary entity, Brahman could not be said to be possessed of distinctions. But this is futile; for this absence must be either real or neither real nor unreal. (None of these is acceptable, for) the first alternative would imply that Brahman is endowed with distinctions. On the second alternative, it would follow that Brahman is non-intelligent. And the third alternative has already been refuted. Besides, on that view, Brahman would scarcely be different from objects like the jar. Moreover, so long as the terms *jñānā*, *ānanda* and the like are not taken to signify the features opposed to non-intelligence and the like which are said to be excluded they could not really be said to have been eliminated; even as terms signifying the character of non-intelligence (*jaḍatva*) are incapable of denying these qualities. (Taking his stand on the view that negation is merely the perception of an object when some other perceptible entity is not cognized (e. g. the negation of the jar is no other than the perception of the bare ground) the opponent may argue that Brahman is non-dual, since the absence of non-intelligence is no other than knowledge of pure Brahman, and not an attribute thereof. But even then it would follow that Brahman has distinctions (since knowledge of Brahman will not convey the idea of the absence of non-intelligence, sorrow and the like so long as intelligence, bliss and the like are not attributed to it).

It cannot be contended that the world is distinct from sat and asat

Is it perception and the like or scripture that establishes the theory that the elements and what is born of them are distinct at once from

16. cf. *Satadūṣaṇi*, vāda 38.

reality and unreality ? Each one knows for himself that perception and other pramāṇas reveal their respective objects as something specific. The cognition of a blue flower in front of the perceiver is not of the same form as that of a white crystal. The apprehension of milk as something sweet is not of the same kind as that of morgosa as something bitter. Thus, all items of knowledge, sacred and secular. are marked off from one another.

(The opponent may argue as follows). "True, distinct cognitions do arise; but they have no basis in fact." (To this it may be replied that) if the presence of varied cognitions is admitted, the cause of these must be ascertained. And the senses and reason are their well-known causes; for these cognitions arise whenever they are present.

The refutation of the view that pratyakṣa cannot perceive difference:—

The opponent may hold the erroneous view that distinction (*bheda*) cannot be the object of perception, since the object itself (*svarūpa*) and its distinction from other things (*bheda*) cannot be apprehended either simultaneously or in succession, and since these two apprehensions are not identical.[17] This false view is due to the failure to realise that *svarūpa* and *bheda* are non-different.

In the light of the *pratiyogīn* (that which is denied), the object itself which is revealed by perception is responsibile for the apprehension and belief in multiplicity (*bheda-vyavahāra*) ; just as the knowledge of an object in itself leads to manifold negations and just as an object six inches long may (in the light of objects longer or shorter than this) be considered short or long.

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17. (Akhaṇḍavākyārthabhaṅgavāda.)

Those who do not subscribe to the notion of difference (*bheda*) may argue as follows,– 'Whoever accepts the notion of difference believes that it is open to perception. Let him state clearly whether the apprehension of an object itself (*svarūpa-grahaṇa*) and the apprehension of its distinction from other objects (*bheda-grahaṇa*), which are both the result of perception, are identical with or different from each other. If they are distinct, it may be asked, does perception grasp an object or its distinction from others or both these ? If perception is said to grasp both, there is the further question :

Thus the character of possessing distinctions cannot be denied to the world since it is perceived to possess diverse well-defined shapes and forms.

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(Having shown that perception does not establish that the world is sadasadvilakṣaṇa the author proceeds to show that scripture also fails to establish that point.)

Since scripture speaks of what has to be accomplished (*kārya* it cannot be considered an authority in this matter (i.e., with regard to matters of fact, namely, *siddha*). Even if it be considered authoritative in this regard it cannot be said to teach this unintelligible doctrine; for the different elements of your doctrine do not fit in with one another.

(Here it is shown that inference too fails to establish that the world is indescribable as *sat* or *asat*).

It is argued that *avidyā* and its products cannot be described as unreal (*asat*). since they are perceived and that it is equally difficult to define them as real (*sat*), since they are later contradicted. But this does not stand to reason; for (it may well be asked) why should not the

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Are both these grasped simultaneously or in succession? *Svarūpagrahaṇa* and *bhedagrahaṇa* cannot be identified as one; for to treat them as identical would amount to attributing to the self-same experience the contradictory qualities of not depending on a *pratiyogin* (in the case of *svarūpagrahaṇa*) and depending upon *pratiyogin* (in the case of *bhedagrahaṇa*). It it equally difficult to treat them as distinct; for, if perception were to grasp the objecs (*svarūpa*) only, clearly it cannot apprehend *bheda*. And perception cannot grasp difference only; since the cognition of difference presupposes apprension of *svarūpā*. Nor is the view that perception apprehends both *svarūpa* and *bheda* tenable; for this apprehension must be either simultaneous or successive. But it cannot be simultaneous, since knowledge of difference presupposes cognition of *svarūpa* and remembrance of *pratiyogin*; while *svarūpagrahaṇa* does not stand in need of any of these. Nor could *svarūpa* and *bheda* be grasped in succession; since perception is momentary and cannot last until the experience of *bheda* which occurs only at the next moment.

Vide *Prameyamālā* of Vātsya Varadaguru, Annamalai University Journal.

world be treated as real (*sat*), since it is perceived, and as unreal (*asat*), since it is later contradicted? Hence it is clear that this notion of *avidyā* (ignorance) is posited by you in ignorance.

Is the mithyātva of the world real or unreal? Either alternative goes against the advaitic position.

Is the character of unreality (*mithyātva*) attributed by you to the world of multiplicity unreal or real? It cannot be the former; because if the unreality of the world is itself phenomenal, then the reality of the world becomes irrefutable. It cannot be the latter, because if mithyātva were real then your theory of non-dualism would have to be given up. As already pointed out, all pramānas are known to us as marking off their respective objects from their opposites (*asat*) and from their distincts (*arthāntara*). For example, when there arises the awareness, 'The jar exists." it rules out the assertion of the non-existence of the jar or of the attribution of clothness to the jar.

The opponent may try to meet this by arguing as follows.—"In the cognition "The jar exists', the word 'jar' conveys either the same meaning as 'existence' (Brahman) or something else. If it is the former it would follow that reality is non-dual; (because other propositions like, this, 'the cloth exists', "tree exists" and so on will convey the same idea, viz.. existence); if it is the latter what is signified by the term 'jar' must be incapable of being defined either as *sat* or *asat* (*sadasadanirvacanīya*). (because the term *ghaṭa* would then imply something distinct from existence (*sadvilakṣaṇa*) and would at the same time be (asadvilakṣaṇa) something positive.

To this we reply that, if so, you would have to admit that Brahman also, like the jar, is indescribable as *sat* or *asat*; for the cardinal teaching of the upaniṣads is "Brahman exists" (asti Brahman). And you yourself have established, with the aid of vedic texts speaking of Brahman being bliss (*ānanda*), reality (*sat*), and knowledge (*jñāna*), that Brahman is distinct from bliss and the like. (Logically, in your statement: The world is *sadasadanirvacanīya*' the term "world" must

signify something different from what is describable as sat ro asat) Therefore, it is impossible for you to speak of the world as being distinct from reality and unreality. What is said of one instance should apply to all identical or parallel instances.

The knowledge of *sattā* (existence) arising in the case of objects like the jar does reveal the reality of diverse configurations of objects.

Existence (*sattā*) is no other than the continuity of objects along with their specific and well-defined forms or configurations which are responsible for their distinction from similar (*sajātīva*) as also from dissimilar (*vijātīya*) objects. (i.e. from objects of the same class as also from those belonging to other classes.) And it (*sattā*) is no independent entity. How, then, is it at all possible to speak of non-dualism ? It it impossible to deny the apprehension of diverse configurations.

In the very act of denying dharmas, the ground on which the denial is made shows Brahman to be endowed with dharma.

As regards your statement: What is known (i.e. *satta*) cannot be an attribute of knowledge (Brahman), (we ask:) From this statemens is anything established regarding *samvit* (consciousness) or not? If it is the former, your doctrine of non-dualism would have to be sacrificed;[18] if it is the latter, your effort is wholly wasted.

Therefore, various cognitions which are clearly and readily known to be distinct from one another cannot be identified with objects like the jar which endure (i e., are not momentary, like cognitions.)

Refutation of the contention that the invariable concomitance of knowledge and the known establishes their identity.

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18. A variant reading is 'pakṣapāta'. On this reading the text would mean—"If the former, you must be considered partial (in as much as you attribute *nirdharmakatva* (the character of having no qualities) to Brahman, while denying all other attributes even when they are established by various pramāṇas.) of *Śrutaprakāśikā*.

The opponent may argue that objects are not distinct from knowledge, since they are invariably cognized together. The wise declare that the term self-luminous (*swayamprakāśa*) denotes that which is able to manifest itself without depending on anything else. That object which remains unmanifest so long as another does not present itself cannot be considered to be distinct therefrom; just as the falsely perceived double moon is non-different from the real moon.[19] When knowledge (*vi, ñāna*) is not manifest neither the self nor the object is revealed. Therefore, the world-process is an illusory presentation of knowledge. To this we reply that distinctions, being established by perception which is of superior validity, cannot be explained away by your reasoning. To explain it fully.—In the cognition "I know this", each person realises in his own experience clearly and distinctly that the three—the knower, the known and knowledge—shine forth separately and without being mixed up with one another. Inference cannot go against the evidence of perception. Surely, it is never inferred that fire does not burn, since it is a substance.

Moreover, (in your argument that since thought and things always go together, they must be identical), the *hetu* (reason) is liable to be charged with the defect of *viruddha*. For 'going together', necessarilly implies two objects. Surely knowledge cannot be said to be manifest along with itself; (it can only be manifest along with some object or other). Further, if (on your theory there is no universal (*sāmānya*) apart from the different particulars) what goes by the name of knowledge must be unaccompanied by what may be called knowledge in general, each item of knowledge must be said to be manifest in association with all objects; but it is not so.[20]

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19. cf. Sahopalambhaniyamādabhedo nīladaddhiyoḥ |
Bhedaś ca bhrānti vijñanai dṛśya indāvivādvaye ||

20. Though this stanza is found earlier in the printed books and manuscripts, this appears to be the proper place.

The opponent may argue that in the state of deep sleep, the stream of pure consciousness alone shines forth uncontaminated by objects such as the jar. Therefore, objects are not distinct from knowledge. Knowledge (*samvit*) alone is real: while objects are unreal.

To this we reply that it is the prattle of one who fails to realise the contradiction in one's own statement; for there could be no invariable presentation of thought and things together, if the two were really identical. Moreover, if consciousness could manifest itself without objects, the latter too must present themselves in the absence of consciousness; even as the jar may manifest itself without the presentation of the cloth, which, in its turn may present itself without the awareness of the jar.

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ERRATA

Page	Line	For	Read
1	10	Veiw	View
	17	he	the
5	19	differene	difference
8	26	thouhgt	thought
13	18	separatness	separateness
14	20	far	for
15	6	ou	on
15	20	form	from
17	1	of the	of
18	31	bnar	boar
20	28	a time a given	a given time
21	23	non-inhentent	noninherent
22	18	inherent	inherent
22	27	eojunction	conjunction
29	12	prcived	perceived
37	28	in	if
41	25-26	attributelessnes	attributelessness
45	14	o	of
46	2	consciuosness	consciousness
47	7	thos	those
54	8	refered	referred
62	9	identrcal	identical
63	28	10	106
66	17	entites	entities
67	1	conconmitat	concomitant
70	16	unshakables	unshakable
		collcation	collocation
	20	collcation	collocation
71	9	th	the
74	33	bus	but
78	1	knolwledge	knowledge
	10	knowlegde	knowledge
	27	whne	when
79	28	same	some
81	11	appchension	apprehension
83	30	Tee	The
84	28	alm	aim
	30	through	though

Page	Line	For	Read
89	7	essentia	essential
90	17	knowlebge	knowledge
93	18	casual	causal
94	13	In	It
	26	walking statae	waking state
99	16	khowledge	knowledge
101	13	peron	person
104	14	prevalene	prevalence
	16	souf	soul
114	2	disapparance	disappearance
	8	knowledgs	knowledge
	20	generaliiy	genarality
115	9	nembers	numbers
117	13	dis ant	distant
	18	what ep existed	what existed
118	3	obcets	objects
121	10	nunber	number
128	15	has	that
131	33	cenjunction	conjunction
135	20	reval	reveal
	26	preception	perception
136	12	object	objects
141	7	aegument	argument
	8	arugument	argument
145	16	adhiṭṣhāna	adhiṣṭhāna
151	8	eonjunction	conjunction
153	19	continuance	continuance
159	21	is a always	is always
160	18	cf	of
	25	eertain	certain
165	21	bltand	blind
168	25	doqmaiic	dogmatic